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SUMMARY 
 
This thesis makes a contribution to the growing field of criticism on David Foster Wallace, 
reconsidering the fundamental question of how we read Wallace’s fiction—the particular 
interpretative activity demanded by his work. Wallace’s fiction is essentially defined by its 
incompletion: an unfinished-ness which forms a foundational structural and thematic principle 
throughout his career. Tracing the various kinds of incompleteness found across Wallace’s 
oeuvre, this thesis questions how these incompletions inform our readerly responses to his 
writing. In this, it shows how Wallace’s work provokes a particularly self-conscious form of 
‘active reading’, one which makes us persistently aware of our own role in ‘realising’ or 
‘completing’ the text. This enquiry draws on a range of theoretical sources, including Iser’s 
phenomenology of reading, Blanchot’s conception of the ‘solitude’ of the literary work, and 
Felski’s contemporary discussions of the affective dimensions of the reading process. 
Ultimately, it shows how Wallace’s writing directs us outwards, inviting us to consider more 
broadly the complex, participatory nature of reading itself—the extent to which interpretation 
always involves an encounter with incompletion, a negotiation with an unfinished-ness inherent 
in every literary text. 
 
This investigation takes a chronological approach—tracing the development of Wallace’s 
concerns across his career—but also a thematic one, using each chapter to address a different 
facet of incompletion. The first two chapters focus on Wallace’s reading, addressing his 
intertextual engagements, both literary and philosophical, in The Broom of the System and Girl 
with Curious Hair. Chapter three investigates the tension between encyclopaedic ‘mastery’ and 
inevitable incompleteness in Infinite Jest. Chapter four explores the focus on silence and 
absence which characterises Brief Interviews with Hideous Men and Oblivion. Finally, chapter 
five draws these various enquiries together in reading the radical unfinished-ness of Wallace’s 
posthumously-published final novel The Pale King.  
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I should have liked to produce a good book. This has not come about, but the time is past in 
which I could improve it. 
 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, preface to Philosophical Investigations (1953) 
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Introduction 
Reading Endings 
 
‘You can trust me’, R.V. says, watching her hand. ‘I’m a man of my1 
The close of David Foster Wallace’s 1987 debut novel The Broom of the System presents us 
with a sentence, and thus a text, without an ending. While apparently pointing towards a 
specific endpoint (in this case, the single, final word ‘word’), the novel’s closing sentence 
teasingly leaves a blank space for the reader to fill. Taken at face value, Rick Vigorous’ 
unfinished final utterance seems merely an ironic—and arguably self-indulgent—joke on the 
part of its author. Reading the first draft of Broom, Wallace’s agent Bonnie Nadell insisted that 
‘[y]ou absolutely cannot end the book with an incomplete sentence [. . .] I just feel it isn’t fair to 
leave all the ends dangling’.2 Her response is illuminating, in part in its articulation of the 
readerly frustration provoked by the novel’s ‘dangling’ ending, but also in the fact that it was 
finally ignored by Wallace altogether. In his reply Wallace defended the novel’s final line, 
arguing that ‘the way [he] conceived and wrote the book’ did not place emphasis on 
‘“resolution” as a major value’.3 Surveying this exchange, we are given a glimpse of the 
significance which Broom’s denial of syntactic or narrative ‘resolution’, its final lapse into 
potentially frustrating ‘silence’, holds for Wallace’s fictional project—a significance which far 
exceeds its ostensible status as a throwaway metafictional gag. 
Broom’s incomplete final line in part gestures towards an extended tradition of literary 
works which deliberately end mid-sentence, including Sterne’s Tristram Shandy, Joyce’s 
Finnegan’s Wake, Beckett’s Malone Dies, and Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow. Beyond this, 
however, it also serves as an articulation of a wider denial of formal, thematic, or narrative 
resolution, manifested in various forms throughout Wallace’s novels and stories, which comes 
to stand as a defining feature of his oeuvre. The five books of fiction published in Wallace’s 
lifetime confront us with a series of comparably frustrated endings, a succession of narratives 
united in their failure to come to a definite close. ‘Westward the Course of Empire Takes Its 
Way’—the long story which closes Wallace’s 1989 collection Girl with Curious Hair—offers a 
                                                            
1 David Foster Wallace, The Broom of the System (New York: Penguin, 1987). 
2 Bonnie Nadell, ‘Letter to Wallace, 28 October 1985’, Bonnie Nadell Collection of David Foster 
Wallace, Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center, University of Texas at Austin, Box 1.1. 
3 Wallace, ‘Letter to Nadell, 31 October 1985’, Nadell Collection, Box 1.1. 
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142-page narrative of a terminally frustrated ‘journey west’ which, like the endlessly deferred 
road trip it depicts, breaks down before reaching its promised destination.4 Wallace’s 1996 
novel Infinite Jest, meanwhile, notably withholds any plot resolution, abruptly cutting off before 
closing the ‘loop’ of its circular narrative structure.5 Wallace’s two subsequent books, Brief 
Interviews with Hideous Men (1999) and Oblivion (2004), are likewise characterised by self-
conscious incompletions: as, for example, in the shift into schematic notes in the second part of 
‘Adult World’,6 or the metafictional twist which interrupts the conclusion of ‘Good Old Neon’.7 
These works present us with a continued recapitulation of Broom’s closing unfinished-ness, 
pointing us, like Rick’s final exclamation, in the direction of a specific ending, but lapsing into 
an unavoidable incompletion.  
Of course, any discussion of this subject must acknowledge a more radical example of 
the unfinished in Wallace’s work. In September 2008, Wallace killed himself, leaving behind a 
work-in-progress, posthumously published in 2011. The Pale King offers an incompletion 
wholly distinct from the deliberately frustrated endings of Wallace’s preceding fiction.8 
Assembled for publication from the author’s working notes and drafts by Wallace’s editor 
Michael Pietsch, the novel presents a concrete unfinished-ness, a terminal ‘silence’ which, far 
from gesturing towards any defined point of resolution, rather opens out onto a more 
fundamental instance of the unspeakable and unreadable. While demanding, like all of 
Wallace’s fiction, that the reader negotiate, and perhaps even ‘fill in’, its textual and narrative 
gaps, the novel also reminds us how far any interpretative effort to definitively ‘finish’ or 
understand the text will always fall short. In contrast with the self-conscious terminal silences of 
Sterne, Joyce, or Pynchon, TPK’s unfinished ending rather invokes the ruptured conclusions of 
Kafka’s The Castle, Gogol’s Dead Souls, or Wollstonecraft’s The Wrongs of Woman—texts 
which, even in their superficially ‘complete’, published status, are defined by a manifest 
unfinished-ness. Even as TPK echoes the strategies of Wallace’s preceding novels and stories, it 
finally works to trouble our interpretation of its ‘blank spaces’, forcing us to rethink the way we 
respond to the novel—and, perhaps, to Wallace’s fiction as a whole. 
                                                            
4 Wallace, 'Westward the Course of Empire Takes Its Way', in Girl with Curious Hair (New York: 
Norton, 1989), pp. 231–373. 
5 Wallace, Infinite Jest (London: Abacus, 1997). 
6 Wallace, 'Adult World II', in Brief Interviews with Hideous Men (London: Abacus, 2001), pp. 156–61. 
7  Wallace, 'Good Old Neon', in Oblivion: Stories (London: Abacus, 2004), pp. 141–81. 
8 Wallace, The Pale King: An Unfinished Novel (London: Penguin, 2012). 
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This thesis asks how the various instances of incompletion in Wallace’s fiction work to 
inform or affect our readerly responses to these texts. What kind of reading do they demand? 
And, more broadly, what do they tell us about the nature of literary reading, the complex 
entanglement which characterises any readerly encounter with a literary work? My investigation 
will explore how these disparate versions of the unfinished are brought inescapably (and often 
uncomfortably) together in any reading of Wallace’s fiction. I shall examine, in particular, the 
relationship between the ‘deliberate’ incompletion of Broom or Jest and TPK’s inevitable 
compositional unfinished-ness. In so doing, I suggest that the incompletions of Wallace’s 
writing demand—and point towards—a particular mode of reading, one capable of self-
consciously confronting the gaps, breaches, flaws, spaces, and silences which punctuate and 
define these works. In tracing the outline of this ‘unfinished reading’, I finally want to consider 
how Wallace’s writing might direct us outwards, inviting us to consider the complex, 
participatory nature of reading itself—the extent to which any readerly engagement with a work 
of fiction always involves an encounter with incompletion, a negotiation with, and submission 
to, an unfinished-ness fundamental to every literary text. 
 
Reading ‘Wallace Studies’ 
Since his death in 2008, Wallace has been the focus of an ever-expanding field of popular and 
academic discussion, his life and writing serving as the subjects for a biography,9 a bestselling 
memoir/extended interview,10 two films,11 and a wealth of newspaper and magazine articles. It 
has become something of a critical cliché to position Wallace as a pre-eminent ‘voice of his 
generation’, a writer who uniquely articulated the particular anxieties of late-20th/early-21st 
century American culture.12 In a 2009 retrospective, Jon Baskin suggested that Wallace’s 
authorial method was ‘rooted in the conviction that literature ought to address the paradoxes and 
confusions of its moment’: Baskin and others have seen the looping self-consciousness of 
                                                            
9 D. T. Max, Every Love Story Is a Ghost Story: A Life of David Foster Wallace (London: Granta 
Publications, 2012). 
10 David Lipsky, Although of Course You End Up Becoming Yourself: A Road Trip with David Foster 
Wallace (New York: Broadway Books, 2010). 
11 Respectively, John Krasinski's adaptation of Brief Interviews with Hideous Men (IFC Films, 2009), and 
James Ponsoldt’s The End of the Tour (A24, 2015), which adapted Lipsky’s memoir. 
12 See, for example, ‘The Writer Who Was The Voice Of A Generation’, All Things Considered, NPR, 
2012, 2 September 2012 <https://www.npr.org/2012/09/02/160248690/the-writer-who-was-the-voice-of-
a-generation> [accessed 14 May 2019]. 
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Wallace’s fiction, its impersonation of ‘a mind choked with manipulative jargon and self-
conscious prattle’, as evoking and responding to the acutely paradoxical and confusing qualities 
of American life at the turn of the millennium.13 A decade after his death, Wallace’s writing is 
still regularly cited for its continued capacity to speak to the texture and concerns of 21st century 
American experience. Speaking at a memorial for Wallace in 2008, Don DeLillo described 
Wallace’s fiction and essays as reading like ‘the scroll fragments of a distant future’,14 and the 
steady stream of articles citing Wallace’s prescience in anticipating variously the growth of the 
internet, the invention of Skype, or the presidency of Donald Trump, provide evidence for the 
enduring influence of his work today.15 Infinite Jest, specifically, has been much referenced, not 
least in Alexandra Ocasio-Cortez’s recent, arresting assertion that ‘We are living in “the Year of 
Perdue Chicken”’ 16  
Alongside this ongoing popular conversation, the past decade has seen the development 
of a growing body of academic criticism focused on Wallace. Following a handful of 
foundational articles and monographs published during his lifetime,17 the period since Wallace’s 
death has been marked by an exponential increase in scholarly work, with essay collections,18 
                                                            
13 Jon Baskin, ‘Death Is Not the End’, The Point, Spring 2009, para. 2 
<https://thepointmag.com/2009/criticism/death-is-not-the-end> [accessed 14 May 2019]. 
14 Don DeLillo, ‘Informal Remarks from the David Foster Wallace Memorial Service in New York on 
October 23, 2008’, in The Legacy of David Foster Wallace, ed. by Samuel Cohen and Lee Konstantinou 
(Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2012), p. 23.  
15 See Katie Herzog, ‘We Have Entered David Foster Wallace’s Dystopian Future’, The Stranger, 19 
December 2017 <https://www.thestranger.com/slog/2017/12/19/25639990/we-have-entered-david-foster-
wallaces-dystopian-future> [accessed 14 May 2019]; and John Michael, ‘Donald Trump Is Ushering In 
the Infinite Jest Apocalypse’, HuffPost, 20 April 2015 <https://www.huffpost.com/entry/donald-trump-is-
ushering-_b_8334542> [accessed 13 May 2019]. 
16 Irina Aleksander, ‘How Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Other Progressives Are Defining the Midterms’, 
Vogue, 15 October 2018 <https://www.vogue.com/article/alexandria-ocasio-cortez-interview-vogue-
november-2018-issue> [accessed 13 May 2019]. 
17 Particularly Marshall Boswell, Understanding David Foster Wallace (Columbia: University of South 
Carolina Press, 2003); Stephen J. Burn, David Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest: A Reader’s Guide, 1st edn 
(London: Continuum, 2003); Mary K. Holland, ‘“The Art’s Heart’s Purpose”: Braving the Narcissistic 
Loop of David Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest’, Critique: Studies in Contemporary Fiction, 47.3 (2006), 
218–42. 
18 See, for example, David Hering, ed., Consider David Foster Wallace: Critical Essays (Los Angeles: 
Sideshow Media Group Press, 2010); Boswell and Burn, eds., A Companion to David Foster Wallace 
Studies (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Boswell, ed., David Foster Wallace and The Long 
Thing: New Essays on the Novels (New York: Bloomsbury Continuum, 2014); Philip Coleman, ed., 
Critical Insights: David Foster Wallace (Hackensack, NJ: Salem Press, 2015); and Ralph Clare, ed., The 
Cambridge Companion to David Foster Wallace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018). 
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monographs,19 and journal articles,20 as well as frequent academic conferences,21 and, more 
recently, the establishment of an international society (and accompanying academic journal) 
dedicated to Wallace.22 This thriving field of ‘Wallace Studies’ exhibits a striking diversity of 
critical approaches: with scholars variously reading Wallace’s writing through the lenses of 
philosophy, politics, psychoanalysis, technology, economics, geography, religion, neuroscience, 
and notions of the ‘posthuman’ (to name only a few). This multiplicity of perspectives has been 
further broadened by a large and committed community of non-academic readers: from its 
inception, ‘Wallace studies’ has been shaped, as Adam Kelly has noted, by significant 
interaction between scholarly and non-scholarly readings, a process of ‘cross-pollination’ 
facilitated by the growth of the internet while Wallace was writing.23 Meanwhile, the 2010 
public opening of Wallace’s archive at the Harry Ransom Center at the University of Texas in 
Austin—containing the author’s drafts, letters, and personal library—has offered further scope 
for ever more varied interpretations of Wallace’s oeuvre.24 
                                                            
19 See, for example, Clare Hayes-Brady, The Unspeakable Failures of David Foster Wallace: Language, 
Identity, and Resistance (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016); Hering, David Foster Wallace: Fiction 
and Form (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016); Lucas Thompson, Global Wallace: David Foster 
Wallace and World Literature (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016); Jeffrey Severs, David Foster 
Wallace’s Balancing Books: Fictions of Value (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017); Marshall 
Boswell, The Wallace Effect (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019); Tim Groenland, The Art of Editing: 
Raymond Carver and David Foster Wallace (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019). 
20 For an early survey of this emergent field, see Adam Kelly ‘David Foster Wallace: The Death of the 
Author and the Birth of a Discipline’, Irish Journal of American Studies Online, 2, 2010, 47–59, later 
revised in 2015 as ‘David Foster Wallace: The Critical Reception’, in Critical Insights, pp. 46–62. 
21 The most significant of these include ‘Consider David Foster Wallace’—the first international 
conference dedicated to Wallace’s work—organised by David Hering and held at University of Liverpool 
in July 2009; ‘Infinite Wallace’, a conference held the Sorbonne-Nouvelle and École Normale Supérieure 
in Paris in September of 2014; and the annual ‘David Foster Wallace Conference’ held at Illinois State 
University since 2014. 
22 The International David Foster Wallace Society (<https://www.dfwsociety.org/>) was founded in 2016, 
with the first issue of the Journal of David Foster Wallace Studies published in 2018. 
23 Kelly, ‘Death of the Author’, p. 48. Kelly suggests that Wallace was ‘the first major writer to live and 
die in the internet age’ (para. 3). This ‘cross-pollination’ was aided by the presence of dedicated websites 
such as Nick Maniatis’ The Howling Fantods (<http://www.thehowlingfantods.com/dfw/> [accessed 15 
May 2019]), as well as ‘Wallace-l’, a (still active) email listserv administered by Matt Bucher. More 
recently, see The Great Concavity—a podcast hosted by Bucher and Dave Laird—for further fruitful 
discussions between academic and non-academic readers of Wallace’s work. 
24 Hering notes that the availability of Wallace’s papers has resulted in something of an ‘archival turn’ in 
Wallace scholarship (Hering, Fiction and Form, p. 9), and we see this suggestion borne out in the wave of 
recent essays and monographs which have grounded their investigations in a detailed analysis of 
Wallace’s drafts, letters, and/or marginal annotations. See, for example, Hering, Fiction and Form; 
Thompson, Global Wallace; Groenland, Art of Editing; Mike Miley, ‘… And Starring David Foster 
Wallace as Himself: Performance and Persona in The Pale King’, Critique: Studies in Contemporary 
Fiction, 57.2 (2016), 191–207; and John Roache, ‘“The Realer, More Enduring and Sentimental Part of 
Him”: David Foster Wallace’s Personal Library and Marginalia’, Orbit: A Journal of American 
Literature, 5.1 (2017) <https://doi.org/10.16995/orbit.142>.  
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It is, however, nonetheless possible to discern a number of clear and significant trends 
in Wallace scholarship since 2008, most pertinently a movement away from approaching 
Wallace’s work on his ‘own terms’. It is striking how far Wallace’s writing reflexively works to 
prescribe and inform its own critical reception. In an early essay on David Markson’s 1988 
experimental novel Wittgenstein’s Mistress, Wallace characterises Markson’s text as an 
‘INTERPRET-ME’ fiction, an exemplar of a class of novels which ‘not only cry out for what 
we call “critical interpretations” but actually try to help direct them’.25 In many respects, this 
offers an acute characterisation of Wallace’s own work. Stephen Burn has suggested that 
Wallace’s ‘approach to fiction’ is ‘nearly always connected to metafiction’,26 and we can see, 
surveying Wallace’s novels and stories—from the creative-writing workshop framework of 
‘Westward’ to the series of direct addresses from the ‘real author’ which punctuate TPK—a 
persistent concern with interrogating the fictionality of his own work, and, with this, reflexively 
probing (and inevitably informing) our readerly interpretation of these texts.27  
Wallace’s tendency to ‘help direct’ the interpretation of his work is further manifested 
in the extratextual discussions found in his interviews and non-fiction essays. This body of 
supplementary writing—and particularly the early-career statements of artistic intent offered in 
his interview with Larry McCaffery and his essay ‘E Unibus Pluram: Television and U.S. 
Fiction’—offers a persuasive ‘frame’ through which readers are invited to interpret Wallace’s 
literary project.28 Adam Kelly has argued that, while ‘all great writers teach us how to read 
them’, Wallace ‘carried out this task in a more hands-on manner than usual’, and we can see 
how the apparent ‘artistic manifesto’ offered by this ‘essay-interview nexus’29—and, beyond 
                                                            
25 Wallace, 'The Empty Plenum: David Markson's Wittgenstein's Mistress' (1990), in Both Flesh and Not: 
Essays (London: Penguin, 2013). 
26 Burn, David Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest: A Reader’s Guide, 2nd edn (London: Continuum, 2012), p. 
16. While Wallace’s relationship with the specific postmodern metafiction of his literary predecessors (as 
exemplified by, for example, John Barth) is an undeniably vexed and ambivalent one, his work 
nevertheless meets the criteria for Patricia Waugh’s broad definition of metafiction as ‘fictional writing 
which self-consciously and systematically draws attention to its status as an artefact in order to pose 
questions about the relationship between fiction and reality’, a practice which, Waugh argues, is ‘as old 
(if not older) than the novel itself’ (Waugh, Metafiction: The Theory and Practice of Self-Conscious 
Fiction (London: Routledge, 1984)). 
27 Wallace, The Pale King, p. 68.  
28 See Wallace, ‘Interview with Larry McCaffery’ (1993), in Conversations with David Foster Wallace, 
ed. by Stephen J. Burn (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2012), pp. 21–52; and Wallace, ‘E 
Unibus Pluram: Television and U.S. Fiction’ (1993), in A Supposedly Fun Thing I’ll Never Do Again 
(London: Abacus, 1998), pp. 21–82. These two pieces were first published together in the Summer 1993 
issue of the Review of Contemporary Fiction. 
29 Kelly, ‘Death of the Author’, pp. 49–50. 
7 
 
this, by the extended metacommentary offered within Wallace’s stories, essays, and interviews 
over the course of his career—have profoundly informed the critical conversation surrounding 
Wallace’s fiction.30 Certainly, much early scholarship on Wallace followed lines of enquiry that 
the author himself established—from his ambivalent relationship with postmodernism,31 to his 
critique of irony,32 to his famous call for a fiction of ‘single-entendre principles’ at the 
conclusion of ‘E Unibus Pluram’.33 These foundational studies tended to read Wallace’s work as 
offering a diagnosis, and even a remedy, for the ills of contemporary US culture, building on 
Wallace’s definition of ‘good art’ as that which ‘locates and applies CPR to those elements of 
what’s human and magical that still live and glow despite the times’ darkness’.34 Boswell 
introduces the notion of Wallace’s work as ‘both diagnosis and cure’,35 while Baskin positions 
Wallace’s fiction as the author’s ‘sincere prescription’ for the ‘pain’ which he identified 
everywhere in late capitalist America.36 These scholars interpret Wallace’s fiction in terms of 
adherence to (or, occasionally, divergence from) the ‘nourishing, redemptive’ fictional project 
envisioned in Wallace’s metacommentary,37 viewed, as Kelly has suggested, ‘not primarily in 
terms of aesthetic representation, but of ethical intervention’.38 
                                                            
30 See, for example, ‘Fictional Futures and the Conspicuously Young’ (1988), in Both Flesh and Not, pp. 
37–68;  ‘Greatly Exaggerated’ (1992), in  A Supposedly Fun Thing, pp. 138–45; ‘Joseph Frank’s 
Dostoevsky’ (1996), in Consider the Lobster: Essays and Arguments (London: Abacus, 2007), pp. 255–
74; and the various interviews collected in Burn, Conversations.  
31 See Robert’s McLaughlin’s characterisation of Wallace’s ‘post-postmodern’ fiction as ‘responding to 
the perceived dead end of postmodernism’ (McLaughlin, ‘Post-Postmodern Discontent: Contemporary 
Fiction and the Social World’, Symploke, 12.1 (2004), 53–68); Boswell’s description of Wallace as ‘a 
nervous member of some still-unnamed (and perhaps unnameable) third wave of modernism’ (Boswell, 
Understanding, p. 1). 
32 See Boswell on Wallace’s outlining of the ‘exhausted vitality’ of postmodern irony (Boswell, 
Understanding, p. 16); A. O. Scott on Wallace’s attempts to ‘turn irony back on itself, to make his fiction 
relentlessly conscious of its own self-consciousness’ (Scott, ‘The Panic of Influence’, New York Review 
of Books, 10 February 2000, para. 22 <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2000/feb/10/the-panic-
of-influence/> [accessed 17 May 2019]). 
33 See Konstantinou on Wallace’s efforts to ‘discover or invent a viable postironic ethos for U.S. literature 
and culture and the End of History’ (Konstantinou, ‘No Bull: David Foster Wallace and Postironic 
Belief’, in Legacy Of David Foster Wallace, pp. 83–112; Kelly on Wallace’s work’s exemplification of 
‘New Sincerity’ in US fiction (Kelly, ‘David Foster Wallace and the New Sincerity in American Fiction’, 
in Consider David Foster Wallace, pp. 131–46). Note, however, that Kelly’s reading is more nuanced 
than his title implies, establishing a conditional conception of ‘sincerity’—via a careful reading of 
Wallace alongside the theory of Jacques Derrida—which is built on an innate undecidability, arriving at 
the conclusion that ‘being a “post-postmodernist” of Wallace’s generation means never quite being sure 
whether you are one, whether you have really managed to escape narcissism, solipsism, irony and 
insincerity’ (Kelly, ‘New Sincerity’, p. 145). 
34 Wallace, ‘Interview with McCaffery’, p. 26. 
35 Boswell, Understanding, p. 17. 
36 Baskin, para. 23. 
37 Wallace, ‘Interview with McCaffery’, p. 22. 
38 Kelly, Death of the Author, p. 51. 
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The years since Wallace’s death have seen a decisive shift away from this pervasive 
‘diagnosis/cure’ model, a shared critical effort to move beyond the ‘established orthodoxy’ 
identified by Kelly.39 Where, as Hering notes, early Wallace criticism was at least partly 
concerned with making 'the case for Wallace’s canonicity’, subsequent scholarship has offered 
progressively more varied interpretations of Wallace’s writing, broadening the scope of Wallace 
studies.40 Lucas Thompson’s 2016 monograph Global Wallace, for example, attempts to look 
beyond the ‘national lines’ which have defined the majority of criticism on Wallace (and which 
are ‘deliberately signalled’ within Wallace’s own work): for Thompson, the ‘widespread 
emphasis on Wallace as a quintessentially American figure’ has ‘obscured the more oblique, 
though equally important, global dimensions of Wallace’s work’.41 Jeffrey Severs’ David Foster 
Wallace’s Balancing Books (2017), meanwhile, positions Wallace as ‘a rebellious economic 
thinker, one who not only satirized the deforming effects of money but threw into question the 
logic of the monetary system’.42  
The most significant example—for the purposes of this study—of the critical shift in 
Wallace scholarship since 2008 is offered by Clare Hayes-Brady’s 2016 monograph The 
Unspeakable Failures of David Foster Wallace. Hayes-Brady does not abandon the 
interpretative frame established by Wallace’s non-fiction writing, being still fundamentally 
concerned with the notion of Wallace’s work as ‘ethical intervention’, and with the author’s 
own conception of his ‘redemptive’ intent. She proceeds, however, from the assertion that 
Wallace’s ‘apparent redemptive project [. . .] is a failure, and its failure is a necessary part of the 
project’.43 Rejecting the ‘diagnosis/cure’ model, she argues that the societal ‘antidote’ promised 
by Wallace’s fiction ‘is never presented, and never can be’: reading against the grain of 
Wallace’s authorial statements of intent, her enquiry directs us towards the inescapable flaws, 
contradictions, and limitations which characterise Wallace’s fictional oeuvre.44 Crucially, 
                                                            
39 Kelly, Death of the Author, p. 50. 
40 Hering, Fiction and Form, p. 1. 
41 Thompson, Global Wallace, pp. 1, 4–5.  
42 Severs, Balancing Books, p. 2. 
43 Hayes-Brady, Unspeakable Failures, p. 15. 
44 Hayes-Brady, Unspeakable Failures, p. 15. In addressing the apparent ‘failure’ of Wallace’s fictional 
project, Hayes-Brady’s study builds on the earlier foundational work of Mary K. Holland, who in 2006 
offered the argument that Jest ‘fails to deliver on the agenda that Wallace set for it, not only because it 
fails to eschew empty irony for the earnestness that Wallace imagines but also, and more importantly, 
because it fails to recognize and address the cultural drive toward narcissism that fuels and is fueled by 
that irony’ (Holland, ‘The Art’s Heart’s Purpose’, p. 218). 
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however, she sees this failure as ‘inevitable and necessary’; indeed, ‘failure’, figured primarily 
in terms of an ‘absence of closure’, is positioned as a ‘generative force’ in Wallace’s work.45 
Though Hayes-Brady eschews a straightforwardly positive view of Wallace’s failures (insisting 
that the term ‘failure’ itself is ‘carefully chosen’ to reflect ‘a range of attributes, including the 
many very real shortcomings in Wallace’s writing’) she nevertheless finds something 
constructive within the limitations of Wallace’s work, the unavoidable gaps between his literary 
ideals and his own imperfect oeuvre.46 In Hayes-Brady’s study, as in Thompson’s and Severs’, 
we find a deliberate effort to reframe the interpretative ‘orthodoxy’ established by Wallace 
himself, and to point us instead towards new and productive ways of reading Wallace’s body of 
work. 
 
Reading Incompletion 
Building on this ongoing collective effort to rethink the project, strategies, and intertextual co-
ordinates of Wallace’s work, I want to return to the fundamental question of how we read 
Wallace’s fiction. Undoubtedly, Wallace’s work is itself persistently concerned with this 
question. In his interviews and essays, Wallace repeatedly shares his conception of fiction as 
built on dialogic interaction between reader and author: in ‘Greatly Exaggerated’, Wallace 
refers to writing as ‘an act of communication between one human being and another’,47 while in 
an interview with Laura Miller he describes fiction as ‘a conversation. There’s a relationship 
between the reader and the writer that’s very strange and complicated and hard to talk about’.48 
While Wallace’s (somewhat vaguely theorised) conception of the ‘communicative’ function of 
fiction has been addressed by critics,49 my own focus is particularly on the readerly side of this 
literary ‘conversation’, the particular experience of approaching, engaging with, and interpreting 
Wallace’s texts. In his interview with McCaffery, Wallace describes the process of reading as a 
                                                            
45 Hayes-Brady, Unspeakable Failures, pp. 8, 3, 2. 
46 Hayes-Brady, Unspeakable Failures, pp. 2. Hayes-Brady’s study is in part concerned with addressing 
the ‘serious structural and political shortcomings in Wallace’s work’, shortcomings which, Hayes-Brady 
argues, ‘emerge from his failure to overcome the distance between selves, and his often-paralyzing 
consciousness thereof’ (Hayes-Brady, Unspeakable Failures, p. 7). 
47 Wallace, ‘Greatly Exaggerated’, p. 144. 
48 Wallace, ‘Interview with Laura Miller’ (1996), in Conversations, pp. 58–65 (p. 62). 
49 Most notably Hayes-Brady, who argues that Wallace’s artistic project is underpinned by a ‘drive to 
connect’, a ‘yearning for connection between selves’, and goes on to further investigate Wallace’s 
‘conception, exploration, and execution of the process of communication’, attempting to pin down, 
through a reading of Wallace’s work and his non-fiction metacommentary, what ‘might in loose terms be 
called his philosophy of communication’ (Hayes-Brady, Unspeakable Failures, pp. viii, 93). 
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‘relationship’ between the ‘writer’s consciousness’ and the reader’s own, arguing that ‘in order 
for it to be anything like a full human relationship’, the reader is ‘going to have to put in her 
share of the linguistic work’.50 That Wallace’s writing demands active participation by the 
reader has become a critical axiom: Hayes-Brady argues that Wallace’s fictional 
‘communication’ is by definition a ‘dynamic process’, relying on ‘multiple agents engaging in 
mutual exchange, rather than on a unidirectional transfer of information’;51 while Greg Carlisle 
asserts that the reader of Jest is ‘rewarded not by passive acceptance of easy answers or tidy 
resolutions, but by an active engagement with ongoing narratives’.52 This thesis interrogates the 
precise nature of this readerly ‘engagement’: I intend to explore, question, and ultimately offer 
an account of the mode of interpretation invited (or, perhaps, demanded) by Wallace’s fiction.53 
It is from this perspective that I approach the issue of incompletion in Wallace’s fiction. I would 
suggest that only through an investigation of the instances of unfinished-ness, breakage, and 
silence in Wallace’s writing can we understand the particular readerly ‘work’ it demands, a 
‘work’ repeatedly (and often self-consciously) framed by Wallace as an effort by us, his readers, 
to subjectively ‘complete’ the unfinished text for ourselves. With this I position ‘incompletion’ 
as a defining structural and thematic principle in Wallace’s fiction, present in various forms 
across practically every aspect of his work.  
The significance of the incomplete in Wallace’s writing (and our reading of Wallace) 
has been addressed—albeit often only in passing—by a handful of critics: Carlisle, for example, 
has commented on Wallace’s ‘undefined-climax technique’, his tendency to leave climactic 
events unresolved or undefined [. . .] truncating the narrative as it makes an exponential rise to a 
climax that we’ll never reach’.54 Burn, meanwhile, has outlined a ‘theory of vision’ for TPK 
which argues that the novel’s incompletion can be understood as a ‘feature rather than a bug’: 
drawing on a neuroscientific model of the way the brain ‘fills in gaps in vision by “constructing 
what ‘ought’ to be there, on the evidence of the surrounding colour and pattern”’, Burn suggests 
                                                            
50 Wallace, ‘Interview with McCaffery’, pp. 33–4.  
51 Hayes-Brady, Unspeakable Failures, p. 94. 
52 Greg Carlisle, Elegant Complexity: A Study of David Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest (Los Angeles: 
Sideshow Media Group Press, 2007), Amazon Kindle eBook, ‘Introduction’. 
53 Although primarily concerned with Wallace’s fiction, my investigation does not abandon Wallace’s 
non-fiction metacommentary altogether. While I follow recent criticism in attempting to avoid reading 
Wallace ‘on his own terms’, I am nonetheless interested in how this framework impacts and shapes our 
readerly responses to Wallace’s fiction.  
54 Carlisle, ‘Introduction: Consider David Foster Wallace’, in Consider David Foster Wallace, pp. 12–23 
(pp. 16–17). 
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that the reader ‘must act as the brain operating on the fragmented stimuli’ provided by the 
unfinished novel, ‘knitting together disparate episodes into some kind of coherent whole’.55 
Crucially, Burn positions this need for work as not merely a result of TPK’s unfinished state, 
but rather as part of a larger ‘poetics of incompleteness’ which characterises Wallace’s writing 
generally.56 While I depart from Burn’s neuroscientific framework, my thesis is concerned with 
unpacking this ‘poetics of incompleteness’, addressing in greater depth than previous critics the 
unfinished-ness of Wallace’s work. 
This incompletion has also been addressed from a different angle in recent studies 
which have approached Wallace’s fiction, and particularly the unfinished text of TPK, via 
consideration of notes and drafts held in Wallace’s archive.57 These studies are informed by the 
theoretical model offered by ‘genetic criticism’, and its ‘attention to the dynamics of textual 
development’: Groenland, quoting Dirk Van Hulle, summarises that genetic critics are united in 
their desire to approach literary works not as a ‘single published text’, but rather as ‘a complex 
interplay between completion and incompletion’.58 While I build on the work of Staes, Hering, 
and Groenland—and will continue to refer to the contents of Wallace’s archive—I diverge from 
the focus which they place on these archival materials. Where these critics are concerned with 
establishing an ‘objective’ picture of the unfinished shape of Wallace’s stories (as in Hering’s 
stated desire to construct of a genetic ‘map’ of Wallace’s fiction ‘as a developing system’), I 
focus on interrogating the uneasy, fundamentally subjective experience of reading Wallace’s 
fiction in its ‘final’ published (and yet still inescapably incomplete) state.59 
My approach to the incompletion of Wallace’s work is also informed by Hayes-Brady’s 
conception of Wallace’s ‘failure’. Her understanding of the ‘generative failure’ of Wallace’s 
work is bound up with a reading of his fiction’s structural and thematic incompleteness, 
according to which a ‘resistance to endings’ is a ‘central part of his creative process’.60 Failure 
                                                            
55 Burn, ‘Toward a General Theory of Vision in Wallace’s Fiction’, English Studies, 95.1 (2014), 85–93 
(p. 91). 
56 Burn makes explicit comparison between TPK and Infinite Jest, noting the lexical link between 
‘infinite’ and the French ‘in fini—unfinished or incomplete’, and making the case that both texts are 
‘designed to leave us with our own work still to do’ (Burn, ‘Theory of Vision’, p. 91). 
57 See, for example, Staes, ‘Work in Process: A Genesis for The Pale King’, English Studies, 95.1 (2014), 
70–84; Hering, Fiction and Form; and Groenland, ‘“A Recipe for a Brick”: The Pale King in Progress’, 
Critique: Studies in Contemporary Fiction, 58.4 (2017), 365–76. 
58 Groenland, ‘A Recipe for a Brick’, p. 366; Dirk Van Hulle, qtd. in Groenland, ‘A Recipe for a Brick’, 
p. 367. 
59 Hering, Fiction and Form, p. 4. 
60 Hayes-Brady, Unspeakable Failures, p. 3. 
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is explicitly figured in terms of a ‘lack of, and resistance to, completion’, and the ‘recurrence of 
the incomplete in various guises throughout Wallace’s work’ is seen to speak ‘both of his desire 
for completion and his awareness of its impossibility’.61 My enquiry follows Hayes-Brady in 
attending to the interrelatedness of incompletion and failure, the degree to which the structural 
unfinished-ness of Wallace’s work is connected with an inescapable disappointment, with 
Wallace drawing persistent attention to the undeniable gaps between his stated literary ideals 
and the reality of his own writing. Where my work departs from Hayes-Brady’s however, is in 
my understanding of the shape and texture of these ‘gaps’ and the ways in which they work to 
direct our reading. Hayes-Brady’s study finally positions Wallace’s incompletion in ‘generative’ 
terms: drawing on the pragmatic philosophy of Richard Rorty, she argues that Wallace’s writing 
is driven by an effort to ‘keep the conversation going’, finding, in its points of incompleteness 
and failure, a foregrounding of ‘the pragmatic importance of continuity’, a deliberate space for 
an ongoing dialogic engagement between reader and text.62 My reading, however, is equally 
concerned with exploring the limits of this dialogic ‘space’, the extent to which Wallace’s 
unfinished fiction reflexively works both to invite and place inevitable restrictions on our 
interpretation. Reading Wallace’s fiction, we are repeatedly faced with narratives which—as in 
Broom’s unfinished final line—direct us towards a specific end-point, but which leave this 
gesture unfinished. Rather than Hayes-Brady’s pragmatic ‘continued conversation’, then—or 
Boswell’s characterisation of Wallace’s fiction as an ‘open system of communication [. . .] 
between author and reader’63—my enquiry reads these points of incompletion as establishing an 
irresolvable tension between openness and closedness, between the dialogic potential of our 
readerly interpretation and the inevitable monologic limitations placed on us by the ‘broken’ 
literary text.64 
In attempting to theoretically situate this incompletion—in particular, the tension 
between the ‘open’ and the ‘closed’ which marks Wallace’s texts—it helps to consider 
Wallace’s ambivalent relationship with poststructuralist thought. Various critics have explored 
                                                            
61 Hayes-Brady, Unspeakable Failures, pp. 3, 40. 
62 Hayes-Brady, Unspeakable Failures, pp. 2, 195. 
63 Boswell, Understanding, p. 31. 
64 My understanding of this tension between openness and closedness builds on the work of Hering, who 
likewise argues that Wallace’s fiction is ‘underpinned by a recurrent oscillation between narrative models 
of monologism and dialogism’, employing the work of Mikhail Bakhtin to offer ‘a sustained career-length 
model by which to map the problems of authorial monologism’ which characterise Wallace’s work 
(Fiction and Form, pp. 7, 18–19). 
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how Wallace’s fiction was, from its beginnings, profoundly informed by the pervasive influence 
of ‘theory’ as encountered during his university studies in the 1980s. Hering, for example, 
argues that Wallace was ‘continually faced with the ramifications of theoretical discourse upon 
the form of the novel itself’, suggesting that Wallace’s writing was particularly shaped by ‘the 
integration of post-structuralist theory into academic syllabi’.65 In his interview with McCaffery, 
Wallace himself reflects that  
the way Barthian and Derridean post-structuralism’s helped me the most as a 
fiction writer: once I’m done with the thing, I’m basically dead, and probably 
the text’s dead; it becomes simply language, and language lives not just in but 
through the reader.66  
Poststructuralist thought provides a potential framework for understanding the self-consciously 
participatory reading invited by Wallace’s work.67 Certainly, Roland Barthes’ notion of the 
‘Death of the Author’ (and the subsequent ‘birth of the reader’) offers a model of a text 
fundamentally shaped by active readerly interpretation.68 Even more pertinently, Jacques 
Derrida presents a conception of reading founded on a radical textual incompletion: in Of 
Grammatology, Derrida describes the writer as writing ‘in a language and in a logic whose 
proper system, laws and life his discourse by definition cannot dominate absolutely’; the reader 
is figured as confronting a central incompletion or absence at the heart of the text, a ‘certain 
relationship, unperceived by the writer, between what he commands and what he does not 
command of the language that he uses’.69 While Wallace is indisputably influenced by his early 
                                                            
65 Hering, Fiction and Form, p. 16. See also Kelly’s assessment of the fact that Wallace’s critics have 
‘demonstrated a marked tendency to utilise theory in a way that emphasise[s] Wallace’s own assimilation 
to it, with the often explicit assumption that Wallace was himself versed in all these figures and engaging 
in implicit dialogue with them in his fiction’ (Kelly, ‘Death of the Author’, p. 51). 
66 Wallace, ‘Interview with McCaffery’, p. 40. Wallace’s engagement with ‘theory’ is further 
demonstrated in ‘Greatly Exaggerated’, his review of H.L. Hix’s 1987 theoretical text Morte D’Author: 
An Autopsy, in which he makes explicit reference to Barthes, Derrida, Paul de Man, Edward Said, and 
Gayatri Spivak, among other philosophers and theorists. 
67 Hering, for example, has utilised Barthes’ writing (and particularly ‘The Death of the Author’) in 
exploring Wallace’s engagement with the ‘question of authorial effacement’ (and the ‘dramatised 
instances of “possession” and ghostliness’) throughout his fiction (Hering, Fiction and Form, pp. 16–17). 
Hayes-Brady, meanwhile, has commented on the extent to which the ‘procedures of deconstruction’ can 
be seen to ‘echo throughout Wallace’s writing’. Crucially, however, Hayes-Brady simultaneously argues 
that Wallace’s work is in ‘several important senses [. . .] anti-deconstruction’, noting that ‘the cataclysmic 
inwardness of poststructuralist textuality is superseded in Wallace’s work by the sincere interpretive work 
of the reader, the uncontrolled but engaged commitment to the process’ (Hayes-Brady, Unspeakable 
Failures, p. 25). 
68 Roland Barthes, 'The Death of the Author' (1967), in Image Music Text, trans. by Stephen Heath 
(London: Fontana Press, 1977), pp. 142–8 (p. 148). 
69 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1976), p. 158. 
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reading of these poststructuralist thinkers, I would argue that the incomplete ‘spaces’ of his 
work are not, in the end, characterisable in the radically open, undecidable terms of Derrida’s 
‘absent center’—the ‘nonlocus in which an infinite number of sign substitutions [come] into 
play’.70 Rather, Wallace’s ‘silences’ persistently direct us towards a certain, specific (if 
unreachable) conclusion, an endpoint which closes off the possibility of Derridean ‘play and 
difference’, placing an inevitable limit on our interpretation. In this respect, the productive 
‘openness’ of Wallace’s incompletion is always qualified by a competing aspect of what Steven 
Connor has termed ‘finitude’: a sense of ‘that which is destined to end’, of ‘the endingness of 
things in general’.71 This finitude is associated in part with temporality and death, but also with 
‘the inescapability of limit or restriction’: this latter finitude is ‘hard to distinguish absolutely 
from indefiniteness’, denoting ‘not the certainty of coming to an end, but the certainty of ending 
unfinished’.72 It is this suggestion of an inescapable limit, a paradoxical tension between 
terminal certainty and inevitable unfinished-ness, which I argue defines the incomplete ‘spaces’ 
of Wallace’s fiction, indelibly shaping our reading, both of the deliberate incompletions of his 
earlier work, and of the more radical, actual unfinished-ness of TPK.73  
 My enquiry draws on the theoretical work of a number of writers and philosophers who 
have attempted to theorise the process of reading, in particular Wolfgang Iser’s phenomenology 
of reading—an interpretative approach which ‘lays full stress on the idea that, in considering a 
literary work, one must take into account not only the actual text but also, and in equal measure, 
the actions involved in reading that text’.74 Iser prefigures Wallace in his conception of the work 
of literature as a ‘form of communication’ and his focus on the question of ‘what happens to us 
through’ literary texts, the particular, mysterious ‘entanglement’ involved in approaching, or 
‘communicating’ with, a literary work.75 Significantly, Iser’s understanding of the reading 
                                                            
70 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. by Alan Bass (London: Routledge, 1978), p. 280. 
71 Steven Connor, Beckett, Modernism and the Material Imagination (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014), pp. 189–90. Connor associates this ‘finitude’ particularly with the work of Samuel Beckett, 
a writer whose work, he argues, ‘always defaults to the question “what happens last?” or “how will the 
last thing of all happen?”’ (Connor, p. 190).   
72 Connor, p. 190. 
73 Kelly has indicated the critical potential in paying greater attention to ‘the limitations of [Wallace’s] 
vision’, commenting that limits, ‘after all, can be animating and enable: this is surely one of the primary 
insights offered by Infinite Jest’ (Kelly, ‘The Critical Reception’, pp. 59–60). 
74 Wolfgang Iser, ‘The Reading Process: A Phenomenological Approach’, New Literary History, 3.2 
(1972), 279–99 (p. 279). 
75 Wolfgang Iser, The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response (London: Routledge, 1978), pp. ix, 
x, 131. 
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process is founded not on total interpretative freedom—the radical undecidability of Derrida’s 
‘play’—but rather a two-sided interaction: an activity ‘guided by the text’ and ‘processed by the 
reader, who is then, in turn, affected by what [they have] processed’.76 While the text’s meaning 
is always partially ‘worked out by the reader’s imagination’ it is also, inevitably, circumscribed 
by ‘certain limits’ imposed by the text.77 This readerly ‘interaction’ is, in fact, figured as an 
encounter with a kind of textual incompletion: the reader of the literary work is, Iser suggests, 
necessarily confronted with ‘gaps in the text’, ‘blanks which the reader is to fill in’.78 In its 
conception of deliberate textual ‘gaps’ which establish a space for readerly interpretation, Iser’s 
model of the reading process imagines a foundational unfinished-ness present in every literary 
text. This builds on the earlier phenomenology of Roman Ingarden, who argues that ‘every 
literary work is in principle incomplete and in need of further supplementation’—a 
supplementation which ‘can never be completed’.79 We can see how Iser (and by extension 
Ingarden) offer a productive framework through which to approach the ‘gaps’ in Wallace’s 
work and the tension between interpretative freedom and textual limitation which defines our 
encounters with his ‘incomplete’ fiction.80 
 While Iser’s carefully-structured phenomenological model is useful, I want to attend to 
the idiosyncrasies of Wallace’s unfinished narratives, and the often uniquely unsettling reading 
demanded by his fiction. Thus, my enquiry is further informed by other theories of reading, 
including, for example, Barthes’ conception of the ‘writerly’—a class of literary works which 
‘make the reader no longer a consumer, but a producer of the text’ (as opposed the ‘readerly’, 
which denotes those works which ‘can be read, but not written’, which plunge the reader ‘into a 
                                                            
76 Iser, The Act of Reading, p. 163. Iser’s work is often considered within the wider context of ‘reader-
response criticism’, a term which, as summarised by Jane P. Tompkins, does not denote a ‘conceptually 
unified critical position’, but which rather groups together a collection of critics whose work ‘refocus 
criticism on the reader’, ‘examin[ing] authors’ attitudes toward their reader, the kinds of readers various 
texts seem to imply, the role actual readers play in the determination of literary meaning, the relation of 
reading conventions to textual interpretation, and the status of the reader’s self’ (Tompkins, ‘An 
Introduction to Reader-Response Criticism’, in Reader-Response Criticism: From Formalism to Post-
Structuralism, ed. by Tompkins (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), pp. ix–xxvi (p. ix)).  
77 Iser, ‘The Reading Process’, p. 281. 
78 Iser, The Act of Reading, p. 169. 
79 Roman Ingarden, qtd. in Iser, The Act of Reading, p. 170. 
80 Within Wallace scholarship, Iser’s work has largely been addressed only briefly: Toon Staes, for 
example, cites Iser alongside other reader-response critics in his discussion of the readerly ‘empathy’ 
provoked by Wallace’s work, observing how ‘gaps take center stage in Infinite Jest’, and going on to 
investigate the ways in which Wallace’s novel reflexively demands that the reader ‘fills in gaps in the 
text’ (Toon Staes, ‘Wallace and Empathy: A Narrative Approach’, in Long Thing, pp. 23–42 (p. 29)).  
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kind of idleness’).81 I draw also on Maurice Blanchot’s more complicated understanding of the 
‘interaction’ at the heart of the reading process. Blanchot, like Iser, offers a model of reading as 
a fundamentally two-sided, participatory activity: the literary ‘work’ is only brought into being 
when it ‘becomes the intimacy between someone who writes it and someone who reads it’.82 
This ‘intimacy’, however, is not a straightforward ‘communication’ or ‘dialogue’ between 
author and reader: Blanchot asserts that reading ‘never asks of the book, and still less of the 
author: “What did you mean exactly? What truth, then, do you bring me?”’.83 Rather, the act of 
reading is figured as an attempt to ‘cast out’ the author from the work altogether, to make of 
‘the book what the sea and the wind make of objects fashioned by men: a smoother stone, a 
fragment fallen from the sky without a past, without a future, the sight of which silences 
questions’.84 Crucially, this process of authorial erasure does not result in a Barthesian ‘birth of 
the reader’, an assertion of readerly autonomy and control, but instead works to affirm the text’s 
essential ‘solitude’: 
It would seem, then, that to read is not to write the book again, but to allow the 
book to be: written—this time all by itself, without the intermediary of the 
writer, without anyone's writing it. The reader does not add [themselves] to the 
book, but tends primarily to relieve it of an author.85 
Blanchot offers us a conception of reading which, while far removed from Iser’s somewhat 
schematic phenomenology, nonetheless builds on a comparable notion of an incompletion at the 
heart of the literary text. ‘For the artist’, Blanchot argues, ‘the work is always infinite, 
unfinished’.86 This notion of a text which both invites and resists our readerly attempts to ‘fill 
in’ its blank spaces offers us a suggestive model for approaching the particularly evocative self-
conscious incompletions of Wallace’s fiction. 
My enquiry is also influenced by more contemporary critical discussions around the 
question of reading, and, in particular, by Rita Felski’s influential (and controversial) 2015 
monograph The Limits of Critique. Felski argues that the interpretative practice of ‘critique’—a 
mode of critical reading ‘against the grain and between the lines’, defined by its ‘suspicious’ 
attempts to ‘expose hidden truths and draw out unflattering and counterintuitive meanings’ —
                                                            
81 Roland Barthes, S/Z, trans. by Richard Miller (New York: Hill & Wang, 1974), p. 4. 
82 Maurice Blanchot, The Space of Literature, trans. by Ann Smock (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1982), pp. 22–3. 
83 Blanchot, p. 194. 
84 Blanchot, p. 193. 
85 Blanchot, p. 193. 
86 Blanchot, p. 221. 
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has become ‘pervasive [. . .] as mood and method’ within literary studies today.87 My 
investigation, though not principally considering the value or limitations of critique, is 
nonetheless informed by Felski’s broader efforts to offer an alternative to this hegemonic 
critical ‘mood’ by gesturing towards new and productive kinds of reading, to free up literary 
studies to ‘embrace a wider range of affective styles and modes of argument’.88 Felski’s 
approach builds on the approach of theorists such as Iser, noting how phenomenology’s ‘care or 
concern for phenomena’—its ‘preference for description over explanation’ and ‘willingness to 
attend rather than to analyze’—position it as a potential alternative to the ‘suspicious’ methods 
of critique.89 She also, however, acknowledges the essential limitations of Iser’s formalised, 
structured conception of the reading process: 
Much work in the phenomenology of reading [. . .] is a strangely bloodless 
affair, drained of affect and intensity. Interpretation is treated as a purely 
cerebral exercise, a question of filling in gaps, imposing schemas, and 
deciphering ambiguities, akin to doing a leisurely Sunday morning crossword 
puzzle. But what of that sudden manic surge of exegetical energy, the drawn-
out agony of banging one’s head against an impervious wall of words followed 
by the bliss of that aha! moment when things fall into place? Reading—even 
academic reading—is a less dry and dispassionate activity than it is often made 
out to be.90 
 Felski points towards an alternative model of ‘postcritical reading’ which places us ‘in front of 
the text, reflecting on what it unfurls, calls forth, makes possible’, recognising the text’s ‘status 
as coactor: as something that makes a difference, that helps make things happen’.91 In this, 
Felski positions our relationship with literary works as complex, personal, and fundamentally 
affective: interpretation is thus figured as a ‘powerful mode of attachment’: 
Readers are not autonomous, self-contained, centers of meaning, but they are 
also not mere flotsam and jetsam tossed on the tides of social or linguistic 
forces that they are helpless to affect or comprehend. When they encounter 
texts, they do so in all their commonality and quirkiness; they mediate and are 
                                                            
87 Rita Felski, The Limits of Critique (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), p. 1. In her 
investigation into the influence, and arguable limitations, of this ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ (a phrase 
borrowed from Paul Ricoeur), Felski’s study can be situated within a wider critical conversation around 
the continued value and usefulness of ‘critique’, building on Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s earlier discussion 
of ‘paranoid’ and ‘reparative’ modes of reading (‘Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading, or, You’re 
So Paranoid, You Probably Think This Essay Is About You’, in Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, 
Performativity (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), pp. 123–51), and Bruno Latour’s 
questioning of whether the practice of critique has ‘run out of steam’ (Bruno Latour, ‘Why Has Critique 
Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern’, Critical Inquiry, 30.2 (2004), 225–48). 
88 Felski, The Limits of Critique, p. 3. 
89 Felski, The Limits of Critique, p. 107. 
90 Felski, The Limits of Critique, p. 107. 
91 Felski, The Limits of Critique, p. 12. 
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in turn mediated, in both predictable and perplexing ways.92 
While not following Felski’s specific model of ‘postcritical reading’, my investigation builds on 
her conception of an ‘affective hermeneutics’,93 a conception which situates her study within a 
wider critical effort to investigate the affective dimensions of the reading process—as, for 
example, in Marielle Macé’s argument that the reading of literature is inextricably bound up 
with ‘forms intrinsic to life itself, impulses, images, and ways of being that circulate between 
subjects and works, revealing, activating, and affecting them’.94 This critical effort is perhaps 
traceable back to Susan Sontag’s argument, at the conclusion of her 1996 essay ‘Against 
Interpretation’, for a mode of critical reading which, in attending to the ‘luminousness of the 
thing in itself, of things being what they are’, allows us to ‘recover our senses’, creating the 
space for us to ‘see more, to hear more, to feel more’, to ‘make works of art [. . .] more, rather 
than less, real to us’—an approach which she finally, strikingly refers to as an ‘erotics of art’.95 
By drawing on these varying critical approaches to the question of how we read 
literature, my own enquiry aims to create the space to investigate—in all its complexities and 
contradictions—the specific mode of reading invoked by Wallace’s ‘unfinished’ work. My 
fundamental argument is that the instances of incompletion in Wallace’s fiction demand from us 
a uniquely self-conscious (and unsettling) form of ‘active reading’ requiring the reader to 
negotiate with the text. I will seek to situate Wallace within a broader tradition of literary 
incompletion, exploring how the use and incidence of incompletions and failures in his fiction 
follow a trajectory established by earlier writers, including, especially, Beckett,96 DeLillo,97 and 
Kafka.98 I will, however, also address how Wallace can equally be seen to break from the 
                                                            
92 Felski, The Limits of Critique, pp. 175, 171. 
93 Felski, The Limits of Critique, p. 178. 
94 Marielle Macé, ‘Ways of Reading, Modes of Being’, trans. by Marlon Jones, New Literary History, 
44.2 (2013), 213–29 (p. 213).  
95 Susan Sontag, ‘Against Interpretation’, in Against Interpretation (London: Vintage, 1994), pp. 3–14 (p. 
14). It is perhaps significant to note that Wallace’s personal library at the Harry Ransom Center includes a 
heavily annotated copy of Sontag’s Against Interpretation. 
96 Beckett’s writing notably directs itself towards ‘the expression that there is nothing to express, nothing 
with which to express, nothing from which to express, no power to express, no desire to express, together 
with the obligation to express’ (Samuel Beckett, Proust, and Three Dialogues with Georges Duthuit, 3rd 
edn (London: Calder Publications, 1969), p. 103). 
97 Peter Boxall argues that DeLillo’s ‘idiomatic, textured, and multireferential’ novels are nonetheless 
‘driven by an investment in the possibilities of aesthetic silence’, an investment inherited ‘to an extent, 
from Beckett’ (Boxall, ‘DeLillo and Media Culture’, in The Cambridge Companion to Don DeLillo, ed. 
by John N. Duvall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 43–52 (p. 46)). 
98 Allen Thiher suggests that Kafka’s frequently fragmentary or ‘broken’ works are defined by an 
underlying ‘incompletion principle’, an unfinished-ness felt in both formal and thematic terms’ (Thiher, 
Understanding Franz Kafka (Columbia: The University of South Carolina Press, 2018), p. 39). 
19 
 
aesthetics of incompletion variously employed by these literary predecessors—primarily, I 
would argue, in the degree to which his (meta)fictional approach places reflexive focus on the 
reader’s felt experience. Even if we resist taking Wallace’s own articulation of his ‘redemptive’ 
fictional project at face value, it is nevertheless worth noting how his theorisations of the 
‘communicative’ function of fiction are repeatedly framed in explicitly affective terms. In a 
1993 interview, Wallace expresses hope that his work might have the capacity to ‘make people 
less lonely. Or really to affect people’, going on to assert that ‘what fiction and poetry are doing 
is what they’ve been trying to do for two-thousand years: affect somebody, make somebody feel 
a certain way’.99 It is in its engagement with the affective dimension of incompletion, and giving 
rise to a complex, often uncomfortable readerly experience of negotiating textual or narrative 
unfinished-ness, that Wallace’s writing stands out from that of his modernist (and 
postmodernist) precursors, and which makes contemporary, affectively-inclined theories of 
reading such as a Felski’s so pertinent in exploring the kind of reading demanded by his work.  
In this way, I want to consider how Wallace’s fiction points us towards a contemporary 
conception of ‘incomplete reading’, an interpretative model which, beyond teaching us how to 
read his own, ‘broken’ fictions, also provokes a broader consideration of the complex, 
mysterious, and in some sense always ‘incomplete’ nature and practice of literary interpretation. 
While the ‘blank spaces’ of Wallace’s writing offer us a self-consciously concrete manifestation 
of ‘the incomplete’, I would argue that their effect—at least in part—is to provoke us into a 
larger reflection on the implications of the incompletion and indeterminacy present (in varying 
forms and degrees) in every work of fiction—the active, if inevitably circumscribed, work 
involved in the process of reading itself. This is not to suggest that all literary works demand the 
same level of readerly ‘entanglement’—Wallace himself is acutely attuned to a distinction 
between the strategies of ‘serious fiction’ and the pacifying ‘entertainment’ offered by 
‘commercial art’100—but rather to find, across Wallace’s fiction, a consistent concern with an 
incompletion inherent to the reading process, a felt unfinished-ness which transcends, and to 
some extent collapses, (post)modernist distinctions between ‘writerly’ and ‘readerly’, ‘open’ 
and ‘closed’ texts. In its manifest incompletion, and its persistent concern with exploring (and 
inviting us to explore) the readerly experience of this unfinished-ness, Wallace’s writing works 
                                                            
99 Wallace, ‘Interview with Hugh Kennedy and Geoffrey Polk’ (1993), in Conversations, pp. 11–20 (pp. 
16, 18). 
100 Wallace, ‘Interview with McCaffery’, p. 22, 33. 
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to gesture beyond itself, leading us to look with fresh eyes at the central, inescapable 
‘blankness’ which sits at the heart of all literary texts, all literary interpretation. 
Investigating the various forms of incompletion found across Wallace’s fiction, I take 
an approach both chronological and thematic—tracing the development of his thinking over his 
career, but addressing in each chapter in turn a different facet of the incomplete as felt both in 
the individual text and, by extension, across Wallace’s oeuvre. Chapter 1 is concerned with 
Wallace’s own ‘incomplete reading’ of philosophical texts, using The Broom of the System to 
explore the ways in which his work is consistently driven by a ‘creative misreading’ of 
philosophies of language and interpersonal communication. Chapter 2 employs Wallace’s early 
short story collection Girl with Curious Hair as a lens through which to investigate Wallace’s 
literary intertexts, exploring how his self-conscious attempts to ‘move fiction forward’ are 
marked by an unavoidable unfinished-ness which works to interrupt and critique linear models 
of literary ‘progression’. Chapter 3 explores how Infinite Jest’s sheer bigness works to establish 
an essential tension between excess and incompletion, between seeking panoramic ‘mastery’ 
and awareness of the impossibility of completing such an encyclopaedic project. Chapter 4 turns 
to Wallace’s late-career short story collections Brief Interviews with Hideous Men and Oblivion, 
investigating a shift towards smallness, silence, and absence which, I argue, fundamentally 
alters our understanding of the ‘breaches’ in his writing. Finally, Chapter 5 concentrates on The 
Pale King, drawing together points from my previous chapters to establish a conception of 
‘incomplete reading’, and confronting the central, inevitable question of how we can attempt to 
interpret a truly incomplete work.  
 
Coda 
My investigation will, of course, be confronted with limitations and failures of its own. 
Wallace’s oeuvre is strikingly marked by concerns, ideas, and motifs which recur, develop, and 
mutate between texts: Hayes-Brady notes how ‘concerns that dominated Wallace’s later 
writing’ are ‘visible in embryonic form in his earliest work’.101 Her thematically-organised 
study offers one viable way of addressing the complex, looping network of echoes and 
correspondences which characterise his oeuvre, which are difficult to elucidate in a purely 
chronological tour through Wallace’s novels and stories. Nevertheless, a book-by-book 
                                                            
101 Hayes-Brady, Unspeakable Failures, p. 15. 
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approach also holds rewards of its own, allowing us to attend to the varying ways in which 
incompletion is manifested and explored in each of his published works, and, with this, the 
changes of shape, tone, and strategy which take place across Wallace’s literary career. That it 
faces unavoidable limitations is perhaps only apt: in approaching Wallace’s fiction, we are 
repeatedly forced to confront the awareness that any reading—and particularly any attempt to 
offer anything like a ‘complete’ critical account—will always necessarily ‘fall short’ in some 
way.  
This thesis, then, is driven by a belief in the critical potential of limits: of paying 
attention to the inescapable shortcomings, failures, and incompletions which serve as an 
unavoidable (and arguably necessary) aspect both literary readings and literary texts. The 
question of reading Wallace’s fiction is, in 2019, one inevitably shaped by the question of 
shortcomings. Beyond the sense of felt unfinished-ness associated with the collective feeling 
that Wallace ‘died with his work incomplete’, having never truly ‘hit his target’,102 recent years 
have seen greater scrutiny of the shortcomings of a different kind. Scholars have paid increasing 
attention to the limitations found in his fictional portrayals of women103 and people of colour,104 
and his popular reception has been affected by critiques of the disproportionate 
whiteness/maleness of his readership (Alex Shephard has characterised his writing as ‘the 
lingua franca of a certain subset of overeducated, usually wealthy, extremely self-serious 
(mostly) men’),105 and, most recently, renewed discussion—in the wake of the #MeToo 
                                                            
102 Max, ‘The Unfinished’, The New Yorker, 2 March 2009, para. 3 
<http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/03/09/the-unfinished> [accessed 17 January 2019]. 
103 See, particularly, chapter 8 of Hayes-Brady’s Unspeakable Failures; and Mary K. Holland, ‘“By 
Hirsute Author”: Gender and Communication in the Work and Study of David Foster Wallace’, Critique: 
Studies in Contemporary Fiction, 58.1 (2017), 64–77. 
104 See Jorge Araya, ‘Why the Whiteness?: Race in The Pale King’, in Critical Insights, pp. 238–251; 
Thompson, ‘Wallace and Race’, in Cambridge Companion to David Foster Wallace, pp. 204–19. 
105 Alex Shephard, ‘Neil Gorsuch Will Be Our First Lit Bro Supreme Court Justice’, New Republic, 21 
March 2017, para. 1 <https://newrepublic.com/minutes/141498/neil-gorsuch-will-first-lit-bro-supreme-
court-justice> [accessed 31 May 2019]. See also Deirde Coyle’s widely-shared article ‘Men Recommend 
David Foster Wallace to Me’, Electric Literature, 17 April 2017 <https://electricliterature.com/men-
recommend-david-foster-wallace-to-me/> [accessed 13 May 2019]. 
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movement—of Wallace’s personal history of abusive relationships with women.106 The 
interpretative approach of Wallace’s readership is thus unavoidably shaped and informed by an 
awareness of these real problems. While they are not my primary subject, I intend to identify a 
mode of reading capable of acknowledging the wider shortcomings of Wallace’s life, work, and 
reception, and, in this, to identify that which is still compelling, affecting, or vital within his 
novels and stories. 
In carrying out an extended reading of Wallace’s fiction, I aim to find a way to look 
(and read) beyond Wallace. In his 2015 survey of ‘Wallace studies’, Kelly concludes by arguing 
that  
A scholarship that wants to pay genuine tribute to Wallace’s vision [. . .] also 
has the duty to move beyond it, to explore what the author—in his political, 
historical, cultural and aesthetic moment—could not quite see or say. In 
considering Wallace in this way, we can respond to resources in his texts that 
go beyond the limitations of his moment and can thereby begin to play the 
radical role that Wallace conceived for readers.107 
Ultimately, I want to explore how we as readers still have the capacity to find something 
productive within the blank spaces and (sometimes very real) failures of Wallace’s fiction, to 
establish, in our self-consciously active work of interpretation, an understanding of our own 
reading which allows us to rethink the way we approach other literary texts in 21st century life. 
Looking beyond Wallace, my thesis endeavours to contribute to the current critical discussion 
around the nature, place, and uses of literary interpretation being carried out by critics such as 
Felski and Elizabeth Anker, the ‘rethinking of literary studies’—involving ‘new conceptions of 
literary value, of the critic’s interpretive labor, and of the public role of the humanities’—which, 
these writers identify as ‘currently taking place’.108 The enduring power of Wallace’s fiction, I 
                                                            
106 This recent discussion was primarily prompted by the testimony of the author Mary Karr, who was 
herself involved in an abusive romantic relationship with Wallace (detailed—if arguably uncomfortably 
briefly—within Max, Every Love Story). See Mary Karr, ‘Mary Karr, Author on Twitter: “Deeply 
Saddened by the Allegations against #JunotDiaz & I Support Every Woman Brave Enough to Speak. The 
Violence #DavidFosterWallace Inflicted on Me as a Single Mom Was Ignored by His Biographer & 
@NewYorker as ‘Alleged’ despite My Having Letters in His Hand. But DFW Was White.”’, Twitter 
<https://twitter.com/marykarrlit/status/992545700004139008> [accessed 13 May 2019]. For further 
discussion, see Megan Garber, ‘David Foster Wallace and the Dangerous Romance of Male Genius’, The 
Atlantic, 9 May 2018 <https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2018/05/the-world-still-spins-
around-male-genius/559925/> [accessed 31 May 2019]; Steve Paulson and Clare Hayes-Brady, ‘David 
Foster Wallace in the #MeToo Era: A Conversation with Clare Hayes-Brady’, Los Angeles Review of 
Books, 10 September 2018 <https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/david-foster-wallace-in-the-metoo-era-a-
conversation-with-clare-hayes-brady/> [accessed 13 May 2019]. 
107 Kelly, ‘The Critical Reception’, p. 60. 
108 Elizabeth S. Anker and Rita Felski, eds., introduction to Critique and Postcritique (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2017), pp. 1–30 (p. 2). 
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would suggest, lies at least in part in its capacity to point us towards new ways of reading, its 
power to remind us of the extent to which our interpretation of a literary work always involves a 
negotiation with an aspect of unfinished-ness. By investigating the subjective, felt experience of 
this ‘incomplete reading’, I will show how Wallace’s work tells us something essential about 
the uncertainty of reading in everyday life, the pervading aspects of unfinished-ness, and the 
unfinished modes of reading, demanded from us by the contemporary world. 
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1. ‘The limits of my world’: The Broom of the System 
‘An essentially shitty first book’ 
I wrote Broom of the System when I was very young. I mean, the first draft of 
that was my college thesis. There are parts of it that I think are good. But it’s—I 
wince.1 
In his 1996 interview with David Lipsky, Wallace reflects on his retrospective disappointment 
with his debut novel. For the Wallace of 1996 (following the publication of Infinite Jest) The 
Broom of the System (1987) is dismissible as an ‘essentially shitty’ piece of work, a novel 
which, despite showing evidence of ‘some talent’, betrays the ‘wince’-inducing inexperience of 
its author.2 In many respects, Wallace’s disavowal of his early writing can be seen to have 
shaped the reception of his work: Hayes-Brady has identified a critical tendency to ‘perceive 
Wallace’s career in terms of a break, with Jest at the center and with Broom and the early work 
in general consigned to the sidelines’.3 Certainly, scholarly discussions of Broom have inclined 
towards reading the novel as a formative, incomplete expression of Wallace’s literary project: 
Matthew Luter has characterised Broom as an ‘apprentice work’, the product of a writer ‘still 
figuring out what sort of writer he is going to be’.4 There is some truth to these assessments: in 
its freewheeling, sophomoric, and sometimes self-indulgent humour, Broom betrays its origins 
as a ‘college thesis’ (a version of the novel was submitted as one of two undergraduate theses 
while Wallace was studying at Amherst College).5 These qualities were noted in contemporary 
reviews: Michiko Kakutani critiqued the novel’s predilection for ‘superfluous verbal riffs [. . .] 
repetitious digressions, and nonsensical babbling that reads like out-takes from a stoned, late-
night dormitory exchange’.6 For Kakutani, Broom, while ‘no mean achievement’, presented 
‘only a shadow of what the author might accomplish’—a critique which has, to some degree, 
echoed through the novel’s subsequent critical response.7 
                                                            
1 Wallace, qtd. in Lipsky, p. 22. 
2 Wallace, qtd. in Lipsky, pp. 22, 34. See also Wallace’s interview with McCaffery, where he reiterates 
his disappointment with Broom, admitting that ‘there’s a lot of stuff in that novel I’d like to reel back in 
and do better’ (Wallace, ‘Interview with McCaffery’, p. 32). 
3 Hayes-Brady, Unspeakable Failures, p. 15. 
4 Matthew Luter, ‘The Broom of the System and Girl with Curious Hair’, in Cambridge Companion to 
David Foster Wallace, pp. 67–81 (p. 67). 
5 See Max, Every Love Story, ch. 2. 
6 Michiko Kakutani, ‘Books of The Times; Life in Cleveland, 1990: Review of The Broom of the System’, 
New York Times, 27 December 1986, section Books, para. 6 
<https://www.nytimes.com/1986/12/27/books/books-of-the-times-life-in-cleveland-1990.html> [accessed 
18 June 2019]. 
7 Kakutani, ‘Review of The Broom of the System’, para. 7. 
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 Despite these imperfections, Broom nevertheless offers an invaluable jumping-off point 
for our exploration of Wallace’s fiction. Even in its aspects of untidiness, Wallace’s first novel 
is striking in introducing a range of ideas, motifs, and images which will go on to define his 
writing throughout his career. Reading Broom today, we are confronted with numerous 
anticipatory echoes of Wallace’s later work, ranging from the general (in its obsessive 
exploration of the nature and limits of interpersonal communication and connection, Broom 
introduces concerns felt across all of Wallace’s subsequent writing) to the weirdly specific (in a 
subplot concerning a mysterious baby food additive enabling infants to speak ‘months, maybe 
years before they normally would have’,8 Broom bizarrely foreshadows the comparably 
mysterious, uncannily articulate ‘fierce’ infant who appears in the unfinished Pale King).9 
Hayes-Brady has suggested that Broom is a ‘crucially important text’ for ‘understanding the 
trajectory of Wallace’s career and the development of his guiding principles’.10 Significantly, 
however, she goes on to suggest that  
Its chief importance lies in its very clumsiness, in the visibility of its central 
concerns [. . .] and stylistic features for which Wallace is most famous, which 
awkwardly and obviously permeate that first novel.11 
For Hayes-Brady, it is these aspects of ‘clumsiness’ which make Broom so significant: in this 
early work, Wallace’s central concerns and stylistic strategies are laid bare, in terms more 
visible than anywhere else in his writing career. Building on this, I am particularly interested in 
what Broom’s ‘clumsiness’ can tell us about Wallace’s reading. To some extent, the awkward 
qualities of Wallace’s pre-Infinite Jest fiction—both in Broom and in his subsequent story 
collection Girl with Curious Hair (1987)—are manifested in its uniquely self-conscious, 
anxious, and visible engagements with a range of intertexts: Luter notes that Broom and Girl are 
‘more defined by their influences (both literary and philosophical) and Wallace’s careful 
responses to them’ than any of his subsequent work,12 and we see this reflected in the wealth of 
criticism exploring, for example, Broom’s stylistic debts to Pynchon, or Girl’s ambivalent 
                                                            
8 Wallace, Broom of the System, p. 149. Further references to Broom in this chapter will be placed in 
parentheses in the text. 
9 See Wallace, The Pale King, p. 389. 
10 Hayes-Brady, Unspeakable Failures, p. 66. 
11 Hayes-Brady, Unspeakable Failures, p. 66, emphasis added. 
12 Luter, p. 67. 
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engagement with work of John Barth.13 Moving beyond the identification of these key points of 
influence, however, I want to explore how the ‘clumsy’ intertextual engagements of these early 
works tell us something about how Wallace reads, about the particular kind of intertextual and 
interpretative activity enacted—and, arguably modelled for us—by Wallace’s fiction. The first 
two chapters of this thesis will thus investigate the nature of Wallace’s intertextual ‘readings’, 
focusing firstly on his engagement with philosophical texts in Broom, and secondly on his 
engagement with the literary texts in Girl, showing how the uniquely ‘awkward’ readings 
offered by these formative works offer us a reflexive foundation for understanding our own 
interpretative approach to Wallace’s fictional oeuvre as a whole. 
 
‘INTERPRET-ME’ 
I thought of David as a very talented young philosopher with a writing hobby, 
and did not realize that he was instead one of the most talented fiction writers of 
his generation who had a philosophical hobby.14 
In his memoir relating the experience of teaching Wallace, Jay Garfield recalls how, as a 
university student, Wallace’s interest in writing fiction was matched by a concurrent 
commitment to philosophy: significantly, alongside his first draft of Broom, Wallace submitted 
a second thesis on the technical philosophy of Richard Taylor and the question of fatalism.15 
While Wallace’s interests eventually shifted towards fiction writing as a primary pursuit, the 
sustained influence of his early philosophical study can be felt throughout his career: from 
Gerhardt Schtitt’s metaphysical conception of the ‘infinite roots’ of tennis as attempt to 
‘vanquish and transcend the limited self’ in Jest,16 to Wallace’s consideration of the ethical 
implications of shellfish consumption in ‘Consider the Lobster’,17 to ‘Philosophy and the Mirror 
of Nature’’s titular allusion to Richard Rorty.18 Critics have consistently investigated the 
                                                            
13 See, for example, Kakutani’s assertion that Broom ‘will remind readers of The Crying of Lot 49 by 
Thomas Pynchon’ (‘Review of Broom of the System’, para. 2), or Boswell’s identification of the ‘number 
of striking similarities’ between Broom and Lot 49 (Understanding, p. 51). For Girl’s complex 
engagement with Barth, see chapter 2 of this thesis. 
14 Jay Garfield, ‘David Foster Wallace as Student: A Memoir’, in David Foster Wallace, Fate, Time, and 
Language: An Essay on Free Will, ed. by Stephen M. Cahn and Maureen Eckert (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2011), pp. 219–221 (p. 221). 
15 Following Wallace’s death, this thesis was published as ‘Richard Taylor’s “Fatalism” and the 
Semantics of Physical Modality’, in Fate, Time, and Language. For more on Wallace’s early 
philosophical study, see Max, Every Love Story. 
16 Wallace, Infinite Jest, p. 84. 
17 Wallace, ‘Consider the Lobster’, in Consider the Lobster, p. 235–254. 
18 Wallace, ‘Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature’, in Oblivion, pp. 182–9. 
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philosophical dimensions of his writing.19 While some commentators have approached Wallace 
as a philosopher in his own right,20 much of this scholarship has been dedicated to exploring the 
philosophical encounters offered by Wallace’s fiction: Hayes-Brady has suggested that, for 
Wallace, philosophy and literature ‘worked in tandem, with philosophy articulating questions, 
and fiction offering scope within which to dramatize, embody, or otherwise ventilate these 
issues’.21 In this chapter, I will further explore the complex, shifting, and often unstable 
philosophical encounters found in Wallace's fiction, considering the ways in which his 
intertextual ‘readings’ of philosophy work to inform our own interpretative responses to his 
work. 
In The Broom of the System, we are confronted with Wallace’s most explicit fictional 
engagement with philosophy. James Ryerson has suggested that, as a work written ‘when his 
own philosophical efforts were most intense’, Broom stakes a claim to be Wallace’s ‘most 
philosophically intriguing text’: this is borne out in the novel’s direct engagement with abstract 
theoretical questions around the nature and limits of language.22 Even when compared with 
Wallace’s own subsequent body of work, Broom stands as a particularly stark example of an 
‘INTERPRET-ME’ fiction, a novel which reflexively directs the theoretical terms by which it is 
read. Significantly, Wallace introduces his conception of the ‘INTERPRET-ME’ novel in a 
review of another text deeply grounded in philosophy: David Markson’s 1988 experimental 
novel Wittgenstein’s Mistress.23 Markson’s text is one fundamentally indebted to and concerned 
with the linguistic philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein: approaching the novel, we are 
everywhere pointed towards Wittgenstein’s work—and particularly the early philosophy of his 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus—as a necessary ‘frame’ for our reading.24 In Wallace’s 
assessment, this reflexive philosophical engagement works to bring Wittgenstein’s philosophy 
                                                            
19 See, for example, Lance Olsen, ‘Termite Art, or Wallace’s Wittgenstein’, Review of Contemporary 
Fiction, 13.2 (1993), 199–215; Allard den Dulk, Existentialist Engagement in Wallace, Eggers and Foer: 
A Philosophical Analysis of Contemporary American Literature (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015); 
Robert K. Bolger and Scott Korb, eds., Gesturing Toward Reality: David Foster Wallace and Philosophy 
(London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014). 
20 See, for example, Stephen M. Cahn and Maureen Eckert, eds., Freedom and the Self: Essays on the 
Philosophy of David Foster Wallace (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015). 
21 Hayes-Brady, Unspeakable Failures, p. 21. 
22 James Ryerson, ‘Introduction: A Head That Throbbed Heartlike: The Philosophical Mind of David 
Foster Wallace’, in Fate, Time, and Language, pp. 1–33. 
23 David Markson, Wittgenstein’s Mistress (Normal, IL: Dalkey Archive Press, 2006). 
24 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. by Charles Kay Ogden (London: 
Routledge, 1922). 
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to life: Markson’s novel, he argues, succeeds in ‘transposing W’s intellectual conundra into the 
piquant qualia of lived, albeit bizarrely lived, experience’, offering a concrete, imaginative 
rendering of the ‘very bleak mathematical world’ established through the ‘abstract argument’ of 
the Tractatus’ text.25 
Like Wittgenstein’s Mistress, Broom is a work self-consciously framed in terms of its 
confrontation with, and animation of, Wittgenstein’s philosophies of language. Boswell has 
argued that Wittgenstein’s presence is ‘felt everywhere’ through the novel, and we see this in its 
numerous allusions to the philosopher: from the fact that one of its characters is introduced as a 
former ‘student of Wittgenstein’ at Cambridge in the twenties (p. 63), to its references and jokes 
revolving around Wittgensteinian concepts such as ‘language-games’, ‘family resemblances’, 
and ‘private languages’, to the title itself.26 In many respects, Wallace, like Markson, can be 
seen to reflexively position Wittgenstein’s philosophy as a necessary frame, an unavoidable 
point of theoretical reference, directing our interpretative responses to the text: indeed, 
Wittgenstein has been cited and dissected in practically every piece of criticism on the novel, 
with Hayes-Brady suggesting that his influence has become ‘almost too commonplace to 
investigate’.27 Nevertheless, the question of how the novel makes use of Wittgenstein is less 
straightforwardly clear: Ryerson notes that, though the book is ‘clearly supposed to be “about” 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy’, it is ‘not obvious at first in what way’.28 Wallace’s review of 
Wittgenstein’s Mistress—notably written three years after the publication of Broom—is 
intriguing in its implicit positioning of Markson’s novel as offering a more successful version of 
what his own debut was trying to achieve: Ryerson suggests that Wallace felt that ‘Markson’s 
novel had succeeded in uniting literature and philosophy in a way that he, in Broom, had tried 
but failed to do’.29 We can see how Wallace’s analysis of Wittgenstein’s Mistress—and, in 
particular, his praise for Markson’s exploration of ‘the consequences, for persons, of the 
                                                            
25 Wallace, ‘The Empty Plenum’, p. 76. 
26 The title is, as Boswell has noted, a ‘complex allusion to Wittgenstein’ (Boswell, Understanding, p. 
23): the ‘broom of the system’ refers to Wittgenstein’s use, in Investigations I §60, of the image of a 
broom to figure the fundamental intricacy of the statements of language: when we use the word ‘broom’, 
are we referring to both the stick and the brush at once? And which part is more essential to our concept 
of what a ‘broom’ is?  
27 For further analysis of the novel’s references to Wittgenstein, see particularly Boswell, Understanding, 
ch. 2; Hayes-Brady, ‘The Book, the Broom and the Ladder: Philosophical Groundings in the work of 
David Foster Wallace’, in Consider David Foster Wallace, pp. 24–36, and Unspeakable Failures. 
28 Ryerson, p. 18.  
29 Ryerson, p. 22. 
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practice of theory’—offers us a retrospective starting point for our investigation into the 
attempts at philosophical ‘reading’ presented within Broom.30 
 
‘Everything that is the case’ 
To a certain degree, Broom can be seen to run parallel to Wittgenstein’s Mistress in its 
interrogation of the felt, human implications of Wittgenstein’s early philosophy of language—
the question of what it would actually be like to ‘live in a Tractatusized world’.31 In his 
introduction to Wittgenstein’s work, Anthony Kenny asserts that Wittgenstein’s ‘major 
philosophical concern throughout his life’ was with ‘the nature of language and its relation to 
the world’.32 In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein offers a highly structured, logically-organised 
conception of this language/world relationship, beginning with the famous dictum: ‘The world 
is everything that is the case’.33 For the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, the world, when properly 
analysed according to the rules of logic, ‘divides into facts’: ‘the world’ is itself understood as a 
‘totality of facts’, a collection of fundamental, discrete ‘states of affairs’ which cumulatively 
determine everything which ‘is the case, and also all that is not the case’.34 It is in the context of 
this factually-constituted conception of the world that Wittgenstein outlines his ‘picture theory’ 
of meaning, a theory which Kenny succinctly summarises thus: 
According to this theory, language consists of propositions which picture the 
world. Propositions are the perceptible expressions of thoughts, and thoughts 
are logical pictures of facts [. . .]35 
In the philosophy of the Tractatus, the words and sentences of language are understood as direct 
representations (pictures or models) of the world. Taken as a whole, language offers a ‘model of 
reality’, a comprehensive, totalising mirror image of the ‘facts’ which constitute the world.36 
While Wallace admired the terse, poetic formal clarity of Wittgenstein’s early work (he 
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33 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 1. 
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remarked in a 1992 letter to Lance Olsen that the first statement of the Tractatus was one of the 
‘most beautiful opening lines in Western Lit.’)37 his own reading of the Tractatus’ philosophy—
as articulated most explicitly in his Markson essay and his interview with McCaffery—is 
profoundly troubled by the implications of Wittgenstein’s notion of a world ‘composed only & 
entirely’ of ‘logically discrete facts that have no intrinsic connection to one another’.38 In 
particular, Wallace suggests that Wittgenstein’s ‘picture theory’, when taken to its logical 
conclusion, carries the implication of a ‘tragic fall. The loss of the whole external world’: 
The Tractatus’s picture theory of meaning presumes that the only possible 
relation between language and the world is denotive, referential. In order for 
language both to be meaningful and to have some connection to reality, words 
like tree and house have to be like little pictures, representations of real trees 
and houses. Mimesis. But nothing more. Which means we can know and speak 
of nothing more than little mimetic pictures. Which divides us, metaphysically 
and forever, from the external world.39 
The Tractatus’ pictorial language leaves the speaker imprisoned behind language, unable to 
truly connect with the outside world (or with other people): ‘the individual person with her 
language is trapped in here, with the world out there, and never the twain shall meet’.40 More 
disturbingly, meanwhile, there is ‘no iron guarantee the pictures truly are mimetic’, no way of 
determining whether language’s pictorial ‘mirror’ offers a truly clear or complete representation 
of the outside world.41 This suggestion finally points, Wallace argues, towards the possibility of 
solipsism: the view, as summarised by Michael Morris, that ‘only the self (“solus ipse”) exists: 
nothing but the self is real’.42 
 Turning to Broom, we find this philosophical anxiety articulated and interrogated most 
clearly in the character of Rick Vigorous. Throughout the novel, Rick—‘Editor, Reader, 
Administrator’ and ‘All-Around Literary Presence’ at ‘Frequent and Vigorous Publishing, Inc’ 
(p. 43), and older romantic partner of Broom’s protagonist Lenore Beadsman—is obsessively 
tortured by the Tractatus-informed fear that he is cut off from the world (and people) external to 
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him, an anxiety manifested most strongly in terms of his romantic relationship with Lenore. In 
an early chapter, he laments that he ‘must in the final analysis remain part of the world that is 
external to and other from Lenore Beadsman’ a fact which is for him a ‘source of profound 
grief’ (p. 60). The source of Rick’s anxiety is, at least in part, figured in comically physical, 
bodily terms: Rick’s insecurity is intimately bound up with his constant awareness of the fact of 
his tiny penis.43 In comparison with ‘those who dwell deep, deep within the ones they love, 
drink from the soft cup at the creamy lake at the center of the Object of Passion’, Rick is 
consumed by the fear that his physical shortcomings mean he is ‘fated forever only to intuit the 
presence of deep recesses while I poke my nose, as it were, merely into the foyer of the Great 
House of Love, agitate briefly, and make a small mess on the doormat’ (p. 60). Beyond this 
bodily separation, Rick’s anxiety is also figured in linguistic terms: as Boswell has noted, Rick 
is ‘tirelessly, hysterically articulate’, seeking to ‘fill with words the enormous gap left by his 
small penis’.44 In this respect, Rick’s feelings of separation from Lenore serve as a comically 
concretised manifestation of the ‘tragic fall’ which Wallace reads in the Tractatus: Rick cannot 
escape the feeling that he is trapped behind his language, cut off—physically and 
metaphysically—from the external world. 
Significantly, Rick’s attempts to fill this ‘gap’ repeatedly take the form of fictional 
narratives: over the course of the novel, Rick, in his position as editor of a literary magazine, 
tells Lenore a series of stories-within-stories which—while ostensibly drawn from the Frequent 
Review’s submissions pile—all read suspiciously like fictionalised versions of his and Lenore’s 
relationship (albeit ones skewed by Rick’s own neurotic anxieties and preoccupations). In many 
respects, Rick’s narrative efforts to bridge the gap between him and Lenore offer a literalised 
version of Wallace’s own conception—as articulated in later essays and interviews—of fiction 
as an ‘act of communication between one human and another’, a means of establishing a 
meaningful, dialogic ‘connection’ between author and reader.45 In the case of Rick’s stories, 
however, we are faced with repeated examples of incomplete, inadequate fictional 
communication. Even as he attempts to use them to ‘connect’ with Lenore, Rick’s stories are 
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beset by unavoidable limitations: from their tendency towards cliché and hackneyed expression 
(there is a running gag about Rick’s fondness for the phrase ‘grinned wryly’ (pp. 123, 164, 335, 
350, 351, 352, 435) which culminates in Lenore questioning ‘Who grins wryly? Nobody grins 
wryly, at all, except in stories’ (p. 335)), to their frequent descent into transparent wish-
fulfilment (in the extracts from the notes for his ‘Fieldbinder Collection’, his alter-ego Monroe 
Fieldbinder is characterised by an ‘enormous sex-organ’ (p. 158)). When Rick later gives 
Lenore a finished Fieldbinder story to read (titled ‘Love’, and presented as an anonymous 
submission to the magazine), she dismisses it as ‘artificial. Like the kid who wrote it was trying 
too hard’ (p. 335), asserting that ‘that thing wasn’t even good enough in my opinion to have any 
effect on me, good or bad, at all’ (p. 337).  
This sense of limitation is, for Rick, one arguably encoded within the act of storytelling: 
while Rick’s stories are presented as attempts to connect with Lenore, there is always the 
parallel suggestion that, in framing these attempts as fiction, Rick only ever achieves a 
compromised, incomplete form of ‘communication’. Rick asserts that ‘telling stories that are not 
my own is at this point what I do, after all. With Lenore I am completely and entirely myself’ 
(p. 74)—the irony being that Rick, in rewriting his and Lenore’s relationship as a series of 
fictional narratives, is fundamentally not himself with her. Even if, as is suggested, he is the 
author of these stories, they are still at some level not ‘his own’. This suggestion comes to a 
head towards the end of Broom, as Rick, having taken Lenore out into the novel’s fictional 
‘Great Ohio Desert’, demands that she ‘implore me for a story’ (p. 422). As the scene 
progresses, Rick—to Lenore’s increasing frustration—offers a final, fictionalised account of 
their (now collapsing) relationship, via a story about ‘the most phenomenally successful 
theoretical dentist of the twentieth century’ (p. 423). While Lenore questions why they can’t 
‘just have a talk without you pretending it’s something else’ (p. 438), Rick insists that ‘the 
issues here can be treated and perhaps even resolved in the context of the story I have in mind’ 
(p. 423). Here, storytelling is positioned as an innately broken mode of communication: far from 
establishing a meaningful author/reader dialogue, Rick’s narrative is one-sided, a futile attempt 
to assert monologic authorial control over Lenore and their relationship. Rick’s narrative 
eventually converges with reality as he pathetically attempts to literalise this ‘connection’, 
handcuffing himself and Lenore together (‘We are now joined, my center and reference! In 
negation and discipline! Our bodies are husks!’ (p. 440))—an action directly mirroring the 
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characters in his story. Rick’s attempts to collapse the metaphysical gap between Lenore and 
him are brought—with comic abruptness—back to the realm of the physical: confronted with 
the impotence of language (or fiction) as a means of communicating, he attempts to establish a 
literalised connection between self and other. Through Rick, we find Wallace using Broom to 
interrogate the felt implications of the Tractatus’s austere, logical philosophy of language. In his 
obsessive, failed attempts at ‘communicative’ story-making, Rick leads us to consider both the 
limits of language and—more specifically—the limits of Wallace’s own idealised conception of 
fiction as a ‘mode of communication’, the extent to which any attempt at fictional ‘connection’ 
will, if we take the philosophy of the Tractatus seriously, always fall short.46 
 
‘I don’t know my way about’ 
We can see, then, how the strategies underpinning Broom anticipate those which Wallace 
praises in his review of Wittgenstein’s Mistress: like Markson, Wallace is concerned with 
exploring the human consequences of the ‘practice of theory’, using fiction to transpose the 
‘bleak mathematical world’ of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus into ‘lived, albeit bizarrely lived, 
experience’.47 Wallace’s novel departs from Markson’s, however, in the degree to which it 
simultaneously articulates the limitations of this philosophical ‘system’: where Wittgenstein’s 
Mistress clearly positions the Tractatus as a primary philosophical foundation for its narrative, 
Broom invites us to think beyond this singular ‘framing’, setting Rick’s early Tractatus-
inflected understanding of language and the world against a series of alternate, often conflicting, 
lines of philosophical enquiry. Indeed, considered as a whole, Broom can equally be seen to 
respond to the very different philosophy outlined in Wittgenstein’s late work, the Philosophical 
Investigations (1953).48 The Investigations offer a stark contrast with Wittgenstein’s early work: 
the Tractatus’s terse propositions are replaced by a flowing, discursive style, while the attempts 
of the Tractatus to delineate a structured, ‘complete’ account of language give way to what 
Marie McGinn refers to as ‘a concern with the detailed workings of the concrete, complex, 
multifarious and indeterminate phenomenon of language-in-use’.49 Central to this shift in 
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method and focus is the abandoning of the Tractatus’s ‘picture theory’: in the Investigations, 
language is imagined not as an abstract system of direct representation, but rather as something 
complex, shifting, and difficult to pin down—McGinn asserts that ‘instead of approaching 
language as a system of signs with meaning, we are prompted to think about it in situ, 
embedded in the lives of those who speak it’.50 It is this move away from what Wallace refers to 
as ‘the ideal abstraction of math-logic’ and towards ‘ordinary day-to-day language in all its 
general wooliness & charm’ which leads Wittgenstein to the notion of the ‘language-game’.51 
Wittgenstein asserts that ‘the term “language-game” is meant to bring to prominence the fact 
that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life’.52 Throughout the 
Investigations, language is figured as an activity carried out between persons, a series of games 
with rules determined by the communities who play them, and by the context in which they are 
played. In many ways, this conception of language as a ‘game’ can be read as directly refuting 
the solipsistic possibility of being trapped behind language which so troubles Rick. The 
Investigations suggests that, far from being something which separates us from the outside 
world, language is dependent on our communicating with those around us, an idea which forms 
the basis of its famous attack on the possibility of ‘private languages’. For the Wittgenstein of 
the Investigations, the notion of a language which is internal, comprehensible only to one’s self, 
is nonsensical: language is too bound up with the social activities of life to exist as anything 
other than a form of communication between people. It is this suggestion which leads 
Wallace—in his interview with McCaffery—to characterise the Investigations as ‘the single 
most comprehensive and beautiful argument against solipsism that’s ever been made’: if 
language is a fundamentally social activity, then the possibility that we might be trapped inside 
our own heads, unable to communicate with the external world, has been rendered impossible.53  
As with his idiosyncratic reading of the Tractatus, however, Wallace finds that, when 
taken to its logical conclusion, the philosophy of the Investigations carries its own set of equally 
disturbing real-world implications: 
Wittgenstein argues that for language even to be possible, it must always be a 
function of relationships between persons (that’s why he spends so much time 
arguing against the possibility of a ‘private language’). So he makes language 
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dependent on human community, but unfortunately we’re still stuck with the 
idea that there is this world of referents out there that we can never really join 
or know because we’re stuck in here, in language, even if we’re at least all in 
here together.54 
While the later Wittgenstein’s conception of communal ‘language-games’ removes the 
possibility that we might be solipsistically trapped behind language, it leaves Wallace with the 
unsettling suggestion that we might be collectively trapped inside it. For the Wittgenstein of the 
Investigations, we can never attain the necessary distance from language required to fully 
understand either its structures or its relation to the world: the problems of philosophy are all 
figured as variations on the statement ‘I don’t know my way about’.55 It is this sense of being 
caught within language which Wallace finds so disconcerting: 
If I were separate from language, if I could somehow detach from it and climb 
up and look down on it, get the lay of the land so to speak, I could study it 
‘objectively’, take it apart, deconstruct it, know its operations and boundaries 
and deficiencies. But that’s not how things are. I’m in it. We’re in language.56 
For Wallace, the Investigations gestures towards a reality in which we are unable to discern 
where the language-game ends and ‘the world’ begins, a reality which might consequently be 
seen to exist for us as language: he argues that Wittgenstein, having died ‘right on the edge of 
explicitly treating reality as linguistic instead of ontological’, can be considered the ‘real 
architect of the postmodern trap’.57 
Within Broom, this philosophical anxiety is articulated primarily through the character 
of Lenore, who throughout the novel is troubled by the feeling that she has ‘no real existence, 
except for what she said and did and perceived and et cetera, and that these were, it seemed at 
such times, not really under her control’ (p. 66). In contrast with Rick’s Tractatus-informed fear 
that he is trapped behind the language of his stories, Lenore is plagued by the suspicion that her 
very existence is caught within the systems of language, that there is no reliable way of knowing 
if there is a reality external to language at all. In a ‘rap session’ with her eccentric therapist Dr 
Jay, Lenore articulates her anxiety over the possibility that ‘all that really exists of my life is 
what can be said about it’, that, there is, perhaps, ‘no such thing as extra-linguistic efficacy, 
extra-linguistic anything’ (pp. 119–21). Lenore’s ontological anxiety is traced explicitly back to 
the philosophy of the Investigations: her conception of a wholly linguistic reality originates, we 
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learn, from her indoctrination in the basics of Wittgenstein’s late philosophy by her great-
grandmother (significantly, and confusingly, also named ‘Lenore Beadsman’). It is via the 
influence of ‘Gramma’ Beadsman—a former student of Wittgenstein’s who keeps a signed copy 
of the Investigations ‘with her all the time’ (p. 40)—that Lenore has become convinced that 
there is no tangible difference between language and life, that ‘the living is the telling, that 
there’s nothing going on with me that isn’t either told or tellable’ (p. 119). In Lenore, we find 
Wallace animating and concretising the troubling implications which he finds in Wittgenstein’s 
late work, the unsettling felt experience of a world defined by a series of complex, intersecting, 
and inescapable language-games. In the face of her ontological insecurity, Lenore is left with 
‘feelings of disorientation and identity-confusion and lack of control’ (p. 61), feelings which 
inevitably affect her relationships with those around her. Even from Rick’s perspective, Lenore 
is described as having  
The quality of a sort of game about her. [. . .] Lenore soundlessly invites one to 
play a game consisting of involved attempts to find out the game’s own rules. [. 
. .] The rules of the game are Lenore, and to play is to be played. (p. 72) 
Lenore’s relationship with Rick is figured in terms of a late-Wittgensteinian language-game, 
with both parties’ attempts to meaningfully ‘connect’ with each other reduced to the status of an 
abstract linguistic interaction, shaped by grammatical ‘rules’.  
 Here, again, this central instance of ‘identity confusion’ is rendered in self-consciously 
literary terms. Significantly, Lenore’s crisis of identity arises not only from a feeling that she 
might exist only as a linguistic construct, but also from the sense that she is somehow 
specifically fictional. Discussing her anxieties with Dr Jay, Lenore compares her existence to 
that of a character in one of Rick’s stories: 
The lady’s life is the story, and if the story says, ‘The fat pretty woman was 
convinced her life was real’, then she is. Except what she doesn’t know is that 
her life isn’t hers. It’s there for a reason. To make a point or give a smile, 
whatever. She’s not even produced, she’s educed. She’s there for a reason.  
           (p. 122) 
It is this feeling of being ‘educed’ rather than ‘produced’ which so disturbs Lenore: beyond her 
sense of her own unreality, she also feels that her life ‘isn’t hers’, that she is playing a part in 
someone else’s story, and thus that her own thoughts and actions are out of her control. When 
questioned by Jay as to whether she feels she owes her existence to an external ‘author’ figure, 
Lenore argues that her ‘character’ is controlled by the system of language itself: ‘The telling 
makes its own reasons. Gramma says any telling automatically becomes a kind of system that 
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controls everybody involved’ (p. 122). Throughout Broom, we find Lenore guided by systems 
beyond her control, ‘used’ in a vast language-game (or number of intersecting language-games) 
which she does not, and cannot hope to, understand.  
Broom’s central irony—what Wallace refers to as its ‘funny little poststructural gag’—
comes from our readerly knowledge that Lenore is fictional: she is, in the end, ‘a character in a 
story who’s terribly afraid that she’s really nothing more than a character in a story’.58 By 
drawing our attention to Lenore’s fictionality, the novel invites us to question—as Lenore does 
with the ‘fat pretty lady’ in Rick’s story—whether Lenore’s existence can reliably be considered 
any less ‘real’ than our own. Wallace draws out of the Investigations a suggestion that, in its 
incomprehensible intersecting language games, our ‘real world’ might reasonably be considered 
to share the same basic qualities as a work of fiction. In this, we are thus presented with a 
counterpoint to the suggestion—evoked in Rick’s failed attempts at connection-through-
storytelling—that fiction can only ever provide a compromised incomplete mode of 
communication. If our world is, as Wallace’s reading of the Investigations suggests, one which 
is fundamentally linguistic, then a work of fiction is no more or less flawed a means of 
communicating than any other—Lenore herself feels that, in their explicit fictionality, stories 
are in fact ‘more honest, somehow’ (p. 120). Nevertheless, this argument offers only partial 
comfort: while no more limited than other forms of linguistic communication, fiction, 
understood in this way, still denies the possibility of meaningful interpersonal ‘connection’. 
Following Lenore’s late-Wittgensteinian conception of language and its relationship with 
reality, fiction is afflicted by the same failures which affect all kinds of language: we are still 
trapped within the ‘game’, denied contact with an extra-linguistic world. 
 
The Limits of the System 
In Rick and Lenore’s competing anxieties, then, we are faced with a central conflict between 
Wittgenstein’s early and late philosophies. Crucially, by juxtaposing these competing 
philosophical ‘systems’, Broom establishes an unresolved tension between the two, forcing us to 
recognise the inherent limitations of both. Considered alongside each other, the philosophies of 
the Tractatus and the Investigations are positioned as essentially incomplete models for 
interpreting the relationship between language and the world—and thus, with this, as inevitably 
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inadequate ‘frames’ for our own interpretation of Wallace’s novel. Even as it apparently 
establishes itself as a self-conscious ‘INTERPRET-ME’ text, Broom equally works to resist 
univocal interpretation: unlike Markson in Wittgenstein’s Mistress, Wallace denies the 
possibility of finding a coherent theoretical system through which to orient our reading of his 
work. In this, Broom invites us to consider more widely the limitations inherent in any unitary 
model of philosophical reading—either of literary texts or of the world more generally. Faced 
with Broom’s arrangement of juxtaposed, competing philosophies, we are confronted by the 
suggestion that each of these posited interpretative systems is inevitably and necessarily 
incomplete.  
This suggestion is only compounded when we take into account the extent to which 
Wallace’s own readings of Wittgenstein, in turn, offer a comparably ‘incomplete’ interpretation 
of these philosophical texts. Wallace’s intertextual engagements with both the Tractatus and the 
Investigations—as outlined both in Broom and in his discussions in the Markson essay and the 
McCaffery interview—are both built on a strikingly idiosyncratic, skewed approach to 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy: Ryerson has asserted that Wallace’s ‘explications of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy are not always convincing or strictly true’,59 while Horn has explored in detail how 
Wallace ‘overlooked the distinctive way in which Wittgenstein approached the question of 
solipsism, leading Wallace to a conclusion that Wittgenstein himself would have been unable to 
make sense of’.60 Turning again to the Tractatus, we can see how the early Wittgenstein’s 
treatment of solipsism is more complex and ambiguous than Wallace’s reading would suggest: 
Morris argues that, while the Tractatus’s philosophy does suggest a kind of solipsism, ‘it is not 
clear [. . .] that this is quite Wittgenstein’s view’.61 When Wittgenstein addresses the problem of 
solipsism in the Tractatus, it is to suggest obliquely that ‘what solipsism means, is quite correct, 
only it cannot be said, but it shows itself’.62 Wittgenstein argues that, if there is truth in the 
notion of solipsism, it is not a truth which can be expressed through language, and thus not a 
truth which can be comprehended in any definite way. Thus, while Tractatus does not deny the 
possibility of solipsism, it asserts that this possibility is meaningless in terms of everyday life. 
While our engagement with the world may be delimited by our use of language, this language is 
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understood as a direct and complete representation of reality (it is this notion which allows 
Wittgenstein to argue that ‘solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism’)—a point 
which renders moot Rick’s neurotic fears of being trapped behind language, ‘metaphysically 
and forever’ divided from the external world.63  
Similarly, Broom’s engagement with the Investigations is arguably built on a 
comparable misreading, with Wallace’s depiction of the later Wittgenstein as a ‘mad crackpot 
genius [. . .] who believed that everything was words’ (p. 73), offering a notable distortion of 
the Investigations’ argument. While Wittgenstein does assert the centrality of language-games 
in life, he never goes so far as to deny the possibility of engaging with a concrete, extralinguistic 
reality: McGinn notes that the very concept of the ‘language-game’ is introduced to articulate 
how ‘language functions within the active, practical lives of speakers, that its use is inextricably 
bound up with the non-linguistic behaviour which constitutes its natural environment’.64 For the 
Wittgenstein of the Investigations, language can only ever exist as something bound up with 
actions and relationships in a world which, while undeniably shaped by our use of language, is 
never conceived of in purely linguistic terms—an argument which, again, works to render 
irrelevant the feelings of ontological insecurity expressed by Lenore throughout Broom. 
These aspects of misreading tell us something significant about how Wallace employs 
and engages with philosophical ideas through his fiction. Wallace’s readings of Wittgenstein are 
unmistakably filtered through his own distinctive perspective, reoriented towards a series of 
concerns—with the threat of solipsism, the limitations of language, and the (always qualified) 
possibility of fiction as a ‘mode of communication’—that will remain central throughout his 
career. In his interview with McCaffery, Wallace makes notable reference to Wittgenstein as a 
‘real artist’: in Broom, we find Wallace appropriating Wittgenstein’s philosophical texts not in 
terms of a coherent or definitive series of guiding principles, but rather as examples of a kind of 
‘artwork’, open to creative re- or mis-interpretation.65 Hayes-Brady has commented on 
Wallace’s ‘often utilitarian approach’ to ‘the work of other philosophers, taking what is useful 
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and discarding what is not’ in the construction of his own novels and stories.66 For Hayes-
Brady, Wallace’s fiction is characterisable not in terms of its ‘adherence to’ the work of any 
philosopher(s), but rather in its ‘encounters with them—probing, contradictory, and plural’.67 It 
is this sense of a ‘plurality’ of philosophical encounters which we find demonstrated in Broom’s 
conflicting ‘misreadings’ of Wittgenstein’s early and late philosophies of language: far from 
offering a reliable theoretical frame for our interpretation, Wallace instead presents us with a 
series of philosophical ‘systems’ which are, inevitably, self-consciously incomplete. 
While we have hitherto limited our enquiry to focus on Broom’s encounters with the 
Tractatus and the Investigations, it is important to acknowledge the extent to which Wallace’s 
novel also invokes the presence of a range of further philosophies. Lenore’s ostensibly late-
Wittgensteinian anxieties of ‘disorientation and identity-confusion and lack of control’, for 
example, seem to draw as much on the work of Derrida as on the Investigations.68 Indeed, 
Lenore’s ontological crisis could arguably be read as a literalised exploration of the 
ramifications of Derrida’s famous assertion that ‘There is nothing outside of the text’.69 The 
critical discussion surrounding Broom, meanwhile, has convincingly posited a series of 
additional philosophical sources for the novel: Hayes-Brady has asserted the relevance of ‘Paul 
Ricoeur’s theory of self-narrative’ as a theoretical foundation for Broom’s treatment of 
questions of identity and self/other relationships;70 Thomas Tracey has stressed the significance 
of the tradition of ‘American Pragmatist thought’ exemplified by William James, John Dewey, 
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Wittgenstein and Derrida’ (Wallace, qtd. in Lipsky, p. 35). The influence of Derrida on Broom has been 
thoroughly explored by critics: see, for example, Bradley J. Fest, who describes Derrida as an ‘unnamed 
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(Boswell, Understanding). 
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misunderstandings’ (Jacques Derrida (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 62). In Royle’s reading, Derrida is 
no more concerned with denying the existence of an extra-linguistic reality than the Wittgenstein of the 
Investigations: Royle asserts, for example, that Derrida ‘has always been preoccupied (in the strongest 
senses of that word) by what precedes or exceeds language’ (Royle, p. 62). In this respect, Broom’s 
treatment of Derrida is thus characterised by the same ‘creative misreading’ found in Wallace’s 
appropriation of Wittgenstein’s work. 
70 Hayes-Brady, Unspeakable Failures, p. 104. 
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Charles Sanders Pierce;71 while Hering has traced the beginnings of Wallace’s career-length 
‘dialogue with Lacan’ back to this early work.72 Beyond these self-conscious reference points, 
meanwhile, Broom presents us with a further array of philosophical and theoretical ‘systems’ 
articulated by characters within the novel itself: from Dr Jay’s absurd, vaguely gross theory of 
‘Hygiene Anxiety’ (p. 60), in which self and other are divided by ‘membranes’ both 
psychological and bodily; to Norman Bombardini’s ‘Project Total Yang’, wherein he attempts 
to grow—through unimaginably excessive eating—large enough to ‘fill the universe with Self’ 
(p. 91), thus eliminating the problem of other-directed communication altogether; to the ‘family 
theater’ (p. 160) performed by the Spaniard family, in which, through the use of masks and a 
pre-recorded ‘audience’, they attempt to vocalise and ‘work through’ their familial failures of 
communication. Surveying this multiplicity of conflicting, and sometimes overlapping, 
philosophical frameworks, we find each in turn claiming to offer a coherent, totalising ‘system’, 
a mode of reading which will make complete sense of the unstable, confusing relationship 
between language and the world (the novel’s transcriptions of Dr Jay’s ‘rap sessions’ with Rick 
and Lenore are, for example, comically predictable in directing their problems back to the 
question of ‘membranes’ and ‘hygiene anxiety’).73 While often transparently ridiculous, these 
competing philosophies are not dismissed altogether: as Broom progresses, these ‘systems’ 
seem—particularly in their increasingly frequent points of intersection—to gesture towards the 
possibility of a unifying frame which could draw together the disparate parts of Broom’s 
narrative, towards a coherent explanation which—crucially—remains persistently half-
obscured. Randy Ramal has argued that Broom as a whole is primarily concerned with 
illustrating ‘the problem of theorizing’, exploring how the novel shows how ‘system-building 
and explanatory theorizing are hopeless endeavors in the attempt to understand existential, 
psychological, moral, or aesthetic issues in people’s lives’.74 While I agree that Broom is 
concerned with articulating the inevitable limitations of any philosophical ‘system’, I would 
contest Ramal’s suggestion that Wallace’s novel stands as an argument ‘against theorization’ 
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72 Hering, Fiction and Form, p. 89. 
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general’ (Boswell, Understanding, p. 54). 
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altogether. Rather, I would suggest that Broom’s assemblage of philosophies both real and 
fictional finally illustrate the extent to which any single system—any attempt to offer a coherent 
‘reading’—must always be defined by an essential incompleteness. While each of these 
‘systems’ offers its own aspects of utility, none of them can hope to offer us a complete means 
of interpreting the world, or of Broom’s own text. 
 
‘Thereof one must be silent’ 
This aspect of inevitable incompleteness is reflected in the overarching system of Broom’s own 
narrative structure—a structure consisting, as Patrick O’Donnell has argued, of an ‘assemblage 
of half-finished stories, intentions gone awry, and discursive trajectories’.75 O’Donnell 
characterises Broom as an ‘ode to incompletion’, a text organised around ‘no singular system’, 
but rather ‘comprised of dozens of stories and potential stories, trajectories and partial lines of 
flight, and unconnected dots’.76 The novel’s multiplicity of ‘systems’ and narrative threads 
come to a head in the novel’s penultimate chapter, which begins with Lenore—having escaped 
Rick’s attempt to handcuff himself to her in the Great Ohio Desert—returning to the lobby of 
the Bombardini Building ‘in a nearly unprecedented state of piss-off’ (p. 444) to collect her 
things from her workplace at the Frequent and Vigorous switchboards. Here, almost all of 
Broom’s various plots and characters converge: Lenore is accompanied by Andrew Sealander 
Lang, who has recently expressed his (at least partially reciprocated) romantic feelings for her; 
she is met at her cubicle by her roommate Candy Mandible, her colleague Judith Prietht, and her 
permanently disgruntled supervisor Walinda Peahen; she is approached with ‘unprecedentedly 
urgent business’ (p. 448) by David Bloemker, manager of her great-grandmother’s nursing 
home, and her brother-in-law Alvin Spaniard; they are followed by her psychiatrist Dr Jay, her 
father Stonecipher Beadsman III, chemist Neil Obstat Jr. (who is also infatuated with Lenore), 
and Rick Vigorous, who has also returned from the desert. Meanwhile, throughout the scene, 
Norman Bombardini (who has also become obsessed with Lenore) continues his efforts to eat 
his way towards an autonomously full universe by ‘having at the rear wall of the whole 
Building with his [. . .] stomach’ (p. 453). In bringing these disparate characters and subplots to 
this single location, Wallace stages a final, chaotic confrontation between Broom’s various 
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philosophical and narrative threads.  
Far from offering a cohesive conclusion, or allowing a single character (or related 
philosophical ‘system’) to emerge as prominent, however, the novel instead collapses under the 
weight of these conflicting perspectives, presenting a collective breakdown of communication—
one metaphorically reflected in the malfunctioning Frequent and Vigorous telephone lines, 
which, having been broken for the duration of Broom’s narrative, are here described as having 
‘finally gone totally insane’, ‘ringing and beeping like crazy’ (p. 448) through the scene. 
Standing at the centre of this chaos is Lenore, who is bombarded with a series of entreaties from 
Broom’s extended cast of male characters: from Dr Jay’s attempts to convince her to ‘quickly 
and quietly leave’ (p. 449) with him, to Norman Bombardini’s demands for ‘admission to Ms. 
Beadsman’s space’ (p. 453), to Stonecipher Beadsman’s requests that they discuss an urgent 
‘family matter’ (p. 454), to Andy Lang’s suggestion that they both ‘just git’ (p. 452). Faced with 
these characters’ attempts to draw her into their respective philosophical, interpersonal, or 
narrative ‘systems’, Lenore asserts her autonomy by giving up altogether—one of her final lines 
of dialogue in the novel is her shouted exclamation, ‘I quit!’ (p. 451)—abdicating her position at 
the Frequent and Vigorous switchboards, and, with this, removing herself from the text itself: 
Lenore’s voice appears less and less frequently in the chapter’s concluding pages, while she is 
significantly missing from the novel’s subsequent, final chapter. In Lenore’s final 
‘disappearance’, Wallace forces us to confront the chaos of Broom’s manifold conflicting plots, 
characters, and ‘systems’, denying us the possibility of establishing a unifying reading of the 
novel’s narrative and philosophical disorder. 
Broom’s ending, then, is one defined by anti-climax, by a stubborn refusal to reveal a 
conclusive meaning. It is left teasingly unclear what actually happens at the penultimate 
chapter’s close, with our knowledge primarily coming from Rick’s cryptic retrospective account 
of ‘alphabets of old people, or children singing like birds, or fat men chewing on buildings, or 
phone crews fishing in black air, or people eating each other’s membranes’ (p. 463). Olsen has 
described Broom as ‘one grand system of communication’, its various stories-within-stories 
serving as parts of a ‘master network’.77 At the novel’s end, however, this ‘network’ is marked 
by a self-conscious incompletion, crystallised in Rick’s unfinished closing sentence: ‘I’m a man 
of my’ (p. 467). We are faced here with the same question posed in the introduction to this 
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thesis: how are we to read Broom’s closing unfinished-ness? And how might our interpretation 
be informed by the various conflicting modes of philosophical reading exhibited throughout the 
novel? 
 In many respects, Broom’s incomplete ending points us again back towards the 
philosophy of Wittgenstein’s Investigations—and, particularly, towards the philosophical 
method underpinning Wittgenstein’s late work. In contrast with the Tractatus’s attempts to offer 
a ‘complete’, totalising account of language—to ‘draw a limit to thinking, or rather—not to 
thinking, but to the expression of thoughts’78—the Investigations finds Wittgenstein rejecting 
the notion of a discernible ‘limit’ to language altogether: 
But how many kinds of sentence are there? Say assertion, question, and 
command?—There are countless kinds: countless different kinds of use of what 
we call ‘symbols’, ‘words’, ‘sentences’. And this multiplicity is not something 
fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as 
we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get 
forgotten.79 
In the face of this limitless multiplicity of potential language-games, the later Wittgenstein 
presents us with a philosophy which is, in a sense, incomplete: the Investigations is thus 
structured as a series of discrete, specific enquiries into the practical uses of language, enquiries 
which by definition do not claim to offer any coherent or complete philosophical ‘whole’. 
McGinn suggests that, for the Wittgenstein of the Investigations,  
the very idea of completeness has ceased to make sense. There is no essential 
structure or function against which the notion of completeness can be defined; it 
makes no more sense to speak of a complete language than to speak of a 
complete tool-kit.80 
In the Investigations, we are faced with a model of philosophical ‘reading’ characterised by a 
necessary, pragmatic incompletion, an unfinished-ness which reflects the infinite possibilities of 
language-in-use. 
To a certain extent, Broom’s ‘unfinished’ ending seems to invite a reading in terms of 
this pragmatic incompletion. The various narrative pieces and theoretical ‘systems’ of Wallace’s 
novel can thus be framed as a series of ‘investigations’ which, rather than adding up to a 
coherent whole, instead pose a series of open-ended questions about the nature of language, the 
possibility of human ‘connection’, and the communicative potential of fiction—questions which 
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we, as readers, are left to further explore beyond the limits of the printed page. We find this late-
Wittgensteinian approach animating many of the existing critical readings of Broom (and of 
Wallace’s fiction as a whole): Boswell, for example, argues that Broom establishes ‘an open 
system of communication—an elaborate and entertaining game—between author and reader’, 
inviting an interpretation which is ‘open and never complete’,81 while Hayes-Brady—drawing 
in part on the Investigations, but also on Rorty’s subsequent pragmatic readings of, and 
developments upon, Wittgenstein’s late philosophy—suggests that Broom ‘bursts out of the 
borders of coherent structure, gesturing at further conversation beyond the narrative borders’.82 
Read in this way, Broom’s incomplete final sentence becomes an emblem of its pragmatic 
‘openness’, a visible marker of the space left for our readerly participation in its complex 
‘language-game’. Boswell concludes that the ‘novel ends with a blank space. The system 
remains open’.83 
I would argue, however, that, running parallel to this aspect of dialogic openness, 
Broom’s incomplete ending is simultaneously defined by a conflicting sense of closedness, by a 
suggestion of an inescapable limit to the narrative’s apparently ‘open system of 
communication’. We find evidence of this ‘limit’ again encoded within Broom’s closing 
sentence: as noted in our introduction, Rick’s final statement, while teasingly incomplete, also 
directs us toward the specific endpoint of the inevitable word ‘word’. Kelly has directly 
contested Boswell’s dialogic reading of Broom’s final ‘blank space’, arguing that  
because there is no real ambiguity concerning the next word in this closing 
sentence, the reader’s agency is in fact negated. There is thus a gesture toward 
an open system and a readerly dialogue, rather than an achievement of it.84 
Broom’s closing incompletion thus establishes a tension between the open and the closed: a 
tension which I would suggest is equally felt in the wider ‘unfinished’ narrative structure of the 
novel as a whole. Even as Broom’s various narrative and philosophical ‘systems’ seem—in their 
refusal to cohere into a unitary whole—to reflect the discrete, open-ended ‘investigations’ of 
Wittgenstein’s late work, Wallace’s novel does not reject the possibility of totalising completion 
altogether. In particular, the mysterious, marginal figure of Lenore’s great-grandmother 
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‘Gramma’ Beadsman—the Wittgenstein-acolyte whose disappearance first sets Broom’s plot in 
motion—seems to offer the possibility of a unified answer to its numerous unanswered 
questions. Over the course of the novel, it becomes increasingly clear that Gramma Beadsman is 
somehow ‘behind’ almost all of Broom’s disparate philosophical and narrative threads: it is 
Gramma who apparently orchestrates many of the unlikely ‘chance meetings’ between 
characters; Gramma who shapes many of the novel’s ostensibly conflicting philosophical 
‘systems’ (Dr Jay’s ‘Hygiene Anxiety’, for example, is eventually revealed as a fabrication 
invented by Lenore Sr.); Gramma who hastens the collapse of Rick and Lenore’s relationship 
(and pushes Lenore towards an alternative romance with Andy Lang); and finally Gramma who 
is revealed to have been hiding in the tunnels beneath the Bombardini Building, causing the 
breakdown of communication in the Frequent and Vigorous phone lines. Boswell asserts that 
‘Gramma Beadsman is, in fact, the ghost of this book’s plot machinery,—that is, the broom of 
the system [. . .] Indeed, nearly every major plot development in the novel eventually points 
back to her’.85 As suggested by her nickname, Lenore Sr. seems to stand as the underlying 
‘grammar’ of the novel’s chaotic narrative ‘system’, operating, as Fest has argued, as a ‘limit 
within which the world of the text must always operate, a boundary necessary for any language 
game to be played’.86 In this respect, ‘Gramma’ Beadsman’s marginal presence thus works to 
destabilise the notion of Broom as an ‘open’ work, offering the implied presence of a series of 
definite ‘answers’, and thus placing an limit on the interpretative possibilities of Broom’s non-
ending. Crucially, however, Lenore Sr. is persistently and entirely absent from Wallace’s text: 
Fest notes the significance of the fact that, in a text so obsessed with the efficacy of language, 
‘Lenore Sr never actually says anything in the novel’.87 Even as it establishes her as a limiting 
‘master key’ to its various systems, Broom denies us access to this conclusive ‘grammar’, 
positioning Gramma Beadsman’s totalising ‘answers’ outside the margins of its narrative, 
frustratingly beyond our reach.88 
In her paradoxical state of absent presence, Lenore Sr. comes to stand as an embodied 
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reflection of the particular incompletion presented by Wallace at the end of Broom, an 
incompletion which, I propose, gestures just as much towards the terminal ‘silence’ at the 
conclusion of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus as it does to the pragmatic open-ness of the 
Investigations. Unlike the ‘grammatical’ enquiries of the Investigations, the Tractatus is 
concerned with delineating the limits of language as a complete whole: ‘The limits of my 
language’, Wittgenstein argues, ‘mean the limits of my world’.89 In its attempt to offer an 
‘unassailable and definitive’ account of the structures of language—of everything that can and 
cannot ‘be said’—however, the Tractatus is marked by an incompleteness of its own.90 Over the 
course of his enquiry, the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus comes to argue that the statements of 
philosophy—statements which include, significantly, the propositions of the Tractatus itself—
belong to the class of that which ‘cannot be said’: of the unspeakable, and thus the 
‘nonsensical’. At the conclusion of the Tractatus, therefore, Wittgenstein is faced with the 
paradoxical problem that his own work—a work which has, according to his preface, ‘finally 
solved’ a number of fundamental philosophical problems—is nonsensical.91 This problem is 
famously confronted in the Tractatus’s penultimate proposition: 
My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally 
recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, 
over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up 
on it).  
He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly.92 
Even as it offers an apparently ‘complete’ account of the relationship between language and the 
world, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is, when read according to its own philosophical ‘system’, 
finally ‘senseless’, marked by an unavoidable incompletion. The propositions of the Tractatus 
are imagined as a ‘ladder’ which must be thrown away once it has been climbed, a means of 
gesturing towards something fundamentally unspeakable, something beyond the limits of 
language (‘There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical’).93 It is this 
sense of that which is beyond the reach of language, of an unfinished-ness present in any 
attempt to offer a totalising philosophical account of the world, which is addressed in the 
Tractatus’s final, poetic proposition: ‘Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent’.94 
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 At the conclusion of ‘The Empty Plenum’, Wallace explicitly addresses this ‘terrible & 
moving final prescription’ of ‘the master’s Tractatus’, arguing that the proposition ‘is only 
indirectly what it’s really about. It whispers & plays. It’s really about the plenitude of 
emptiness, the importance of silence, in terms of speech’.95 I would suggest that it is this 
‘important’ silence which we find articulated in the concluding unfinished-ness of Broom. 
While Wallace gestures in part towards the open-ended ‘language-games’ of the Investigations, 
Broom’s ending looks back to the speechlessness evoked by Wittgenstein’s early philosophy: a 
philosophy which directs us towards a totalising ‘completion’, but which finally opens out onto 
an unspeakable blankness, a silence which, while partially prescribed by the text, retains 
something of the ‘mystical’. In this unresolved (and unresolvable) tension between these two 
competing modes of incompletion, Broom offers us a means of theorising our own unstable, 
uncertain readerly responses to the various points of unfinished-ness which mark his body of 
work—of the conflict between dialogic, participatory communication and monologic, 
unspeakable (and unreadable) ‘silence’ which will go on to characterise his subsequent fictional 
oeuvre. 
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2. The Journey Worstward: Girl with Curious Hair 
‘Post-Post-’ 
Since the beginnings of his literary career, criticism of Wallace has placed focus on his 
intertextual engagements with other writers. From the 1986 Kirkus review of Broom, which 
dismissed Wallace as a ‘something of puerile Pynchon, a discount Don DeLillo’,1 to 
Thompson’s recent consideration of the author as a ‘highly pragmatic reader of global texts’,2 
Wallace’s work has been repeatedly considered in terms of its debts to, and encounters with, a 
range of literary intertexts, with Wallace himself consistently figured, as Hayes-Brady has 
argued, as ‘a writer deeply embedded in other writings’.3 Surveying the numerous critical 
accounts of this ‘embeddedness’, we find Wallace’s oeuvre most frequently read in terms of its 
uneasy relationship with his literary predecessors—and, particularly, of its ambivalent, highly 
self-conscious negotiation with the legacy of postmodern metafiction. Drawing on the 
provocative statements of literary intent articulated in his early essays and interviews—
including, most notably, his extended critique of ‘postmodern irony’ in ‘E Unibus Pluram’,4 and 
his collective characterisation of Nabokov, Pynchon, Burroughs, Coover, and Barth as his ‘real 
enemy, the patriarch for my patricide’ in his interview with McCaffery5—critics have frequently 
addressed Wallace’s reflexively-signposted attempts to ‘get over’ the spectre of postmodernism, 
to find his way towards a new mode of ‘post-postmodern’ American writing.6 Whether or not 
we feel that Wallace succeeds in these attempts, this somewhat awkward notion of the ‘post-
postmodern’ nonetheless offers a useful frame for articulating the generational ambivalence 
which marks Wallace’s work. In an influential mid-career analysis, Scott described Wallace’s 
fiction as ‘haunted by a feeling of belatedness’, and we find this sense of the self-consciously 
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belated—the uneasily ‘post-post-’—present within the ambivalent, reflexive invocations of his 
literary predecessors which punctuate Wallace’s novels and stories.7 
 Looking beyond these key points of reference, however, Wallace’s intertextual 
‘readings’ are often more diffuse, and more complex, than this ‘post-postmodern’ tag would 
suggest. Alongside the ghostly ‘patriarchal’ presences of Pynchon and Barth, Wallace’s writing 
is marked by its invocation of a broad range of literary and pop cultural sources. There is 
evidence for this breadth of reading even within Broom: while early commentators focused 
almost exclusively on Wallace’s debt to Pynchon, critics have since reassessed Wallace’s debut 
in terms of its parallel allusions to (and/or parodies of) the work of Updike, Nabokov, Kafka, 
and Puig.8 While these critics have offered a broader understanding of the intertextual co-
ordinates for Wallace’s fiction, I am more concerned with again addressing the question of how 
Wallace’s work engages with these literary intertexts, and how this engagement works to shape 
and inform our own reading of his work. Building on the previous chapter’s exploration of 
Wallace’s philosophical intertextual engagements, this chapter turns to Wallace’s 1989 story 
collection Girl with Curious Hair—and, particularly, to the collection’s final long story 
‘Westward the Course of Empire Takes Its Way’—to investigate the nature of Wallace’s 
intertextual ‘readings’, readings which, I contend, are again defined by an inescapable aspect of 
the incomplete. 
 
‘A weird kind of forger’ 
In many respects, the stories of Girl are characterised by the same early-career ‘clumsiness’ 
which we identified in Broom. Like Wallace’s first novel, Girl is an unmistakably formative 
work, one which displays the marks of an author still establishing the parameters of his fictional 
project. As with Broom, Wallace later expressed a retrospective embarrassment over these early 
stories: in his interview with McCaffery, for example, he acknowledged the ‘unsubtle and 
clumsy’ qualities of ‘Little Expressionless Animals’, while dismissing ‘Westward’ altogether: 
God, even talking about it makes me want to puke. The pretension. Twenty-
five-year-olds should be locked away and denied ink and paper. Everything I 
wanted to do came out in the story, but it came out just as what it was: crude 
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and naive and pretentious.9 
Despite these continued elements of unsubtlety, however, Girl’s stories nonetheless demonstrate 
a development in Wallace’s writing from the ‘college thesis’ limitations of Broom. In part, this 
progression is evident in the range of narrative voices found across the collection. Reflecting on 
Broom in a later interview, Wallace admitted that one of the novel’s key ‘weaknesses’ was that  
a lot of the characters seem to have the same voice: Rick Vigorous sort of 
sounds like David Bloemker who sort of sounds like Norman Bombardini and 
even Lenore’s father. A lot of that is a parody of intellectual prose.10 
By contrast, Girl is marked by an array of distinctive narrative registers: in an early review, 
Alfred Alcorn notes how each of its stories has ‘its own distinct style, its own set of rhetorics’, 
describing Wallace as being ‘like a mockingbird’, both in his adoption of ‘many voices’ and his 
capacity to sing ‘beautifully in all of them’.11 We find evidence of this polyphony throughout 
the book: from the affectless monologue of the psychopathic ‘Sick Puppy’ in the title story, to 
the broken sentences of Mitch and Mayfly in ‘Everything is Green’, to the old-world Jewish 
colloquialisms of Labov in ‘Say Never’, to the voices of the numerous real-world figures 
(including David Letterman, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Jeopardy!-host Alex Trebek) which 
punctuate the collection.12 Significantly, however, Alcorn’s ‘mockingbird’ simile captures how 
these voices are united by an essential aspect of imitation: in his interview with Lipsky, Wallace 
would later reflect on his authorial gifts for mimicry, describing himself as ‘a weird kind of 
forger. I mean, I can sound kind of like anybody’.13 In many respects, Girl’s disparate narrative 
rhetorics can be read as a series of self-conscious ‘forgeries’ of other literary texts. Where 
Broom was primarily defined by its arrangement of competing philosophical ‘systems’, Girl is 
characterised by a comparable assemblage of literary ‘readings’—readings which, in their 
aspects of transparent ‘awkwardness’ of ‘unsubtlety’, again provide an insight into the kind of 
intertextual engagement employed by Wallace across his writing career. 
 Within the scholarly reception of Girl, critics have tracked the various sources for 
Wallace’s forgeries: from ‘Girl with Curious Hair’’s parodic echoing of the nihilistic 
                                                            
9 Wallace, ‘Interview with McCaffery’, pp. 40–1. 
10 Wallace ‘Interview with Kennedy and Polk’, p. 13. 
11 Alfred Alcorn, ‘Review of Girl with Curious Hair’, Harvard Book Review, 15/16, 1990, 14–15 (pp. 
14–15). 
12 Wallace, Girl with Curious Hair. Further references to Girl in this chapter will be placed in parentheses 
in the text. 
13 Wallace, qtd. in Lipsky, p. 258. 
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minimalism of ‘Brat Pack’ writers such as Bret Easton Ellis and Jill Eisenstadt;14 to ‘Lyndon’’s 
homage to the historiographic metafiction of Robert Coover’s The Public Burning (1977);15 to 
‘Everything is Green’’s reproduction of the ‘Dirty Realism’ of Raymond Carver and Jayne 
Anne Phillips;16 to ‘John Billy’’s exaggerated mimicry of William H. Gass’s Omensetter’s Luck 
(1966);17 to ‘Say Never’’s emulation of Jewish American authors such as Philip Roth and Alan 
Lelchuk.18 In the reflexive attention which it draws to these literary intertexts, Girl as a whole 
offers a self-conscious ‘map’ of Wallace’s reading at this early point in his career: Boddy 
characterises the collection as ‘a kind of Künstlerroman, a portrait of the artist’s growth through 
his virtuosic engagement with other books’.19 The nature of Wallace’s intertextual encounters is, 
however, not explicable in straightforward terms: while many seem positioned as critiques 
(Boddy suggests that Wallace’s parodies demonstrate the limitations of his targets’ work, acting 
as ‘a provocation to new forms’), at other points they come closer to appreciative homages, 
attempts to echo the successful strategies of these other writers.20 This uncertainty is present 
within individual stories: even ‘Girl with Curious Hair’, which seems, as Boswell has argued, 
like a parodic effort to explode the vacuity of Ellis’s ‘phony nihilism’, can equally be read as an 
attempt to borrow and reframe the more effective qualities of his writing—Max suggests that 
Wallace, as ‘a natural mimic, [. . .] admired the strong voice Ellis has found; he saw its 
potential’.21 Girl’s intertextual ‘readings’ thus present an unresolved tension, an oscillation 
between admiration and criticism. Through these self-conscious uneasy ‘forgeries’, Wallace can 
be seen to ‘try on’ a series of diverse literary styles, attempting to define his own characteristic 
authorial voice. In this, we find Girl’s stories betraying their compositional origins: much of the 
                                                            
14 Max suggests that ‘Girl’ is ‘written in the same key’ as Ellis’ 1985 novel Less Than Zero (Every Love 
Story, p. 73). See also Boswell, Understanding, p. 78, and Kasia Boddy, ‘A Fiction of Response: Girl 
with Curious Hair in Context’ in Companion to David Foster Wallace Studies, pp. 23–41 (p. 34). 
15 Max notes that Wallace read Coover’s novel ‘shortly before’ composing his own ‘fictionalized 
biography’ (Every Love Story, p. 84). 
16 Boddy characterises the story as Wallace’s attempt at a Carverian ‘low-rent’ tragedy (‘Fiction of 
Response’, p. 33). 
17 Max notes that the story began as an attempt to echo the ‘laconic hillbilly voice’ of Gass’s novel (Every 
Love Story, p. 74). 
18 Boswell argues that the story is an ‘homage to and parody’ of Roth’s ‘lighter work’ (Understanding, p. 
97), while Boddy alternatively suggests that its parodic ‘target’ may have been Lelchuk, a ‘minor’ 
novelist and ‘unsympathetic teacher’ of Wallace’s from Amherst (‘Fiction of Response’, p. 41, n. 12). 
19 Boddy, ‘Fiction of Response’, p. 26. 
20 Boswell, Understanding, p. 79. 
21 Max, Every Love Story, p. 73. Max goes on to note that Wallace ‘would never acknowledge’ his debt to 
Ellis, describing how, when Wallace’s editor Gerry Howard ‘asked after reading the story whether 
Wallace had read Less Than Zero, Wallace told him no’ (Max, Every Love Story, p. 73). 
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collection was written while Wallace was studying for a creative writing MFA at the University 
of Arizona, and we can see how its ‘forgeries’ accordingly read as attempts to ‘workshop’ or 
‘work through’ Wallace’s ambivalent relationship with his literary predecessors and 
contemporaries.22 This sense of Girl’s stories as ‘workshop pieces’ also, however, draws our 
attention to the limitations of these intertextual encounters. In his review, Alcorn concludes that 
the ‘verbal richness’ of the collection ‘doesn’t make up for what might be called a lack of heart’, 
noting that, despite its collection of ‘remarkable voices’, most of Girl’s characters come across 
as ‘puppets on which to hang these voices’.23 In this respect, Wallace’s stories arguably struggle 
to surpass their status as writerly ‘exercises’, anxious ‘ventriloquisms’ marked by an 
unavoidable aspect of hollowness, of incompletion. 
Of course, even as it reflexively invokes and critiques this array of literary intertexts, 
Girl as a whole cannot be wholly dismissed as a series of mere ‘forgeries’: Hering asserts that, 
while it is certainly possible to read the collection as ‘Wallace’s parroting of several preceding 
and contemporary writers’, this approach is ‘a little reductive’.24 Running beneath Girl’s 
ventriloquisms is a consistent suggestion of a larger animating project, an attempt on Wallace’s 
part to ‘move fiction forwards’. Max suggests that Wallace’s post-Broom writing is driven by a 
desire to ‘answer the question of how to write in a new way’, to outline a ‘new direction’ for 
both his own work and for contemporary US fiction more widely.25 In attempting to trace the 
outline of this ‘project’, we find our reading again shaped by the metacommentary offered by 
Wallace’s essays and interviews: specifically, Girl’s intertextual engagements are illuminated 
and recontextualised by Wallace’s first published non-fiction essay, ‘Fictional Futures and the 
Conspicuously Young’.26 ‘Fictional Futures’—first published in the Review of Contemporary 
Fiction in 1988, a year after Girl—presents the first example of Wallace using his non-fiction 
writing to shape the critical reception of his fiction: Boddy goes so far as to suggest that the 
                                                            
22 See Max, Every Love Story, ch. 3. Wallace’s uneasy position as a product of what Mark McGurl has 
termed the ‘Program Era’ (The Program Era: Postwar Fiction and the Rise of Creative Writing 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011)) has been addressed by various critics, including 
Boddy, who describes Girl as ‘both an exemplary product’ of a literary era shaped by the rise of creative 
writing programs and ‘an interrogation of that era’s modes and mores’ (‘Fiction of Response’, p. 23); and 
McGurl himself, who characterises Wallace as a ‘singularly “high performance” product of the Program 
Era [. . .] with all of the fragility and tendency to break down that that term implies’ (McGurl, ‘The 
Institution of Nothing: David Foster Wallace in the Program’, Boundary 2, 41.3 (2014), 27–54 (p. 33)). 
23 Alcorn, p. 15. 
24 Hering, Fiction and Form, p. 20. 
25 Max, Every Love Story, p. 59. 
26 Wallace, ‘Fictional Futures’. 
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collection can be read ‘like a companion volume to the essay, articulating its central anxieties 
and offering preliminary solutions to the problems it raises’.27 While I would contest the 
suggestion that Girl offers any kind of concrete ‘solution’ to the problems identified in 
‘Fictional Futures’, Wallace’s essay offers a persuasive frame for interpreting the collection’s 
aesthetic strategies. The essay finds Wallace surveying and critiquing the field of late-80s US 
literary fiction, identifying ‘a certain numbing sameness about much contemporary young 
writing’.28 Wallace suggests that the ‘vast bulk’ of this writing is dividable into ‘three dreary 
camps’: ‘(1) Neiman Marcus Nihilism, declaimed via six-figure Uppies and their salon-tanned, 
morally vacant offspring’; ‘(2) Catatonic Realism, a.k.a. Ultraminimalism, a.k.a. Bad Carver, in 
which suburbs are wastelands, adults automata, and narrators blank perceptual engines’; and 
‘(3) Workshop Hermeticism’, writing-program-friendly ‘well-made’ stories, reliably featuring 
‘no character without Freudian trauma in accessible past [. . .] no image undissolved into 
regulation Updikean metaphor; no overture without a dramatized scene to “show” what’s 
“told”’.29 In its scathing assessment of these trends, Wallace’s essay provides vital context for 
Girl’s ventriloquisms: it is possible to read a number of Girl’s stories (most notably ‘Girl with 
Curious Hair’, ‘Everything is Green’, and ‘Say Never’) as mapping directly on to these ‘dreary 
camps’, standing as Wallace’s attempts to appropriate and/or parodically critique the work of 
his peers. 
Beyond this, however, ‘Fictional Futures’ also provides an insight into the larger project 
informing these intertextual ‘forgeries’. Wallace’s essay is further concerned with interrogating 
his own uneasy position within this group of ‘Conspicuously Young’ writers, a ‘generation that 
is both New and, in some odd way, One’.30 For Wallace, he and his contemporaries are 
‘conjoined less by chronology’ than by the ‘new and singular environment’ of late-80s US 
culture: an environment characterised by the growing omnipresence of television (‘the 
American generation born after, say, 1955 is the first for whom television is something to be 
lived with, not just looked at. [. . .] TV’s as much a part of reality as Toyotas and gridlock. We 
quite literally cannot “imagine” life without it’), and the commercial logic of late-capitalist 
advertising (‘a young culture so willingly bombarded with messages equating what one 
                                                            
27 Boddy, ‘Fiction of Response’, p. 24. 
28 Wallace, ‘Fictional Futures’, p. 41. 
29 Wallace, ‘Fictional Futures’, p. 41. 
30 Wallace, ‘Fictional Futures’, p. 41. 
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consumes with who one is that brand loyalty is now an acceptable synecdoche of identity, of 
character’).31 Wallace argues that these cultural shifts have radically altered the nature and 
process of ‘literary production’, inevitably informing (and distorting) the ‘aesthetic values and 
literary choices’ of his ‘Conspicuously Young’ generation.32 In a contemporary review of Girl, 
Sven Birkerts interpreted Wallace’s collection as a response to a ‘crisis in the arts’, a collective 
feeling that ‘the greater part of contemporary experience has fallen out of the reach of 
language—or very nearly so’: 
So much of our time is passed in talking on phones, driving on freeways, 
staring at terminals or TV screens, and waiting in lobbies. Larger and larger 
portions of what our lives are made up of cannot be encompassed in coherent 
narrative form. The writer must either distort or else work around the expanding 
blank spots.33 
In ‘Fictional Futures’, Wallace expresses his anxiety over the unstable place of literary fiction 
within this unprecedentedly technologically (and televisually) mediated world, and, with this, 
tentatively points towards the possibility of a ‘next step’ for contemporary US writing, a mode 
of fiction with the power to productively respond to this ‘crisis’. 
Returning to Girl, we can see how Wallace’s collection can thus productively be framed 
as an attempt to determine the nature of this ‘step forward’. This animating project is felt in the 
collection’s explicit concern with the televisual. Two of Girl’s stories (‘Little Expressionless 
Animals’ and ‘My Appearance’) are set in the world of TV-production—a world in which 
characters’ efforts at interpersonal communication and connection are everywhere mediated by 
the presence of a series of screens, mirrors, and lenses. In ‘Little Expressionless Animals’, the 
story’s action is frequently related as ‘reflected in the dark window’ (p. 5), while Jeopardy! 
champion Julie Smith is described as being ‘like some lens, a filter for that great unorganized 
force that some in the industry have spent their whole lives trying to locate and focus (p. 24).34 
In ‘My Appearance’, meanwhile, these distorting reflections and refractions proliferate, with the 
protagonist Edilyn’s appearance on Late Night with David Letterman described as viewed 
                                                            
31 Wallace, ‘Fictional Futures’, p. 42–3. 
32 Wallace, ‘Fictional Futures’, p. 42. 
33 Sven Birkerts, ‘David Foster Wallace’, in American Energies: Essays on Fiction (New York: William 
Morrow, 1992). 
34 In its evocation of these distorting, ‘concave’ and ‘convex’ reflective surfaces, ‘Little Expressionless 
Animals’ offers a further key instance of intertextual appropriation: John Ashbery’s 1975 poem Self-
Portrait in a Convex Mirror (Manchester: Carcanet Press, 1975), a source notably acknowledged on 
Girl’s copyright page. For more on Wallace’s engagement with Ashbery, see Boswell, Understanding, p. 
73–4. 
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through a ‘wall of monitors’, affording ‘several views of me at once’ (p. 189). In these reflected, 
distorted environments, Wallace presents a concretised depiction of a contemporary culture in 
which—as he argues in ‘Fictional Futures’—‘the most significant feature of persons is 
watchableness, and that contemporary human worth is not just isomorphic with but rooted in the 
phenomenon of watching’.35 We find this televisual logic encoded even within the structures of 
Girl’s stories: in his interview with McCaffery, Wallace reflects on the ‘scrambled flash-cut 
form’ he employed in ‘Little Expressionless Animals’, a form which consciously mimics the 
rhythms and techniques of commercial TV (or, perhaps, the experience of channel-surfing).36 
While these pop-culture references were to some extent present in Broom (which notably 
features a Gilligan’s Island-themed bar, and an extended discussion of a drinking game based 
around the Bob Newhart Show), they are here repositioned at the centre of Wallace’s work: Max 
suggests that Girl demonstrates ‘Wallace’s first attempt to treat seriously’ issues that had in 
Broom ‘been played for laughs’.37 This underlying project recontextualises the literary 
ventriloquisms found across the collection: through this series of intertextual ‘exercises’, we 
find Wallace attempting to determine the direction of his imagined literary ‘next step’, to find, 
within these various literary trends and techniques, a mode of writing capable of evoking and 
confronting the particular texture of late-80s American experience. 
Throughout Girl, however, it is difficult to escape the feeling that these attempts are 
themselves incomplete. It is not insignificant that the ‘manifesto’ offered by ‘Fictional Futures’ 
does not, finally, conclude with a vision of what this literary ‘next step’ will actually look like: 
Wallace comes to the conclusion that his ‘Conspicuously Young’ generation is ‘united by 
confusion, if nothing else’, offering only a broad-strokes vision of a ‘Whole New Generation’ 
who will ‘make art, maybe make great art, maybe even make great art change’.38 Confronted 
with Girl’s array of shifting, ambivalent ‘forgeries’, we are left with a cumulative impression of 
a writer entangled within these anxious intertextual ‘readings’, unable to discern a clear ‘way 
forwards’. This incompletion is self-consciously addressed in ‘Here and There’, a story which 
                                                            
35 Wallace, ‘Fictional Futures’, p. 48. Girl’s complex arrangements of reflection and refraction have been 
explored in greater detail by Hering (Fiction and Form, ch. 3). 
36 Wallace, ‘Interview with McCaffery’, p. 39. 
37 Max, Every Love Story, p. 75. 
38 Wallace, ‘Fictional Futures’, pp. 66, 68. This conclusion comes five years before Wallace’s famous—if 
arguably equally vague—call for a fiction of ‘single-entendre principles’ at the close of ‘E Unibus 
Pluram’ (p. 81), an essay which takes up and builds on many of the key ideas from ‘Fictional Futures’. 
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Wallace, in a letter to Steven Moore, claimed was Girl’s ‘only really autobiographical piece’.39 
In the story, Bruce, a ‘hulking, pigeon-toed, blond, pale, red-lipped Midwestern boy’ (p. 153), 
who has been read by various critics as a clear ‘Wallace stand-in’, outlines his desire to become 
‘the first really great poet of technology’ (p. 155).40 Though not a fiction-writer, Bruce—the 
author of ‘an epic poem about variable systems of information- and energy-transfer’ (p. 154)—
reflexively echoes Wallace in his stated belief that he is ‘standing on the cusp between two eras’ 
(p. 162), his desire to find a literary mode capable of responding to a contemporary culture 
defined by screens, technology, and data. Significantly, however, Bruce’s response to this 
‘crisis’ is a far cry from the stories of Girl: he argues that the features of ‘traditional’ literary 
language—the ‘poetic units that allude and evoke and summon’ (p. 167), with their focus on the 
human, the bodily, or the metaphorical—have been rendered obsolete. In their place, he 
positions himself as ‘an aesthetician of the cold, the new, the right, the truly and spotlessly here’ 
(p. 155), envisioning a future poetry consisting entirely of ‘axiom, sign, and function’ (p. 167), a 
literature which leaves behind the inefficiencies and imperfections of language altogether. In 
many respects, Bruce stands as an inverse mirror-image of the Wallace of Girl: if Wallace’s 
collection is inextricably caught up with the literature of the past, Bruce’s poetry is willing to 
abandon the structures and conventions of the ‘literary’ altogether in service to a wholly new, 
technologically-informed kind of writing. Crucially, however, Bruce’s vision of a ‘crystalline 
renaissance; cool and chip-flat’ (p. 155) ultimately embodies only another kind of incompletion. 
Within ‘Here and There’, Bruce’s former girlfriend comments on the nagging sense of 
something missing from Bruce’s poetry: 
I said I wasn't going to pretend like I understood and disagreed but it seemed 
like what he thought about poetry was going to make poetry seem cold and sad. 
I said a big part of the realness that poems were about for me, when I read 
them, was feelings. I wasn't going to pretend to be sure, but I didn't think 
numbers and systems and functions could make people feel any way at all.  
        (p. 167)41 
In its attempts at evoking the technological ‘perfection’ of the contemporary, Bruce’s writing 
becomes almost inhuman, failing to invoke anything approaching ‘real feeling’ in its readers. 
                                                            
39 Wallace, ‘Letter to Steven Moore’, qtd. in Boddy, ‘Fiction of Response’, p. 31. 
40 See Max, Every Love Story, p. 62; Boswell, Understanding, p. 89. 
41 Significantly, Bruce’s literary failures are throughout the story bound up with his wider failures of 
interpersonal communication, and ultimately the breakdown of his romantic relationship (Max argues that 
‘Here and There’ can be read as an ‘exaggerated variant on the typical college breakup story’ (Max, 
Every Love Story, p. 62)). In this drawing together of literary and romantic ‘failures of communication’, 
Bruce thus offers an echo of Rick’s abortive attempts at ‘communicative’ storytelling in Broom. 
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Through its reflexive, distorted, mirroring of Wallace’s own fictional project, ‘Here and There’ 
leads us to recognise the incompleteness of Girl’s efforts to ‘move fiction forwards’, while also, 
simultaneously, inviting us to consider the possibility that any attempt at literary ‘progression’, 
any attempt to decisively outline a ‘next step’ for contemporary writing, will always carry its 
own aspects of the incomplete. 
 
Westward Ho 
Girl’s gestures towards literary ‘progress’ are brought to a head in the collection’s final long 
story, ‘Westward the Course of Empire Takes Its Way’. Boswell describes ‘Westward’ as 
‘repris[ing] all the numerous themes and innovations that preceded it’, and we can see how the 
story stands as both a culmination of and an expansion upon the various strands of enquiry 
raised across Girl.42 ‘Westward’ finds Wallace again focused on depicting and interrogating the 
specific textures of late-1980s American experience: from the inescapable presence of television 
(the story’s central characters engage in an extended debate over the merit and meanings of 80s 
police drama Hawaii Five-O), to the pervasive influence of advertising (the plot follows a 
journey towards a ‘Reunion of Everyone Who’s Ever Appeared in a McDonald’s Commercial’ 
(p. 272), masterminded by advertising mogul J.D. Steelritter), to the uneasy position of literary 
fiction within this contemporary culture (the story’s creative-writing-student protagonists—
attendants of the fictional ‘East Chesapeake Tradeschool Writing Program’—invite 
consideration of the degree to which the business of fiction-writing has been subsumed into this 
commercialised late-80s environment).43 Recapitulating these various ideas, Wallace situates 
‘Westward’ as both a summation of Girl’s concerns and a self-conscious attempt to draw them 
into some kind of coherent whole.  
With this, ‘Westward’ also stands as Girl’s strongest and most explicit claim to outline 
a ‘new direction’ for US fiction. Like Bruce in ‘Here and There’, ‘Westward’’s protagonist—
writing-student and competitive archer Mark Nechtr—offers a knowingly distorted reflection of 
                                                            
42 Boswell, Understanding, p. 70. 
43 In juxtaposing its creative-writing-student protagonists with the unbounded commercialism of 
Steelritter’s McDonald’s ‘Reunion’, ‘Westward’ arguably offers a concrete vision of Wallace’s anxiety, 
expressed in ‘Fictional Futures’, that ‘Writing Programs and their grinding, story-every-three-weeks 
workshop assembly lines could, eventually, lower all standards, precipitate a broadlevel literary 
mediocrity’, that could finally ‘end up with a McStory chain that would put Ray Kroc to shame’ 
(Wallace, ‘Fictional Futures’, p. 61). 
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Wallace himself. Throughout the story, Mark, like the Wallace of Girl, aspires to find a mode of 
fiction which will allow him to reflect and address the perplexities of his contemporary 
moment—to ‘sing to the next generation of the very same sad kids’ (p. 348). As in Girl’s 
preceding ‘ventriloquisms’, Mark’s (and Wallace’s) proposed ‘next step’ is built on a complex 
intertextual encounter with a preceding literary text: in this case, John Barth’s foundational 
work of postmodern metafiction ‘Lost in the Funhouse’ (1968).44 On Girl’s copyright page, 
Wallace acknowledges that parts of ‘Westward’ are ‘written in the margins’ (p. vii) of Barth’s 
short story, and throughout his text Wallace establishes a deeply ambivalent relationship 
between Barth’s work and his own: from his repeated echoes and rewritings of ‘Lost in the 
Funhouse’’s famous opening line (‘For whom is the funhouse fun?’), to the fact that Barth 
himself appears as a character in the story (as the barely-disguised ‘Professor Ambrose’). In 
Mark, we find Girl’s clearest reflexive vision of an attempt to overcome the literature of the 
past—in this case the metafictional strategies of Barth and other postmodern writers—and 
outline a ‘way forward’ for contemporary American writing. Criticism of ‘Westward’ has 
repeatedly returned to this animating notion of literary ‘progress’, of directionality: Charles 
Harris has argued that the story attempts ‘to move beyond Barth’s postmodern synthesis to 
fiction’s next developmental stage’;45 Boswell has suggested that it ‘seeks to chart, if not arrive 
at, a new direction for narrative art’;46 while Boddy has noted that it ‘has come to be seen [. . .] 
as a “manifesto” for fin-de-siècle fiction’s “next step”’.47 
 Even as it establishes this notion of ‘progress’, however, ‘Westward’ is marked by the 
same aspects of incompletion which we have traced across Girl’s stories. Wallace himself 
would later be unsparing in his critique of the story: in his interview with McCaffery, he 
reflected that 
It was a horror show. The stuff’s a permanent migraine. [. . .] And maybe 
‘Westward’’s only real value’ll be showing the kind of pretentious loops you 
fall into now if you fuck around with recursion.48 
While, as we have seen above, this retrospective disparagement is to some degree typical of 
                                                            
44 John Barth, Lost in the Funhouse: Fiction for Print, Tape, Live Voice, (New York: Anchor Books, 
1988), p. 72. 
45 Charles B. Harris, ‘The Anxiety of Influence: The John Barth/David Foster Wallace Connection’, 
Critique: Studies in Contemporary Fiction, 55.2 (2014), 103–26 (p. 120), emphasis added. 
46 Boswell, Understanding, p. 102, emphasis added. 
47 Boddy, ‘Fiction of Response’, p. 23, emphasis added. 
48 Wallace, ‘Interview with McCaffery’, p. 41. 
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Wallace’s later attitudes to his pre-Infinite Jest fiction, his negative opinion of ‘Westward’ has 
been notably echoed within other critical responses to the text. In her New York Times review of 
Girl, Jennifer Levin dismissed ‘Westward’ as a ‘ponderous novella’, one which comes off as the 
sort of inside joke that ‘might play best in a creative writing seminar’.49 Later readings have 
likewise focused primarily on how the story points us towards the greater accomplishments of 
Wallace’s later work: Boswell, for example, describes ‘Westward’ as both an ‘engaging piece of 
pretentious juvenilia’ and ‘an astonishingly confident preface to a masterpiece [Wallace] had 
not even written yet’,50 while Fest argues that the story finds Wallace ‘preparing a narratological 
ground for the emergence of Infinite Jest’.51  
 While there is some truth to these assessments, I would argue that, beyond its status as 
flawed ‘dry run’ for Wallace’s following novel, ‘Westward’ is uniquely intriguing in the sheer 
extent of its failed ‘progression’, its evocation and embodiment of a fundamentally incomplete, 
stalled teleological movement. Hayes-Brady has asserted that ‘the primary recurring image in 
‘Westward’ is of movement, a specifically directed movement with a view to an end point’.52 
This movement is figured most consistently in the story’s central, recurring image of the 
‘westward journey’. The figure of ‘westwardness’ has already emerged at various points across 
Girl’s preceding stories: in the fictional eulogy at conclusion of ‘Lyndon’, for example, Texas 
State Senator Jack Childs implores his listeners to ‘go west. I say the further you go west, the 
nearer you get to Lyndon Baines Johnson’ (p. 109); while in ‘Here and There’ the ‘therapist’ 
meaningfully notes Bruce’s problem with ‘remembering things west’, his tendency to ‘shut off’ 
(p. 158) the voice of the ex-girlfriend who occupies this westward territory. In ‘Westward’, this 
motif is brought to the foreground: from the central journey west towards the suggestively 
named Illinois town of ‘Collision’ undertaken by the protagonists; to the discussions of 
contrasting landscapes East and West of the airport at which these characters find themselves 
stalled (and in which there are, significantly, ‘no windows facing west’ (p. 256)); to, most 
obviously, the title of the text itself. Philip Coleman has argued that the title signals ‘a nexus of 
intertextual routes over a range of contextual domains’, and we can see how Wallace cultivates 
                                                            
49 Jenifer Levin, ‘“Love Is a Federal Highway”: Review of Girl with Curious Hair’, New York Times, 5 
November 1989, section Books <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/11/05/books/love-is-a-federal-
highway.html> [accessed 13 July 2019]. 
50 Boswell, Understanding David Foster Wallace, 102. 
51 Fest, p. 87. 
52 Hayes-Brady, Unspeakable Failures, p. 57. 
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a cluster of intertextual associations—allusions at once diverse and interrelated—around the 
notion of the ‘westward journey’, resisting any attempt to ascribe a univocal interpretation or 
reading.53 In presenting us with this swirling ‘nexus’ of associations, ‘Westward’ establishes a 
series of interpretative frames for making sense of its own incomplete attempt at ‘literary 
progress’. I would suggest that, by teasing out the various meanings and allusions encoded 
within this central image of ‘westwardness’, we are thus offered a unique insight into the kind 
of reading, the particular mode(s) of intertextual engagement, carried out by Wallace within the 
story—and across Girl as a whole. 
 The most obvious intertextual ‘reading’ invoked by Wallace’s conception of westward 
movement is that explicitly signalled by the story’s title, which refers to the final stanza of 
George Berkeley’s 1728 poem ‘Verses on the Prospect of Planting Arts and Learning in 
America’ (and, perhaps even more famously, to an 1861 mural by Emmanuel Gottlieb Leutze, 
currently displayed in the US Capitol Building in Washington DC).54 In its dual allusions to 
Berkeley and Leutze, the story’s title immediately situates Wallace’s exploration of westward 
movement in relation to what Coleman has referred to as ‘a context of ideas about the meaning 
of “America” and “Americanness”’.55 In Berkeley’s poem, America is figured as a 
mythologised site of cultural progress, ‘the seat of innocence / Where nature guides and virtue 
rules’—the journey west is imagined as a progression towards this Edenic America, a fertile 
ground for the ‘rise of empire and of arts’.56 Meanwhile, Leutze’s 1861 mural—depicting the 
journey westward undertaken by American pioneers across the continent—acts as an 
affirmation of an American-ness founded on this westward expansion, a journey which, in its 
symbolic progression from darkness into light, frames the ‘course of empire’ as the realisation 
of a ‘manifest destiny’ for the American people. 
 The enduring significance of this American figure of the ‘westward journey’ is 
illustrated in Frederick Jackson Turner’s influential 1893 essay ‘The Significance of the 
Frontier in American History’, which offers a model of US history in which the country’s 
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in Consider David Foster Wallace, pp. 62–74 (p. 63). 
54 George Berkeley, ‘Verses on the Prospect of Planting Arts and Learning in America’, in The Works of 
George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, Volume 7, ed. by A. A. Luce (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 
1955), p. 373. 
55 Coleman, p. 66.  
56 Berkeley, p. 373. Coleman has further explored the extent to which Wallace’s reading of Berkeley’s 
philosophy informs his ‘considerations of American selfhood’ (Coleman, p. 65). 
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origins as an expanding western frontier have been instrumental in shaping a collective 
understanding of ‘American development’.57 While Turner’s thesis is written at the close of this 
period of expansion, he suggests that US identity continues, and will continue, to be shaped by 
the notion of an ‘empire’ which progresses westward: 
He would be a rash prophet who should assert that the expansive character of 
American life has now entirely ceased. Movement has been its dominant fact, 
and, unless this training has no effect upon a people, the American energy will 
continually demand a wider field for its exercise.58 
For Turner, American identity is founded on the ‘fact’ of a westward progression which, if no 
longer applicable in geographical terms, is still essential in informing a collective conception of 
American-ness. In the years since its publication, Turner’s thesis has been hugely influential, 
both in illustrating how idealised narratives of ‘American progress’—such as those offered by 
Berkeley and Leutze—have informed discussions around US identity, and in itself continuing to 
shape these discussions through the 20th century.59  
 With this intertextual frame in mind, the car ride at the centre of ‘Westward’ can thus be 
read as a parodic re-enactment of the ‘pioneer’s journey’ depicted in Leutze’s mural, with Mark 
Nechtr, D.L. Eberhardt, and Tom Sternberg cast as contemporary pilgrims, making their way 
from an Eastern landscape (described as ‘hard to even look [at]: flat right to the earth’s curve’ 
(p. 244)) towards a western ‘Reunion’ figured in the ‘ecstatic’, ‘halcyon’ (p. 310) terms of 
biblical revelation. By staging a version of this uniquely American ‘progress’, Wallace invites 
consideration of the contemporary implications of a national identity still bound up with notions 
of westward expansion.60 While, as Paul Giles has suggested, the journey in ‘Westward’ could 
be read as ‘exemplifying a familiar strain of American pastoral’, in which ‘the movement 
westward epitomizes a paradigmatic shift from corruption into authenticity’, I would suggest 
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that Wallace’s text is more concerned with subverting this American model of ‘cultural 
idealism’.61 Wallace’s suspicion towards American ‘westwardness’ is implied in part within the 
title’s allusion to Berkeley: in establishing westward progress as the ‘course of empire’, Wallace 
draws attention to the problematic implications of American expansion. From a contemporary 
perspective, Turner’s conception of ‘winning a wilderness’ carries inescapable connotations of 
colonialist violence. By framing the narrative’s central westward journey as a tracing of the path 
of ‘Empire’, Wallace destabilises any suggestion of an unproblematic movement towards 
‘authenticity’, tacitly reminding the reader of the fact that this American ‘progress’ is also the 
progress of a violent imperialism.  
The troubling implications of this ‘progress’ are only reinforced when we turn to 
another reading of ‘westwardness’: that of the journey west as a figure for the apocalyptic 
progression of late-20th century postmodernism. Amid the critical response to ‘Westward’, this 
model has perhaps been the most pervasive: Fest, for example, argues that the story’s title 
‘forces us to pause in terms of the directionality of the novella’s structure and its historical 
relationship to postmodern literature’.62 Certainly, Wallace’s ambivalence towards postmodern 
metafiction is founded on an awareness of its eschatological movement: in his interview with 
McCaffery, Wallace argues that ‘metafiction’s real end has always been Armageddon’.63 This 
assertion is traceable back to Barth’s 1967 essay ‘The Literature of Exhaustion’, where he 
characterised postmodern fiction as expressing the ‘used-upness of certain forms or the felt 
exhaustion of certain possibilities’, arguing that it ‘reflects and deals with ultimacy, both 
technically and thematically’.64 For Wallace, the recursive self-consciousness in works such as 
‘Lost in the Funhouse’ only moves further towards this exhaustion, and, indeed, towards a self-
destructive exhaustion of literary possibilities: he concludes that ‘art’s reflection on itself is 
terminal’.65 In ‘Westward’, the protagonists’ journey can thus be read as following this 
movement towards metafictional exhaustion, to an apocalypse manifested in their westward 
destination of ‘Collision’. Wallace retrospectively described ‘Westward’ as an attempt ‘to get 
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the Armageddon-explosion, the goal metafiction’s always been about [. . .] to get it over with’: 
in its description of the protracted car ride towards Collision, Wallace reflects on his own 
movement towards this imagined Armageddon, his ostensible desire to exhaust the ‘literature of 
exhaustion’ altogether.66 
 Beyond this, we find this apocalyptic trajectory equally present in ‘Westward’’s broader 
depiction of American late capitalist postmodernity. Connie Luther has argued that ‘Westward’ 
‘identifies a postmodernism that is more far-reaching than a mere literary movement [. . .] 
portraying rather an all-pervasive cultural phenomenon’67—a portrayal which she traces back to 
Fredric Jameson’s famous characterisation of postmodernism as a ‘cultural dominant’, an 
expression of the underlying ‘logic’ of late capitalism.68 Following Luther, we can thus read the 
central journey in ‘Westward’ as charting an eschatological movement towards an apocalyptic 
endpoint, not merely for the self-referential strategies of Barth’s metafiction, but also for 
Jameson’s conception of cultural postmodernity. The ‘Reunion’ which serves as the final 
destination for the characters in ‘Westward’ is repeatedly figured in terms of a culmination of 
American late capitalist consumerism: 
The Reunion will be huge. Larger than life. Beyond belief. Forty-four thousand 
actors, endorsers, celebrities, former actors, returning. 44,000 who will—
photorecorded—reunite, greet, meet and eat. Eat. An irruption of ninety-nine-
and-forty-four-one-hundredths percent pure consumption. (p. 309) 
 This orgy of collective consumption is described in persistently eschatological terms: it is the 
‘Reunion to end all reunions’ (p. 267), a grotesque literalisation of the ‘Armageddon-explosion’ 
which Wallace imagines as the end-point for postmodernism. Here, we find the self-reflexive 
aesthetic strategies of Barth’s literary ‘exhaustion’ uneasily subsumed into the wider movement 
of this apocalyptic postmodern ‘journey west’—a subsumption parodically concretised in 
Steelritter’s scheme to open a chain of ‘Funhouse’ nightclubs modelled on the ‘funhouse’ of 
Barth/Ambrose’s short story.69 
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 In this suggestion of a shared apocalyptic telos for postmodern literature/culture, 
‘Westward’ again gestures back to the final quatrain of the Berkley poem from which its title is 
taken: 
Westward the course of Empire takes its way.  
     The four first acts already past,  
A fifth shall close the drama with the day:  
     Time’s noblest offspring is the last.70 
Berkeley’s westward progress is imagined as a movement towards finality, a concluding act 
which will ‘close the drama with the day’. Through its interrogation of postmodernity, 
‘Westward’ traces a line of connection between Berkeley’s ‘Empire’ and the hegemonic 
‘empire’ of late capitalism. For Wallace, the self-referential strategies employed by writers such 
as Barth, and the broader instances of cultural postmodernism noted by theorists such as 
Jameson, are cumulatively seen to participate in the inexorable ‘progress’ of a contemporary US 
culture in which the logic and values of the market have become inescapable. It is significant 
that the apocalyptic destination which Wallace imagines for postmodern culture is the same as 
that of the story’s ‘pioneers’. By allowing these readings of westwardness to run parallel, 
Wallace invites us to consider the extent to which American national identity has been co-opted 
by the commercial logic of late capitalism (as exemplified in Steelritter’s Reunion)—and, 
indeed, the possibility that the American-ness described by Turner has been complicit in 
allowing this market-driven culture to develop. Turner himself notes that the American culture 
he articulates—a ‘democracy born of free land, strong in selfishness and individualism’—holds 
within it the possibility of ‘pressing individual liberty beyond its proper bounds’, 
acknowledging that this ‘has its dangers as well as its benefits’.71 In ‘Westward’, we are 
confronted with the suggestion that the ‘progress’ of late-20th century postmodernity has been 
facilitated by the same individualism which Turner posits as central to US national identity, that 
these interrelated ‘journeys west’ are all iterations of the same eschatological movement.  
Looking beyond these overlapping ‘readings’, Wallace’s central image of westwardness 
also invokes a further broader historical model of literary ‘progress’. Returning once more to 
‘Verses on the Prospect’, we can see how Berkeley’s idealised imagining of the ‘journey west’ 
is concerned with an artistic and cultural movement as much it is with an imperial one: his 
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version of American progress is self-consciously literary, initiated by an exhausted Muse who 
seeks out ‘subjects worthy fame’ in America, and embodied and recorded by ‘future poets’ who 
draw fresh inspiration from this Edenic ‘New World’.72 Taking this into account, Wallace’s 
images of ‘westwardness’ can also be seen to refer to this artistic voyage into uncharted 
territory, to the ‘step forward’ which he attempts to take in his own ambitious text. In Mark 
Nechtr’s endeavours to name and define a new mode of post-Barthian/Ambrosian, and perhaps 
even ‘post-postmodern’, fiction (‘Maybe it's called metalife. Or metafiction. Or realism. Or 
gfhrytytu. He doesn't know’ (pp. 332–3), Wallace reflects on the literary ambitions at the heart 
of his story, and of Girl as a whole. The story’s ‘journey westward’ can thus be read as figuring 
the progression of literary history attempted by both Nechtr and Wallace, a progression 
imagined as a linear movement from one literary generation to another. 
In this notion of generational literary ‘progression’, Wallace invokes the presence of 
Harold Bloom, whose Anxiety of Influence outlines a model of literary history as a succession of 
‘strong poets, major figures with the persistence to wrestle with their strong precursors, even to 
their death’.73 For Bloom, literary influence is understood as a generational struggle, a Freudian 
confrontation between the ‘ephebe’ and their literary ‘father’ figure. Various critics have argued 
that Wallace’s conflicted engagement with his postmodern predecessors can be read in relation 
to Bloom’s theory: Harris, for example, interprets ‘Westward’ as a sustained engagement with, 
and enactment of, The Anxiety of Influence, arguing that Bloom’s work ‘is as important an 
intertext in “Westward” as “Funhouse”’.74 In his own description of ‘Westward’ as an ‘homage 
and patricidal killing thing’ to Barth, Wallace drew deliberate attention to the connections 
between Bloom’s text and his own.75 Approached in this context, the story’s various instances 
of ‘westward’ movement—and most pertinently the literary ‘progress’ coveted by both Nechtr 
and Wallace—figure the progression of a distinctly Bloomian version of literary history: a 
generational line of succession from one ‘strong poet’ to the next. 
 This reading becomes clearer when we investigate further the intertextual reference 
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points encoded within Wallace’s image of ‘westwardness’. Beyond its clear allusions to 
Berkeley and Leutze, the ‘westward journey’ of Wallace’s story also signals a separate and 
specific literary lineage, one traceable backwards through the work of Wallace’s postmodernist 
and modernist forebears. This can be seen by turning again to Barth, whose short story ‘Water-
Message’ (another text from his 1968 Lost in the Funhouse collection, and another narrative 
centred around a fictionalised version of Barth named ‘Ambrose’) contains a further reference 
to westward movement. At the climax of ‘Water-Message’, the young Ambrose discovers a 
‘sea-wreathed bottle’, which induces a ‘greater vision, vague and splendrous’:  
Westward it lay, to westward, where the tide ran from East Dorset. Past the 
river and the Bay, from continents beyond, this messenger had come. Borne by 
the currents as yet uncharted, nosed by fishes as yet unnamed, it had bobbed for 
ages beneath strange stars. Then out of the oceans it had strayed; past cape and 
cove, black can, red nun, the word had wandered willy-nilly to his threshold.76  
For Ambrose this water-message holds a significance bound up with its mysterious 
westwardness: ‘Water-Message’ stands as a fragmentary Künstlerroman, with the message-in-a-
bottle’s mysterious ‘word’ directing Ambrose on the path towards being a writer. While the 
bottle’s message is itself almost empty of content, it has acquired meaning in the fact of its 
journey, a journey which Ambrose, in his westwardly-directed ambitions, seems poised to 
continue. Like ‘Westward’, ‘Water-Message’ invokes the context of the American cultural 
‘journey west’ imagined by Berkeley; beyond this, however, it also points back towards a 
literary text which offers yet another source for Wallace’s exploration of westwardness: that of 
James Joyce’s The Dead. 
 Joyce’s 1914 story—a work which, like Wallace’s ‘Westward’, acts as both coda to and 
summation of the ideas explored in its surrounding collection—concludes with another instance 
of a symbolically suggestive journey west, as the protagonist Gabriel Conroy looks out of the 
window at the snow falling ‘all over Ireland’: 
A few light taps upon the pane made him turn to the window. It had begun to 
snow again. He watched sleepily the flakes, silver and dark, falling obliquely 
against the lamplight. The time had come for him to set out on his journey 
westward.77 
As in Barth’s and Wallace’s stories, the significance of this ‘journey west’ remains oblique, and 
as such invites a number of various and potentially conflicting readings: in an essay focused on 
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this ‘strange sentence’, Jack Foran notes how the figure of the westward journey suggests a 
‘constellation of related meanings’, referring both to a projected future journey by Gabriel to the 
west of Ireland, and also to the human journey towards the ‘western horizon’ of death.78 Beyond 
this, Foran argues that this journey also figures a literary progression: that within ‘The Dead’, 
the anticipated westward movement of Gabriel Conroy—a character who, like Ambrose and 
Nechtr, serves as a fictionalised version of Joyce—can be read as a statement of intent on 
Joyce’s part, a figure of the literary ‘next step’ which he intends to take in the writing of his 
modernist masterpiece Ulysses.79 Although Gabriel’s, and Joyce’s, journey into the heart of 
Ireland is in many ways distinct from the American journeys found in Barth and Wallace, it 
nonetheless offers a model for both writers in imagining the ‘progression’ of literature as a 
‘journey west’. In this figure of westward movement, Wallace invites us to trace a Bloomian 
line of poetic succession back to Joyce via Barth, to consider the ‘journey west’ as in each case 
representative of a literary ‘step forward’, from the modernism of Joyce’s Ulysses, to the 
postmodernism of Barth’s Lost in the Funhouse, to the as-yet-unnamed ‘post-postmodern’ 
fiction attempted (or at least described) in ‘Westward’. 80  
 Even as he invokes this conception of a westwardly-developing line of literary 
‘progress’, however, Wallace again draws attention to the problems inherent in these models of 
teleological, directional movement. While it is clear that ‘Westward’ engages in dialogue with 
The Anxiety of Influence, I would contest Harris’s argument that Wallace is predominantly 
‘impressed’ by ‘the explanatory power of Bloom’s theory’.81 Rather, across ‘Westward’ 
Wallace interrogates the implications of Bloom’s conception of literary ‘progress’. In its 
imagined succession of ‘strong poets’, Bloom’s model progresses on fundamentally linear, 
patriarchal terms: ‘battle between strong equals, father and son as mighty opposites, Laius and 
Oedipus at the crossroads’.82 By staging a version of this ‘battle’, Wallace situates himself in 
relation to this this developing ‘canon’, but equally highlights the limitations of Bloom’s lineage 
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of (almost exclusively male) ‘strong’ writers.83 This suggestion is supported in Wallace’s 
positioning of this 20th century literary tradition alongside the other problematic ‘journeys west’ 
invoked in ‘Westward’. By aligning this Bloomian model of linear literary progress with the 
connected notions of both the ‘progress’ of American national identity and the ‘progress’ of 
contemporary postmodernity, Wallace again leads us to consider the potential connections 
between these versions of teleological movement. Mark’s ‘journey’ towards a new fiction is 
bound up with his geographical journey across the American continent, and, as such, is directed 
towards the same apocalyptic destination of Steelritter’s Reunion. Drawing together these 
various versions of ‘westwardness’, Wallace invites the question of whether the progressing 
‘canon’ of 20th century fiction has been absorbed by, and perhaps contributed to, the steadily 
developing hegemony of late capitalism, and whether it, too, is headed inevitably towards the 
telos of unrestrained commercialism envisioned by Steelritter. Beyond his direct critique of 
Ambrose/Barth’s ‘selling out’, Wallace raises the prospect that Mark’s—and, by extension, his 
own—attempts to ‘chart a new course’ for contemporary fiction might be doomed, unable to 
separate themselves from the ‘course of empire’. 
 
‘The unmuffled engine dies’ 
Crucially, however, ‘Westward’’s various narratives of uneasy ‘progress’ are united in the 
extent to which they are delayed, interrupted, or stalled altogether. The clearest example of this 
failed progression is presented by the plot: the movement of Mark, D.L., and Tom towards 
Collision is repeatedly faced with deferrals and digressions, from their extended wait for a ride 
from Central Illinois Airport, to Mark’s feeling during the subsequent drive that ‘they’re 
circling. They are not, by any means, creating for themselves the shortest distance between C.I. 
Airport and Collision’ (p. 326). These delays culminate in a final breakdown: 
The unmuffled engine dies, the jacked-up car coasting in a sudden roaring 
absence of homemade sound and halting in the shoulderless space between 
rural blacktop and bare fallow field, by the field's ditch, in dirt, maybe a 
quarter-mile from where the road they're on takes its last curve left, West, dead 
into Northeast Collision. All that's there to hold your eye up ahead are three tiny 
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rural shacks, shanties, up by the big broad leftward curve. The shanties keep 
you from seeing exactly where the curved road goes. (p. 341) 
Like Broom’s array of unresolved plot threads, ‘Westward’’s ending denies both characters and 
readers the possibility of narrative resolution. The story’s ‘journey west’ has been cut short 
before ‘the last road takes its final Westward curve’ (pp. 343–4); its terminus remains obscured, 
mysterious. While Wallace directly addresses readers with the assurance that his characters will, 
eventually, reach the Reunion—that ‘in time, they’ll arrive at what’s been built’ (p. 372)—this 
promised conclusion fails to materialise within the confines of the text. 
 Beyond these plot-level examples, this ‘stalling’ is further reflected in the story’s form: 
even as Wallace describes the interruptions faced by Mark, D.L., and Sternberg, ‘Westward’ is 
formally characterised by abundant instances of textual digression and authorial interjection, 
breaks in the ‘progress’ of its narrative. These digressions—often taking the form of intrusions 
from the voice of ‘the author’—are self-consciously signposted throughout, from sections with 
headings such as ‘A REALLY BLATANT AND INTRUSIVE INTERRUPTION’ (p. 264), to 
points where the narrating voice apologises for what ‘may have seemed like a digression [. . .] 
and as of now a prolix and confusing one, and I’ll say that I’m sorry, and that I am acutely 
aware of the fact that our time together is valuable. Honest’ (p. 235). Despite the narrator’s 
professed ‘honesty’, these apologies only draw further attention to the plot’s deferred 
movement, the fact that ‘the story isn’t getting anywhere, isn't progressing in the seamless 
Freitagian upsweep we should have scaled by this, mss. p. 35, time’ (p. 269).84 In these 
digressions and interruptions, ‘Westward’ extends into a narrative and textual excess which 
troubles its definition as ‘short’ story: while it is positioned alongside the stories of Girl, the 
expansive length of ‘Westward’ has led to its more often being referred to as a ‘novella’.85 
Boswell has characterises the text as resisting formal classification, having ‘the page bulk of a 
short novel and the dramatic compression of a short story that goes on too long’.86 This 
conception of ‘Westward’ as a short narrative that ‘goes on too long’, outstaying its welcome, is 
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useful in its illustration of the shape and project of Wallace’s text. In contrast to the panoramic 
scope, the multiplicity of characters, locations, and voices, found in his novels, ‘Westward’—in 
primarily restricting itself to depicting the protracted journey of its three central characters—
retains the narrower focus of the other stories in Girl. This comparatively linear narrative is 
stretched to novella-length not in the scope of the story it tells, but rather in its endless deferrals, 
its resistance to narrative progression. As the plot progresses, Wallace’s repeated promises of a 
‘FINAL INTERRUPTION’ (p. 331) are superseded by sections with headings such as 
‘ACTUALLY PROBABLY NOT THE LAST INTRUSIVE INTERRUPTION’ (p. 346). In the 
self-conscious overextension of its narrative, and the repeated delaying of its conclusion, 
Wallace invites us to consider ‘Westward’ as a short story which fails to end, a text which 
stretches the short-story form (and with it, the attention of its readers) up to, and perhaps 
beyond, breaking point.  
 This stalled progression is further evident in the reflexive focus which ‘Westward’ 
places on the deferrals and disruptions of its own attempts to ‘move fiction forward’, to carry 
out a Bloomian ‘patricidal killing’ of Barth’s postmodern fiction. The interruption of this 
literary ‘progress’ is evident partially in the story’s undermining of Bloom’s linear model of 
literary history. Although Wallace’s nested invocations of Barth and Joyce certainly invite 
consideration of ‘Westward’ in the context of a defined poetic ‘lineage’, the text as a whole 
consistently destabilises the directional, patrilineal structures of Bloom’s theory. We have 
discussed above the variety of intertexts invoked by the story’s recurring figure of 
‘westwardness’; beyond this, critics have identified numerous other points of literary reference 
for Wallace’s story.87 In establishing this multiplicity of possible intertexts, Wallace challenges 
any attempt to pigeonhole ‘Westward’ as a univocal attempt to ‘outdo’ Barth, and 
simultaneously critiques the limitations inherent in Bloom’s linear model of literary influence. 
Following the range of ‘ventriloquisms’ found across Girl, Wallace situates ‘Westward’ in 
relation to a variety of writers and thinkers (a group which exceeds the narrow classification of 
‘postmodern fiction’), cumulatively offering a version of intertextual engagement more 
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complex, and more diffuse, than that allowed by the more rigid literary ‘canon’ offered by 
Bloom. 
 This disruption is seen most clearly in the story’s extended engagement with Cynthia 
Ozick’s 1976 story ‘Usurpation (Other People’s Stories)’. Along with ‘Lost in the Funhouse’, 
‘Usurpation’ is acknowledged by Wallace on Girl’s title page as one of the texts in whose 
‘margins’ ‘Westward’ is self-professedly written. In the case of ‘Usurpation’, Wallace’s 
intertextual engagement is evident in a passage which directly borrows from Ozick’s text: 
[. . .] occasionally a writer will encounter a story that is his, yet is not his. I 
mean, by the way, a writer of stories, not one of these intelligences that analyze 
society and culture, but the sort of ignorant and acquisitive being who moons 
after magical tales. Such a creature knows very little: how to tie a shoelace, 
when to go to the store for bread, and the exact stab of a story that belongs to 
him, and to him only. (p. 294) 
This passage, which recites verbatim the opening of Ozick’s story, is significant in presenting a 
version of intertextual relationships which already stands at odds with that described by 
Bloom.88 Ozick’s imagined writer suffers a kind of anxiety of influence in their discovery of a 
story which both is and is not their own: she goes on to articulate the way this anxiety is felt in 
the instances where ‘it happens that somebody else has written the story first’.89 Unlike Bloom, 
however, Ozick does not figure this anxiety as a necessary aspect of the ‘progression’ from one 
literary generation to another, but rather as something more chaotic and unpredictable, a product 
of chance which occurs only ‘occasionally’.  
 Considering ‘Usurpation’ as a whole, we find Ozick developing a cumulative 
impression of intertextual influence as something altogether messier and more prosaic than the 
mythologised generational struggle imagined by Bloom. Within the story, writers are figured as 
‘cheats and fakes’ who ‘hunt themselves up in stories, sniffing out twists, insults, distortions, 
transfigurations, all the drek of the imagination’; later, the narrator reflects that ‘what people 
call inspiration is only pilferage’.90 Ozick frames literary influence as a form of usurpation, not 
in the regal, Oedipal terms laid out by Bloom, but rather as a series of thefts, borrowings and 
echoes between various conflicting sources: 
‘All stories are rip-offs’, I said. ‘Shakespeare stole his plots. Dostoyevski dug 
them out of the newspaper. Everybody steals. The Decameron’s stolen. 
                                                            
88 Cynthia Ozick, ‘Usurpation (Other People’s Stories)’, in Bloodshed and Three Novellas (Syracuse, NY: 
Syracuse University Press, 1995), pp. 131–78 (p. 131). 
89 Ozick, p. 131. 
90 Ozick, pp. 133, 160. 
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Whatever looks like invention is theft’.91 
In ‘Usurpation’, literary history is imagined not as a line of succession, but an accumulation of 
usurpations, of attempts by writers to replace one another within the literary establishment, 
whether by stealing, sabotage, or flattery. These instances of literary supplanting—which do not 
follow a linear path (a speaker describes ‘stealing from two disparate tales’ by ‘smash[ing] their 
elements one into the other’)—offer an alternative to the coherent literary ‘canon’ imagined by 
Bloom.92 This suggestion is further compounded by the fact that Ozick herself does not readily 
conform to the mould of writers generally considered as Wallace’s literary ‘forebears’. In 
comparison with the lineage of—exclusively male and white—postmodern ‘father’ figures cited 
by Wallace as the targets of his generational critique, Ozick stands apart. When asked about 
Ozick’s influence on his work in an interview with Mark Schechner (who remarked that the two 
writers ‘seem so different’), Wallace ironically joked that they were ‘both politically active 
Jewish females’, going on to describe Ozick as an ‘immortally good pure prose writer’, and 
noting that, despite his being ‘about the goyest gentile anybody’s ever met’, he could 
nonetheless ‘feel in my nerve endings the kind of stuff she is writing about’.93 In his invocation 
of Ozick, Wallace disrupts his own ostensibly straightforward attempts to ‘progress’ beyond the 
influence of Barth’s postmodernism, dismantling the impression of Barth as the sole, or even 
primary, ‘patriarch’ for his ‘patricide’. Within ‘Westward’, D.L. Eberhardt characterises, in 
terms which explicitly recall those of ‘Usurpation’, the work of ‘Professor Ambrose’ as 
‘nothing more than the closet of a klepto with really good taste’ (p. 293); across his long story, 
we find Wallace likewise participating in the literary pilferage which for Ozick characterises all 
literary composition. This aspect of ‘usurpation’ applies to Wallace’s reading of Ozick’s text 
itself—a story which, beyond its discussions of literary influence, is equally concerned with a 
series of questions surrounding religion, Jewishness, and the relationship between writing and 
idolatry. Here, we again find Wallace’s intertextual encounters built on an incomplete reading, a 
fragmentary and self-serving intertextual ‘theft’ crystallised in ‘Westward’’s decontextualised 
                                                            
91 Ozick, p. 161. 
92 Ozick, p. 157. 
93 Wallace, ‘Interview with Mark Schechner’ (2000), in Conversations, pp.  104–109 (pp. 108–9). 
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‘rip-off’ of ‘Usurpation’’s opening paragraph.94 By invoking Ozick’s chaotic, nonlinear model 
of intertextual appropriation, Wallace allows us to reframe the various intertextual ‘readings’ of 
‘Westward’—and, with this, the further literary ‘forgeries’ found across Girl as a whole—via 
this more complex, shifting, and essentially incomplete conception of the ‘progress’ of literary 
history. 
 It is this incomplete ‘progression’, then, which we find reflected in the manifest 
unfinished-ness of ‘Westward’’s own literary project. Wallace’s reflexive awareness of his 
failed ‘next step’ in ‘Westward’ becomes clearer when we consider again his representation of 
Mark Nechtr’s stalled attempts to ‘sing to the next generation’, to find a fictional mode which 
will ‘progress’ beyond the influence of Barth/Ambrose. Wallace places focus on Mark’s 
attempts to theorise what this ‘new fiction’ might look like, to make sense of its relationship 
with its literary forebears, and to assign it a name: we are faced variously with the suggestion 
that this fiction should be like a cruel lover, ‘should treat the reader like it wants to [. . .] well, 
fuck him’ (p. 331); that it should be ‘made out of a funhouse’, albeit one which is ‘a frictionless 
plane. Cool, smooth, never grasping [. . .] burnished to a mirrored gloss’, in which the ‘Exit 
would never be out of sight’ (p. 331–2); that it should ‘NOT be metafiction’ (p. 332), but rather 
‘use metafiction as a bright smiling disguise’ (p. 333); and that it should be a ‘Trinitatian 
fiction’ which is ‘distinctively American’ and ‘cold as any supermarket—probably more 
economics than art’ (p. 347). In Mark’s conceptualisations of this literary ‘next step’, 
‘Westward’ reflects again on Wallace’s own attempts to ‘progress’ the course of contemporary 
US fiction. Critics have identified clear parallels between Mark’s theories of ‘Trinitarian fiction’ 
and Wallace’s own ideals for contemporary US writing: Boswell argues that Mark serves as 
‘Wallace’s projection of the writer of literature’s resuscitation’.95 Beyond this, however, 
Wallace equally uses Mark’s failures to place focus on the limitations of his own work, the 
incomplete nature of his own theories for the ‘progress’ of contemporary fiction. In the sheer 
                                                            
94 A further example of Wallace’s ‘pilfering’ in ‘Westward’ can be found in an unacknowledged 
borrowing from Don DeLillo’s 1973 novel Great Jones Street: in the aforementioned passage detailing 
the writer’s encounter with ‘a story that is his, yet is not his’, Wallace describes the ‘usurped’ tale as 
‘menacingly alive, self-sufficient, organic, [. . .] trading chemicals briskly with the air’ (p. 294), directly 
echoing a sentence from Great Jones Street: ‘There seems a fundamental terror inside things that grow, 
things that trade chemicals with the air’ (Don DeLillo, Great Jones Street (London: Houghton Mifflin, 
1973), p. 51). DeLillo’s work offers another significant source for Wallace’s story: his debut novel 
Americana (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), for example, offers a further point of influence in its 
narrative depiction of yet another American ‘journey westward’. 
95 Boswell, Understanding, p. 106. 
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volume of the models which he puts forward in his attempts to characterise a ‘new fiction’, 
Mark stretches the limits of coherence (a suggestion supported by the narrator’s characterisation 
of Mark as ‘a crashing chattering flapjaw, once he lets go’ (p. 347)). Mark’s assemblage of 
disparate and sometimes conflicting theories of literature—an assemblage which continues to 
accumulate and shift as the story progresses—ultimately illustrates the failures of his project.96 
His ‘journey’ towards a new kind of fiction, like the text’s other journeys, finds itself extended 
to the point of frustration, left manifestly incomplete. By drawing attention to these failures, 
Wallace invites us to question whether ‘Westward’ itself should be considered in the same 
terms. 
 This sense of Mark’s failure to put forward—or follow—a coherent ‘programme’ for 
contemporary fiction is supported when we turn to his own story, the narrative-within-a-
narrative which dominates the final pages of ‘Westward’. This story, presented as the 
culmination of Mark’s literary ambitions, begins with a semi-autobiographical account of the 
troubled relationship between ‘a young competitive archer, named Dave, and his live-in lover, 
named L——’ (p. 356). In its personal focus and direct style, Mark’s story initially seems to 
follow through on his desire to escape the self-referential concerns of Ambrose/Barth’s 
metafiction and write something which ‘stabs’ the reader ‘in the heart’. As it progresses, 
however, the story falls into the same metafictional traps which it professedly aspires to 
overcome: as he relates the story of Dave’s murder of L——, and his subsequent trial and 
imprisonment, Mark is seen to ‘compromise the tale’s carefully crafted heartfelt feel and 
charming emotional realism’ (p. 360), shifting instead towards passages of ‘sudden, gratuitous, 
and worst of all symbolic [. . .] surrealism’ (p. 360), incongruous references to pop-cultural 
icons (Dave’s prison Warden is played by Jack Lord, star of ‘Hawaii Five-O’), and heavy-
handed moralising discussions of ‘honour’ in contemporary culture. Perhaps most significantly, 
Mark’s story ‘goes on a bit longer than absolutely necessary’ (p. 357), digressing and deferring 
until it stretches into a textual excess which reflects the shape and structure of ‘Westward’. 
Mark’s failed story presents a version of Wallace’s text in miniature: from its expansive length, 
to its digressive narrative, to its attempts to respond to the self-conscious metafictional 
                                                            
96 This array of literary ‘programmes’, of course, echoes the comparable arrangement of conflicting 
philosophical ‘systems’ at the end of Broom. 
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techniques of Ambrose with a further, ‘meta-metafictional’ layer of self-consciousness.97 This 
abortive story-within-a-story serves to draw reflexive attention to the manifest failures of 
Wallace’s own ‘journey west’, of his own narrative’s incomplete attempts to find or enact a 
‘way forward’ for contemporary American fiction. 
 
Worstward 
Even in its self-conscious failure to outline a coherent ‘next step’ for contemporary US fiction, 
however, I would argue that ‘Westward’ finds (or at least points towards) an aesthetic 
possibility within its various unfinished ‘journeys west’. Crucially, Wallace suggests that there 
might be something useful in these instances of failed ‘progression’—that this failure might 
offer an alternative to the eschatological ‘course of empire’ evoked through the story. Fest has 
noted how Wallace finds possibilities in the frustrated movement of his own narrative: 
In refusing to actually reach Collision, Illinois [. . .] nor to end ‘Westward’ 
properly in any sense at all, but rather to begin another narrative about the 
problems inherent in constructing a narrative, Wallace simultaneously 
acknowledges the impossible task of forging a direction toward something else, 
away from the course of Empire, while holding out a hope that 
perhaps directionality itself, or rather eschatology, can be overturned.98 
I would suggest that this desire to interrupt the inevitable ‘journey west’—to defer or halt the 
various forms of teleological movement which cluster around the figure of ‘westwardness’—
underpins all the incompletions evoked and explored throughout Wallace’s story. Bearing this 
in mind, we can see how the unfinished-ness of ‘Westward’ itself—including Wallace’s 
inability to ‘get to the Armageddon explosion’ of, or find a way to ‘progress beyond’, the legacy 
of postmodern metafiction—might read as being in some way constructive.  
 In this suggestion of a literary failure which is somehow worthwhile or useful, Wallace 
invokes the presence of another key intertext: that of Samuel Beckett, who famously suggested 
that ‘to be an artist is to fail, as no other dare fail’.99 In her investigation into the ‘unspeakable 
failures’ of Wallace’s work, Hayes-Brady suggests that, for an ‘origin’ of the kind of aesthetic 
                                                            
97 The suggestion that Mark’s story is an attempt to offer an ‘authentic’ autobiographical ‘truth’ is 
amplified in the choice of names: by naming Mark’s fictional counterpart ‘Dave’, Wallace draws 
attention to Mark’s own status as a kind of distorted authorial stand-in. Of course, the fact that Mark’s 
autobiographical ‘honesty’ is manifested in this instance of metatextual trickery arguably also points 
towards the essential limitations of Mark’s, and Wallace’s, attempts at ‘authentic’ author-reader 
communication. 
98 Fest, p. 100. 
99 Beckett, Proust, and Three Dialogues, p. 125.  
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failure found through Wallace’s writing, we should ‘look to the deep failures’ of Beckett, whose 
own conception of literary failure, she argues, emerges from the sense that, ‘while to be 
incomplete is not necessarily to fail, to fail is necessarily incomplete’.100 In Beckett’s writing, 
we find the articulation of a literary aesthetic in which art is seen to move steadily towards 
silence, inarticulacy, and failure, an expression of the fact that ‘there is nothing to express, 
nothing from which to express, no power to express, no desire to express, together with the 
obligation to express’.101 This conception of a literature which, even as it fails, is nonetheless 
compelled or obligated to ‘go on’, to continue in its flawed or incomplete attempts at 
expression, is articulated and embodied in Beckett’s late work Worstward Ho (1983), which 
features the famous lines: 
All of old. Nothing else ever. Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try again. Fail 
again. Fail better.102 
In suggesting that it might be possible to ‘fail better’, to build on or make something out of 
failure, Beckett provides a model for the kind of aesthetic incompletion which Wallace explores 
and enacts in ‘Westward’. Worstward Ho is a text which continually moves towards literary 
failure, a text without definable plot, characters, locations, or dialogue, but which nonetheless 
asserts its need to ‘Say on’, to continue in its successive attempts to ‘Try again’ in a steady 
progression ‘worstward’. In this notion of ‘worstwardness’, Beckett provides Wallace with a 
conception of literary ‘movement’ which stands apart from the various versions of ‘westward 
progress’ found throughout Wallace’s story. While ‘Westward’—with its tendency towards 
digression and expansion, literary and linguistic excess—is stylistically far from the spare 
pronouncements of Worstward Ho, it nevertheless arrives at a comparable point: an awareness 
of its own literary failure, combined with a sense that this failure might have a potential of its 
own. 
 Beyond its repeated exploration of instances of stalled progression, then, Wallace’s 
story might be said to evoke and engage in a kind of Beckettian worstward movement, a 
movement which subverts and collapses the narratives of ‘progress’ which serve to reify the 
‘course of empire’. This ‘journey worstward’ is constructed out of an arrangement of 
                                                            
100 Hayes-Brady, Unspeakable Failures, p. 8. 
101 Beckett, Proust, and Three Dialogues, p. 103. 
102 Samuel Beckett, Company / Ill Seen Ill Said / Worstward Ho / Stirrings Still (London: Faber & Faber, 
2009), p. 81. 
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incompletions: from the failure of his characters to reach their destination, to the failure of the 
narrative to reach any kind of resolution or ‘ending’, to the more fundamental flaws which later 
caused Wallace to dismiss the story as a ‘horror show’.103 In his numerous interruptions of and 
digressions from the ‘journey west’, Wallace thus posits ‘worstwardness’ as a kind of anti-
progress: rather than succeeding in his desire to ‘move fiction forward’, Wallace rather engages 
in a series of unfinished attempts to do so, a series which might, perhaps, constitute a kind of 
movement of its own. Here, we are brought back to Connor’s reading of Beckett’s ‘finitude’—
an ‘endingness’ which denotes ‘not the certainty of coming to an end, but the certainty of 
ending unfinished’.104 It is this sense of a movement which, even in its endless extensions, only 
points towards an inevitable incompleteness which we find animating ‘Westward’’s various 
unfinished ‘journeys’. In the context of this negative ‘anti-movement’, we find Wallace’s 
critique of Bloom’s linear ‘progression’ of ‘strong poets’ reinforced by the tentative suggestion 
of an alternate literary ‘tradition’, a loose collection of writers—including Beckett, Ozick, and 
DeLillo—who share a concern with the nature, and potential worth, of literary incompletion. 
While these writers resist categorisation in terms of a linear or coherent ‘canon’, I would argue 
that, in tracing lines of connection between their work, we can gain a greater understanding of 
the context for the engagement with unfinished-ness which we find both in ‘Westward’ and 
across all of Wallace’s fiction. By paying attention to the nature of the various incomplete 
‘journeys’ explored, depicted, or embodied within ‘Westward’—and, with this, to the 
arrangement of correspondingly incomplete ‘readings’ of various literary intertexts found across 
the story—we can see how this uneasy example of ‘pretentious juvenilia’ is in fact crucial to our 
understanding of the larger project of Girl as a collection, and of Wallace’s fictional oeuvre as a 
whole.  
 
 
 
                                                            
103 McCaffery, Wallace, p. 40. 
104 Connor, p. 190. In this, I diverge from Hayes-Brady, who offers a more positive reading of 
‘Westward’ as offering an example of continued dialogic ‘conversation’ between reader and author, a 
physical enaction of ‘the Rortian continuity of dialogue that [. . .] animates the structures of Wallace’s 
writing’ (p. 2). 
79 
 
3. Failed Entertainment: Infinite Jest 
‘Not really a novel’ 
In a much-cited moment from his interview with Lipsky, Wallace characterises his second novel 
Infinite Jest (1996) as a deliberate literary failure: the novel, he notes, was initially known as ‘A 
Failed Entertainment’1—a subtitle which, according to Max, was dropped after Pietsch 
expressed his reservations about putting the words ‘on a book people were supposed to buy’.2 
On the face of it, this characterisation seems counterintuitive for a text widely regarded as 
Wallace’s most influential, ambitious work. Within criticism of Wallace, Jest has been 
repeatedly cited, as Hayes-Brady has noted, as Wallace’s ‘very magnumest opus’:3 Boswell 
describes the novel as ‘both the culmination of [Wallace’s] earlier work and a remarkable 
expansion of his reach and ambition’;4 Burn characterises it as a ‘virtuoso performance’, a 
‘journey into the maelstrom of the modern self’;5 while Holland confidently asserts that it is ‘the 
most accomplished single product of Wallace’s career, and one of the most influential works of 
fiction of the past 50 years’.6 Despite these critical testaments to the novel’s ‘successes’, 
Wallace’s comments frame Jest as a work defined by an underlying structural failure, an 
intentional aspect of formal brokenness. In Wallace’s terms, Jest, like ‘Westward’ before it, 
self-consciously strains against the limits of its form: if ‘Westward’ was a short story which 
‘went on too long’ then Jest is a correspondingly ‘failed’ novel—Wallace tells Lipsky that it is 
‘not really a novel, it’s not supposed to be a novel’.7 To what extent is our reading of Jest 
shaped by this aspect of self-professed ‘failure’? How can this enormous, ambitious, panoramic 
text be classified as an incomplete work, as ‘not really a novel’ at all? 
In attempting to answer this question, it is worth first considering more carefully the 
implications of Wallace’s conception of ‘failed entertainment’. Specifically, Wallace’s phrase 
consciously establishes a comparison between his own novel and the lethal ‘Entertainment’ at 
its centre: James Incandenza’s ‘Infinite Jest’. Though it remains elusive throughout the novel—
its contents related only through fragmentary, contradictory second-hand accounts—the film is 
                                                            
1 Wallace, qtd. in Lipsky, p. 79.  
2 Max, Every Love Story, p. 200. 
3 Hayes-Brady, Unspeakable Failures, p. viii. 
4 Boswell, Understanding, pp. 117–8. 
5 Burn, Reader’s Guide, p. 2. 
6 Holland, ‘Infinite Jest’, in Cambridge Companion to David Foster Wallace, pp. 127–41 (p. 127). 
7 Wallace, qtd. in Lipsky, p. 78. 
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nonetheless situated, as Boswell has argued, ‘firmly at the core of the story’, offering a point of 
connection between Jest’s various disparate narrative threads.8 From the limited information we 
are given, we learn that ‘Jest’ is so completely entertaining that it induces a state of total passive 
spectation in its audience: viewers of the film are left ‘blank, as if on some deep reptile-brain 
level pithed’, wanting ‘nothing else ever in life but to see it again, and then again, and so on’—a 
compulsion finally resulting in their deaths.9 Through Jest, the ‘Entertainment’ is encountered 
most frequently in terms of these lethal effects: as, for example, in the case of the ‘Near Eastern 
medical attaché’ (p. 78) whose experience watching and re-watching an endless ‘recursive loop’ 
of the film—his ‘rictus of a face’ all the while displaying a ‘positive, ecstatic’ expression (p. 
54)—is described intermittently across the novel’s first hundred pages. In many respects, 
Incandenza’s film can be seen to stand as a ‘so-called perfect Entertainment’ (p. 318), a 
grotesque vision of an artwork so ‘complete’, so ‘successful’, that its audience cannot tear their 
eyes away from the screen. In their shared titles, Wallace invites inevitable comparison between 
Incandenza’s film and his own novel: like Mark’s final story in ‘Westward’, Bruce’s coldly 
technological poetry in ‘Here and There’, or Rick’s thinly-veiled autobiographies in Broom, 
Incandenza’s ‘Infinite Jest’ offers a further instance of an artwork-within-the-artwork, a 
(distorted) reflection of its containing text.10 While critics have identified aspects of 
correspondence between the strategies of film and novel,11 Wallace’s own characterisation of 
Jest as a ‘failed’ entertainment establishes an apparent antithesis between the two: indeed, 
Wallace explicitly tells Lipksy that the novel is structured as ‘entertainment that doesn’t work’ 
precisely because ‘what entertainment ultimately leads to, I think, is the movie Infinite Jest’.12 
In establishing this dichotomy, Wallace continues to gesture—as he did at the end of 
‘Westward’—towards an aesthetic possibility within literary failure. Where ‘Infinite Jest’ offers 
a horrifying manifestation of a ‘perfect’ entertainment—a vision of ‘what entertainment 
                                                            
8 Boswell, Understanding, p. 126. 
9 Wallace, Infinite Jest, p. 549. Further references to Jest in this chapter will be placed in parentheses in 
the text. 
10 This recurring use of ‘nested narratives’ in Wallace’s fiction has been explored further by Hering, who 
suggests that Wallace’s fictional artworks can be understood in terms of Lucien Dällenbach’s theory of 
mise-en-abyme: in his nested narratives, Wallace offers a ‘reflection of the text within the text’, in a 
strategy comparable to that of Hamlet’s ‘play-within-a-play’ (Hering, Fiction and Form, p. 86). 
11 Frank Louis Cioffi for example, has argued that the novel is itself ‘addictive’ in the same way as 
Incandenza’s film, going so far as to suggest that ‘[t]o read Infinite Jest is, almost, to watch the fatal 
videotape’ (Frank Louis Cioffi, ‘“An Anguish Become Thing”: Narrative as Performance in David Foster 
Wallace’s Infinite Jest’, Narrative, 2000, 161–181 (p. 171). 
12 Wallace, qtd. in Lipsky, p. 79. 
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ultimately leads to’—Infinite Jest thus presents us with a potential alternative to this finality, a 
constructive, deliberate incompletion.13 
Significantly, however, Incandenza’s film and Wallace’s novel are apparently united by 
a shared aesthetic project. Echoing Wallace’s description of fiction as ‘an act of communication 
between one human being and another’, Incandenza’s ‘Jest’ is figured as an attempt on the 
director’s part to communicate, not merely in the generalised terms of artist/audience 
‘connection’, but rather specifically with his son Hal.14 Late in the novel, Incandenza—who, 
having killed himself before the beginning of Jest’s narrative, appears as a mysterious, 
posthumous ‘wraith’—recalls his distress at witnessing Hal’s withdrawal into a state of 
noncommunicative depression, a ‘retreat to the periphery of life’s frame’ (p. 837). He goes on to 
relate how, in response to this ‘retreat’,  
he spent the whole sober last ninety days of his animate life working tirelessly 
to contrive a medium via which he and the muted son could simply converse. [. 
. .] His last resort: entertainment. Make something so bloody compelling it 
would reverse thrust on a young self's fall into the womb of solipsism, 
anhedonia, death in life. (pp. 838–839) 
For Incandenza, the ‘entertainment’ offered by his final film is presented as a means of 
‘conversing’ with his inaccessible son, an attempt to draw Hal ‘out of himself’ (p. 839). While 
this longed-for communication is figured in specific, father/son terms, Incandenza also links it 
with his broader, ‘life-long dream’ for his art, a dream unrecognised by ‘scholars and 
Foundations and disseminators’: ‘to entertain’ (p. 839). Read in these terms, we can see how 
Incandenza’s film presents us with a troubling version of communicative ‘success’: 
Incandenza—who asserts his belief that ‘[a]ny conversation or interchange is better than none at 
all’ (p. 839)—finally succeeds in his desire to use his art to ‘connect’ with his audience, to draw 
them ‘out of themselves’. In its tranquilising, lethal form of passive spectatorial pleasure, 
however, the film offers a communication which is disturbingly one-sided, a violently 
monologic exchange in which, in its totalising ‘completion’, leaves no space for the viewer to 
engage with or respond to the work. 
 In stark contrast to this, Wallace’s Jest rejects the totalising strategies of Incandenza’s 
film in favour of something self-consciously broken, something which, in its unfinished-ness, 
                                                            
13 In many respects, Incandenza’s film offers a uniquely concrete manifestation of the treatment of 
completion or closure as ‘a kind of death, death as a kind of perfection’ which, according to Hayes-Brady, 
defines Wallace’s writing (Hayes-Brady, Unspeakable Failures, p. 3). 
14 Wallace, ‘Greatly Exaggerated’, p. 144. 
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demands an active interpretative engagement on the part of the reader. In its excessive length, 
its frequent lexical difficulty, its use of (frequently expansive) endnotes, Wallace’s text demands 
a mode of reading which—while potentially pleasurable—is anything but passive. In his 
interview with McCaffery Wallace outlines in greater detail the strategies by which he attempts 
to distinguish his own writing from the ‘passive spectation’ offered by commercial 
entertainment: 
It’s supposed to be uneasy. For instance, using a lot of flash-cuts between 
scenes so that some of the narrative arrangement has got to be done by the 
reader, or interrupting flow with digressions and interpolations that the reader 
has to do the work of connecting to each other and to the narrative. It’s nothing 
terribly sophisticated, and there has to be an accessible payoff for the reader if I 
don’t want the reader to throw the book at the wall. But if it works right, the 
reader has to fight through the mediated voice presenting the material to you.15 
Wallace emphasises the extent to which his fiction requires a readerly ‘work’, demanding a 
process of ‘fighting through’ the text wholly antithetical to the pacifying strategies of 
Incandenza’s ‘entertainment’.16 This chapter, then, investigates more closely the kind of ‘work’ 
modelled and demanded by the incomplete structure of Wallace’s novel, addressing in particular 
the ways in which Jest’s manifest bigness—its panoramic, and sometimes excessive size and 
scope—establishes a tension between the possibility of literary ‘totality’ and a concurrent 
suggestion of inevitable incompletion. Through this, the chapter will thus explore how Jest’s 
formal ‘failures’ work to fundamentally shape our interpretation, establishing a (broken) frame 
for our own, correspondingly ‘unfinished’, reading of Wallace’s text. 
 
‘Total Data’ 
In considering the formal qualities of Jest, it is difficult not to define the novel in terms of its 
expansiveness: at 1079 pages, the text stands apart from Wallace’s previous (and subsequent) 
work in both its broadened scope—with its huge cast of tennis students, recovering drug 
addicts, and Québécois terrorists—and its extended length. Boswell notes that what ‘every 
reviewer and reader of Infinite Jest must first contend with is the book’s sheer bulk, its massive 
                                                            
15 Wallace, ‘Interview with McCaffery’, p. 33. 
16 With this, Wallace is aware of the potentially alienating consequences of this ‘antagonistic strategy’—
the danger that, without an aspect of ‘accessible payoff’, the reader will eventually ‘throw the book at the 
wall’. Within Jest, we find this danger self-consciously addressed in the descriptions of Incandenza’s 
experimental ‘après-garde’ film work—work which, in its total focus on antagonising its audience, is 
largely ‘just plain pretentious and unengaging and bad’ (p. 64). 
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size. The length is at once a challenge, a threat, and an enticement’.17 Since its publication, a 
subsection of commentators have read the novel’s ‘bulk’ as constituting a failure in its own 
right: in an ambivalent New York Times review, Kakutani characterised Jest as  
a vast, encyclopedic compendium of whatever seems to have crossed Mr. 
Wallace's mind. [. . .] The book seems to have been written and edited (or not 
edited) on the principle that bigger is better, more means more important, and 
this results in a big psychedelic jumble of characters, anecdotes, jokes, 
soliloquies, reminiscences and footnotes, uproarious and mind-boggling, but 
also arbitrary and self-indulgent.18 
For Kakutani, Jest’s bigness is figured as a failure of concision and organisation: although she 
acknowledges that ‘[s]omewhere in the mess [. . .] are the outlines of splendid novel’, the text’s 
‘random muchness of detail and incident’ are taken as evidence of a lack of authorial or editorial 
discipline, ‘an excuse for Mr. Wallace to simply show off his remarkable skills as a writer’.19  
 Even as it critiques the ostensible disorganisation of Jest, however, Kakutani’s 
description of the text’s ‘encyclopedic’ qualities introduces a specific—and enduringly 
influential—contextual model for approaching the bigness of Wallace’s novel. In its panoramic 
scope, Jest seems to consciously invite consideration in terms of the forms and strategies of 
encyclopaedic thought: a mode of thinking which, as defined by Kiron Ward in a recent study of 
fictional encyclopaedism, ‘summarises and organises all knowledge within a totalising 
epistemological framework’.20 In Ward’s terms, encyclopaedias present us with a ‘totalised 
version of reality’, an attempt to ‘paint a complete and coherent picture of our world and 
universe’.21 This notion of a totalising, ‘complete’ textual account of the world is one which 
informs Wallace’s thinking across his career: in ‘Little Expressionless Animals’, for example, 
Jeopardy!-champion Julie Smith’s vast knowledge of trivia is founded on her capacity to 
memorise the contents of ‘an obscure and limited-edition Canadian encyclopedia called 
LaPlace’s Guide to Total Data’.22 In its sheer massiveness Jest finds Wallace gesturing 
towards, and arguably attempting to formally embody, this ‘Total Data’, this imagined 
                                                            
17 Boswell, Understanding, p. 118. 
18 Michiko Kakutani, ‘Books of the Times; A Country Dying of Laughter. In 1,079 Pages: review of 
Infinite Jest’, New York Times, 13 February 1996, para. 3 
<http://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/13/books/books-of-the-times-a-country-dying-of-laughter-in-1079-
pages.html> [accessed 21 July 2019]. 
19 Kakutani, ‘Review of Infinite Jest’, paras. 11, 14, 15.  
20 Kiron Ward, Fictional Encyclopaedism in James Joyce, Leslie Marmon Silko, and Roberto Bolaño: 
Towards a Theory of Literary Totality (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Sussex, 2017), p. 6. 
21 Ward, p. 10. 
22 Wallace, Girl with Curious Hair, p. 10. 
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comprehensive textual ‘completion’.  
It has become something of a critical commonplace to approach Jest as an 
encyclopaedic novel23—and particularly, an example of the particular ‘Encyclopedic Narrative’ 
described by Edward Mendelson in his influential 1976 essay of the same name.24 Mendelson’s 
essay offers a notably specific conception of encyclopaedic literature, arguing that 
Each major national culture in the west, as it becomes aware of itself as a 
separate entity, produces an encyclopedic author, one whose work attends to the 
whole social and linguistic range of his nation, who makes use of all the literary 
styles and conventions known to his countrymen, whose dialect often becomes 
established as the national language, who takes his place as national poet or 
national classic, and who becomes the focus of a large and persistent exegetic 
and textual industry comparable to the industry founded upon the Bible.25 
In Mendelson’s grandiose terms, each encyclopaedic novel is defined as such by its attempt to 
offer a comprehensive account of its respective ‘national culture’, a textual summing-up of the 
‘whole social and linguistic range’ of its surrounding society. Mendelson’s framework is 
strikingly narrow in its scope—he claims to know of ‘only seven’ examples of encyclopaedic 
narrative—with these texts thus positioned as a series of singular, ‘complete’ masterworks, texts 
which, in their self-conscious massiveness, point towards a kind of literary totality.26 We can 
see, then, how Jest seems to invite reading in the totalising terms of Mendelsohn’s 
encyclopaedism. Mendelson significantly notes that an ‘encyclopedic narrative is, among other 
things, an encyclopedia of narrative’, and we find this clearly manifested in Jest’s vast 
collection of narrative and linguistic styles and forms: from its assortment of voices (ranging 
between the insufferably pretentious ‘U.S. Academese’ (p. 1056, n. 304) of Geoffrey Day’s 
essay on Les Assassins de Fauteuils Rollents and the slang-inflected inarticulacy of ‘yrstruly’’s 
account of life as a homeless drug addict (p. 128)); to its complex arrangement of formally 
diverse textual fragments (including first-person monologues, email exchanges, magazine 
interviews, extracts from academic essays, transcripts of meetings, and a nine-page filmography 
of Incandenza’s work); to its appropriation and employment of numerous technical jargons 
(culminating in Michael Pemulis’s unapologetically dense discussion of mathematical formulae, 
                                                            
23 See, for example, Boswell, Preface to Long Thing, pp. vi–xi (p. vii); Burn, Reader’s Guide, p. 27; 
Hering, ‘Form as Strategy’, in Critical Insights, pp. 128–43 (p. 128); Hayes-Brady, Unspeakable 
Failures, p. 39.  
24 Edward Mendelson, ‘Encyclopedic Narrative: From Dante to Pynchon’, MLN, 91.6 (1976), 1267–75.  
25 Mendelson, p. 1268. 
26 Mendelson, p. 1267. Mendelson’s encyclopaedic canon consists of ‘Dante's Commedia, Rabelais' five 
books of Gargantua and Pantagruel, Cervantes' Don Quixote, Goethe's Faust, Melville's Moby-Dick, 
Joyce's Ulysses’, and finally ‘Pynchon's Gravity's Rainbow’ (Mendelson, p. 1267). 
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complete with in-text line graphs, in one of the novel’s footnotes (p. 1023, n. 123)).27 
  Looking beyond Mendelson, Jest’s encyclopaedic scope can further be read as invoking 
a series of further related (and often overlapping) critical models of literary ‘totality’. In many 
respects, the novel’s self-evident expansiveness points us back towards the older (and more 
vaguely conceptualised) notion of the ‘Great American Novel’—a canon stretching back at least 
to Melville’s Moby-Dick. In his recent monograph on the history and development of the ‘dream 
of the Great American Novel’, Lawrence Buell notes how, despite its perennial status as an 
empty ‘media cliché’—one which ‘self-respecting literary critics’ at least pretend ‘not to take 
seriously’—the ‘G.A.N.’ has ‘refused to die’.28 Boddy asserts that the Great American Novel 
has continued to serve as a critical/journalistic ‘benchmark for literary prestige, ambition, and 
sales’, coming to stand as a ‘recognizable genre’ in its own right—one characterised by a series 
of ‘recognizable conventions’, including a ‘reliance on national microcosm and representative 
characters’, a ‘length-justifying claim to “complete and whole articulation”’, and a reliably 
‘macho reputation’.29 While the G.A.N. unquestionably intersects with Mendelson’s conception 
of encyclopaedic narrative—Mendelson, of course, imagines an encyclopaedism explicitly 
bound up with the reflection of a ‘national culture’, while Boddy notes how the G.A.N. is 
likewise characterised by an ‘encyclopaedic impulse’, a drive towards ‘roaming and 
cataloguing’, capturing ‘the “billion forms” of the nation’30—it also carries the suggestion of a 
specifically American ideal of expansiveness, a reflection of what Buell refers to as the ‘heady 
challenge of getting a whale-sized country between the covers’.31  
 In Jest, we find Wallace self-consciously establishing his novel’s dialogue with, and 
perhaps its participation in, this longer tradition of panoramic American fictions. Certainly, 
more than any of Wallace’s preceding novels or stories, Jest is explicitly concerned with 
                                                            
27 Mendelson, p. 1270, emphasis added. Boswell goes so far as to suggest that ‘Wallace wrote his 
encyclopedias with Mendelson’s definition firmly in mind’, and as such that ‘his novels not only 
epitomize the form but also interrogate and parody it’ (Boswell, preface to Long Thing, p. viii). 
28 Lawrence Buell, The Dream of the Great American Novel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2014), p. 1. The notion of the Great American Novel was, as Buell acknowledges, ‘born a century and a 
half ago, in the wake of the Civil War’ (p. 1), originating in an essay by John William De Forest, in which 
he characterised the G.A.N. as ‘the picture of the ordinary emotions and manners of American existence’, 
an attempt to paint ‘the American soul within the framework of a novel’ (‘The Great American Novel’, 
The Nation, 9 January 1868, pp. 27–28). 
29 Kasia Boddy, ‘Lynne Tillman and the Great American Novel’, Electronic Book Review, 2011, para. 7 
<https://electronicbookreview.com/essay/lynne-tillman-and-the-great-american-novel/> [accessed 22 July 
2019]. 
30 Boddy, ‘Lynne Tillman and the Great American Novel’, paras. 13, 23. 
31 Buell, p. 13. 
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questions of national identity: in an interview conducted shortly after its publication, Wallace 
related how he ‘wanted to do something real American, about what it’s like to live in America 
around the millennium’.32 This developing focus is most prominent in the novel’s political 
subplot concerning the government of the now-‘interdependent’ ‘Organization of North 
American Nations’ (presided over by ‘Johnny Gentle, Famous Crooner’ (p. 381)), and its 
attempts to obtain the master copy of the ‘Infinite Jest’ film. While this broadly-drawn 
background surfaces usually only at the edges of Jest’s narrative, it supports the sense of 
Wallace attempting to address and respond to ‘the millennial fulcrum of very dark U.S. times’ 
(p. 382). In the extended dialogues between Hugh Steeply (an O.N.A.N. agent) and Rémy 
Marathe (a member of Quebecois A.F.R), for example, the novel’s central concerns—with 
questions of art and entertainment, addiction and worship, attention and surrender—are situated 
on a national scale, as the two men discuss the relationship between the lethal ‘entertainment’ 
(an entertainment which is, crucially, a ‘U.S.A. production’), and a broader culture of American 
individualism, wherein ‘people choose nothing over themselves to love, each one’ (p. 318).33 In 
light of this specific concern with American identity, the length of Jest can thus be seen to direct 
us towards this lineage of ‘Great’ (or, alternatively, just ‘Big’) American texts, works in which, 
as Boddy argues, ‘America is not just their setting, but also their subject’.34  
Beyond this, Jest can also be seen to situate itself in relation to a more specifically 
contemporary model of literary expansion. Burn notes that the novel’s 
erudite form most clearly recalls the tradition of massive fictions written by 
older postmodernists that began with William Gaddis’s The Recognitions, and 
includes later works such as Gravity’s Rainbow, Gaddis’s second novel, J R 
(1975) and DeLillo’s Underworld (1997).35 
While Mendelson’s conception of ‘encyclopedic narrative’ again overlaps with this tradition—
taking Gravity’s Rainbow as its jumping-off point—these huge postmodern works seem to offer 
a particular iteration of this encyclopaedism, a massiveness which reflects and responds to the 
uniquely overwhelming ‘totality’ of late-20th century experience. This more recent lineage of 
                                                            
32 Wallace, ‘Interview with Miller’, p. 59. This concern builds, of course, on the figure of American 
‘progress’ which ran through ‘Westward’. 
33 Wallace’s engagement with questions of US identity has been explored in greater detail by Giles, who 
discusses ‘the author’s own intense capacity for self-interrogation about what it means to be an 
“American” writer at the beginning of the twenty-first century’ (Giles, ‘All Swallowed Up: David Foster 
Wallace and American Literature’, in Legacy of David Foster Wallace, pp. 3–22 (pp. 3–4). 
34 Boddy, ‘Lynne Tillman and the Great American Novel’, para. 11. 
35 Burn, Reader’s Guide, p. 27. 
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‘massive fictions’ has been conceptualised in various terms: from Frederick Karl’s ‘Mega-
Novel’,36 to more recent studies of ‘maximalist fiction’ by Stefano Ercolino and Nick Levey.37 
While there are significant points of difference between these various models,38 they share a 
sense of reading the expansiveness of these texts as responding to the complexity and 
fragmentation of contemporary experience: Karl, for example, characterises the ‘mega-novel’ as 
a specific ‘response to postwar America as an indeterminate, problematic, unfixed place’.39  
Perhaps the most pertinent characterisation, however, is found in Tom LeClair’s 
conception of the ‘systems novel’, as laid out in his 1988 study In the Loop: Don DeLillo and 
the Systems Novel, and expanded upon in The Art of Excess: Mastery in Contemporary 
American Fiction (1989).40 Like Mendelson, LeClair is concerned with defining, and asserting 
the value of, a certain kind of ‘large book’, a group of late-20th century US novels which 
LeClair argues are united in exploring 
the size and scale of contemporary experience: how multiplicity and magnitude 
create new relations and new proportions among persons and entities, how 
quantity affects quality, how massiveness is related to mastery.41 
For LeClair, the very massiveness of these ‘long, large, and dense’ texts is bound up with their 
attempts to present readers with vast, complex ‘systems of information’: these ‘systems novels’ 
strive, in their expansiveness, to ‘comprehend, represent, and critique’ a contemporary culture 
itself ‘largely composed of huge systems of information, both ideological and institutional, that 
exert power over individuals and their groups’.42 This model of the ‘systems novel’ seems 
particularly relevant, in part because LeClair himself, in an early essay on Jest, explicitly 
                                                            
36 Frederick R. Karl, ‘American Fictions: The Mega-Novel’, Conjunctions, 7, 1985, 248–60. 
37 See, respectively, Stefano Ercolino, The Maximalist Novel: From Thomas Pynchon’s Gravity’s 
Rainbow to Roberto Bolaño’s 2666 (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015); Nick Levey, Maximalism in 
Contemporary American Literature: The Uses of Detail (London: Routledge, 2016). 
38 These differences include the question of whether these novels constitute a uniquely American 
phenomenon (as in Karl’s problematically narrow assertion that ‘Mega-Novels’ are written primarily by 
US ‘white protestant males’ (Karl, p. 258)), or whether this tendency towards maximalism can be found 
across the world (Ercolino, for example, cites Roberto Bolaño’s 2666 and the Babette Factory’s 2005 
dopo cristo as clear global examples of maximalist fiction). 
39 Karl, p. 249. 
40 Tom LeClair, In the Loop: Don DeLillo and the Systems Novel (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1988); The Art of Excess: Mastery in Contemporary American Fiction (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1989). 
41 LeClair, Art of Excess, p. 6. 
42 LeClair, Art of Excess, pp. 6, 14. LeClair’s notion of ‘systems’ recalls the various competing 
philosophical systems which confronted us in Broom. 
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characterised Wallace’s novel as part of this tradition,43 but also because Wallace was in turn 
familiar with LeClair’s writing—a familiarity evidenced in Wallace’s own heavily marked-up 
copy of In the Loop, held in his archive at the Harry Ransom Center. Various critics have 
suggested Jest finds Wallace engaging in a conscious dialogue with LeClair’s work: Graham 
Foster, for example, argues that Wallace ‘place[s] Infinite Jest in the tradition of the “systems 
novel”, revealing Wallace’s attention to his own position in the American literary canon’,44 
while Hering notes that ‘the presence of extensive notes in Wallace’s own copy of [In the Loop] 
suggests that LeClair’s work was influential on Wallace’s ideas of form’.45 
At the centre of LeClair’s model is the notion of a contemporary informational 
‘overload’, one reflected in the ‘excess’ of these massive texts: 
Overload results when the rate of information [. . .] becomes too high for the 
receiver to process, to sort and integrate within his operative categories. In an 
artificial channel, overload can cause a short circuit or, on a computer terminal, 
a blank screen. In a novel, overload—or what I call excess—can stop the 
reading, cause scanning, or produce a reorientation to the novel’s information.46 
For LeClair, this ‘overload’ can be considered the ‘dominant strategy’ of the systems novel: 
these reflexive efforts to interrupt the process of reading provide the foundation for what 
LeClair terms ‘the art of excess’, an art which responds to a contemporary culture in which ‘the 
scale of information has increased’ at an unprecedented rate.47 LeClair concludes that, in 
representing and mimicking the fragmentary complexity of these informational systems, the 
‘systems novel’ thus serves as an attempt to attain a kind of ‘mastery’ over both the reader and 
this excess itself: ‘[e]xcess’, he argues, ‘represents and critiques excess’.48 In this, LeClair 
echoes Mendelson’s claim for the encyclopaedic novel’s capacity to ‘render the full range of 
knowledge and beliefs of a national culture’: as with the various other models of literary 
‘totality’ invoked within Jest, the systems novel is characterised by a panoramic 
comprehensiveness, a suggestion of a text which is able to take on, and thus ‘master’, the chaos 
                                                            
43 Tom LeClair, ‘The Prodigious Fiction of Richard Powers, William Vollmann, and David Foster 
Wallace’, Critique: Studies in Contemporary Fiction, 38.1 (1996), 12–37. LeClair groups Wallace with 
Powers and Vollmann as writers of ‘prodigious fictions’, inheritors of the ‘systems novel’ who, having 
been ‘educated in the Age of Information’, have thus ‘acquired an expertise nowhere evident in the work 
of the previous generation’ (p. 13). 
44 Graham Foster, ‘A Deep Insider’s Elegiac Tribute: The Work of Don DeLillo in David Foster 
Wallace’s Infinite Jest’, Orbit: A Journal of American Literature, 4.2 (2016), 1–20 (p. 2) 
<https://doi.org/10.16995/orbit.127>. 
45 Hering, ‘Form as Strategy’, p. 131. 
46 LeClair, Art of Excess, p. 15. 
47 LeClair, Art of Excess, p. 15. 
48 LeClair, Art of Excess, pp. 15, 17. 
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of the contemporary world.49  
To a certain extent, the textual excesses of Jest can be read as presenting a version of 
the ‘overload’ outlined by LeClair. Perhaps the clearest example of this is found in Jest’s ‘Notes 
and Errata’, the 388 endnotes which occupy the novel’s final 96 pages. In a 1994 letter to his 
editor Michael Pietsch, Wallace defended his (relatively late) addition of endnotes to the novel, 
arguing that the notes serve both to ‘allow/make the reader go literally physically “back and 
forth” in a way that perhaps cutely mimics some of the story’s thematic concerns’, and also to 
‘mimic the information-flood and data-triage I expect’d be an even bigger part of US life 15 
years hence’.50 While their content varies wildly—Ira Nadel has noted how they shift between 
‘the informative, the interpretative, and the narrative’, working variously to ‘fracture, intimidate, 
layer, expand, frustrate, revise, critique, and support the text’—the notes collectively offer a 
supplementary excess of language and data to the novel’s already maximalist text.51 Many of 
these notes are themselves excessive in terms of length and content, presenting either lengthy 
catalogues of information (as in Incandenza’s filmography), or otherwise with chapter-length 
narrative passages outside the main body of the text (as in note 110, which runs between pages 
1004–1022, and includes 12 of its own sub-endnotes). Even the briefest and most apparently 
cursory of the endnotes, however, demonstrate a kind of textual surplus, a spilling-over of the 
novel’s limits. 
 
‘Too Much’ 
Even as it invokes these various overlapping models of encyclopaedism, however, Jest can 
simultaneously be seen to disrupt and frustrate this notion of textual ‘completion’, offering a 
manifestation of literary ‘totality’ which is self-consciously incomplete: Levey suggests that ‘it 
becomes clear that as much as it wants to dazzle us with its power, Infinite Jest also wants to 
evade or even sabotage fantasies of literary value and greatness by being dysfunctional’.52 We 
                                                            
49 Mendelson, p. 1269. Surveying Wallace’s copy of LeClair’s In the Loop, it is clear that Wallace was 
intrigued by this notion of mastery via textual excess: in a passage where LeClair lays out his conception 
of systems novels as ‘mastering works’ which have the potential to ‘transform the reader’s understanding 
of wholes, rather than please his engineered appetite for parts’, Wallace marks the entire paragraph with 
the marginal comment: ‘NICE’ (Wallace, marginal inscription in LeClair, In the Loop, p. 12. Copy held 
in Wallace’s Library, Harry Ransom Center). 
50 Wallace, letter to Pietsch, qtd. in Max, Every Love Story, pp. 195–196. 
51 Ira B. Nadel, ‘Consider the Footnote’ in Legacy of David Foster Wallace, pp. 218–240 (p. 233). 
52 Levey, p. 26. 
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find evidence of this dysfunction if we consider more closely the nature of Jest’s textual 
excesses. While confronting us with a textual ‘overload’, Jest denies the ‘mastery’ which 
LeClair assigns to the systems novel. Through the novel, we are faced with a consistent sense of 
‘too much’ text: from endlessly digressive sentences (such as that describing the horrifying 
death of Lucien Antitoi, which stretches between pages 487 and 489), to passages swelled by 
apparently superfluous data (such as the absurdly detailed account of the tennis/war game 
‘Eschaton’ (pp. 321–342), complete with endless technical abbreviations, byzantine rules, and 
mathematical formulae), to absurdly-extended section headings: 
WHY — THOUGH IN THE EARLY DAYS OF INTERLACE'S 
INTERNETTED TELEPUTERS THAT OPERATED OFF LARGELY THE 
SAME FIBER-DIGITAL GRID AS THE PHONE COMPANIES, THE 
ADVENT OF VIDEO-TELEPHONING (A.K.A. 'VIDEOPHONY') ENJOYED 
AN INTERVAL OF HUGE CONSUMER POPULARITY — CALLERS 
THRILLED AT THE IDEA OF PHONE-INTERFACING BOTH AURALLY 
AND FACIALLY (THE LITTLE FIRST-GENERATION PHONE-VIDEO 
CAMERAS BEING TOO CRUDE AND NARROW-APERTURED FOR 
ANYTHING MUCH MORE THAN FACIAL CLOSE-UPS) ON FIRST-
GENERATION TELEPUTERS THAT AT THAT TIME WERE LITTLE 
MORE THAN HIGH-TECH TV SETS, THOUGH OF COURSE THEY HAD 
THAT LITTLE 'INTELLIGENT-AGENT' HOMUNCULAR ICON THAT 
WOULD APPEAR AT THE LOWER-RIGHT OF A BROADCAST/CABLE 
PROGRAM AND TELL YOU THE TIME AND TEMPERATURE OUTSIDE 
OR REMIND YOU TO TAKE YOUR BLOOD-PRESSURE MEDICATION 
OR ALERT YOU TO A PARTICULARLY COMPELLING 
ENTERTAINMENT OPTION NOW COMING UP ON CHANNEL LIKE 491 
OR SOMETHING, OR OF COURSE NOW ALERTING YOU TO AN 
INCOMING VIDEO-PHONE CALL AND THEN TAP-DANCING WITH A 
LITTLE ICONIC STRAW BOATER AND CANE JUST UNDER A MENU 
OF POSSIBLE OPTIONS FOR RESPONSE, AND CALLERS DID LOVE 
THEIR LITTLE HOMUNCULAR ICONS — BUT WHY, WITHIN LIKE 16 
MONTHS OR 5 SALES QUARTERS, THE TUMESCENT DEMAND 
CURVE FOR 'VIDEOPHONY' SUDDENLY COLLAPSED LIKE A KICKED 
TENT, SO THAT, BY THE YEAR OF THE DEPEND ADULT 
UNDERGARMENT, FEWER THAN 10% OF ALL PRIVATE TELEPHONE 
COMMUNICATIONS UTILIZED ANY VIDEO-IMAGE-FIBER 
DATATRANSFERS OR COINCIDENT PRODUCTS AND SERVICES, THE 
AVERAGE U.S. PHONE-USER DECIDING THAT S/HE ACTUALLY 
PREFERRED THE RETROGRADE OLD LOW-TECH BELL-ERA VOICE-
ONLY TELEPHONIC INTERFACE AFTER ALL, A PREFERENTIAL 
ABOUT-FACE THAT COST A GOOD MANY PRECIPITANT VIDEO-
TELEPHONY-RELATED ENTREPRENEURS THEIR SHIRTS, PLUS 
DESTABILIZING TWO HIGHLY RESPECTED MUTUAL FUNDS THAT 
HAD GROUNDFLOORED HEAVILY IN VIDEO-PHONE TECHNOLOGY, 
AND VERY NEARLY WIPING OUT THE MARYLAND STATE 
EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM'S FREDDIE-MAC FUND, A FUND 
WHOSE ADMINISTRATOR'S MISTRESS'S BROTHER HAD BEEN AN 
ALMOST MANICALLY PRECIPITANT VIDEO-PHONETECHNOLOGY 
ENTREPRENEUR . . . AND BUT SO WHY THE ABRUPT CONSUMER 
RETREAT BACK TO GOOD OLD VOICE-ONLY TELEPHONING?  
     (pp. 144–5) 
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In its layers-upon-layers of superfluous subclauses, digressions, asides, and colloquial 
interjections—and, indeed, its visual bulk on the printed page—the videophony chapter’s title 
presents a maximalism which feels unsettlingly unmanaged and unmanageable: Holland 
suggests that, at times, ‘the novel’s explosion of voices and of jargon’ threatens to ‘collapse 
under the weight of its collective uselessness’, or otherwise ‘atomize into a wash of white 
noise’.53 Across Jest, we are confronted with comparable instances of ‘too much’ language— 
excess which, as Giles notes, sometimes makes the work of reading a ‘gruelling’ process, 
mirroring the novel’s ‘sombre depiction of American culture as a spiral of obsessions and 
compulsions, a labyrinthine system from which there is no escape’.54 Rather than asserting its 
claim to LeClair’s imagined ‘mastery’ over reader and world, Jest’s excess is consistently 
framed in terms of a fundamental non-mastery: an uncontrollable, and sometimes unsettling, 
sense of the ‘too much’. 
This sense of a ‘failed’ expansiveness, an unmanageable excess, is felt equally in Jest’s 
engagement with questions of American-ness. In its speculative depiction of a near-future US 
society, Wallace evokes an America which has itself become ‘too much’: in ‘continental 
Reconfiguration’ (p. 92) which resulted in the formation of the Organization of North American 
Nations, the US is imagined as having exceeded its national boundaries, absorbing Canada and 
Mexico into little more than ‘sort of post-millennial American protectorates’ (p. 384). In this 
process of ‘U.S. Experialism’ (p. 385), Wallace presents us with a uniquely late-20th century 
vision of the American ‘progress’ which he interrogated in ‘Westward’: within Mario 
Incandenza’s cinematic retelling of the birth of O.N.A.N., President Gentle claims to have 
‘decided we’re going to reinvent not just government but history. Torch the past. Manifest a 
new destiny’ (pp. 402–3). Here, the historical ‘journey westward’ of American ‘empire’ has 
been reimagined as an ‘experialist’ movement outwards: an excessive, unmanageable growth 
beyond the limits of ‘America’ or ‘American-ness’. This sense of uncontrollable territorial 
excess is crystallised most clearly in the figure of the ‘Great Concavity’: the ‘vast stretches of 
                                                            
53 Holland, ‘Infinite Jest’, p. 130. See also David Letzler, who explores the ‘junk text’ (which he terms 
‘cruft’)—text ‘simultaneously too excessive and too vacuous to be worth anyone’s attention’—found 
throughout Jest. For Letzler, this ‘cruft’ is figured as ‘the characteristic text of encyclopedic novels’ 
(Letzler, ‘Encyclopedic Novels and the Cruft of Fiction’, in Long Thing, pp. 127–147 (p. 131). 
54 Giles, ‘Sentimental Posthumanism’, p. 334. This ‘too much’ notably resonates with the novel’s parallel 
exploration of the horrifying excesses of drug addiction (as, for example, in the euphemistic ‘Too Much 
Fun’ (p. 238) by which Joelle van Dyne privately designates her own attempted suicide by drug 
overdose). 
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U.S. territory’ which—having been transformed into ‘uninhabitable and probably barbed-wired 
landfills and fly-shrouded dumps and saprogenic magenta-fogged toxic-disposal sites’ (p. 
402)—have been excised from the US altogether, transferred to Canada in an ostensibly 
generous act of ‘Experialistic “gift” or “return”’ (p. 58). Giles argues that 
Infinite Jest thus not only critiques the idea of American exceptionalism 
experientially, showing how US citizens are becoming more uneasy as their 
borders become more permeable, but also demystifies it politically: in a 
multinational, interdependent world, the notion of the US as a protected, 
pristine space has been rendered null and void.55 
In this geographically excessive, unstable vision of the US, Jest problematises its own claim to 
offer a ‘complete’ literary depiction of or response to the chaotic world of late-20th century 
America. While the panoramic reach of Wallace’s novel echoes the encyclopaedic ‘greatness’ 
of American texts such as Moby-Dick (Andrew Hoberek, for example has explored in detail 
how Jest echoes the ‘digressive qualities’ of Melville’s novel), Wallace’s text resituates these 
strategies within its ‘overloaded’ future vision of the United States.56 If Wallace’s novel 
gestures towards the tradition of the ‘Great American Novel’—attempting, as Max argues, to 
‘capture the everything of America’—it equally works to disrupt this tradition, evoking an 
America which has itself become unmanageable, an ‘everything’ which, in its vastness, cannot 
be ‘mastered’ within a literary text.57 
With this, Jest can thus be seen to destabilise the notion of the ‘encyclopaedic’ 
altogether. In its recurring instances of chaotic excess, of uncontrollable textual ‘overload’, 
Wallace’s novel denies the possibility of the kind of summative, coherent literary totality 
imagined by Mendelson: far from reflecting or attending to ‘the whole social and linguistic 
range of his nation’, Wallace leads us to conclude that this kind of encyclopaedic 
comprehensiveness has become (and has, perhaps, always been) impossible. Burn argues that 
Jest ‘dramatizes the limitations’ inherent in any attempt towards ‘encyclopedic knowledge’: 
while depicting and formally reflecting ‘the accumulation of information’—the process of 
seeking ‘exhaustive accounts’—Wallace’s novel shows these efforts to be little more than 
                                                            
55 Giles, ‘Sentimental Posthumanism’, pp. 339–40. 
56 Andrew Hoberek, ‘Wallace and American Literature’, in Cambridge Companion to David Foster 
Wallace, pp. 33–48. In the section of Jest in which Hal lists ‘following things in the room [that] were 
blue’ (p. 508), for example, Wallace arguably presents us with a parodically emptied-out iteration of the 
‘roaming and cataloguing’ which defined Moby-Dick’s ‘Cetology’ chapters. 
57 Max, Every Love Story, p. 60. 
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‘empty and futile exercises’.58 In this, Jest’s excess thus invites us to consider the limitations 
inherent in Mendelson’s notion of literary ‘completion’, or of any conception of a ‘total’ body 
of knowledge. In his thesis, Ward articulates how the project of encyclopaedism is by definition 
‘inevitably limited’, asserting that ‘encyclopaedic thought is always selective thought—
capacious thought, certainly, but by no means all-inclusive or universal or absolute’.59 For 
Ward, the encyclopaedia’s totality is ‘always already encoded with a particular set of values’: 
following this, notions of encyclopaedic fiction such as Mendelson’s are thus seen to be ‘rather 
too ready to allow “encyclopaedism” to become a euphemism for a nation’s “great novel”, or 
for a re-packaged “great man” theory of literature’.60 While confronting these problematically 
limited conceptions of the ‘great novel’, Jest also points us towards a potential alternative, 
presenting an encyclopaedism which is self-consciously ‘failed’, a textual expansiveness which, 
in its chaotic excess, is unavoidably incomplete. For Ward, it is this capacity for incompletion—
for an attentiveness to ‘the willed gaps and exclusions on which certain encyclopaedic ideas of 
the world depend’—which forms the foundation of his own, broader conception of fictional 
encyclopaedism: he argues that 
if encyclopaedic thought requires a totality that is complete, consistent, 
coherent, singular, and certain, then perhaps what a literary totality enables is a 
form of encyclopaedism that can involve its own failure—its own incompletion, 
inconsistency, incoherence, multiplicity, and uncertainty.61 
Far from the coherent totality imagined by Mendelson, it is this uncertain, incoherent, 
incomplete version of the encyclopaedic which we find underpinning the self-evident 
massiveness of Jest. I would argue that Wallace’s novel—in its simultaneous invocation and 
critique of a series of models for a totalising literary ‘greatness’—finally stands as something of 
an anti-encyclopaedic text, a work which, in its radical, overloaded broken-ness, interrogates the 
necessary limits both of encyclopaedic thought, and specifically of the more coherently 
maximalist works of his literary predecessors. 
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Bolaño’s 2666 as its central examples, establishing a tradition of encyclopaedism notably more inclusive 
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In attempting to define this anti-encyclopaedic excess, it is perhaps useful to compare 
Jest with another famously expansive US novel of the late 1990s: Don DeLillo’s Underworld. 
DeLillo—the writer around whom LeClair first develops his conception of the ‘systems 
novel’—serves as a key point of influence across all of Wallace’s fiction, and his work is 
invoked at various points throughout Jest: from the glancing allusion to Ratner’s Star in the 
filmography’s brief mention of the fictional ‘M.I.T. language riots’ (p. 987, n. 24);62 to the 
echoes of Great Jones Street in Jest’s descriptions of variously damaged, deformed, or 
‘gargantuan’ (p. 211) infant bodies (recalling DeLillo’s description of Mrs Mickewhite’s 
severely disfigured son, ‘full of bulges and incurvatures, scant of hair, a soft curious object that 
seemed to belong in a greenish jar’);63 to the Eschaton passage’s extended homage to the war 
game played between Gary Harkness and Major Staley at the end of DeLillo’s End Zone (an 
allusion so direct that Wallace wrote to DeLillo apologising for the ‘rather uncomfortable debt’ 
he owed to the novel).64 While Underworld—first published in 1997, a year after Jest—is 
obviously not explicitly referred to within Wallace’s novel, it nonetheless provides, as a 
contemporary maximalist text of comparable length, a pertinent point of comparison for Jest’s 
particular strategies of textual excess.65 Like Jest, Underworld is self-consciously engaged in 
both the exploration and the representation of excess information, as seen, for example’ in Klara 
Sax’s observation on the rarity of being able to ‘see what stands before you [. . .] in the grinding 
life of the city’: 
[. . .] what a novelty of basic sensation [. . .] to look across a measure space and 
be undistracted by signs and streetlights and taxis and scaffolding, by your own 
bespattered mind, sorting the data, and by the energy hurrying people make, 
lunch crowds and buses and bike messengers, all that consciousness powering 
down the flumes of Manhattan so that it becomes impossible to see across a 
street to the turquoise tiles of some terra-cotta facade, a winged beast carved 
above the lintel.66 
DeLillo, like Wallace, is concerned with ‘sorting the data’, depicting and interrogating a 
contemporary US culture characterised by the ‘sand-grain manyness of things that can’t be 
                                                            
62 The same fictional riots are also mentioned in DeLillo’s novel (DeLillo, Ratner’s Star (New York: 
Random House, 1989), p. 31). 
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(London: Picador, 1998), p. 424). 
66 DeLillo, Underworld, p. 379. 
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counted’, an excess which has profoundly affected the way Americans respond to the world 
around them. 67  
 Where Underworld essentially diverges from Jest, however, is in the way this excess is 
reflected in DeLillo’s own writing. While undeniably massive in both size and scope, 
Underworld is nonetheless characterised by a formal and linguistic precision, a meticulousness 
which stands in stark contrast with Jest’s unmanageable surpluses of text and data. This 
difference is partially evident on a sentence-by-sentence basis: in a letter written to DeLillo 
following his reading of a pre-publication typescript of Underworld, Wallace praised the work 
as ‘a book in which absolutely nothing is skimped or shirked or tossed off or played for the easy 
laugh’, noting how DeLillo’s prose ‘always seems exquisitely controlled, sober, poised rather 
than lunging’.68 DeLillo’s reply is enlightening in its articulation of the guiding impulse 
underpinning these qualities in his writing: 
[. . .] I think the key to all this is precision. If the language is precise, the 
sentence will not (in theory) seem self-conscious of overworked. At some point 
(in my writing life) I realized that precision can be a kind of poetry, and the 
more precise you try to be, or I try to be, the more simply and correctly 
responsive to what the world looks like – then the better my chances of creating 
a deeper and more beautiful language.69 
This aspect of ‘precision’ lies at the heart of an essential distinction between Underworld and 
Infinite Jest: where DeLillo’s novel strives to be precise in the construction of its fictional 
world, Jest conversely embodies a self-conscious imprecision, an enacted failure to achieve the 
‘deeper and more beautiful language’ which Wallace finds so praiseworthy in DeLillo’s work.  
This ‘precision’ is further evident at the level of Underworld’s wider form. Even in its 
engagement with and representation of excess, DeLillo’s novel is coherent in tracing a ‘secret 
history’ of the US in the second half of the 20th century, its numbered sections moving 
backwards in time from 1992 to 1952. Shaped by this underlying structure, the maximalism of 
DeLillo’s novel thus brings us much closer to Mendelson’s conception of ‘encyclopedic 
narrative’, its expansiveness employed in a panoramic representation of contemporary 
American experience. Boxall has suggested that DeLillo ‘uses words to make a world, to build 
an American edifice’: 
His is a writing that does not reject, delete, eliminate but one that absorbs, 
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recycles, accommodates. [. . .] it does not tend toward silence but toward 
speech; rather than failure of expression, this work tends toward a sublime 
articulacy.70 
In contrast to Underworld’s ‘sublime articulacy’, Jest’s excess is characterised as a form of 
inarticulacy, an incomplete version of literary ‘communication’. In these terms, Wallace’s 
writing once again seems to gesture back beyond DeLillo, aligning itself rather with Beckett’s 
earlier efforts at making art out of incompletion and failure. As in ‘Westward’, Jest’s excesses, 
in their often incoherent unfinished-ness, reach a point comparable to the speechlessness of 
Beckett’s writing: for Wallace, surplus language serves only to further the incompletion at the 
centre of his work.71 
 
‘Something broken’ 
Looking beyond Jest’s specific invocations/critiques of these models of literary 
encyclopaedism, we find this suggestion of ‘non-mastery’, of a tension between textual excess 
and inevitable incompletion, informing the structure of Wallace’s novel as a whole. In 
comparison with Underworld’s comparatively coherent reverse-historical narrative, Jest is, at 
least on the surface, self-consciously chaotic in its arrangement, a collection of fragmentary 
parts frequently marked by jarring shifts of perspective, location, and time. Cioffi has suggested 
that the novel could reasonably be approached as ‘a collection of numerous short stories all 
linked by taking place in a relatively circumscribed fictive world’.72 In this aspect of ostensible 
structural disorganisation, Jest can to a certain extent be seen to live up to Kakutani’s dismissive 
characterisation of the novel as a ‘mess’, of a ‘random muchness of detail and incident’.73 While 
Kakutani’s reading is undoubtedly reductive—Burn has argued against her characterisation of 
the novel as ‘the bloated product of an undisciplined writer who didn’t know when to stop’—it 
is clear that Wallace does, at least to some degree, invite reading of Jest’s structure in terms of a 
failure of coherence and concision, a macro version of the micro instances of textual excess 
found throughout the novel.74 Writing to Pietsch during the novel’s composition, Wallace 
                                                            
70 Boxall, ‘DeLillo and Media Culture’, p. 43. 
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described Jest as ‘a novel made up out of shards, almost as if the story were something broken 
that someone is picking up the pieces of’.75 We can see, then, how Jest’s surface disorganisation 
invites interpretation in terms of this formal ‘broken-ness’, of this conception of the text as an 
arrangement of disorganised fragments which it is the job of the reader to (re)construct.  
This is not, however, to suggest that the structure of Jest is actually ‘random’ or 
‘arbitrary’. Critics have convincingly traced the complex patterns and structures at work within 
the novel: Burn, for example, has argued that Jest’s architecture is ‘surprisingly controlled’, 
asserting that its ‘harmonic structure’ is ‘the product of a layered aesthetic that reaches toward a 
richer, more polyphonic register than many earlier readings have recognized’.76 Of these 
proposed formal models for Jest, one of the most critically enduring has been that of the 
Sierpinski Gasket, a triangular ‘fractal object’ which Carlisle has described as a structure 
‘generated geometrically by an iterative process of cutting smaller triangle-sized holes out of 
larger triangles’.77 This fractal understanding of Jest’s form has its roots in comments made by 
Wallace himself: in a 1996 radio interview, Wallace acknowledged that Jest is ‘actually 
structured like something called a Sierpinski Gasket, which is a very primitive kind of 
pyramidal fractal’, describing this as one of the ways the novel is ‘supposed to come together’.78 
In light of these comments, critics have made use of the model of the Sierpinski Gasket in 
attempting to make sense of the Jest’s chaotic organisation: Carlisle’s detailed guide to the 
novel, for example, is organised so as to map the novel’s various plots, characters, and thematic 
concerns on to this guiding structure,79 while Hering has since described how the experience of 
reading Jest is informed by this kind of mathematical construction: 
The reader gradually becomes aware of an increase in the size and focus of the 
chapters as they read, and the initial smaller chapters—relatable to the smaller 
triangles of the gasket shape—are later retrospectively understood to form part 
of the overarching structure so we are ultimately aware of the gargantuan 
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system of relationships that operates across the entire novel.80 
For critics such as Burn, Hering, and Carlisle, the ostensible disorder of Jest is seen to obscure a 
deeper formal sophistication, a complex order which runs beneath, and gives coherent shape to, 
the novel’s apparent excesses of text and information. 
Even as it offers evidence of this underlying formal organisation, however, Jest never 
allows us to wholly abandon our awareness of an essential disorganisation, a mass of text which 
resists our readerly attempts to provide it with shape or meaning. Wallace establishes a conflict 
between the concurrent suggestions of order and disorder, coherence and incoherence, structure 
and chaos, within his expansive text. While the novel is clearly not ‘random’, its gestures 
towards underlying structure are nonetheless bound up with a kind of failure, a ‘broken-ness’ 
which informs even its most complex and considered formal patterns. At the heart of this 
failure, I would suggest, is a pervasive aspect of structural unfinished-ness. Returning to 
Wallace’s description of the Sierpinski Gasket, we can see how Wallace’s invocation of this 
structure is qualified by an acknowledgment of its incompletion:  
[. . .] although what was structured as a Sierpinski Gasket was the first– was the 
draft that I delivered to Michael in '94, and it went through some I think 'mercy 
cuts', so it's probably kind of a lopsided Sierpinski Gasket now.81 
For Wallace, the novel’s adherence to this fractal structure is ‘lopsided’: in the process of being 
edited, the text has been left in a state of incompletion. To a certain degree, Wallace’s 
comments reflect an actual compositional anxiety over Jest’s protracted editing process: Max 
describes how, following several successive round of suggested cuts from Pietsch, Wallace was 
faced with a fear that ‘in the cascade of edits, the nebulous, fine-veined schema of the novel had 
been compromised’.82 Wallace’s letters of the period support this sense of authorial unease: he 
relates to DeLillo, for example, the frustration of having ‘cut 310 pages from the fucker over the 
winter (it is, still, pretty long), and now even as it’s at the copyeditor they say they’d like 
another 100 or so pages cut’,83 and elsewhere shares with David Markson his worry that ‘though 
many of the cuts (editor-inspired) made the thing better, it fucked up a certain water-tightness 
that the mastodon-sized first version had, I think’.84 In these letters, we see Wallace concerned 
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that the process of editing his novel has indeed left it ‘lopsided’, lacking the completeness or 
coherence of his initial draft. 
Beyond this authorial anxiety, however, Wallace’s comments on the post-editorial 
‘broken-ness’ of Jest’s structure can be read as part of a wider extratextual attempt on Wallace’s 
part to publicly emphasise the incompletion at the heart of his novel, to publicly frame the 
published text as a construction which has—in the process of editing—been left unfinished in 
some essential way. This sense of Wallace drawing deliberate and self-conscious attention to 
this incompletion is supported by other interviews of the period, in which he discusses—and, 
significantly, exaggerates—the amount of material cut from the first draft of Jest. In an 
interview with Laura Miller, for example, Wallace describes how the novel’s manuscript was 
‘1700 manuscript pages, of which close to 500 were cut. So this editor didn’t just buy the book 
and shepherd it. He line-edited it twice’.85 Elsewhere, in his interview with Lipsky, Wallace 
notes how ‘the changes are from Michael’s cuts, I had to move things around. It’s quite a bit 
shorter than it was’, claiming that the first draft was ‘about five hundred pages longer. Of which 
four hundred unambiguously needed to go, and the other hundred was painful’.86 In these 
comments, Wallace acknowledges the importance of Jest’s editing process, recognising the 
amount of material which ‘needed to go’ from his initial drafts. Crucially, however, he 
consistently overstates both the length of these draft versions and the amount he cut from them. 
Steven Moore’s detailed discussion of his reading of a first draft of Jest, for example, 
contradicts Wallace’s account of this massive reduction in size: Moore describes various 
significant revisions between the first and published drafts, but summarises that ‘it should be 
obvious [. . .] that not only did Wallace make very few cuts—about 40 pages, and almost none 
of the ones I suggested, as it happens—he wound up adding a considerable amount of new 
material’.87 In drawing public attention to the (largely non-existent) ‘missing pages’ of Jest, 
Wallace can be seen to exaggerate and mythologise the essential incompleteness of his novel, to 
establish an extratextual framing of the published work as a flawed, compromised, or ‘broken’ 
version of an imagined ‘complete’ text. In this way, Wallace’s suggestion of the complex 
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structures on which the novel is founded are essentially limited by this aspect of incompletion: 
Jest may not be random or arbitrary in its excess, but it is nonetheless defined by an essential 
‘broken-ness’, one manifested in the reflexive incompletion which fundamentally informs the 
structure of the text. 
Indeed, we find this aspect of formal incompletion reflexively modelled within the 
novel itself. In the extended endnote dedicated to Incandenza’s filmography, we are faced with a 
discrete instance of a structure which, in both its excessive length—including, beyond its nine-
page list of films, production information, and brief descriptions, a further six supplementary 
sub-footnotes—and its attempts to provide a coherent, total catalogue of Incandenza’s 
directorial career, seems to reflect on the expansive, ‘encyclopaedic’ strategies of Jest as a 
whole. Hering has explored in detail how the series of ‘nested narratives’ offered by the 
filmography work as a reflexive ‘interrogation of Wallace’s own methodology’.88 Like Jest, 
however, the filmography is a self-evidently broken encyclopaedia, one marked by a series of 
gaps, flaws, and failures which disrupt and problematise its totalising project: from the initial 
acknowledgments of unknown dates (‘Cage’ is ‘Dated only “Before Subsidization”’ (p. 986)), 
and ‘Uncredited’ casts (p. 986, n. 24); to the later accounts of ‘conceptually unfilmable’ works 
(p. 989, n. 24); to the increasingly frequent expressions of doubt over basic factual details (as 
evidenced in the gradual accumulation of ‘(?)’ marks across the entries); to the total 
informational blanks presented by films described only as ‘Untitled. Unfinished. 
UNRELEASED’ (p. 990, n. 24). In an initial headnote, the filmography’s compilers ‘Comstock, 
Posner, and Duquette’ (from whose academic article on ‘Exemplary Works of the 
Anticonfluential Après-Garde’ the list is ostensibly drawn) explicitly acknowledge that the 
filmography is only ‘as complete as we were able to make it’: citing a series of obfuscating 
factors, they conclude with the admission that ‘the list’s order and completeness are, at this 
point in time, not definitive’ (p. 985, n. 24). In many respects, it is this filmography, rather than 
the ‘Infinite Jest’ film, which stands as the most pertinent in-text reflection of Wallace’s own 
novel: in its gestures towards an expansive, information totality, and its foundational aspects of 
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unfinished-ness, the filmography presents us with a self-contained image of the ‘text’-within-
the-text, inviting us as readers to consider the corresponding structural brokenness of its 
surrounding work. 
This formal unfinished-ness is felt most acutely, however, at the novel’s end. Jest’s 
ending is unambiguous in its rejection of coherent or conventional narrative resolution: its final 
pages (in which Don Gately—convalescing in a hospital bed after a gunshot wound, and 
attempting to recover without the aid of narcotic painkillers—recalls the horrific death of his 
former partner Gene Fackelman), fail to ‘close the loop’ with the chronological end-point 
offered by the novel’s first chapter (Hal’s University of Arizona interview, which takes place 
roughly a year after the rest of the novel’s action). Readers are faced with a distinct—and 
potentially jarring—narrative gap between the final chapter and the opening one, a chunk of plot 
left undescribed, existing beyond the limits of the text. The effect of this narrative ‘breach’ is 
one of denied conclusion or closure: Samuel Cohen has argued that 
at the end of Infinite Jest, the thing that readers in general and readers of this 
very long novel in particular wait for—the final revelation of meaning, the 
simultaneous end of the chain of events that constitute the plot and the moment 
when we can look back and see that whole chain in light of its end—isn’t there. 
What’s there instead is a nonending, an inconclusion—a number of possible but 
unprovable hypotheses, interpretations of what occurs in this gap in the chain 
between where the novel ends and where the story or stories that constitute it 
end.89 
This sense of ‘inconclusion’ serves in part to frustrate readerly expectations: Kakutani, for 
example, reads Jest’s lack of resolution as another example of its failure, complaining that, at 
the end, the novel’s ‘word machine is simply turned off, leaving the reader [. . .] suspended in 
midair’.90 Other critics, meanwhile, have read the novel’s narrative incompletion as an 
expression of an essential unknowability: Boswell describes this ‘significant gap’ as ‘a void, 
into which all the novel’s unanswered questions fall endlessly, like coins down a well with no 
bottom’.91 This ‘nonending’ works in part to again place Jest within a tradition of postmodern 
works which have comparably denied the ‘closed system’ of a conventional realist conclusion 
(consider, for example Oedipa Maas’ unresolved ‘awaiting’ at the close of Pynchon’s The 
Crying of Lot 49).92 Various critics have read Jest’s ending as comparable in its rejection of the 
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closure (or enclosure) of a clearly-defined ending: Hering, for example, argues that Wallace is 
concerned with how a ‘closed system might be transfigured into an open or communicative 
one’, going on to assert that the ‘formal structure of Infinite Jest, with its absent, “open” 
climaxes, represents a rejection of solipsistic and claustrophobic closed systems and 
environments’.93 This sense of Jest’s ending as a gesture of ‘opening out’ has been explored 
most fully, however, by Hayes-Brady, who argues that 
In the context of generative failure, to reach a conclusion in any narrative is a 
priori to close off avenues of possible communication by collapsing the 
distance between subjects; to succeed, then—to write a successful ending, to 
perform successful connection on the page—is to fail, and vice versa.94  
Approached in these terms, the deliberate ‘failure’ of Jest’s ending is read as offering a kind of 
success: the novel is seen to end ‘with a sense not of closure, but of inevitable continuation’.95 
While these predominantly positive readings of Jest’s conclusion are persuasive, I 
would suggest that the lack of resolution found in Wallace’s novel presents us with an 
incompletion more specific, and more uneasy, than these models of ‘opening out’ would 
suggest. Beyond its general resistance to closure, Jest can be seen to enact a distinct form of 
broken completion, a failed attempt to reach a specific narrative point. This suggestion is 
supported by Wallace himself, who noted in an online webchat that  
there is an ending as far as I'm concerned. Certain kind of parallel lines are 
supposed to start converging in such a way that an ‘end’ can be projected by the 
reader somewhere beyond the right frame. If no such convergence or projection 
occur[. . .]red to you, then the book’s failed you.96 
In this notion of converging, unfinished, parallel lines, Wallace suggests that, rather than 
establishing an ‘open’, ‘continued’ system, Jest works to guide readers towards a defined 
ending—albeit one situated beyond the limits of the printed text. This suggestion is supported 
by the details in the novel’s opening (chronologically final) chapter which gesture obliquely 
towards the details of the narrative’s ‘missing’ year: the most notable example being Hal’s 
reminiscence of ‘John N. R. Wayne [. . .] standing watch in a mask as Donald Gately and I dig 
up my father’s head’ (p. 17), implying both an undescribed meeting between two of the novel’s 
central characters, and some form of resolution of the search for the ‘master copy’ of the 
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‘Infinite Jest’ film. In this suggestion of a specific, but unreachable, endpoint (a suggestion 
which has led a number of readers to attempt to reconstruct the ‘actual’ events which take place 
within this narrative gap), Jest’s ending ultimately offers neither openness nor undecidability, 
but rather an enacted incompletion, a self-conscious unfinished-ness which mirrors the 
mythologised ‘missing pages’ cut from the first draft of Wallace’s novel.97 Indeed, it could be 
argued that, through his persistent references to these ‘missing pages’ in letters and interviews, 
Wallace deliberately framed the novel’s narrative incompletion as a result of this editorial 
process, establishing the implication that what we are reading is, in fact, the ‘unfinished’ version 
of the text.  
Within criticism of Jest, Casey Henry has offered a pertinent exploration of the novel’s 
incomplete structure. Henry, who traces the recurring figure of circles, loops and ‘annularity’ 
across Wallace’s text, argues that Wallace’s novel is itself structured as a broken circle, its 
cyclical structure—which he compares with that of Joyce’s Finnegan’s Wake—marked by an 
‘epiphanic gap’ between the novel’s end and its beginning.98 Henry’s positing of this formal 
model is supported by the presence of an incomplete typographical circle, printed at the bottom 
corner of the novel’s final page, extending beyond its margin: he argues that 
The partially occluded circle, lying just beyond Gately’s final breakdown, is 
essential to understanding the forward motion and means of breaking the self-
enclosed annular rings that we might understand the novel’s arrangement 
prompts.99 
While this typographical mark, present in the first edition of Jest, has (for unknown reasons) 
been absent from recent editions of the text, Henry convincingly argues for its importance in 
Wallace’s design for the novel: he notes, for example, how, in his notes on the typesetting 
proofs for Jest, Wallace is consistently ‘fastidious about this terminating symbol’.100 In his 
attachment to this ostensibly superficial marking, Wallace suggests the importance of this 
‘broken circle’ figure for understanding Jest’s incompletion: the novel traces the outline of a 
                                                            
97 See, for example, Aaron Swartz, ‘What Happens at the End of Infinite Jest? (Or, the Infinite Jest 
Ending Explained)’, Aaron Swartz’s Raw Thought, 2009 <http://www.aaronsw.com/weblog/ijend> 
[accessed 25 July 2019]. 
98 Casey Michael Henry, ‘“Sudden Awakening to the Fact That the Mischief Is Irretrievably Done”: 
Epiphanic Structure in David Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest’, Critique: Studies in Contemporary Fiction, 
56.5 (2015), 480–502 (pp. 481–482) . 
99 Henry, pp. 482–483. The significance of this ‘little quarter circle’ has been explored elsewhere by 
Goerlandt, who describes it as a ‘loophole’, allowing readers of Jest the opportuning to ‘leap out of the 
loop’ of the text’s recursive, circular structure (Goerlandt, p, 324). 
100 Henry, p. 482. 
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fully circular narrative shape, but leaves the completion of the circle outside the frame of his 
text. This curving line, while clearly defined, remains inescapably unfinished, stubbornly 
beyond the reader’s grasp. In this ‘circular’ motif, Wallace directs us once again back to the 
notion of the encyclopaedia—the name of which, as Ward notes, is ‘derived from Quintilian’s 
Greek “enkyklios paideia” (ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία), which translates literally as “circle of 
learning”’.101 In both the incomplete ‘loop’ of its narrative and the occluded circle printed on its 
final page, Jest once again positions itself as a self-consciously ‘failed’ iteration of the 
encyclopaedia’s circular project: Burn suggests that ‘completing this circle of learning from the 
novel still leaves the reader’s knowledge incomplete’.102 Burn goes on to read this incomplete 
loop as an attempt on Wallace’s part to ‘break the closed circle and direct the reader outside of 
the book, to find what has escaped the encyclopaedia’.103 While I agree that Jest’s ending finds 
an aesthetic potential within this ‘broken’ structure, I would again argue that Wallace’s novel 
does not establish a straightforwardly ‘open system’ for our readerly interpretation, but rather 
establishes an unresolved conflict between completion and incompletion, open-ness and closed-
ness. In this conflict, Jest can thus be read as following the model established by the various 
‘unfinished’ endings of Wallace’s preceding fictional work: in Jest, as in these earlier examples, 
Wallace both gestures towards the possibility of narrative closure and denies access to this 
resolution, structuring his texts around an unavoidable and self-conscious ‘breach’ in the text. 
To a certain extent Jest’s final narrative lacuna can be read as a larger-scale recapitulation of 
Broom’s final, unfinished line, signalling as it does an endpoint which, while clearly defined 
(like the missing word ‘word’ in Rick’s final sentence), is nonetheless absent from the published 
work. 
It is this figure of incompletion, of self-conscious unfinished-ness, which underpins the 
central ‘failure’ of Jest. In its self-consciously ‘broken’ ending, Wallace’s novel delineates and 
demands—more clearly than in any of his preceding fiction—a particular kind of interpretative 
activity. Even if Jest’s system is not wholly ‘open’, it nonetheless creates a space for a 
                                                            
101 Ward, p. 9. 
102 Burn explores the novel’s ‘circle of learning’ in relation to the various motifs and versions of 
circularity found throughout Jest—from the (complete) typographical ‘loops’ which designate new 
chapters, to the circular routines of drug addiction—tracing Wallace’s distrust of the encyclopaedia’s 
‘complete’ circle back to William Empson’s insistence, in his essay ‘Circles’, that ‘all the argument and 
wisdom is not in the encyclopaedia’ (Empson, qtd. in Burn, Reader’s Guide, p. 29). 
103 Burn, Reader’s Guide, p. 29. 
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necessary readerly ‘work’, the active, admittedly ‘uneasy’ effort of ‘fighting through’ the text 
which he described in his interview with McCaffery. Within the critical reception of Jest, a 
number of commentators have addressed how the novel demands a form of active reading: 
Staes, for example, argues that the ‘many underspecified actions and textual gaps in Infinite Jest 
indicate that it is up to the reader to reorganize the seemingly unrelated narrative strands into a 
meaningful whole’,104 while Holland comparably explores how 
the novel’s narrative fragmentation and incompleteness motivate the reader to 
rearrange and connect pieces, fill in gaps, and follow leaps in time and 
perspective, causing her to empathize with a variety of characters and with the 
author who handed us the puzzle to figure out, or perhaps even to create the 
missing chapter that enables her to escape the recursive loop in which all of its 
characters are bound.105 
We can see how the narrative strategies of Wallace’s novel are built on this foundational 
unfinished-ness: Burn observes that ‘[o]ne root of infinite, after all, is the French in fini—
unfinished or incomplete’ arguing that Wallace’s novel is ‘designed to leave us with our own 
work still to do’.106 Significantly, however, I would argue that Jest’s incompletion equally 
demands that we attend to the limitations of this interpretative activity. By directing us towards 
a defined, inaccessible end-point, Wallace suggests that, rather than an open-ended continued 
conversation, the ‘work’ of reading Jest must itself be incomplete. Like the silence at the end of 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, Jest’s ending points us towards a textual breach which cannot be 
‘filled in’, a blank space which resists our attempts at ‘complete’ interpretation. Far from the 
‘complete’, pacifying entertainment offered by Incandenza’s lethal film, Wallace presents us 
with a ‘failed’ entertainment, a text which, in its manifest broken-ness, invites us to reflexively 
consider our own, correspondingly broken, participatory work in constructing the narrative. In 
this, Wallace again brings to mind Barthes’ notion of the ‘writerly’ work: in making us 
reflexively aware of our own (admittedly qualified) roles in as ‘producer[s] of the text’, 
Wallace’s novel sets itself apart from the commercial ‘readerly’ pleasures, the ‘kind of 
idleness’, exemplified in Incandenza’s film.107 Beyond establishing this readerly/writerly (or 
art/entertainment) distinction, however, I would suggest that Wallace’s novel gestures towards 
something more fundamental about the process of reading literature, provoking a more self-
                                                            
104 Staes, ‘Wallace and Empathy’, p. 28. 
105 Holland, ‘Infinite Jest’, p. 130. 
106 Burn, ‘Theory of Vision’, p. 91. For more on the ‘active reading’ provoked by Jest’s narrative 
incompletion, see Cioffi, Goerlandt. 
107 Barthes, S/Z, p. 4. 
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conscious version of the kind of interpretative work involved in any reading of a fictional text. 
Ultimately, Wallace is less concerned with establishing a clear line between entertainment and 
‘art’, and more with leading us to interrogate the nature of our own readerly work—an 
interrogation which we will explore further in the next chapter. 
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4. ‘. . .’: Brief Interviews and Oblivion: Stories 
‘Radically Condensed’ 
In the wake of Infinite Jest, both Brief Interviews with Hideous Men (1999) and Oblivion: 
Stories (2004) mark a significant shift in Wallace’s writing. In stark contrast with the 
expansiveness and excess of Wallace’s previous novel, these collections are marked everywhere 
by restriction and limitation, by an abiding sense of constraint which informs the structure, 
concerns, and mood of the work. In September 1996, Wallace writes to DeLillo, complaining 
that he has ‘spent all summer doing dozens of obscure ministories that seem neither 
comprehensible nor interesting to anyone else’.1 This move towards the miniature, the 
potentially ‘incomprehensible’, is heralded—and perhaps most starkly illustrated—by the short 
piece which opens the Brief Interviews collection, a text worth quoting in its entirety: 
A RADICALLY CONDENSED HISTORY  
OF POSTINDUSTRIAL LIFE 
 
     When they were introduced, he made a witticism, hoping to be liked. She 
laughed extremely hard, hoping to be liked. Then each drove home alone, 
staring straight ahead, with the very same twist to their faces. 
     The man who’d introduced them didn’t much like either of them, though he 
acted as if he did, anxious as he was to preserve good relations at all times. One 
never knew, after all, now did one now did one now did one.2 
In its depiction of characters who, in their self-conscious attempts ‘to be liked’ or ‘to preserve 
good relations’, are faced with interpersonal disconnection, the story rehearses some of Jest’s 
familiar thematic concerns. Here, however, these ideas have been ‘radically condensed’, almost 
entirely emptied of content or context. Denied details of character, setting, dialogue, or action, 
we are faced with what Burn has called a ‘monochrome fiction’, a text ‘so stripped of 
individuating local details that all the color drains out of it’.3 In this light, the title’s 
hyperbolic—and apparently ironic—claim to offer a microcosmic ‘history of postindustrial life’ 
seems to reflect on this aspect of blank impersonality: as in the unsettling ‘very same twist’ 
which appears on both ‘his’ and ‘her’ faces, the title assigns a level of generalised sameness to 
late-20th century experience, a radical condensation of Jest’s chorus of varied and conflicting 
voices, leaving a story which could seemingly be set anywhere, about anyone. Wallace presents 
                                                            
1 David Foster Wallace, ‘Letter to Don DeLillo, 7th September 1996’, DeLillo Papers, Box 101.10. 
2 Wallace, Brief Interviews with Hideous Men, p. 0. Further references to Brief Interviews in this chapter 
will be placed in parentheses in the text.  
3 Burn, Reader’s Guide, p. 14. 
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us with a narrative pared down to almost nothing, one which barely qualifies as a ‘story’ at all 
(in a not-insignificant detail, the text occupies ‘Page 0’ of the book) and which descends into the 
ominous, empty repetition of the final sentence. While ‘A Radically Condensed History’ cannot 
quite be treated as representative of the texts in Brief Interviews or Oblivion—at 79 words, it 
stands as Wallace’s shortest story—it is nevertheless useful in providing an example of the 
change evident in his post-Infinite Jest writing, the sense of the contracted, the empty, the 
‘monochrome’, which pervades these two collections.  
How, then, can we make sense of this shift? While the stories in Brief Interviews and 
Oblivion might seem to offer an antithesis to the sheer bigness of Jest, these short texts are 
neither characterisable in terms of minimalism, and particularly not within the tradition of 
American minimalist fiction, with its attendant associations—as outlined by Robert C. Clark—
of the ‘efficient, allusive, and implicative’, of ‘simple and direct’ language employed with 
‘precision and craftsmanship’.4 This minimalist aesthetic is neatly articulated in Ernest 
Hemingway’s ‘iceberg’ model: 
If a writer of prose knows enough about what he is writing about he may omit 
things that he knows and the reader, if the writer is writing truly enough, will 
have a feeling of those things as strongly as though the writer had stated them. 
The dignity of movement of an ice-berg is due to only one-eighth of it being 
above water. A writer who omits things because he does not know them only 
makes hollow places in his writing.5 
Hemingway’s conception of a fiction which, in its omission of excess detail, is suggestive of 
hidden depths—a conception arguably borne out in, for example, the work of Raymond 
Carver—seems inadequate as an explanation of the kind of smallness employed by Wallace in 
Brief Interviews and Oblivion. Rather, these stories are more often marked by incompleteness 
and inarticulacy, by the kind of ‘hollow places’ which Hemingway critiques in the writer who 
‘does not know’ things. Indeed, this notion of ‘hollowness’ is particularly pertinent in exploring 
the structures of incompletion found across these two collections. Where Wallace’s earlier 
fiction is most frequently characterised by points of terminal incompleteness—by the 
concluding ‘gaps’ seen, for example, in Broom’s unfinished final sentence, or Jest’s ruptured 
narrative ‘loop’—in Brief Interviews and Oblivion these lacunae are instead arranged and 
distributed across the collections’ shorter texts. The result is a series of stories which seem to 
                                                            
4 Robert C. Clark, American Literary Minimalism (Tuscaloosa, University of Alabama Press, 2015), p. 1. 
5 Ernest Hemingway, Death in the Afternoon (New York: Scribner, 1932), p. 192. 
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have been ‘hollowed out’, either emptied of content (as in ‘A Radically Condensed History’), or 
otherwise marked by frequent and self-conscious points of textual or narrative incompletion. 
 Rather than an embrace of minimalist economy and precision, Wallace’s shift towards 
relative ‘smallness’ in Brief Interviews and Oblivion might instead be read as moving ever 
closer to the work of Samuel Beckett, to the principles of ‘[i]mpotence, incompleteness, and 
failure’ which serve as ‘necessary conditions’ for what Leo Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit have 
termed Beckett’s ‘art of impoverishment’.6 The abiding ‘hollowness’ of the two collections 
recalls Beckett’s own stated ambition to ‘bore one hole after another’ into language, ‘until what 
lurks behind it—be it something or nothing—begins to seep through’.7 Despite this turn towards 
‘impoverishment’, however, the stories of Brief Interviews and Oblivion are not 
straightforwardly definable in terms of the movement towards ‘pale, starved fizzles of prose’ 
which, Boxall argues, characterises the progression of Beckett’s late work.8 Rather, Wallace’s 
stories are marked by a continued concern with textual excess: from the three-page, 725-word 
sentence which begins ‘Death is Not the End’, to the extended narratives of Oblivion (some of 
which stretch almost to novella-length), Wallace continues to employ and interrogate the 
possibility of too much language.9 Even in their apparent movement towards ‘smallness’, these 
stories present a tension between constraint and excess, between in- and over-articulacy. This 
tension is captured by Boswell, who comments that, while Wallace’s later fiction remains 
‘verbal to a fault—copious, talkative, written and over-written’, its ‘endless outpouring of 
language’ can nonetheless be seen to serve ‘a curiously negative purpose: it is an attempt to 
invoke indirectly the very things that it is not addressing’.10 Across Oblivion and Brief 
Interviews, these verbal ‘outpourings’ seem more than ever to designate a failure of language, a 
speech which leads back to the same point as speechlessness. This chapter investigates the 
nature and significance of the self-conscious ‘hollow places’ found throughout these two 
collections. To do this, I will focus in turn on a key recurring motif from each book—in Brief 
                                                            
6 Leo Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit, Arts of Impoverishment: Beckett, Rothko, Resnais (Cambrige, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 17. 
7 Beckett, 'German Letter of 1937', in Disjecta: Miscellaneous Writings and a Dramatic Fragment, ed. by 
Ruby Cohn (New York: Grove Press, 1984), p. 172. 
8 Boxall, ‘DeLillo and Media Culture’, p. 56. 
9 We have only to consider Arsene’s 26-page, single-paragraph monologue at the end of Watt’s first 
chapter to see how Beckett—and particularly his earlier work—is likewise concerned with the notion of 
linguistic and textual excess (Beckett, Watt (London: Calder Publications, 1963), pp. 37–62). 
10 Boswell, Understanding, p. 209. 
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Interviews, ‘silence’; in Oblivion, the ‘untenanted’—both of which serve as thematic reflections 
of these textual and narrative gaps, and the differences between which serve to articulate the 
changes which Wallace’s work undergoes during this period. In this, I will trace the changing 
ways in which Wallace employs and explores incompletion in his post-Infinite Jest work, 
articulate a potential connection between the thematic incompletion of Wallace’s earlier writing 
and the more radical, inescapable unfinished-ness of The Pale King. 
 
‘Q.’: Brief Interviews with Hideous Men 
Even when considered in the light of the unfinished-ness which we have identified across all of 
Wallace’s fiction, the stories collected in Brief Interviews with Hideous Men are striking in the 
extent to which they foreground instances of formal incompletion. Here, more than anywhere 
else in Wallace’s writing, narrative incompleteness is figured in terms of visible breaks in the 
text: gaps, holes, and breaches which interrupt and fragment the process of reading. These 
structural gaps are evident from the level of the book’s organisation. While the final order of 
Brief Interviews’s stories was suggested by Wallace’s editor Michael Pietsch,11 the narrative and 
thematic links established between the various texts seem nevertheless to demand that we 
approach them in terms of something like a coherent whole: Boswell suggests that the book is 
‘carefully constructed so that it works better as a story cycle than a mere collection of short 
pieces’.12 Running parallel to this suggestion of ‘careful construction’, however, is a concurrent 
sense that the coherence of this ‘whole’ has been compromised, that the structure which 
confronts us is in some way unfinished. While the book’s titular ‘Interviews’, for example, 
present an apparently connected, numbered series of texts catalogued by date and location, this 
series is self-consciously incomplete: although the interviews’ numbers reach as high as #72, 
the collection contains only 18 pieces, presented in apparently random order. In this, Wallace 
suggests that we have only partial access to a larger, inaccessible whole—that the text in front 
of us is one marked by significant missing pieces. This notion of the incomplete series recurs 
throughout Brief Interviews, most notably in the group of texts entitled ‘Yet Another Example 
                                                            
11 In an interview with John O’Brien, Wallace commented that ‘The last fiction book [. . .] Brief 
Interviews with Hideous Men, the order of things that I had sent him [i.e. Michael Pietsch] was utterly 
different than the order that’s in the book. He made the arrangement that’s in the book and it’s about 450 
percent better [. . .]’ (Wallace, ‘Interview with John O'Brien and Richard Powers' (2000), in 
Conversations, pp. 110–120 (p. 113)).  
12 Boswell, Understanding, p. 182.  
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of the Porousness of Certain Borders’. While the collection provides only three ‘Examples’, the 
non-sequential numbers attached to each piece (XI, VI, and XXIV, respectively) again suggest a 
greater number of unheard stories (a suggestion compounded by each title’s weary 
characterisation of each piece as ‘Yet Another’ example), a further ‘whole’ which remains 
beyond our reach. Like the receding ‘parallel lines’ of Jest’s inaccessible ending, Wallace again 
establishes his text as an unfinished structure: Holland argues that the collection ‘withhold[s] 
overarching closure and coherence by comprising pieces and series of pieces that signify gaps, 
incompletion, and disorder as much as meaningful presence’.13  
Within Brief Interviews, these textual gaps are consistently figured in terms of, or 
otherwise associated with, instances of the unsaid or unsayable. The notion of meaningful 
silence forms a recurring figure across all of Wallace’s work: throughout Jest, for example, 
silence is frequently referred to in weighted, textured terms, from the ‘carbonated’, ‘hostile’ 
silence of Hal’s admissions interview, to the ‘great balloon of colored silence’ occupied by Ken 
Erdedy, to Hugh Steeply’s deliberate employment of ‘silent pauses as integral parts of his 
techniques of interface’.14 We can trace this concern back to Broom, where Wallace makes 
frequent use of ellipses to designate significant silences within the novel’s passages of 
unattributed dialogue, as in this conversation between Rick Vigorous and Mindy Metalman: 
‘Just sorry, is all.’ 
‘. . . .’ 
‘If such is appropriate.’ 
‘. . . .’ 
‘Which I rather think it is.’ 
‘Ricky, that’s silly, don’t be sorry. There’s no need to be sorry.’ 
‘. . . .’15 
These transcribed pauses, which recur across Wallace’s fiction, provide silence with a defined 
shape and form within the text, serving as a concretisation of the weighted, meaningful 
instances of speechlessness which Wallace articulates and explores through his writing. Hayes-
Brady traces this concern with silence back to Beckett, noting the parallels between Wallace’s 
‘recurrent, precise’ use of ellipses and Beckett’s ‘exacting stage directions regarding the length 
                                                            
13 Mary K. Holland, ‘Mediated Immediacy in Brief Interviews with Hideous Men’, in Companion to 
David Foster Wallace Studies, pp. 107–30 (pp. 109–10).  
14 Wallace, Infinite Jest, pp. 8, 27, 108. 
15 Wallace, Broom, p. 87. Burn finds a model for these long passages of unattributed speech in William 
Gaddis’s The Recognitions, noting that, where Gaddis makes sparing use of these ‘blank line[s] of 
dialogue’, this technique becomes ‘much more central’ in Wallace’s work (Reader’s Guide, p. 30). 
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of silences’.16 Indeed, it is possible to read Wallace’s work as following in the tradition of a 
twentieth century ‘literature of silence’, a group of writers (among whom Beckett is most often 
included) who have been seen to employ silence as a response—perhaps the only response—to 
the condition of modernity: Ihab Hassan, for example, argues that the works of Beckett and 
Henry Miller embody an ‘anti-literature’, one which ‘turn[s] against itself, aspires to silence, 
leaving us with uneasy intimations of outrage and apocalypse’;17 George Steiner, meanwhile 
reads the silences of Kafka and Beckett as reactions to ‘a certain exhaustion of verbal resources 
in modern civilization’, to the ‘political inhumanity of the twentieth century’.18 However, 
looking beyond these suggestions of a modern or postmodern ‘exhaustion’ of language 
(suggestions more explicitly taken up in, for example, Barth’s conception of a ‘literature of 
exhaustion’), Wallace’s work can also be seen to gesture again towards the philosophy found at 
the conclusion of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Wittgenstein concludes with a famous articulation 
of the parameters of speech: ‘Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent’.19 By 
establishing this distinction between the speakable and the unspeakable, Wittgenstein invokes a 
silence which exists beyond the reach of language, a space which is meaningful precisely 
because of its very inexpressibility. In a well-known letter to Ludwig von Ficker, he writes that 
‘my work consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all that I have not written. And it is 
precisely this second part that is the important one’.20 In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein puts 
forward a philosophy which, in ‘clearly displaying the speakable’, aspires to ‘mean the 
unspeakable’, to show the shape and limits of this inaccessible silence, and thus to make sense 
of the world as an essentially ‘limited whole’.21 It is perhaps this conception of a negative 
‘space’, a significant silence which remains outside the limits of text or language, which most 
usefully explains the meaningful silences of Wallace’s fiction, and particularly the proliferating 
points of speechlessness found throughout Brief Interviews—a collection in which silence at 
points threatens to crowd out and overwhelm the text altogether. 
                                                            
16 Hayes-Brady, Unspeakable Failures, p. 8. 
17 Ihab Hassan, The Literature of Silence: Henry Miller and Samuel Beckett (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1967), p. 3. 
18 George Steiner, Language and Silence: Essays on Language, Literature, and the Inhuman (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 69. 
19 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 7. 
20 Wittgenstein, ‘Letters to Ludwig von Ficker’, ed. by Allan Janik, trans. by Bruce Gillette, in 
Wittgenstein: Sources and Perspectives, ed. by C. G. Luckhardt (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1979), pp. 94–95. 
21 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 4.115, 6.15. 
113 
 
 The central example of this speechlessness is found in the ‘Brief Interviews’ 
themselves. This sequence of short pieces, which form a structural and thematic backbone to the 
collection, is presented as a series of unattributed testimonies from an assortment of men united 
in ‘hideousness’, a toxicity most often manifested in their dysfunctional, manipulative, and/or 
abusive relationships with women. The interviews are immediately striking in terms of form: 
each text is laid out as a one-sided conversation between hideous interviewee and an interviewer 
whose questions have been redacted, replaced only with the letter ‘Q.’.22 These unheard 
questions serve as the collection’s clearest link between formal and thematic silence: each ‘Q.’ 
serves both as a visible structural break and as a meaningful silence, a pointed instance of the 
unspoken and unspeakable which both interrupts and shapes the ‘hideous’ speaker’s otherwise 
unbroken monologue. These silences seem only more significant when the series is considered 
as a (partially) coherent narrative whole: as the interviews accumulate, it becomes clear that 
they are being conducted by a single female character, a silent ‘voice’ who draws these 
scattered, fragmentary pieces together. Wallace himself suggested that this figure (whom he 
refers to as ‘Q’) should be considered the book’s ‘protagonist’, with the interviews constituting 
a larger narrative, culminating in her experiencing ‘something really bad’.23 While this narrative 
is only barely gestured at in the text itself—Q’s ‘really bad’ fate, for example, is signalled only 
by an interviewee’s abrupt, ominous exclamation (‘oh no not again behind you look out!’ (BI, p. 
192)) at the close of the chronologically final interview—these weighted silences, these spaces 
at the edges of and within these stories, nonetheless create the suggestion of an unspoken, 
inaccessible story, a coherence beyond the confines of the printed work. 
Looking closely at the ‘spaces’ in the ‘Brief Interviews’, we can see the complex and 
varied ways in which these silences are arranged and patterned. At the centre of this are the 
interviewer’s redacted questions, the ‘Q.’s which come to assume a range of shapes and 
significances, working to inform our readerly responses to the texts. Frequently, these silences 
seem designed to implicate the interviewee in their ‘hideous’ treatment of women—or, rather to 
allow space for the speaker to implicate themselves. This can be seen in ‘B.I #36’, a short, 
                                                            
22 This one-sided interview format was first employed by Wallace in the discussions between Orin 
Incandenza and ‘Helen’ Steeply in Jest: in an interview with Lorin Stein, Wallace admitted that this 
technique was something he felt he had ‘attempted but never mastered’ in his earlier novel (Wallace, 
‘Interview with Lorin Stein’ (1999), in Conversations, pp. 89–93 (p. 90)). 
23 Wallace, ‘Interview with Stein’, in Conversations, p. 90. 
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unsettling piece set in a ‘Metropolitan Domestic Violence Community Outreach, Counseling, 
and Services Center’: 
     ‘So I decided to get help. I got in touch with the fact that the real problem 
had nothing to do with her. I saw that she would forever go on playing victim to 
my villain. I was powerless to change her. She was not part of the problem I 
could, you know, address. So I made a decision. To get help for me. I now 
know it was the best thing I’ve ever done, and the hardest. It hasn’t been easy, 
but my self-esteem is much higher now. I’ve halted the shame spiral. I’ve 
learned forgiveness. I like myself.’ 
     Q. 
     ‘Who?’ (BI, p. 28)  
Here, the interviewer’s silent question punctures the interviewee’s narcissistic account of his 
own self-improvement, offering a stark reminder of the partner (and, presumably, victim of 
domestic violence) who—amid the speaker’s self-aggrandising language of ‘halting the shame 
spiral’ and ‘learning forgiveness’—has been erased from the narrative entirely, an act of 
silencing which mirrors the disappearance of Q herself. This sense of the interviews’ gaps and 
silences working to expose the essential ‘hideousness’ of the interviewees recurs throughout the 
sequence, as in this passage from ‘B.I. #15’: 
     ‘It is a proclivity, and provided there’s minimal coercion and no real harm 
it’s essentially benign, you’ll have to agree. And that there are a surprisingly 
small number who require any coercion at all, be apprised’ 
     Q. 
     ‘From a psychological standpoint the origins appear obvious. Various 
therapists concur, I might add, here and elsewhere. So it’s all quite tidy.’ [. . .] 
     Q. 
     ‘I mean, it’s not as if I’m torturing them or burning them.’ (BI, p. 15) 
Again, the interviewee’s ‘tidy’ rationalisation of his ostensibly ‘benign’ behaviour—a behaviour 
which, crucially, goes undescribed—is disrupted and fragmented by these textual breaches, 
breaches which eventually prompt him into an unsettling defence of his actions in terms of that 
which he is not doing. While the content of the interviewer’s questions remains inaccessible to 
us, these points of speechlessness—here and throughout the sequence—nonetheless work to 
incriminate the speakers in their hideousness, gesturing towards the disturbing implications of 
that which is left unsaid, and rupturing the smooth surfaces of the interviewees’ monologic self-
presentation. 
Beyond these examples of implication and incrimination, the function of these silent 
questions varies and shifts throughout the sequence. At times, the spaces are used for darkly 
comic effect: in ‘B.I. #48’, for example the speaker’s extended description of his own 
unorthodox sexual behaviour is interrupted by a ‘Q.’ which shifts the conversation abruptly 
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towards his mother, whom he describes (a little too breezily) as ‘Alive and kicking. [. . .] 
liv[ing] with my sister and her husband and their two small children. Very much alive’ (BI p. 
87). At other points, meanwhile, the ‘Q.’ is joined by the ellipses familiar from Wallace’s earlier 
work, suggesting an actual (usually awkward or uncomfortable) break in the dialogue, as in 
‘B.I. #14’: 
     ‘It wouldn’t be so embarrassing if it wasn’t so totally fucking weird. If I had 
any clue what it was about. You know?’ 
     Q. . . . 
     ‘God, now I’m embarrassed as hell.’ (BI, p. 15) 
While these silences serve various purposes, they are consistent in self-consciously guiding our 
reading, informing and directing our responses to, and interpretation of, the texts. When 
considering the ‘Brief Interviews’ as a whole—and particularly the implied ‘narrative’ running 
between the pieces—we can see how the sequence is organised around, and thus shaped by, 
these points of speechlessness. In attempting to piece together (as far as possible) the story of 
the absent interviewer Q, the reader is forced at every turn to pay attention, not only to the 
limited information they are given (eg. dates, numbers, and locations), but also to the shape and 
significance of that which is unsaid. Across the pieces, these silent spaces are variously used to 
suggest the format of each interview (which shifts variously between clinical exercise, informal 
discussion, ‘overheard’ conversation, and personal argument), the relationship between 
interviewer and interviewee (which ranges from professional distance to apparent romantic 
engagement), and even the parameters of, and intentions behind, the overall ‘project’ (the 
origins of the interviewer’s focus on ‘hideous’ maleness would, presumably, be more clearly 
established in ‘B.I. #1’, an interview which is pointedly absent). By organising the text 
around—and, in a sense, positioning an implied central narrative within—these ‘hollow’ spaces, 
the ‘Brief Interviews’ seem built on a foundation of meaningful silence, of an inaccessible 
absence which at times seems to hold more weight and significance than the words on the page. 
How, then, can we interpret these these self-conscious points of textual silence? Within 
criticism of Wallace’s work, the sequence has most frequently (and most productively) been 
approached in terms of questions of gender and structures of power: Hayes-Brady, for example, 
characterises the interviews as a series of ‘linguistic power struggles mediated through gender 
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exchange’,24 while Holland suggests that they offer a ‘gender-specific manifestation of the 
narcissism that Wallace has explored in fiction and nonfiction’, a collection of men who 
appropriate women in their ‘solipsistically conceived quests to escape despair’.25 We can see 
how the silent interviewer Q comes to stand as a figure of ‘marginalized feminine subjectivity’ 
within the texts: throughout the sequence, her questions seem to have been silenced or erased by 
the oppressive chorus of hideous male interviewees who serve as her subjects.26 On the one 
hand, this ‘silencing’ reads as a problematic strategy on Wallace’s part: by denying Q a voice of 
her own, Wallace seems, whether purposefully or otherwise, to have engaged in a denial of 
feminine agency which uncomfortably mirrors the ‘hideous’ actions, the misogynistic and 
narcissistic behaviour, of the men depicted within the stories. For Hayes-Brady, however, Q’s 
silence can equally be interpreted as a ‘mode of resistance’: she argues that, from her position of 
silence, Q stands as ‘the most powerful voice in the collection, shaping and framing the 
confused outpourings of her subjects’.27 We have already discussed how the interviewer’s silent 
questions are organised so as to implicate and incriminate the hideous interviewees; Hayes-
Brady reads Q—in her employment of weighted, powerful silence—as a ‘latter-day Philomela 
figure’, a character who, having herself been violently silenced, weaves this silence into a 
‘tapestry of accusation’ in the form of the interviews.28 Whether or not we agree unreservedly 
with Hayes-Brady’s (potentially generous) treatment of gender politics in Wallace’s writing—
Holland, for example, offers a far more critical interpretation of Wallace’s depictions of ‘empty 
men and appropriated or abused women’—her reading is astute in articulating the power held by 
the textual gaps of the ‘Interviews’, the extent to which Q.’s silences work to shape the text 
surrounding them.29 
 Considering the ‘Interviews’ in more specifically formal terms, meanwhile, we can see 
                                                            
24 Hayes-Brady, ‘“. . .”: Language, Gender, and Modes of Power in the Work of David Foster Wallace’, 
in Companion to David Foster Wallace Studies, pp. 131–150 (p. 143). 
25 Holland, ‘Mediated Immediacy’, p. 108. 
26 Hayes-Brady, Unspeakable Failures, p. 177. 
27 Hayes-Brady, Unspeakable Failures, p. 177. In this, Q. follows in a line of significantly inaccessible, 
peripheral, silent female characters in Wallace’s fiction—running from ‘Gramma’ Beadsman in Broom to 
Avril Incandenza in Jest—characters who, even in their (sometimes problematic) absence, can be seen to 
exert an inescapable influence on their surrounding characters, narratives, and texts. 
28 Hayes-Brady, Unspeakable Failures, 177. This ‘tapestry of accusation’ can arguably be seen to target 
Wallace own ‘hideous maleness’, to serve as a reflexive critique of the inescapably limited depictions of 
women in Wallace’s work—depictions which Hayes-Brady has acknowledged as ‘patchy at best and 
enormously problematic at worst’ (Unspeakable Failures, 167). 
29 Holland, ‘By Hirsute Author’, p. 65. 
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how these arrangements of incompletion, this structural ‘hollowing out’ of the text, might be 
seen to invoke a tradition of more radically experimental fictional work. In particular, the sense 
of formal constraint which runs through the sequence—the aspect of limitation imposed by the 
‘one-sided interview’ format—seems reminiscent of the ‘constrained writing’ employed by the 
OuLiPo (the Ouvroir de Littérature Potentielle, or ‘Workshop of Potential Literature’), a Paris-
based group of French experimental writers—including Raymond Queneau, François Le 
Lionnais, and Georges Perec—who, since 1960, have ‘defined and elaborated the practice of 
writing under constraint’.30 Oulipian writing is characterised by its incorporation of formal and 
structural constraints, of supplementary rules and systems which work to place a limit on, and 
thus reshape, the process of writing literary texts. These constraints vary from the explicitly 
disruptive and experimental—Jean Lescure’s ‘S+7’ formula, for example, involves taking an 
existing literary work and replacing each noun (or ‘substantive’) with the seventh following 
noun from a chosen dictionary—to more subtle, seamless forms of limitation—such as those 
found in Perec’s La Disparition (1969), a novel written entirely without use of the letter ‘e’. 
While, as Jan Baetens has noted, these kinds of supplementary limitation could be considered a 
‘universal phenomenon’ in literature, part and parcel with ‘the notion of form itself’—we find 
aspects of constraint at work in such familiar poetic forms as the sonnet, for example—the 
writers of the OuLiPo collective can nonetheless stake a claim to have drawn this notion of 
‘writing under constraint’ into more radical and self-conscious territory, to have played a key 
role in both ‘the rediscovery of constrained writing’ and in ‘the dramatic redefinition of its 
stakes’.31 We can see how the self-consciously incomplete conversations of Wallace’s 
‘Interviews’ can be read as offering an almost Oulipian textual constraint; in his systematic 
hollowing-out of the text, Wallace seems to invoke specifically the presence of these earlier 
literary experiments.32 Where Wallace essentially differs from these literary predecessors, 
however, is in the end to which these constraints are employed. Where Oulipian texts place 
focus on process, on how the act of writing fiction is affected and informed by these 
                                                            
30 Jan Baetens, ‘OuLiPo and Proceduralism’, in The Routledge Companion to Experimental Literature, 
ed. by Joe Bray, Alison Gibbons, and Brian McHale (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 115–127 (p. 127).  
31 Baetens, pp. 116–17. 
32 Burn has discussed the influence of the OuLiPo on Wallace’s work, noting an apparent reference to one 
of the group’s most famous members in Jest (the mysterious Québécois terrorist ‘Luria Perec’, 
presumably named after Georges Perec), and identifying traces of Oulipian ‘formal games’ in the 
constrained structure of ‘A Radically Condensed History’ (Burn, Reader's Guide, pp. 17–18). 
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supplementary formal ‘rules’, Wallace is more consistently focused on interrogating the nature 
and process of reading fictional texts. Rather than serving as a self-imposed game or 
experiment, a demonstration of Wallace’s own writerly negotiation with formal constraint, the 
silent questions of the ‘Brief Interviews’ rather direct these aspects of constraint towards us as 
readers, presenting us with fundamentally limited, self-evidently incomplete text. In reading the 
interviews, we are led to participate in a kind of ‘reading under constraint’, a reading in which 
we must everywhere negotiate—and with this, reflexively consider—the inevitable inadequacy 
of our engagement with the text at hand. 
Beyond gesturing at their own specific unfinished-ness, the instances of self-conscious 
silence found through the ‘Brief Interviews’ might be seen to invite a wider consideration of the 
constraints involved in any readerly engagement with literary texts, of the ‘spaces’ which 
perhaps confront us in any work of fiction. In his phenomenology of the reading process, Iser 
puts forward a model of reading founded on the notion of ‘gaps in the text’, of ‘elements of 
indeterminacy’ which the reader is left to fill with their own (inevitably limited and subjective) 
interpretation.33 For Iser, these gaps function as the ‘pivot on which the whole text-reader 
relationship revolves’: it is through these blank spaces that the reader is induced to ‘participate 
in both the production and the comprehension’ of the literary work.34 Reading is figured as an 
active process, a productive engagement with a text defined by incompletion—a ‘hollow form’ 
into which the reader is invited to pour [their] own store of knowledge’.35 Viewed from this 
perspective, we can see how the ‘Brief Interviews’ make us persistently aware of our work as 
readers in constructing or piecing together this uniquely ‘hollow’ text. In the silent questions of 
the interviewer, Wallace seems to offer a concretisation and escalation of Iser’s ‘elements of 
indeterminacy’, a starkly self-conscious manifestation of the ‘blank spaces’ present in every 
literary work. Beyond signalling experimental ‘constraint’ or formal fragmentation, these 
textual and narrative gaps are presented as silences which we feel compelled to fill, to respond 
to with our own impressions and ideas. Looking at ‘B.I. #2’, for example, we can see clearly 
how the text’s silences are patterned so as to induce the reader’s construction of a coherent 
narrative, a ‘complete’ conversation only partially accessible on the page: 
                                                            
33 Iser, ‘The Reading Process’, p. 288. 
34 Iser, The Act of Reading, pp. 169, 24. 
35 Iser, The Act of Reading, p. 143.  
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     ‘Sweetie, we need to talk. We’ve needed to for a while. I have I mean, I feel 
like. Can you sit?’ 
     Q. 
     ‘Well, I’d rather almost anything, but I care about you, and I’d rather 
anything than you getting hurt. That concerns me a lot, believe me.’ 
     Q.  
     ‘Because I care. Because I love you. Enough to be really honest.’ 
     Q. 
     ‘That sometimes I worry you’re going to get hurt. And that you don’t 
deserve it. To get hurt I mean. 
     Q, Q. (BI, p. 77) 
This interview—which stands as the chronologically earliest available piece in the series—plays 
out not as a clinical interrogation, but rather a dialogue between the interviewer and a (typically 
‘hideous’) romantic partner. Here, more unambiguously than anywhere else in the sequence, we 
are forced to fill out the silent spaces of the missing conversation: in the interviewer’s 
increasingly significant silences—the ‘Q.’s which are here variously urgently repeated (as 
above) or elsewhere pointedly italicised—we are made ever more acutely aware of our own 
active role in imaginatively constructing or ‘realising’ the absent portion of the narrative. In so 
starkly marking out these points of blankness and indeterminacy, Wallace invokes the 
incompletion which Iser finds at the heart of every literary work, but, beyond this, also positions 
his own text as yet more radically unfinished, a fundamentally partial structure which 
everywhere demands that the reader attempt to organise and join together its broken pieces.36 
Boswell has commented on the ways in which the ‘Brief Interviews’ work to make us 
‘participant[s] in the narrative’s construction’: he argues that Wallace ‘puts the reader “inside” 
the story as a character’, with the absent interviewer serving as the reader’s ‘proxy’, their ‘silent 
voice’ within the text.37 While this notion of readerly ‘participation’ is central to Wallace’s 
strategy in the sequence, I would contest this suggestion that we are ever brought wholly ‘into’ 
the stories’ narrative. While the reader is invited to fill the spaces left by the interviewer, Q 
herself remains a persistently inaccessible figure, the ‘actual’ content of her answers stubbornly 
beyond our reach. Rather than serving as a ‘proxy’, Q’s absent presence comes to define the 
                                                            
36 John Krasinski’s film adaptation of Brief Interviews (IFC Films, 2009), offers an illustrative contextual 
example of this kind of readerly organisation and ‘joining together’: in the film, Q is provided with a 
name (Sarah Quinn), an explicit motivation for the interviews (research for a doctoral thesis in 
anthropology), and clearly-defined relationships with a number of her ‘subjects’. Krasinski’s adaptation is 
pertinent, both in demonstrating the extent to which Wallace’s text demands this work of ‘filling in’ the 
narrative, and in showing how indispensable the spaces and gaps are in contributing to the sequence’s 
overall effect: without these points of silence, Krasinski’s film loses much of the unsettling power of 
Wallace’s work. 
37 Boswell, Understanding, pp. 188, 193. 
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limits of our readerly participation, to serve as a reminder that our own subjective ‘construction’ 
of the text is itself always incomplete. 
 Even as they draw reflexive attention to the participatory nature of our reading, the 
‘Interviews’ also make us concurrently aware of the limitations of this interaction with the text, 
the boundaries and restrictions placed on any attempt at ‘realisation’ of the work. This sense of 
limitation is seen in the persistent suggestion that the sequence’s silences, its openings, are only 
ever partially ‘open’. While Q’s silence leaves a kind of space for the reader to imaginatively 
‘contribute’ to the narrative, this contribution is one which is invariably delineated, and thus 
constrained, by the surrounding text. As we have seen, the interviews’ redacted questions are 
carefully arranged to create the suggestion of weighted silence, a ‘blank’ which, although 
partially inaccessible, nonetheless holds a specific implied significance within the story. In 
attempting to ‘fill in’ these blanks, our apparently subjective interpretation is always at least 
partially delimited by the implied shape, tone, and texture of these silences, by their location 
and context within the interview. In self-consciously demarcating these textual gaps, the ‘Brief 
Interviews’ serve to make us aware simultaneously of both our role in constructing the text, and 
of the innately circumscribed nature of this readerly work. In this, Wallace again recalls Iser, 
whose phenomenological model is dependent on an awareness that, while the text can never 
‘exercise complete control’ over the reader, ‘acts of comprehension’ are always necessarily 
‘guided by the structures of the text’.38 Even taking into account its points of silence and 
absence, the literary text is never completely ‘open’: rather, the reader is faced with a tension 
between ‘determinacy and indeterminacy’, between interpretative constriction and freedom.39 
Throughout the ‘Brief Interviews’, we see a dramatisation of this conflict: in their gaps and 
spaces, these stories create the suggestion of a system at once open and closed, inviting 
reflexive consideration of both the possibilities and the limits of our own engagement with the 
text. We are presented with a uniquely stark iteration of the conditional incompletion found 
across Wallace’s writing: an unfinished-ness which leaves a defined space for the reader to ‘fill 
out’, while also serving as a reminder of the essential inaccessibility of the ‘finished’ work, the 
implied presence of a completion which remains beyond the limits of any individual, subjective 
reading.  
                                                            
38 Iser, The Act of Reading, p. 24. 
39 Iser, The Act of Reading, p. 24. 
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Looking beyond the ‘Brief Interviews’, this notion of meaningful, structured silence, of 
conditional incompletion, recurs in various forms throughout the collection. At times, silence is 
manifested in less obviously formalised terms; ‘The Depressed Person’, for example, does not 
feature the self-conscious structural breaches or gaps of the ‘Interviews’, but is nonetheless 
organised around a central speechlessness—an inarticulacy, outlined in the story’s opening 
sentence, which shapes and defines the entire subsequent narrative: 
The depressed person was in terrible and unceasing emotional pain, and the 
impossibility of sharing or articulating this pain was itself a component of the 
pain and a contributing factor in its essential horror. (BI, p. 31) 
Even as it offers an extended, ostensibly structurally ‘complete’ text, ‘The Depressed Person’ is 
haunted throughout by this bald initial statement of the inexpressible, of a ‘terrible and 
unceasing emotional pain’ which is only amplified by its resistance to articulation. The story 
goes on to follow the ‘depressed person’ (a character who, like so many in Brief Interviews, is 
left significantly nameless) in her abortive attempts to express and explain this inexpressible 
horror—to ‘share at least the contextual shape of her unceasing psychic agony and feelings of 
isolation’ (BI, p. 32)—with the people surrounding her, namely her therapist and a ‘Support 
System’ of female friends and acquaintances, a group of half a dozen ‘rotating members’ whom 
she regularly calls ‘late in the evening, long-distance, for sharing and support and just a few 
well-chosen words to help her get some realistic perspective on the day’s despair’ (BI, pp. 32–
3).  
In many respects, the depressed person’s inarticulable pain recalls the depictions of 
clinical depression found throughout Wallace’s fiction, from the narrator’s evocation of a 
shapeless ‘black hole without a bottom’ in ‘The Planet Trillaphon’,40 to Kate Gompert’s attempt 
to convey the unconveyable ‘sense of radical and thoroughgoing evil’, the ‘nausea of the cell 
and soul’ associated with ‘predator-grade depression’, in Jest.41 Boswell goes so far as to argue 
that the story specifically offers a ‘final link back to the world of Infinite Jest’, an example of 
Wallace ‘taking to its formal and stylistic limit’ his earlier novel’s ‘familiar technique of 
dramatizing the self-reflexive nightmare of self-consciousness’.42 Certainly, ‘The Depressed 
Person’ takes up the formal excesses of Jest (and distinguishes itself from the fragmentary 
                                                            
40 Wallace, 'The Planet Trillaphon as it Stands in Relation to the Bad Thing', in The David Foster Wallace 
Reader (New York: Little Brown and Company, 2014), pp. 5–19 (p. 10). 
41 Wallace, Infinite Jest, p. 695. 
42 Boswell, Understanding, p. 204. 
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pieces of the ‘Interviews’) in its continued concern with the notion of ‘too may words’, a 
language which, in its expansion and proliferation, fails to communicate what is intended. We 
see this in the protagonist’s tortuously digressive attempts to relate her painful experiences to 
her Support System: 
The depressed person averaged four interpolated apologies each time she 
recounted for supportive friends this type of painful and damaging past 
circumstance on the telephone, as well as a sort of preamble in which she 
attempted to describe how painful and frightening it was not to feel able to 
articulate the chronic depression’s excruciating pain itself but to have to resort 
to recounting examples that probably sounded, she always took care to 
acknowledge, dreary or self-pitying or like one of those people who are 
narcissistically obsessed with their ‘painful childhoods’ and ‘painful lives’ and 
wallow in their burdens and insist on recounting them at tiresome length to 
friends who are trying to be supportive and nurturing, and bore them and repel 
them. (BI, p. 32) 
In her ‘preamble’ and ‘interpolated apologies’, her self-conscious anxiety that she not sound like 
‘one of those people who are narcissistically obsessed with their “painful childhoods”’ (a 
description which seems an only too apt description of herself), the depressed person’s 
logorrhoea echoes Jest’s unmanageable masses of text. What differentiates this story, however, 
is the extent to which this excess speech is always seen to spiral outwards from the narrative’s 
opening instance of silence, the protagonist’s persistent inability to ‘articulate the chronic 
depression’s excruciating pain itself’. Wallace frames the depressed person’s excessive 
language, her interminable descriptions of ‘painful circumstances and historical insights about 
her depression and its etiology and texture and numerous symptoms’, as accumulating around 
this foundational point of speechlessness, this failure to convey ‘the overriding and unendurable 
reality of her every black minute on earth’ (BI, p. 49, n. 5). This swirling excess is reflected in 
the form of the text itself, and particularly in Wallace’s employment of footnotes. While these 
notes again gesture back towards Jest, their effect in ‘The Depressed Person’ is notably altered: 
where Jest’s endnotes were positioned at the end of the book—further stretching out the text’s 
excessive length, contributing to its self-conscious status as a massive, unbounded work—here 
they are repositioned as on-page footnotes, offering readers a visible formal analogue for the 
narrative’s digressions and fragmentations. At times, these footnotes themselves slip into 
excess, with single notes running over multiple pages, threatening to overwhelm the ‘main text’ 
altogether: note 5, for example, runs between pages 46 and 50, leaving space for only 5 lines of 
the ‘primary’ narrative on each intervening page. The resulting effect is one of language on top 
of language, of a text which has turned its excess inward on itself, not stretching into Jest’s 
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demonstrative bigness, but rather spiralling around a central silence, endlessly attempting, and 
failing, to articulate the unbearable reality of the depressed person’s inner life. 
For many readers, the story’s excess of obsessive, hyper self-conscious, and inarticulate 
language can ultimately be seen to serve as a critique of the depressed person herself. The 
character has been read by critics as an almost ‘hideous’ figure: Max, for example, characterises 
her as a ‘spoiled young woman’ who ‘repulses the reader with her obsessive neediness’, and 
whose clinical symptoms are ‘revealed to be nothing more than narcissism’.43 In the midst of 
her compulsive attempts to articulate and ‘talk through’ her own inexpressible pain, the 
depressed person is almost entirely without empathy for, or indeed any meaningful awareness 
of, anyone else around her: the abrupt death (and apparent suicide) of her therapist, for example, 
is related only in terms of its negative impact on ‘the depressed person’s journey toward inner 
healing’ (BI, p. 43), while the terminal illness of a key member of her Support System is 
described as conveniently offering the depressed person ‘nearly unlimited conflict-free 
availability and time to share on the telephone’ (BI, p. 55). I would, however, contest 
interpretations of the story as a straightforward critique of its protagonist: while we as readers 
are confronted with the depressed person’s significant personal failings, the narrative’s 
unbearable effect derives from the fact that we are placed alongside her within the text. 
Throughout the story, we are claustrophobically trapped, if not within the depressed person’s 
consciousness, then rather within the chaotic, inarticulate spirals of narcissistic language with 
which she attempts and fails to communicate her pain. We, like the depressed person herself, are 
forced at every turn to negotiate with the speechlessness at the narrative’s centre, with a silence 
which is only more tortuous in its inexpressibility. 
 At the close of the story, the reader is confronted with a concluding instance of 
weighted silence, as the depressed person—who has come to self-consciously question, and 
agonise over, her ‘capacity for basic human empathy and compassion and caring’ (BI, p. 57)—
finally asks her terminally ill friend directly (albeit in typically tortuous, digressive terms) for an 
honest, unvarnished assessment of her character: 
                                                            
43 Max, Every Love Story, p. 241. Max even suggests that the story should be read alongside Wallace’s 
biography as a kind of ‘revenge fiction’ directed specifically towards Elizabeth Wurtzel—the author of 
Prozac Nation—with whom Wallace had had a brief personal relationship. For Max, the story serves as a 
‘way of getting even with Wurtzel for treating him as a statue (or, she would say, refusing to have sex 
with him)’ (p. 241). 
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So, the depressed person said, her voice breaking, she was begging her now 
single most trusted friend to share her very most private judgment of the 
depressed person’s ‘character’’s or ‘spirit’’s capacity for human caring. She 
needed her feedback, the depressed person wept, even if that feedback was 
partly negative or hurtful or traumatic or had the potential to push her right over 
the emotional edge once and for all—even, she pleaded, if that feedback lay on 
nothing more than the coldly intellectual or ‘head’ level of objective verbal 
description; she would settle even for that, she promised, hunched and 
trembling in a near-fetal position atop her workstation cubicle’s ergonomic 
chair—and therefore now urged her terminally ill friend to go on, to not hold 
back, to let her have it: what words and terms might be applied to describe and 
assess such a solipsistic, self-consumed, endless emotional vacuum and sponge 
as she now appeared to herself to be? How was she to decide and describe—
even to herself, looking inward and facing herself—what all she’d so painfully 
learned said about her? (BI, pp. 57–8) 
The narrative concludes with this culminating question—a question unanswered and 
unanswerable, met only with the silences of the terminally ill friend’s non-response and the 
running-out of the text itself. In many respects, this ‘hollow space’ echoes the silences of the 
‘Brief Interviews’: like Q’s redacted questions, this ‘open ending’ seemingly leaves space for 
the reader to imaginatively construct an unwritten response. As in the interviews, however, we 
remain aware that this space is only ever partially ‘open’, always at least partially circumscribed 
by the text. Even as she asks for her friend’s ‘brutally candid assessment’ (BI, p. 57) the 
depressed person’s intense anxieties (her ‘hunched and trembling’, ‘near fetal’ posture, for 
example), endless qualifications (such as the double-edged, ostensible allowance that the 
inevitably ‘negative or hurtful or traumatic’ feedback might ‘push her right over the emotional 
edge’), and self-deprecatory anticipations (including her self-identification as a ‘solipsistic, self-
consumed, endless emotional vacuum and sponge’), all work to direct the shape and tone of her 
friend’s response, closing off the possibility of any truly ‘honest’ or unvarnished answer. The 
story’s open ending seems to point the reader towards a further instance of the unspeakable: in 
asking ‘what words and terms might be applied to describe and assess’ her character, the 
depressed person gestures towards a point which, like her own inarticulable pain, is beyond the 
reach of language. The story as a whole, then, is bookended by these opening and closing points 
of speechlessness. While, unlike the ‘Brief Interviews’, these are not visible ‘gaps’ which we as 
readers are led to ‘fill’, these silences nonetheless serve to organise the text positioned between 
them, to profoundly inform and shape our reading of the work. 
 Elsewhere in the collection, meanwhile, we find examples of a collision between the 
starkly concretised structural breaks of the ‘Interviews’ and the more subtle foundational 
silences of ‘The Depressed Person’—as seen, for example, in the two connected pieces which 
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comprise ‘Adult World’. ‘Adult World I’ initially presents another narrative shaped around a 
central instance of plot-level speechlessness. The story follows a further dysfunctional romantic 
relationship, a young married couple whose problems—as in ‘The Depressed Person’—spiral 
outwards from a central issue, laid out in the opening sentence: 
For the first three years, the young wife worried that their lovemaking together 
was somehow hard on his thingie. (BI, p. 137) 
The subsequent narrative follows the ‘young wife’ in her developing anxieties over the 
problems in the couple’s sex life, problems which she believes must originate in ‘something 
wrong with her’ (BI, p. 137), and which she attempts to address with a variety of strategies 
(including visits to, and purchases from, the titular ‘Adult World’ sex shop). At the heart of this 
anxiety is the recurring notion of something unspoken, a silence which exists between the 
couple: the wife is tortured by the sense that ‘whatever the problem with her was [. . .] there was 
no way to talk about it with him—there was no way the wife could think of to even start such a 
conversation’ (BI, p. 141). Once again, this instance of the inarticulable seems to establish a 
‘blank space’ at the heart of the story, a silence which informs all the wife’s various anxieties 
and actions, which shapes everything in the surrounding text. In ‘Adult World II’, however, we 
are abruptly confronted with a very different silence, a textual ‘space’ much closer to the formal 
fragmentation of the ‘Brief Interviews’. ‘Adult World II’ is presented not as a completed story 
but rather a ‘SCHEMA’ (BI, p. 155), a skeletal outline of the narrative’s latter half, complete 
with itemised section numbers (1a, 1a(1), 1b, 1c, etc.), radically abbreviated language 
(‘Meanwhile F.L. is answering J’s org question in vehement neg., tears appearing in eye’ (BI, p. 
157)), self-conscious markers of technique (‘{Abrupt p.o.v. change}’ (BI, p. 158)), and self-
deprecatory authorial notes-to-self (‘N.B.: avoid easy gags’ (BI, p. 159)). In this narrative 
collapse, Wallace presents us with a text which appears starkly unfinished: Boswell reads 
‘Adult World II’ as little more than the ‘author’s working notes’, a ‘sketch of a sketch, a frame 
to a frame’.44  
In many respects, this reflexive focus on the construction and workings of the narrative 
feels like a typically postmodern, metafictional technique: an echo and extension of Barth’s self-
aware discussions of ‘Freitag’s Triangle’ in ‘Lost in the Funhouse’.45 In interviews Wallace 
                                                            
44 Boswell, Understanding, p. 204. 
45 Barth, 'Lost in the Funhouse’, p. 96. 
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himself suggested that the story’s ‘formal stunt pilotry’ should be read as a response to the 
limitations of post-Joycean ‘epiphanic’ short story form: 
The big reason to have ‘Adult World II’ in outline form is that for myself as a 
reader I don’t buy epiphanies done dramatically anymore. You know: ‘She 
gazed out of the window. Suddenly, the revelation hit her face’. I begin wincing 
when I’m reading shit like that. I don’t think readers can buy epiphanies 
anymore . . . I like stuff that’s moving, but I don’t want to be perceived as 
manipulative, and I don’t like to be manipulative.46 
Viewed from this perspective, we can see how ‘Adult World I’ is everywhere constructed so as 
to gesture towards an anticipated moment of epiphanic revelation, one self-consciously 
signposted from the start of the narrative—as, for example, in the wife’s retrospective 
interjections, which explicitly mention a future point ‘after she had had an epiphany and rapidly 
matured’ (BI, p. 139)—and repeatedly returned to throughout the text (culminating in an 
extended discussion of the ‘secular psychodevelopmental’ definition of ‘epiphany’, and its 
rarity of occurrence outside the constructed worlds of ‘dramatic representations, religious 
iconography, and the “magical thinking” of children’ (BI, p. 150)). In light of this, the silence at 
the centre of ‘Adult World I’—the husband’s hidden sexual ‘secret’, and the resulting 
speechlessness between the couple—can be seen to function as a kind of ‘mystery’, a question 
whose anticipated answer will, it is suggested, result in a life-changing moment of realisation 
for the young wife, a shift from inexperienced childhood (as exemplified in the initial baby-talk 
references to the husband’s ‘thingie’), into mature adulthood (as signalled in the sudden 
disclosure of the wife’s full name—Jeni Roberts—in the moments leading up to her epiphany). 
The abrupt shift into schematic form in ‘Adult World II’ serves as a self-conscious frustration 
and deconstruction of this expected moment of realisation, as both Jeni’s epiphanic revelation 
(‘J. follows F.L.’s gaze out fast-food window & sees husband’s special vanity license plate 
among vehicles in Adult World lot: → epiphany’ (BI, p., 156)), and the husband’s unspoken 
secret (that he is a ‘Secret Compulsive Masturbator’, whose ostensible bouts of insomnia serve 
as cover for his own trips to Adult World to ‘purchase/view/masturbate self raw to XXX films 
& images’ (BI, p., 156)) are dispensed with in flat, shorthand terms. In denying, or at least 
occluding access to, this central moment of dramatic crisis, Wallace invites us to consider the 
limitations of the short story form, the restrictions inherent in the ‘constructed’, artificial nature 
of fictional narrative. Zadie Smith has read ‘Adult World’’s ‘unfinished, unfilled in’ second part 
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as offering readers access to the inner workings of the story, a revelation of the ‘mechanical 
levers behind the Wizard of Oz façade’.47 For Smith, this metafictionality is employed not 
merely as demonstration of Wallace’s skills as a ‘pyrotechnical stylist’, but rather as a gesture of 
‘honest[y]’, a means of showing what is usually obscured by the structures of narrative form; 
this, of course, chimes with Wallace’s own stated desire to avoid the ‘manipulative’ quality of 
traditional fictional epiphanies.48 In these terms, the unfinished-ness of ‘Adult World II’ is 
framed as another kind of textual ‘openness’, another example of Wallace breaking open the 
confines of his work, of handing some kind of control or agency back over to the reader. 
Here, however, as throughout Brief Interviews, we are also made inescapably aware of 
the limitations of this deliberate ‘openness’. This is partially seen in the sheer degree of the 
text’s incompletion: beyond the ‘stunt pilotry’ of its postmodern experimentation, ‘Adult World 
II’ presents a narrative which almost literally falls apart, an incompletion manifested in 
unprecedentedly concrete terms. In this incompletion, Wallace strays—beyond his desire for a 
non-manipulative fiction—towards the frustrations and difficulties associated with an actually 
unfinished work: Smith, for example, goes on to suggest that the story’s ‘shock of the backstage 
glimpse is just that, a shock’, one which eventually ‘wears off and does not satisfy as the full 
story might have’;49 while C. J. Evans argues that it ‘seems like Wallace lost interest in his own 
story and didn’t want to take the time to work it out, preferring to step back and provide the 
more nominal thrill of the authorial view’.50 These expressions of readerly dissatisfaction reflect 
the extent to which Wallace’s text embraces this aspect of deliberate broken-ness, this sense of a 
work which, in attempting to avoid readerly ‘manipulation’, fails to offer the basic prerequisites 
of a finished story. As with all the instances of the unfinished found through the collection, 
however, this is an incompletion which is always in some way partial or conditional. In its 
schematic form, ‘Adult World II’, even as it resists the ‘closure’ of a complete narrative, 
nonetheless makes us aware of how it works to direct the reader’s response, presenting us, as in 
the blank spaces of the ‘Interviews’, with a silence which is always self-consciously defined and 
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shaped by the printed work. Across the two parts of ‘Adult World’, we are confronted with a 
progression towards a more radical incompletion: even as Wallace ‘fills in’ the silences of the 
story’s first section, the ‘schematic’ of the second part descends into a more fundamental 
unfinished-ness, one which, once again, seems poised between one the one hand directing our 
reading, and on the other leaving a blank space, a textual silence for the reader to fill. 
The various strategies of silence and incompletion found throughout Brief Interviews 
are brought together in ‘Octet’. Within criticism of Wallace, ‘Octet’ has frequently been 
regarded as a text of particular significance: Hering, for example, characterises the story as a 
‘central reflective and refractive surface that governs and mediates the collection around it’, 51 
while Iain Williams suggests that it ‘may be quite profitably read as a representative or 
microcosmic example of Wallace’s entire oeuvre’.52 This sense of ‘Octet’ as ‘microcosm’ or 
‘reflective centre’ is supported both in the positioning of the story—at the precise mid-point of 
the collection—and in its unusual form. ‘Octet’ is structured as a series of ‘pop quizzes’, short 
pieces which resemble miniaturised versions of Brief Interviews’s stories, complete with 
nameless characters (the first two pieces, for example, feature ‘Two [unidentified] late-stage 
terminal drug addicts’ and ‘Two men, X and Y’ (BI, p. 111), respectively), oblique depictions of 
interpersonal disconnection, and titles suggesting a formally incomplete series (in a story titled 
‘Octet’, we are notably presented with Pop Quizzes 4, 6, 7, 6(A), and finally 9). Beyond this, 
the story offers a reflection of the surrounding collection in its presentation of a radical 
unfinished-ness, a ‘falling apart’ introduced, at least initially, in gradual terms: ‘Pop Quiz 6’, for 
example, fizzles out before reaching its concluding ‘question’ (‘In fact the whole mise en scène 
here seems to shot through with ambiguity to make a very good Pop Quiz, it turns out’ (BI, p. 
113)); while Pop Quiz 6(A)—an ostensible attempt to ‘[t]ry it again’ (BI, p. 114)—extends into 
another separate narrative, featuring the same characters (the aforementioned ‘X’ and ‘Y’) from 
the earlier piece. This culminates in ‘Pop Quiz 9’, which abruptly shifts into a metafictional 
deconstruction of both the story’s preceding pieces and the ‘project’ underlining the entire 
sequence: 
You are, unfortunately, a fiction writer. You are attempting a cycle of very 
short belletristic pieces, pieces which as it happens are not contes 
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philosophiques and not vignettes or scenarios or allegories or fables, exactly, 
although neither are they really qualifiable as ‘short stories’ [. . .]. How exactly 
the cycle’s short pieces are supposed to work is hard to describe. Maybe they’re 
supposed to compose a certain sort of ‘interrogation’ of the person reading 
them, somehow – i.e. palpations, feelers into the interstices of her sense of 
something, etc. . . . though what that ‘something’ is remains maddeningly hard 
to pin down [. . .] (BI, p. 123) 
In this second-person delineation of the ‘fiction writer’s’ intentions and strategies, Wallace 
invites, almost explicitly, comparison between the miniature ‘belletristic pieces’ of ‘Octet’ and 
the surrounding texts of the wider Brief Interviews collection—texts which feel comparable in 
their resistance to classification as ‘short stories’, and which, in their self-conscious moments of 
silence and absence, seem to demand a level of readerly engagement which corresponds with 
the ‘interrogation’ discussed here. Hering suggests that the ‘Octet’’s pieces ‘should be read as 
an inversion of the format of the brief interviews themselves’, an iteration of the interrogatory 
‘interview’ format in which the answers, rather than the questions, have been excised from the 
text, in which we as readers take the place of the interviewees.53 In this way the ‘pop quizzes’ 
follow the interviews in demarcating the silent spaces for our readerly response: by concluding 
each piece with a ‘quiz question' directed at the reader, Wallace leads us, again, to consider both 
the nature of our participatory role in ‘constructing’ the literary work, and the extent to which 
this response is inevitably shaped and constrained by the printed text.  
This comes to a head in the metafictional turn of ‘Pop Quiz 9’. Even as we are 
presented with the details of the hypothetical fiction writer’s ‘interrogatory’ project, we are also 
confronted with the ways in which this project, and by extension the work as a whole, is 
inescapably incomplete: 
So you do an eight-part cycle of these little mortise-and-tenon pieces. And it 
ends up a total fiasco. Five of the eight pieces don’t work at all – meaning they 
don’t interrogate or palpate what you want them to, plus are too contrived or 
too cartoonish or too annoying or all three – and you have to toss them out.  
     (BI, p. 124) 
By positioning the story as a ‘total fiasco’, an essentially failed work (as exemplified in its 
status as an unfinished, five-part ‘octet’), Wallace here—as in ‘Adult World’—stages a 
narrative collapse manifested in almost literal terms. As ‘Pop Quiz 9’ progresses, the speaker 
goes on to further articulate and enact this failure: the narrative fragments into footnotes 
(which—like those of ‘The Depressed Person’—extend into excess, crowding out the ‘main 
text’), offering extended plot summaries of the ‘five unworkable pieces’ which ‘just plain didn’t 
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work’ (BI, p. 125, n. 3). This self-conscious focus on the story’s incomplete status eventually 
directs the reader towards a final ‘open space’. Towards the end of the ‘quiz’, the speaker raises 
the radical possibility that the ‘fiction writer’ could ‘simply ask the reader’ what they think of 
the story, could ‘address the reader directly and ask her straight out whether she’s feeling 
anything like what you feel’ (BI, pp. 130–31). We are then offered an extended enumeration of 
the prerequisites for, and risks involved in, this kind of direct authorial address: the ‘fiction 
writer’, we are told, must be willing to be ‘100% honest. Meaning not just sincere but almost 
naked’ (BI, p. 131); they must also accept the possibility that they come across as a ‘self-
consciously inbent schmuck, or like just another manipulative pseudopomo Bullshit Artist 
who’s trying to salvage a fiasco by dropping back to a metadimension and commenting on the 
fiasco itself’ (BI, p. 135). These considerations all finally serve as preamble, building towards—
and delineating the shape of—the story’s concluding silence, as the speaker offers a closing 
directive to the reader (in their guise as ‘fiction writer’): ‘So decide’ (BI, p. 136). 
 This final, outwardly-directed ‘interrogation’ stands as one of the most intriguing and 
significant silent spaces of Wallace’s entire body of work. For many critics, ‘Octet’s concluding 
moments work as a demonstration of the very essence of Wallace’s fictional project: an attempt 
to ‘break through’ the ironic strategies of ‘manipulative pseudopomo bullshit’, to employ a kind 
of self-reflexive ‘meta-metafictional’ technique as a means of addressing the reader sincerely 
and directly. Konstantinou argues that the ending to ‘Pop Quiz 9’ establishes a direct 
communication between reader and author, offering a degree of unmediated access to Wallace 
himself: 
In ‘Octet’, Wallace inverts the procedures of metafiction, asking not that we 
become aware of the artifice of his fictional exercise, the artifice of the artificer, 
but rather that we believe in the total, genuine honesty, the ‘100% candor’ [. . .] 
of the author – not the narrator, but the author, Wallace.54 
While Konstantinou’s framing of the story as a kind of ‘meta-nonfiction’ is somewhat extreme, 
its suggestion that the story’s final ‘interrogation’ opens up a space for reciprocal 
communication between reader and author (or, alternatively, reader and text), is echoed by other 
critics: Kelly reads ‘Octet’’s ending as a ‘dialogic appeal to the reader’s attestation and 
judgment’,55 while Hayes-Brady suggests that the story uses its ‘ostensible conclusion’ to ‘break 
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open the expected closure of the narrative system, exposing the narrative to multiple—perhaps 
infinite—new directions’.56 More recently, however, other commentators have offered a 
counterpoint to this critical consensus, questioning the ‘openness’ or dialogic potential of 
Wallace’s story. Williams has convincingly argued that ‘Octet’’s ostensibly open, 
‘interrogatory’ ending can in fact be seen to be strictly circumscribed and directed by the text: 
At first, ‘Octet’ might seem structurally anarchic, with cyclical loops of 
reference that seem to repeat the same point insistently [. . .] However, 
Wallace’s method is profoundly logical; introducing successive instances of 
irony and rebuttal that add substance to his overall claim for sincerity as each 
level of irony is negotiated. [. . .] this method leaves very little option for 
readers other than to take the ‘fiction writer’’s claims as sincere.57  
For Williams, the complex, nested structures of self-awareness at play within ‘Pop Quiz 9’—the 
successive introduction of layers of meta- and meta-metafictionality—all serve as rhetorical 
strategies directing the reader towards the specific outcome of trusting the speaker, of accepting 
this possibility of direct author/reader communication. Viewed in these terms, the story’s final 
‘So decide’ does not really offer a decision at all: like the blank questions of the ‘Brief 
Interviews’, this is a silence shaped by the text, a space only partially ‘open’ for readerly 
participation. In this, Wallace’s apparent ‘dialogic appeal’ is thus inescapably monologic, falling 
short of the reciprocal, two-sided readerly participation which these interrogatory questions 
seem to promise.58 
 What ‘Octet’ finally directs us towards, then, is a consideration of the conditional 
incompletion present across all of Wallace’s fiction. ‘Octet’s concluding unfinished-ness does 
not, in the end, present a space of ‘infinite possibility’, but rather a version of the conflict 
between openness and closedness, silence and speech, which we have found across the Brief 
Interviews collection, and in different forms across Wallace’s entire body of work. In these self-
consciously incomplete texts, Wallace leads us to confront the tension between the text’s 
directing influence and the reader’s creative participation which takes place in our engagement 
with all works of fiction: we are reminded again of Iser’s conception of the interplay of 
‘determinacy and indeterminacy’ which exists at the heart of the reading process. Ultimately, 
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the silence at the end of ‘Octet’—and, with this, ‘hollow spaces’ found throughout Brief 
Interviews—are, like the silence at the end of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, simultaneously 
meaningful and inaccessible: while their outlines are traced, and perhaps even constricted, by 
the printed text, they nonetheless retain something beyond readerly control, beyond the reach of 
our interpretation: a ‘gap’ which persistently remains between text and reader. 
 
‘a bodyshaped area of space’: Oblivion 
In contrast with the fragmentary pieces of Brief Interviews, the stories collected in Oblivion 
appear, at least on the surface, to return to something of a more conventional shape and 
structure. The collection’s eight texts abandon the overt formal experimentation of Wallace’s 
immediately preceding work, moving towards longer, sustained narratives—‘The Suffering 
Channel’, for example, extends almost to novella-length—missing the visible, self-conscious 
incompletions which marked Brief Interviews (indeed, Oblivion as a whole is even notably 
restrained in its employment of footnotes). Alongside this shift, these stories are characterised 
by a further contraction in scope, albeit one manifested very differently from the formal 
restriction of Brief Interviews. Surveying Oblivion, Boswell comments that the stories ‘provide 
almost zero in the way of character interaction or dramatic action’, going on to argue that the 
collection’s ‘vast, unbroken wall of text [. . .] locates the reader in the protagonist’s word-drunk 
interior and traps her there for [each] story’s grueling duration’.59 In this claustrophobic 
interiority, we find Wallace paring down the cacophony of ‘hideous’ voices which characterised 
the previous collection. Oblivion’s various characters seem more than ever defined by an 
essential similarity, a sameness which Chad Harbach has summarised via a ‘composite sketch of 
Oblivion’s several protagonists’:  
[. . .] he is a flabby, heterosexual male in his late thirties, with a midlevel 
corporate job, a beleaguered or nonexistent love life, a habit of curling scare-
quotes around a few too many of his words, and a vocabulary that Wallace 
himself would no doubt describe as ‘literally incredible’.60  
While somewhat reductive, Harbach’s sketch is useful in suggesting the extent to which these 
various voices seem to sound—particularly in their shared tendency towards technical 
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terminology and logorrheic excess—more and more like the voice of Wallace himself—or, 
more accurately, like the particular voice adopted by Wallace in his non-fiction writing. In his 
close analysis of Wallace’s syntax, Simon de Bourcier suggests that Oblivion ‘indulges 
Wallace’s characteristic authorial voice in all its oppressive maximalism’, and we can see how, 
in hewing ever more closely to the voice of ‘David Foster Wallace’, these stories intensify the 
collection’s abiding feeling of constriction and claustrophobia, creating the unsettling 
suggestion that we are trapped not only within the perspectives of these characters, but perhaps 
also within the ‘word-drunk interior’ of Wallace himself.61 
 Looking more closely at Oblivion’s ‘unbroken walls of text’, however, it becomes clear 
that these stories are still marked by the incompletion which we have identified across all of 
Wallace’s fiction. Even in their apparent shift towards comparative formal coherence, 
Oblivion’s texts are punctuated by narrative ‘gaps’ comparable to (if less overtly visible than) 
those of Brief Interviews. There is clear evidence of this in ‘Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature’: a text first published in McSweeney’s in 1998 as further iteration of Brief Interviews’s 
‘Yet Another Example of the Porousness of Certain Borders’ sequence, and which as such 
offers an intriguing illustration of the continuities (and discontinuities) between the two 
collections.62 Like so many of Oblivion’s stories, ‘Philosophy’ is claustrophobically monovocal. 
Throughout, we as readers are confined within the first-person perspective of a single narrating 
male voice, one who displays many of the key features of Harbach’s ‘typical Oblivion 
protagonist’: from his extensive technical vocabulary (‘there was still the matter of the gaping 
mouth and mandibular distension and protrudant tendons and so forth’; to his recurring, and 
somewhat irritating, verbal tics (including a habit of placing random phrases—such as ‘insanely 
frightened’—in italics); to the sustained suggestion of his romantic frustration (‘Respecting 
mating I have been on dates but there was insufficient chemistry’).63 This readerly confinement 
is only exacerbated by a primary ‘plot’ which offers little in the way of dramatic action, 
providing a digressive account of the narrator’s various bus journeys accompanying his mother 
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to and from her attorney’s office, following a botched cosmetic surgery which has left her face 
horrifyingly frozen in a ‘chronic mask of insane terror’ (O, p. 182). 
Over the course of ‘Philosophy’, however, the coherence of this relatively quotidian (if 
vaguely unsettling) description is repeatedly ruptured by seemingly offhand or unintentional 
moments of slippage, moments which work to suggest the presence of something hidden 
beneath the story’s seemingly smooth surface. These narrative ‘breaches’ gesture towards a 
buried or otherwise unaddressed truth: from the opening sentence’s fleeting reference to the 
speaker’s time in prison (‘Then just as I was being released [. . .]’ (O, p. 182)); to the snatches 
describing his unsettling appearance and clothing (‘Physically I am a large specimen and have 
distinctive coloration [. . .] There are also the goggles worn and specially constructed gloves for 
field work’ (O, p. 183)); to the belatedly-revealed details of his mother’s initial accident (‘Her 
original liability was that a worker at the assembly plant actually glued a can’s nozzle on facing 
backward, I submit a clear-cut case of failing to exercise due care’ (O, p. 188)). The most 
notable examples of this slippage, however, are found in the abruptly interpolated descriptions 
of the horrifying incident which led to the narrator’s imprisonment: 
And the special perpendicular seats in the bus’s anterior segment comprise a 
good vantage from which to watch the driver wrestle with the bus. Nor did I 
have anything against the boy in any way. Nor is there anything in any state, 
county or local ordinance restricting what varieties you can study or stipulating 
in any way that cultivating more than a certain number thereof constitutes 
reckless endangerment or a hazard to the community at large. If the 
appointment is AM then the driver sometimes keeps a newspaper folded in a 
hutch by the automatic coin or token box [. . .] (O, p. 184) 
This incident—involving, as gradually becomes clear, a young boy falling into a garage housing 
the narrator’s large collection of widow spiders—is only ever related in these incongruous 
glimpses, these fractures which reveal a buried, and far more disturbing, narrative behind the 
speaker’s otherwise uneventful monologue. This strategy of gradually and obliquely revealing a 
secondary, ‘hidden’ story beneath or behind his primary plot has been addressed by Hayes-
Brady, who refers to this technique as ‘skeletal narrative’: 
Skeletal narrative refers to a strategy by which Wallace embeds the seeds of 
textual and interpretive unraveling within the narrative voice of a story; a 
narrator (often but not always first-person) begins to tell a story, but through 
asides or tonal slippage reveals another layer of narrative under the surface, 
ultimately losing control of the primary narrative vocabulary and confessing or 
revealing what was hidden.64  
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For Hayes-Brady, this strategy can be regarded as one of the ‘defining features’ of Wallace’s 
writing, albeit one only fully ‘mastered’ in the stories of Oblivion.65 Looking again at 
‘Philosophy’, we can see how these instances of ‘tonal slippage’ play a role analogous to the 
points of blankness which we encountered across Brief Interviews. In these ‘breaches’, Wallace 
seems once again to gesture self-consciously—if less immediately perceptibly—towards the 
‘hollow places’ at the heart of his work.  
This sense of a continuity between the formal ‘silences’ of Brief Interviews and these 
more subtly-incorporated narrative blanks is further reflected in the various instances of actual 
silence found through ‘Philosophy’. Although less visible than, for example, the absent 
questions of the ‘Interviews’, ‘Philosophy’ is marked throughout by points of speechlessness, 
silences which here take the form of specific words left conspicuously unspoken throughout the 
story. We see this, for example, in the brand name of the malfunctioning ‘common household 
spray’ which caused the narrator’s mother’s initial accident, the name of which (‘R – – d!’) is 
blanked-out as, we are told, a central condition of her product liability settlement (O, p. 189). In 
a similar, if less obviously noticeable, way, the crucial word ‘spiders’—the central object of the 
speaker’s obsession—is also markedly absent, with reference made only to ‘specimens’ (O, p. 
183), ‘the phylum arthropodae’ (O, p. 185), and, eventually, ‘widows’ (O, p. 187). Perhaps 
most strikingly, we see this in the narrator’s repeated references to a pointedly unnamed 
Hitchcock film: in describing his mother’s surgically-induced ‘mask of insane terror’, the 
narrator explicitly compares her with ‘someone in the shower scene of Hitchcock’ (O, p. 182), 
and later meditates on the fact that ‘less than a centimetre either way is the difference between 
smooth youthful eyes and the chronic expression of Vivian Leigh [sic] in the shower in the 1960 
classic of that name’ (O, p. 188). In each of these references, ‘that name’—Psycho—is 
deliberately and ominously occluded, a silence which only invites consideration of the uneasy 
parallels between the speaker (with his unsettling relationship with his ‘Mother’) and the 
murderous protagonist of Hitchcock’s film.  
In comparison with the unavoidable structural gaps of Brief Interviews, these ‘blanks’ 
are integrated more seamlessly into ‘Philosophy’’s narrative: far from visibly fragmenting the 
text, these scattered silences require our readerly attention, to the extent that they might be 
missed altogether on an initial reading of the text. Nevertheless, these ‘hollow places’ function 
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in a way comparable to the more overt silences of Wallace’s previous collection, leading us, 
once again, to consider the unfilled spaces found in every literary text, the aspects of 
‘blankness’ which form the basis of our readerly engagement with any literary work. In Hayes-
Brady’s analysis, the hollow structure of ‘skeletal narrative’—the ‘gap’ which occupies the 
space ‘between narrative strata’—is seen as a space where ‘interpretive possibilities flourish’; 
she almost directly echoes Iser’s theories of reading in her discussion of the way these ‘copious 
narrative blanks’ serve to ‘mak[e] the reader a co-producer of the text’.66 Here, as with Brief 
Interviews, however, the text can be seen to place equal self-conscious focus on the inevitable 
constraints placed on this readerly engagement. While we as readers are invited to ‘fill’ the gaps 
found throughout ‘Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature’, the fact that each of the story’s 
‘silences’ leaves space only for a single, specific word—be it ‘Raid!’, ‘spider’, or ‘Psycho’—
creates the sense more than ever of a text which circumscribes our reading, which points our 
interpretation in a specific direction.  
 Surveying Oblivion as a whole, we find these ‘breaches’—and the associated sense of 
‘skeletal’, hollowed-out narrative structure—recurring throughout. In ‘Mister Squishy’, the 
primary plot—centred around an advertising agency’s organisation of a focus group to gauge 
public response to a new line of ‘dark and exceptionally dense and moist-looking snack cakes’ 
(O, p. 5)—is gradually punctured, and eventually wholly overwhelmed, by a series of 
proliferating ‘slippages’ revealing a buried foundation of layered corporate hierarchies, 
machinations, and plots, professional double- and triple-crossings which spiral into an almost 
unfollowable complexity. In ‘Oblivion’, meanwhile, the speaker’s tortuously protracted 
description of a snoring-related marital dispute is similarly punctuated by abrupt ‘fractures’ in 
the narrative, surreal visions and disembodied voices which eventually point us towards another 
buried ‘reality’: in the story’s final lines, it is revealed that the preceding narrative has in fact 
been the dream of the ostensible narrator’s sleeping wife, a concluding ‘twist’ which forces the 
reader to (re)consider the ‘hollowness’ at the text’s centre. This strategy has been commented 
upon by various critics: Charles Nixon, for example, suggests that throughout Oblivion Wallace 
demands a ‘detective-like fascination on the reader’s part’,67 while Boswell notes how the 
collection’s frequent narrative fractures and twists work to ‘open up an outer layer of interiority 
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into which the story’s principal layer has been nesting all along’, tasking readers with the 
‘entropic task of ordering and assessing’ the ‘dense descriptive’ work.68 Even in their more 
conventionally-structured forms, Oblivion’s stories continue to place focus on the nature and 
process of readerly engagement, the work (and the limitations) involved in any reading of a 
literary text. To a certain extent, this focus is again reflected in instances of speechlessness and 
silence found across the collection: Thomas Tracey has commented on the various points in 
Oblivion where ‘traumatic experience’ is rendered in soundless terms—from the narrator’s 
disturbingly silent vision of his father’s workplace in ‘The Soul is Not a Smithy’, to the lack of 
sound attached to the looping televised images of human anguish in ‘The Suffering Channel’—
arguing that these silent moments offer a ‘striking contrast’ with a series of texts ‘so replete 
with incessant human speech’.69 Looking beyond these specific examples, however, I would 
argue that, within Oblivion, notions of textual absence and ‘hollowness’ are more frequently 
reframed in a way distinct from the speechlessness seen in Brief Interviews, a change which 
reflects the shift in style and focus which takes place between the two collections. 
Throughout Oblivion, we encounter points where this absence is embodied by specific 
characters, characters who—in their radical emptiness—seem to serve as visible emblems for 
the points of blankness within these stories. The collection’s central illustrative example of this 
embodied hollowness is found in its shortest piece ‘Incarnations of Burned Children’, a three-
page story which relates a brief instance of almost unspeakable horror: 
The Daddy was around the side of the house hanging a door for the tenant when 
he heard the child’s screams and the Mommy’s voice gone high between them. 
He could move fast, and the back porch gave onto the kitchen, and before the 
screen door had banged shut behind him the Daddy had taken the scene in 
whole, the overturned pot on the floortile before the stove and the burner’s blue 
jet and the floor’s pool of water still steaming as its many arms extended, the 
toddler in his baggy diaper standing rigid with steam coming off his hair and his 
chest and shoulders scarlet and his eyes rolled up and mouth open very wide 
and seeming somehow separate from the sounds that issued, the Mommy down 
on one knee with the dishrag dabbing pointlessly at him and matching the 
screams with cries of her own, hysterical so she was almost frozen. (O, p. 114) 
While seemingly familiar in its maximalist expansion, on closer reading this opening sentence 
can be seen to diverge from Wallace’s usual looping overabundance of language. We are free, 
here, from the monologic, self-conscious verbosity which characterises Oblivion’s other stories 
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(or much of Wallace’s earlier writing); instead, ‘Incarnations’’s ‘wall of text’ is used to convey 
an overwhelming breathlessness, a stretching-out of a single, traumatic moment in time. Rather 
than presenting Wallace’s usual reflexive concern with excess language, the story is instead 
organised around points of wordless noise: the screams and cries of both mother and infant are 
sounds which fail to convey anything beyond generalised horror, which seem ‘somehow 
separate’ from the people making them. The figure of wordless vocalisation recurs throughout 
‘Incarnations’, from the description of the ‘Mommy’ ‘with one hand waving around in the area 
of her mouth and uttering objectless words’, to the child’s continuing to breathlessly scream ‘a 
high pure shining sound’ (O, p. 115). These non-communicative vocalisations become crucial at 
the end of the story, as the cause of the child’s continued screaming is revealed to be the boiling 
water collected in the diaper which he is still wearing: the narrative’s central horror is bound up 
with the communicative failure of the child’s wordless sounds, the fact that the boiling water 
has been ‘burning their baby boy all this time while he screamed for them to help and they 
hadn’t’ (O, p. 116). These wordless screams can be read as an inverted mirror-image of Brief 
Interviews’ points of silence, figuring as they do as another kind of speechlessness: a sound 
which is wholly meaningless, which seems fundamentally separate, both from its point of origin 
and, more generally, from the entire sphere of human communication. 
This sense of these wordless sounds establishing a ‘separation’ between sound and 
person is reiterated and expanded upon in the story’s final lines: 
[. . .] but by then it was too late, when it wouldn’t stop and they couldn’t make 
it the child had learned to leave himself and watch the whole rest unfold from a 
point overhead, and whatever was lost never thenceforth mattered, and the 
child’s body expanded and walked about and drew pay and lived its life 
untenanted, a thing among things, its self’s soul so much vapour aloft, falling as 
rain and then rising, the sun up and down like a yoyo. (O, p. 116) 
Here, we are confronted with an abrupt shift, a striking movement beyond the ‘realistic’ 
parameters of the preceding story. Olsen has commented on the power of this ‘fast 
narratological swerve’, a strategy which, he argues, ‘forces the reader to reboot his or her 
reading strategies’.70 Olsen’s reading usefully illustrates the ambiguity carried within Wallace’s 
mid-sentence shift: his suggestion that ‘the toddler dies, or most likely dies’, while apparently 
reasonable, misses the strange specificity of the final sentence. Looking closely at these final 
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lines, we can see how the child’s learning to ‘leave himself’ is framed not as a death but rather 
another instance of separation: we learn that, having been divided from his ‘self’s soul’, the 
child’s body ‘expanded and walked about and drew pay and lived its life untenanted, a thing 
among things’. After spending the narrative teasing out a singularly brief, traumatic moment, 
this phrase sees Wallace suddenly gesturing years into the future, offering a compressed vision 
of an entire life—of ‘expanding’, ‘walking about’ and ‘drawing pay’—as experienced by a body 
which is ‘untenanted’, detached from a soul which, like the wordless sounds of the child’s 
earlier screams, has become untethered from its place of origin. In this brief, partially buried 
vision of an ‘untenanted’ self, Wallace presents us with something like an embodied version of 
the spaces and absences which we have traced through Brief Interviews and into Oblivion. In his 
‘hollowed out’ state—a state of ‘oblivion’ seemingly outside the limits of language—the child 
in ‘Incarnations’ offers us an uncanny vision of a personified ‘blank space’, a human-shaped 
breach in the fabric of Wallace’s text. 
As with the figure of silence in Brief Interviews, it is possible to trace this notion of the 
empty, vacated, or untethered self back through almost all of Wallace’s fictional work: from the 
narrator’s attempts to evoke the experience of being on antidepressants via the metaphorical 
lens of ‘living on another planet’ or ‘being far away’ from one’s self in ‘The Planet 
Trillaphon’,71 to the ghostly James Incandenza’s posthumous fear that his son Hal has become a 
‘figurant’—an unspeaking extra or ‘surreally mute’ background presence within the ‘drama’ of 
his own life—in Jest.72 In the arresting separation of body and self which takes place in the final 
lines of ‘Incarnations’, we again find Wallace both taking up a recurring, persistent concern and 
also bringing it into focus, positioning this unsettling notion of the ‘untenanted’ at the centre of 
this story and, arguably, of the other texts in the collection. Looking across Oblivion, we are 
faced with further instances of this embodied ‘hollowness’: as for, example, in the disturbingly 
blank presence at the centre of ‘The Soul is Not A Smithy’. ‘The Soul’ is presented a first-
person recollection of another traumatic childhood event: in this case a ‘hostage circumstance’ 
which takes place in the unnamed narrator’s ‘4th grade Civics class’ (O, p. 67). Like the 
majority of Oblivion’s texts, ‘The Soul’’s narrative structure is complexly nested, a complexity 
here bound up with the narrator’s self- acknowledged detachment from—and thus potential 
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unreliability in remembering—its central traumatic drama:  
I am someone who has always possessed good peripheral vision, and for much 
of Mr. Johnson’s three weeks on the U.S. Constitution, I had primarily attended 
Civics in body only, my real attention directed peripherally at the fields and 
street outside [. . .] (O, p. 71) 
In the narrator’s self-imposed detachment—his self-confessedly ‘peripheral’ status—Wallace 
immediately presents us with a separation between body and consciousness. Having partially 
absented himself from his bodily surroundings, the narrator retreats into the active construction 
of ‘whole linear, discretely organised narrative fantasies’ (O, p. 71), fantasies which take the 
shape of an elaborate, extended sub-narrative following a young girl (‘Ruth Simmons’) and her 
dog (‘Cuffie’). As ‘The Soul’ progresses, this story-within-the-story gradually becomes more 
violent and disturbing, a progression which mirrors the developing—and allegedly unnoticed—
hostage situation in the ‘real world’ of the classroom. In this mirroring of fiction and truth, 
Wallace suggests the inherent limitations of the narrator’s self-imposed ‘absence’: even as he 
attempts to untether himself from his surroundings, the speaker remains stubbornly attached to, 
and confined within, his bodily existence. 
In his analysis of ‘The Soul’, Carlisle notes that the story’s title alludes to the 
penultimate sentence of Joyce’s Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, in which the novel’s 
protagonist Stephen Dedalus writes in his journal that he is preparing to ‘encounter for the 
millionth time the reality of experience and to forge in the smithy of my soul the uncreated 
conscience of my race’.73 For Carlisle, Wallace’s title, and his story as a whole, can be read as a 
refutation of Dedalus’s smithy metaphor: 
Wallace’s title suggests that a smithy is not an accurate metaphor for the soul, 
given that we cannot control—and sometimes are not even consciously aware 
of—the way our experiences shape our personalities.74  
In Carlisle’s reading, this idea is seen to apply primarily to the story’s narrator, whose partially-
conscious reminiscence of the ‘hostage circumstance’ belies its larger traumatic influence on his 
later life. I would argue, however, that the notion of an unmanageable or uncontrollable soul is 
evidenced more strikingly and comprehensively elsewhere in the story. This sense of a self 
fundamentally removed from conscious intent is seen most strikingly in the story’s second, 
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more radical example of the ‘untenanted’—the substitute Civics teacher Mr Johnson, who 
seems (as the narrator only belated realises) to have undergone a kind of evacuation of self or 
consciousness mid-way through the lesson: 
The only sound [. . .] being that of Richard A. Johnson writing on the 
chalkboard, ostensibly about the XIIIth Amendment’s abolition of Negro 
slavery, except instead it turned out that he was really writing KILL THEM 
KILL THEM ALL over and over again on the chalkboard [. . .] the handwriting 
less and less like the sub’s customary fluid script and more and more 
frightening and ultimately not even human looking, and not seeming to realize 
what he was doing or stopping to give any kind of explanation but only cocking 
his already oddly cocked head further and further over to the side, like 
somebody struggling might and main against some terrible type of evil or alien 
force that had ahold of him at the chalkboard and was compelling his hand to 
write things against his will, and making [. . .] a strange, highpitched vocal 
noise that was something like a scream or moan of effort, except that it was 
evidently just one note or pitch maintained throughout [. . .] (O, p. 91) 
In contrast with the narrator’s partial, self-imposed state of imaginative ‘detachment’, Mr 
Johnson seems wholly (and disturbingly) ‘hollowed out’, emptied of self or personhood, 
engaged in actions beyond his control or intentions. As in ‘Incarnations’, this state of absence is 
again associated with a wordless, non-communicative vocalisation: the ‘strange, highpitched 
vocal noise’ which, in its weirdly sustained, unchanging pitch, seems outside the realm of 
human affect or communication. Here, however, this ‘hollowness’ is figured in terms far more 
pronouncedly unsettling and uncanny: even beyond its violent content, Mr Johnson’s ‘message’ 
becomes increasingly disturbing in the extent to which his handwriting deviates from his 
‘customary fluid script’, eventually appearing ‘not even human’. 
This example of embodied ‘hollowness’ is joined—and complicated—by a concurrent 
implication that Mr Johnson has been possessed by something inhuman: the narrator describes 
Johnson as appearing to struggle against ‘some terrible type of evil or alien force’, while later in 
the story his face is described as ‘looking simultaneously electrocuted and demonically 
possessed’ (O, p. 101). This vague suggestion of demonic or supernatural possession is brought 
into sharper focus when we consider how this passage serves an echo of Wallace’s earlier work. 
Indeed, Johnson’s ‘KILL THEM ALL KILL THEM ALL’ recalls the passage in Jest where 
Gately, being visited by the ‘wraith’ of the deceased James Incandenza, has his consciousness 
invaded by a series of unbidden words: 
[. . .] in Gately's own brain-voice but with roaring and unwilled force, comes 
the term PIROUETTE, in caps, which term Gately knows for a fact he doesn't 
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have any idea what it means and no reason to be thinking it with roaring force, 
so the sensation is not only creepy but somehow violating, a sort of lexical 
rape.75 
In Jest these ‘ghostwords’, imposed on Gately by Incandenza’s wraith, are presented as a kind 
of linguistic possession, a violent supernatural intrusion on, and resultant loss of control of, 
one’s own language and consciousness.76 Returning to ‘The Soul’, we can see how Johnson’s 
‘KILL THEM ALL’—rendered in the same capitalised, italicised script as Incandenza’s 
ghostwords—gesture towards a comparable, if more explicitly malevolent, ghostly possession.77 
Crucially, however, this passage is distinct from Jest in the absence of any visible or apparent 
‘ghost’ or ‘wraith’. In his ‘untenanted’ state, Mr Johnson seems possessed not with a ghostly 
presence but rather with a disturbing (and seemingly malign) absence, a blankness which is 
terrifying precisely in its resistance to articulation (the narrator notes at one point that ‘Mr. 
Johnson’s face’s character and expression were indescribable’ (O, p. 100)). In this way, Johnson 
joins the burned child of ‘Incarnations’ as a further example of embodied ‘hollowness’, an 
unknowable—and here inescapably ‘terrible’—point of speechless oblivion at the heart of the 
narrative.  
This suggestion of the ‘terrible’, unsettling or uncanny quality of the untenanted self 
resurfaces in ‘The Suffering Channel’. The long story’s primary plot follows Skip Atwater, a 
journalist at the fictional New York-based lifestyle magazine Style, in his attempts to interview 
Brint Moltke, a midwestern artist whose ‘work’ consists of ‘shit shaped into various likenesses 
or miniatures’ (O, p. 238), ‘artworks’ which demand particular (and grim) fascination in the fact 
that they ‘come out that way. Already fully formed’ (O, p. 239). Throughout the story, Atwater 
himself is associated with (or threatened by) questions of bodily absence or unconsciousness: 
from the start, he is characterised by ‘several lacunae or blind spots in [his] self concept’ (O, p. 
243), including an involuntary habit of making a ‘waist level fist and mov[ing] it up and down 
in time to his stressed syllables’ (O, p. 239). Later, meanwhile, Atwater is troubled by  
[. . .] the queer sense that he was in fact not a body that occupied space but 
rather just a bodyshaped area of space itself, impenetrable but empty, with a 
certain vacuous roaring sensation we tend to associate with empty space.  
      (O, p. 313) 
In this evocative image of a ‘bodyshaped area of space’—as well as the uneasy suggestion that 
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there are aspects of his personality outside the control of his conscious mind—Atwater seems 
troubled by the possibility of the very untenanted ‘hollowness’ which we have identified in 
characters across Oblivion. As in ‘The Soul is Not a Smithy’, however, the protagonist’s partial 
feelings of ‘emptiness’ are reflected, and more fully manifested, elsewhere in the text: namely in 
the comparatively peripheral figure of the defecatory ‘artist’ Brint Moltke. 
Atwater’s initial interview with Moltke (as organised, and largely directed, by the 
artist’s wife Amber) is informed by an intuition that ‘something was off about the artist and/or 
the marriage’s dynamics’: 
Brint Moltke sat hunched or slumped with his toes in and his hands in his lap, a 
posture reminiscent of a scolded child, but at the same time smiling at Atwater. 
As in smiling the entire time. It was not an empty professional corporate smile, 
but the soul effects were similar. [. . .] A further idiosyncrasy that Atwater 
noted in Gregg shorthand was the arrangement of the artist’s hands: their 
thumbs and forefingers formed a perfect lap level circle, which Moltke held or 
rather somehow directed before him like an aperture or target. He appeared to 
be unaware of this habit. It was a gesture both unsubtle and somewhat obscure 
in terms of what it signified. Combined with the rigid smile, it was almost the 
stuff of nightmares. (O, p. 248) 
In his nightmarishly fixed, ‘empty’, and affectless smile, Moltke offers a further unsettling 
iteration of the untenanted self, another character who has been emptied out, evacuated of 
content or consciousness. As ‘The Suffering Channel’ progresses, Moltke’s ‘blankness’ only 
becomes more pronounced: through all of Atwater’s interviews the artist is almost always either 
spoken for, or otherwise carefully directed by, his wife (to the extent that the final interview is 
conducted without Brint’s presence altogether). Moltke’s essential absence is crystallised most 
clearly, however, in his obscurely significant ‘lap level circle’, a ‘habit’ which offers an uneasy 
mirror image of Atwater’s own ‘waist level’ hand gesture. Over the course of the story, Atwater 
returns obsessively to the question of the meaning behind this apparently unconscious tic: 
No analogy for the digital waist level circle or aperture or lens or target or 
orifice or void seemed quite right, but it struck Atwater as definitely the sort of 
tic or gesture that meant something—the way in dreams and certain kinds of art 
things were never merely things but always seemed to stand for something else 
that you couldn’t quite put a finger on—and the journalist had already 
shorthanded several reminders to himself to consider whether the gesture was 
some kind of unconscious visible code [. . .] (O, p. 253) 
In its resistance to explication, its nagging suggestion of a coded significance which Atwater 
and we as readers can never ‘quite put a finger on’, Moltke’s empty ‘circle or aperture’ stands, 
like Moltke himself, as a ‘void’, an absence at the heart of the narrative. As in ‘The Soul’, this 
blankness seems to point towards a ‘truth’ which is undeniably nightmarish, disturbing, or 
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unspeakable—a suggestion later supported by the artist’s final, obscure communication with 
Atwater: a ‘cri de coeur’ (‘HELP ME’) (O, p. 314), rendered in the medium of Motke’s 
distinctive ‘artwork’, which appears on Atwater’s motel balcony in the story’s closing pages. 
We can see how Moltke offers a further example of a personified ‘hollow’, a ‘bodyshaped area 
of space’ within Wallace’s text. Like both the burned child in ‘Incarnations’ and the hauntingly 
absent Mr Johnson in ‘The Soul’, Moltke seems to present us with an embodied breach in the 
fabric of the narrative: in these characters, we find Wallace pointing us towards something 
unspeakable, a point of incompletion and unfinished-ness at the heart of his own work. 
 While Oblivion’s ‘untenanted’ characters seem to occupy a territory comparable to the 
formal breaks found throughout Brief Interviews—making us aware of the silent, indeterminate 
spaces present in any literary text—they also invoke, in the frequently uncanny and unsettling 
quality of their inexpressibility, a more unknowable blankness. The ‘silence’ embodied by these 
characters frequently seems to exceed the limits of, for example, the defined and structured 
‘blanks and negations’ which Iser identifies in the literary work.78 These points of disquieting 
blankness gesture towards a larger absence, closer to Iser’s conception of ‘negativity’. Within 
his otherwise structured conception of the literary work’s ‘hollow form’, Iser positions 
negativity as a radically unknowable space, the ‘unformulated background’ of everything which 
is not expressed in the printed text: 
As far as literary texts are concerned, negativity is the structure underlying the 
invalidation of the manifested reality. It is the unformulated constituent of the 
text. As far as the reception of the text is concerned, negativity is that which has 
not yet been comprehended.79 
In this notion of an unknowable, but still crucially present, non-text, Iser brings us back to 
Wittgenstein’s argument for the inescapable importance of that which is ‘not written’. At the 
conclusion of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein’s own codified, structured model of the world opens 
out on to the fundamental silence of all that we ‘cannot speak’; in attempting to ‘draw a limit to 
thought’, he is forced to recognise the presence of the ‘inexpressible’, of the unspeakable and 
unthinkable negative space which he refers to as the ‘mystical’.80 It is perhaps this deeper 
oblivion, this radically unformulated silence, which is evoked by Wallace in the untenanted, 
embodied absences of this collection. 
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 This suggestion of a more fundamentally unknowable silence can perhaps also be seen 
to invoke the ‘space’ which Blanchot finds at the centre of the literary work. For Blanchot, 
literature occupies a ‘space’ which is necessarily negative, defined by absence and silence: the 
writer of literature ‘belongs to a language which no one speaks, which is addressed to no one, 
which has no centre, and which reveals nothing’.81 In Blanchot’s terms, literature is by 
definition separate from the communicatory language of everyday life; the literary work consists 
instead of a language which does not denote or refer to anything outside itself, a language  
whose whole force lies in its not being, whose very glory is to evoke, in its own 
absence, the absence of everything. This language of the unreal, this fictive 
language which delivers us to fiction, comes from silence and returns to 
silence.82 
Blanchot’s silence goes beyond both the organised points of ‘indeterminacy’ and the 
foundational ‘negativity’ identified by Iser: rather, we are confronted with a deeper absence, a 
negative ‘space’ out of which the literary work emerges, and into which it inevitably disappears. 
It is this space which, for Blanchot, gives literature its peculiar power—the paradoxical sense of 
a negativity which is also in some way meaningful, positive: 
[. . .] this negation only masks the more essential fact that in language at this 
point everything reverts to affirmation: in this language what denies affirms. 
For this language speaks as absence. Wordless, it speaks already; when it 
ceases, it persists. It is not silent, because in this language silence speaks.83  
For Blanchot, literature’s ‘space’—like the ‘mystical’, inexpressible territory which exists 
beyond the limits of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus—is both absent and present, meaningful and 
meaningless. In these terms, the literary text is, significantly, not figured as an incomplete 
‘hollow form’ left for the reader to fill: the work is, Blanchot argues, ‘neither finished nor 
unfinished: it is. What it says is exclusively this: that it is—and nothing more. Beyond that is 
nothing’.84 
It is perhaps this absolute silence, this negative ‘space’—a space which seems to 
describe both the territory occupied by literature and the absence at its centre—which we find 
evoked by the untenanted characters of Oblivion. In their uncanny, frequently disturbing 
emptiness, these embodied ‘breaches’ seem to expose an absence at the heart of the work, a 
blankness which exceeds and frustrates our attempts to ‘fill out’ the gaps in the narrative. This 
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quality has been commented upon by critics: in a review of Oblivion, Brian Phillips comments 
that the underlying ‘method’ of Wallace’s collection is ‘essentially negative, essentially 
concerned with what lies outside it’:  
The word [‘oblivion’] descends from the Latin to forget, and the stories in 
Oblivion are forgetful in the full, strange sense of that word—they are full of 
their own vanishing; beyond the tiny point of awareness in which their 
characters are conscious at any given moment, they are abundant with 
disappearance, the way an eyelid might be if one had looked suddenly away 
from the sun. Something is always escaping them. Major plot points are 
deferred, held out of frame, or ignored altogether.85  
While Phillips is ultimately critical of Wallace’s collection—he concludes that ‘for all its wild 
verbosity, the book, in the end, mutely gestures’—his review is nonetheless astute in its 
engagement with the peculiarly ‘vanishing’ quality of these stories.86 Throughout Oblivion, we 
repeatedly find Wallace’s stories enacting a ‘disappearance’ which chimes with self-negating 
silence which Blanchot assigns to literary writing, a fundamental (and, in Wallace’s stories, 
often disturbing) silence felt most acutely in these scattered visions of the ‘untenanted self’. 
 The collection’s most significant and striking example of this ‘disappearance’, however, 
is found in ‘Good Old Neon’. The story—which, like ‘Octet’ is positioned at the centre of its 
respective collection—seems, at least initially, to cover familiar territory: we are presented with 
the first-person account of Neal, a man tortured by a self-conscious awareness of what he 
describes as an essential inauthenticity or fraudulence, a feeling that his entire life has been 
overwhelmingly concerned with attempting to ‘create a certain impression of me in other 
people’ (O, p. 141). Neal is a familiarly Wallacean protagonist, both in his status as an educated, 
middle class man with an extensive vocabulary and a history of adolescent sporting 
achievement (in this case American Legion Baseball), and also in his tendency towards the kind 
of particularly looping, hyper self-conscious thinking seen previously in characters such as the 
depressed person or Jest’s Ken Erdedy. Throughout, Neal is trapped within a recognisable 
narcissistic spiral of his own construction, a state of ‘vicious infinite regress’ crystallised in his 
conception of the ‘fraudulence paradox’: the feeling that ‘the more time and effort you put into 
trying to appear impressive or attractive to other people, the less impressive or attractive you felt 
inside’ (O, p. 147). 
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As in so many of Oblivion’s texts, however, these familiar patterns are disrupted by the 
breaches, the points of slippage, which serve as the foundation of Hayes-Brady’s ‘skeletal 
narrative’. In ‘Good Old Neon’, these instances of rupture occur in Neal’s matter-of-fact 
references to his own suicide: 
I know this part is boring and probably boring you, but it gets a lot more 
interesting when I get to the part where I kill myself and discover what happens 
immediately after a person dies. (O, p. 143) 
These seemingly offhand remarks—which emerge at various points within the text—rupture the 
fabric of the narrative, both in their abrupt revelation of its inevitable ending, and, more 
arrestingly, in their situating Neal’s voice uneasily outside the world of his own story. We are 
confronted with another ‘narratological swerve’, one which forces us to reframe our 
understanding of the entire text, from the first line—‘My whole life I’ve been a fraud’ (p. 141, 
emphasis added)—onwards. Beyond this, Neal’s apparently ghostly status offers a further 
separation between body and consciousness: while Neal is not blankly, inaccessibly 
‘untenanted’ in the same way as ‘The Soul’’s Mr Johnson or ‘The Suffering Channel’’s Brint 
Moltke, his is nonetheless placed in a position—like the child at the conclusion of 
‘Incarnations’—outside himself, detached from his bodily existence (a position which, 
significantly, chimes with his recollections of his feelings in life that he is ‘hollow’ (O, p. 161), 
his anxiety that he might have ‘no true inner self’ (O, p. 160)). 
These breaches are only more striking when we consider the extent to which, in 
situating Neal’s narrating voice outside the limits of his earthly life—and, crucially, in offering 
up the promise of an account of ‘what happens immediately after a person dies’—they gesture 
towards a space which is potentially unreachable, a description of something apparently 
indescribable. Throughout the story, Neal is consistently troubled by an awareness of the 
essential limits of his narration, the inadequacy of his language in any attempt to convey the 
reality of our inner lives (or deaths): 
This is another paradox, that many of the most important impressions and 
thoughts in a person’s life [. . .] have so little relation to the sort of linear, one-
word-after-another-word English we all communicate with each other with that 
it could easily take a whole lifetime just to spell out the contents of one split-
second’s flash of thoughts and connections, etc.—and yet we all seem to go 
around trying to use English [. . .] to try to convey to other people what we’re 
thinking and to find out what they’re thinking [. . .]. What goes on inside is just 
too fast and huge and all interconnected for words to do more than barely 
sketch the outlines of at most one tiny little part of it at any given instant. (O, p. 
150–1) 
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At various points in his story, Neal is forced to reckon with the constraints inherent to any 
narrative, the extent to which the ‘linear, one-word-after the other’ nature of language fails in its 
attempts at capturing or conveying the ‘fast and huge and all interconnected’ truth of internal 
experience. Compounding this, he further claims that these limitations only become more 
acutely apparent when attempting to describe the moment of death: 
The internal head-speed or whatever of these ideas, memories, realizations, 
emotions and so on is even faster, by the way— exponentially faster, 
unimaginably faster—when you’re dying [. . .] so that in reality the cliché about 
people’s whole life flashing before their eyes as they’re dying isn’t all that far 
off [. . .] (p. 151)  
When read alongside these self-conscious meditations on the limits of language, we can see how 
the story’s narrative ‘breaches’, in positioning of Neal ‘outside linear time’ (p.163), work to 
establish the moment of death—the point to which the narrative is ostensibly heading—as 
something beyond the constraints of language, chronology, or narrative (a point which Neal 
himself acknowledges as the ‘really central, overarching paradox’ of his own story (O, p. 152)). 
This central, paradoxical disjunction comes to a head towards the story’s end, as we 
approach this apparently impossible point of describing ‘what happens immediately after a 
person dies’. In gesturing towards a seemingly unreachable ending, Wallace brings to mind the 
various instances of terminal incompletion and unfinished-ness which we have traced across all 
of his fiction: from the apocalyptic ‘reunion’ of ‘Westward’, to the self-conscious narrative 
‘gap’ at the close of Jest, to the climactic ‘epiphany’ promised—and frustrated—in ‘Adult 
World’. In ‘Good Old Neon’, we are confronted with what initially appears to be a further 
iteration of this model, a progression towards an unreachable or inexpressible point: Corey 
Hudson notes that the story is defined by its movement ‘toward a final conclusion or statement 
that it can never actually reach’.87 The final pages of ‘Good Old Neon’ however, offer a striking 
subversion of this pattern, an ending which—having established the inaccessibility of its 
projected conclusion—goes on to (seemingly) reach this end, to approach this apparently 
inexpressible point head-on: 
All right, now we’re coming to what I promised and led you through the whole 
dull synopsis of what led up to this in hopes of. Meaning what it’s like to die, 
what happens. Right? [. . .] It’s not what anyone thinks, for one thing. The truth 
is you already know what it’s like. You already know the difference between 
                                                            
87 Cory M. Hudson, ‘David Foster Wallace Is Not Your Friend: The Fraudulence of Empathy in David 
Foster Wallace Studies and “Good Old Neon”’, Critique: Studies in Contemporary Fiction, 59.3 (2018), 
295–306 (p. 301). 
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the size and speed of everything that flashes through you and the tiny 
inadequate bit of it all you can ever let anyone know. [. . .] Think for a 
second—what if all the infinitely dense and shifting worlds of stuff inside you 
every moment of your life turned out now to be somehow fully open and 
expressible afterward, after what you think of as you has died, because what if 
afterward now each moment itself is an infinite sea or span or passage of time 
in which to express it or convey it, and you don’t even need any organized 
English [. . .] (p. 178) 
Rather than—as a reader of Wallace’s work might reasonably expect—cutting off before its 
end, the story appears for a moment to arrive at the finish of this unfinishable narrative, offering 
a startling evocation of a state outside of language, time, and individual consciousness, a space 
in which one’s inner life is ‘somehow fully open and expressible’, where ‘each moment itself is 
an infinite sea or span or passage of time’. In attempting to describe this indescribable point, 
Wallace seems (if admittedly only fleetingly) to reach the state of conclusion and completion 
which so many of his narratives have rejected. In her discussion of Wallace’s ‘resistance to 
endings’, Hayes-Brady has argued that, within Wallace’s fiction, ‘[c]losure is repeatedly 
imagined as a kind of death, death as a kind of perfection’.88 At the end of ‘Good Old Neon’, 
however, we find Wallace apparently embracing this static point of ‘consummation’: offering us 
both a description of the death which forms the narrative promised terminus, and pointing us 
towards a paradoxically impossible narrative space which exists beyond this point of 
completion.89 
It is only when we move beyond this ‘ending’, however, that we become wholly aware 
of the flaws in the foundation of Wallace’s ‘ending’, as this ostensible finality gives way to 
another, perhaps more fundamental, incompletion. Looking more closely at Neal’s final 
monologue, we can see how these inevitable limits are made clear even within his rapturous 
posthumous vision: his attempts to evoke a point ‘outside time’ for example, are immediately 
qualified by competing reminders that ‘we don’t have much time’ (O, p. 178), that we are 
unavoidably bound by the chronological limits of narrative and of language. These scattered 
cracks and contradictions are brought to the fore, however, in the narrative’s final ‘twist’, its 
abrupt mid-sentence turn away from Neal and towards ‘David Wallace’,  
                                                            
88 Hayes-Brady, Unspeakable Failures, p. 3. 
89 It is not insignificant that Neal’s actual description of the moment of his death—the ‘split-second of 
impact when the speeding car’s front bumper’s just starting to touch the abutment’ (O, p. 179n)—is 
relegated to the story’s only footnote, a footnote which, while offering the promised ‘ending’ of the story 
(self-consciously signalled by the capitalised words ‘THE END’ (O, p. 179n)), also fragments the text, 
seemingly ‘opening out’ the primary narrative, allowing Neal to ‘go beyond’ this inescapable concluding 
event. 
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idly scanning class photos from his 1980 Aurora West H.S. yearbook and 
seeing my photo and trying, through the tiny little keyhole of himself, to 
imagine what all must have happened to lead up to my death in the fiery single-
car accident he’d read about in 1991 [. . .] (O, pp. 180–1) 
This metafictional shift most immediately recalls ‘Octet’’s ‘Pop Quiz 9’, offering as it does 
another invitation to inhabit the consciousness of the ‘fiction writer’—a writer here, 
significantly, identified as a version of ‘Wallace’ himself—to step behind the conditional 
‘reality’ established by Neal’s narrative and consider the author in their attempts to construct the 
text we are reading. As with ‘Octet’, this turn has been widely read as a further example of 
Wallace’s efforts to surpass the inevitable constraints of fictional narrative, to break through the 
‘tiny little keyhole of himself’ and ‘communicate’ sincerely with the reader: Boswell, for 
example, suggests that ‘by casting Neal’s monologue as “David Wallace’s” projection, Wallace 
both invites and dares his readers to read Neal’s story as thinly disguised autobiography’,90 
while Konstantinou cites the story as a further iteration of Wallace’s ‘metafictional validation of 
the real’, going on to argue that ‘[t]he purpose of this revelation seems to be to cause the reader 
to experience a form of connection with Wallace as a writer — again, [. . .] not “Dave Wallace” 
the character, but the author’.91  
 Here, as in ‘Octet’’s final Pop Quiz, however, this self-conscious positioning of 
‘Wallace’ within the text serves not as a means of author-reader ‘communication’ or 
‘connection’, but rather as a revelation of a deeper layer of incompletion, an inescapable 
unfinished-ness at the heart of Neal’s seemingly ‘finished’ narrative. In ‘Good Old Neon’’s 
closing moments, ‘David Wallace’ is led to recognise the limitations of his writerly project: 
 [. . .] in other words David Wallace trying, if only in the second his lids are 
down, to somehow reconcile what this luminous guy had seemed like from the 
outside with whatever on the interior must have driven him to kill himself in 
such a dramatic and doubtlessly painful way—with David Wallace also fully 
aware that the cliché that you can’t ever truly know what’s going on inside 
somebody else is hoary and insipid and yet at the same time trying very 
consciously to prohibit that awareness from mocking the attempt or sending the 
whole line of thought into the sort of inbent spiral that keeps you from ever 
getting anywhere [. . .] the realer, more enduring and sentimental part of him 
commanding that other part to be silent as if looking it levelly in the eye and 
saying, almost aloud, ‘Not another word’. (p. 181) 
                                                            
90 Boswell, 'Nightmare of Consciousness', p. 157. 
91 Konstantinou, ‘No Bull’, p. 97. As with ‘Octet’, this suggestion that the story offers us access to the 
‘real’ David Foster Wallace has been questioned by other critics—Hudson, for example, offers a strong 
critique of this critical tendency to ‘take the “Wallace” as character for a bona fide surrogate of David 
Foster Wallace’ (Hudson, p. 298), while Hering reminds us that none of Wallace’s fictionalised personae 
should be ‘taken as exactly commensurate with the author himself’ (Hering, Fiction and Form, p. 38). 
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The fictional ‘Wallace’’s attempts to ‘reconcile’ the confident outer appearance of Neal with his 
presumably troubled inner life are doomed to failure, bound by the ‘hoary and insipid’, but 
nonetheless unavoidable, truth that ‘you can’t ever truly know what’s going on inside somebody 
else’. ‘Good Old Neon’’s concluding metafictional reversal is finally most striking in its 
reflexive insistence on the limitations of any attempt to understand or animate the consciousness 
of another person, the inadequacy of any imaginative to effort convey the ‘reality’ of lived 
experience within the confines of language. By casting Neal’s entire story—up to and including 
his apparently impossible movement outside the bounds of consciousness, language, and time—
as the flawed, ‘fraudulent’ imagining of ‘David Wallace’, ‘Good Old Neon’ reveals an absence 
at its own centre, a ‘blank’ which arguably serves as the most significant ‘hollow place’ of the 
entire collection. While Neal may not offer the uncanny blankness of the collection’s other 
‘untenanted’ characters, he nonetheless stands as Oblivion’s central ‘silent space’, a character 
who—we only belatedly realise—is entirely inaccessible to us, whose entire monologue is 
revealed as fundamentally ‘fraudulent’, a mass of language organised around a central, 
inviolable silence.  
This is an absence arguably present at the heart not only of Wallace’s story, but of all 
fictional narrative: Carlisle rightly observes that the charge of ‘fraudulence’ against Neal could 
be ‘lodged against any character written by any author’, reading the story as a whole as a 
celebration of ‘the necessarily fraudulent art of fiction’.92 Wallace’s final ‘twist’ can be seen to 
enact the kind of ‘disappearance’ which Blanchot finds at the centre of literature, to self-
consciously dramatise the extent to which fictional language ‘comes from silence and returns to 
silence’.93 In this, Wallace offers an incompletion more fundamental than either the formal gaps 
of Brief Interviews or the unfinished narratives which mark so much of his writing, a negativity 
which serves as the very foundation of the literary work. Like Blanchot, however, Wallace’s 
story is simultaneously concerned with the paradoxical power of this literary ‘silence’, the 
extent to which, within this space of negativity, ‘everything reverts to affirmation’.94 Even as it 
exposes the hollow ‘fraudulence’ of its own narrative, ‘Good Old Neon’ also stands as a 
testament to the uncanny impact of this incompletion, the ‘mystical’ quality of a fiction which, 
although built on an inevitable hollowness, still succeeds in giving fleeting, ghostly life to this 
                                                            
92 Carlisle, Nature’s Nightmare, Location 1097. 
93 Blanchot, p. 39. 
94 Blanchot, p. 51. 
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unknowable consciousness, this impossible description of a point beyond language, time, or 
death. The story’s final lines see ‘David Wallace’ confronting a nagging internal voice which 
reminds him of the innate failure of his literary project: a voice which, he feels, will only lead 
him into ‘the sort of inbent spiral that keeps you from ever getting anywhere’. Countering this 
voice however, is a conflicting presence—the ‘realer, more enduring and sentimental part’ of 
‘Wallace’—which ‘command[s] that other part to be silent’, ending the story with the final, 
definitive injunction: ‘Not another word’. This concluding return to silence stands as an almost 
direct echo of the final proposition of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (‘Whereof one cannot speak, 
thereof one must be silent’).95 Like Wittgenstein, Wallace finishes with a gesture towards an 
unspeakable absence, a ‘mystical’ negative space at the centre of all literary work. 
 
Coda 
While, as this chapter has explored, Wallace’s continued, career-length engagement with 
questions of incompletion is clearly evident in the stories of Brief Interviews and Oblivion, these 
two collections are also arguably marked by a very different kind of unfinished-ness, one which 
we have yet to address in our analysis, but which perhaps offers us an alternative perspective 
from which to approach this recurring concern. This aspect of incompleteness is one which only 
becomes evident if we briefly consider these two collections in the context of their composition, 
and specifically in relation to the parallel composition of Wallace’s final, unfinished novel The 
Pale King. In his biography of Wallace, Max writes that, on completing Jest, Wallace almost 
immediately began—or, at least, intended to begin—work on a new novel: 
[. . .] by 1995 he had been hoping—expecting—to start something else. It was 
his assumption that the new thing would be a novel too. The novel was the big 
form, the one that mattered, that reviewers and other authors cared about and by 
which he could fulfil his compact with readers.96 
Hering, meanwhile, confirms that Wallace’s work on his next novel began around this point, 
noting, for example, that by 1997 (two years before the publication of Brief Interviews) Wallace 
had already ‘typed an early outline for a long work titled Sir John Feelgood or, The Genesis of a 
Great Lover’.97 While this early outline—featuring a plot centred around virtual-reality 
pornography—bears little resemblance to the final version of TPK, it is nevertheless possible to 
                                                            
95 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 7. 
96 Max, Every Love Story, p. 234. 
97 Hering, Fiction and Form, p. 110. 
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trace a continuous line between these early attempts and the (still-incomplete) version of the 
novel assembled by Pietsch after Wallace’s suicide. 
In light of this aspect of compositional overlap, it is easy to see why critics have 
attempted to make sense of the inevitably complex relationship between Brief Interviews, 
Oblivion, and TPK: Max, for example, suggests that both story collections emerge (at least to 
some degree) as side-projects, interruptions from, or even abandoned fragments of, this larger 
project.98 Burn, meanwhile, characterises the various texts as ‘a series of parallel compositions 
enlivened by creative cross-fertilization’.99 The most comprehensive account, however, is 
provided by Hering, who persuasively argues that the entirety of Wallace’s post-Infinite Jest 
work can be understood in terms of ‘one huge linear “discrete project” that shed or engendered 
other projects during its process’.100 Hering asserts that ‘a significant number of the post-1996 
fictions [. . .] come into existence because Wallace is trying to write his third novel’, employing 
archival sources to detail how, for example, much of the material initially planned for Sir John 
Feelgood—including its central focus on ‘sex, relationships and visual perception’—was 
‘sloughed off’ into the stories of Brief Interviews.101 This aspect of ‘cross-pollination’ only 
becomes more pertinent in the case of Oblivion, a collection which developed ‘in tandem with 
elements of The Pale King’, to the extent that a number of its stories (including ‘Mister 
Squishy’, ‘Incarnations of Burned Children’, and ‘The Soul is Not a Smithy’) were initially 
earmarked as sections from TPK, ‘components of that larger work that have been hived off and 
polished into stand-alone pieces’.102 
When approaching either Brief Interviews or Oblivion with this compositional context 
in mind, we are confronted with a wholly different form of unfinished-ness, a further series of 
textual ‘breaches’ and frayed edges which seem to betray the genesis of these stories as abortive 
fragments of Wallace’s larger work-in-progress. These ‘fissures’ are most visible in ‘The Soul 
is Not a Smithy’: a text initially conceived of as part of TPK, and which, according to Hering, 
he had been ‘working on for seven years’.103 When read alongside TPK, it is difficult not to be 
                                                            
98 See Max, Every Love Story. 
99 Burn, ‘“A Paradigm for the Life of Consciousness”: The Pale King’, in Long Thing, pp. pp. 149–168 
(p. 166, n. 4). 
100 Hering, Fiction and Form, p. 126. 
101 Hering, Fiction and Form, pp. 126, 129–30. 
102 Hering, Fiction and Form, pp. 115, 117. 
103 Hering, Fiction and Form, p. 135. 
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struck by the still-visible points of connection between the two texts: from the strong echoes of 
subject matter and ideas (the narrator’s description of the crushing weight of administrative 
boredom associated with his father’s job, for example, clearly anticipates the central thematic 
concerns of the later novel), to the apparent plot-level connections (the story’s references to The 
Exorcist seem to connect almost directly with a parallel allusion in §32 of TPK). We find 
similar examples of these broken connections’ elsewhere: whether in the reference to ‘Mister 
Squishee’ trucks in §47 of TPK, or in the buried suggestion that Oblivion’s stories of traumatic 
childhood might have originated as backstories for TPK’s characters (according to Max, for 
example, the story of the burned child in ‘Incarnations’ was originally intended as an origin for 
TPK’s Shane Drinion).104 In teasing out these scattered points of compositional ‘breakage’, we 
can see how Brief Interviews and (especially) Oblivion are imbued with a further layer of 
incompleteness, with points of unfinished-ness which exceed—and, with this inescapably 
complicate—our reading of the persistent incompletion of Wallace’s work. 
How, then, does the compositional context of these stories affect our reading of these 
two collections? Should these archival ‘fissures’—these points of actual unfinished-ness—be 
regarded as wholly separate from more deliberate formal and thematic and thematic 
incompletions which we have traced across Wallace’s fiction, or might they be connected or 
related in some way? Undoubtedly, we are confronted with an inevitable conflict, a tension 
between two, apparently very different, modes of incompletion. The question which arises is 
whether this tension might be in some way productive: whether the stark, very real 
incompleteness of both these stories and TPK might offer us a different perspective on the 
deliberate incompletion of Wallace’s fiction, or, conversely, whether, in the persistent deliberate 
incompletion of his fiction, Wallace might provoke a reading which can more productively 
approach the actual unfinished-ness of his final work.  
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5. Unfinished Reading: The Pale King 
Approaching The Pale King 
How can one responsibly comment on an unfinished novel, posthumously 
published, pieced together by an editor from materials retrieved from the 
author’s workroom? Anything one ventures to say about the lost whole that 
would have been The Pale King will inevitably be speculative. Where does one 
even begin?1 
In many respects, these questions, as articulated by Brian McHale, can be seen to underline any 
attempt to read Wallace’s final novel. The Pale King, left incomplete at the time of Wallace’s 
suicide in 2008, and—following the organisation and assembly of his notes and drafts by 
Pietsch—published as ‘An Unfinished Novel’ in 2011, presents readers with a set of 
interpretative problems unique within Wallace body of fiction.2 In its unfinished state, the novel 
seems, as McHale notes, to demand a ‘speculative’ reading, one which takes account of the 
unavoidable gap between the ‘lost whole’ of Wallace’s intentions and the fragmentary reality of 
the published text. Since its publication, critics have addressed the challenges posed by TPK’s 
incompleteness: in an early review, Burn described the novel as ‘throw[ing] out characters and 
plot lines, narrative arcs that are forever doomed to hang suspended in textual space’.3 It is this 
state of ‘suspension’ which so acutely distinguishes TPK from Wallace’s previous texts, and 
which makes the work of reading the novel so problematic: Burn notes how TPK’s posthumous 
status ‘makes visible the wormhole between the writer’s incomplete intentions and the editor’s 
hand’, and we can see how this ‘wormhole’ serves as an unavoidable obstacle for critical 
readings, destabilising any attempt to offer a ‘complete’ analysis of the text.4 McHale’s essay 
goes on to compare TPK to Gravity’s Rainbow in an effort to ‘fill in some of the gaps and 
bridge over some of the disconnections that are consequences of the text’s incompleteness’, 
offering a speculative account of ‘the ultimate shape that The Pale King might have been 
moving toward’.5 While convincing in many respects, McHale’s attempt to ‘fill in’ TPK’s 
incompletions finally constrains the text within a single (inevitably limited) critical perspective, 
an account which—in placing primary focus on an imagined version of the novel’s ‘ultimate 
                                                            
1 Brian McHale, ‘The Pale King, Or, The White Visitation’, in Companion to David Foster Wallace 
Studies, pp. 191–210 (p. 191). 
2 Wallace, The Pale King. Further references to TPK in this chapter will be placed in parentheses in the 
text. 
3 Burn, ‘The Machine in the Ghost’, American Book Review, 32.5 (2011), 16. 
4 Burn, ‘The Machine in the Ghost’, p. 16. 
5 McHale, p. 202. 
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shape’—risks eliding the particular fragmentary form of the published document. In McHale’s 
reading—as in many other critical responses—we are forced to confront the problems involved 
in any attempt to imaginatively ‘finish’ TPK, the extent to which any interpretation of the text as 
a coherent ‘whole’ will itself be incomplete. 
How, then, are we to respond to the radical unfinished-ness of TPK? One productive 
mode of enquiry can be found in the model of ‘genetic criticism’. In focusing ‘not on “finished” 
texts but rather on the development of a text as it changes from one manuscript to another’, 
critics such as Groenland, Staes, and Hering have approached TPK as a ‘work in process’, a text 
which can be understood only in the context of the larger body of notes and drafts held in 
Wallace’s archive.6 Staes, for example, suggests that Wallace’s notes and drafts offer a ‘glimpse 
of the artist in the process of creation’, thus answering ‘a number of questions that a finished 
text can only hint at’.7 Groenland, meanwhile, argues that TPK’s unfinished status makes it 
uniquely suited to genetic analysis: as an ‘open work’—consisting of both ‘relatively polished 
drafts’ and ‘earlier and rawer material’—the novel self-consciously encodes within it the 
‘interplay between completion and incompletion’ which serves as the foundation of genetic 
critical enquiry.8 The most comprehensive genetic reading thus far, however, is offered by 
Hering, who employs an examination of ‘all extant archive-based documentation and draft 
material pertaining to Wallace’s fiction in the period 1997–2007’ in the construction of a 
‘detailed genetic history of the novel’s composition’, tracing the progress of TPK from its 
inception to its abandonment.9 Hering’s reading—alongside Groenland’s and Staes’s—is 
invaluable in establishing something approaching an empirical view of the ‘complete’ (and, in 
this, fundamentally fragmentary) shape of TPK’s text(s), a ‘map’ of Wallace’s late fiction which 
obviates the need for the kind of imaginative guesswork of ‘filling in’ found in earlier critical 
responses to the novel.10 
While this chapter builds on the work done by these critics—and follows them in 
recognising the unstable nature of TPK’s text—it also significantly departs from them, shifting 
the locus of enquiry away from an ‘objective’ treatment of Wallace’s authorial processes to 
                                                            
6 See Groenland, 'A Recipe for a Brick', p. 365; Staes, ‘Work in Process’; Hering, Fiction and Form. 
7 Staes, ‘Work in Process’, p. 71. 
8 Groenland, ‘A Recipe for a Brick’, pp. 366–7. 
9 Hering, Fiction and Form, p. 125. 
10 Hering, Fiction and Form, p. 12. 
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investigate instead the subjective experience of reading this unfinished, unfinishable novel. 
Taking TPK as a case study, I want to ask: what happens when we attempt to read, engage with, 
or respond to an incomplete literary text? How is our reading shaped, directed, or disrupted by 
the novel’s self-evident unfinished-ness? And what might this ‘incomplete’ reading tell us about 
the reading process more generally? While the chapter will refer to Wallace’s archive, my 
starting point and primary focus will be the published text of TPK, the self-consciously 
incomplete document as collated, edited, and organised by Pietsch. At the start of his analysis of 
TPK, Hering quotes Frank Kermode in addressing the extent to which Wallace’s novel stands 
paradoxically as both a ‘world of potentiality’ (in the sprawling mass of compositional materials 
held in Wallace’s archive), and a ‘completed action’ (in the edited construction of the published 
text).11 Even in its self-proclaimed status as ‘An Unfinished Novel’, Pietsch’s published Pale 
King offers us a text which has, in a certain respect, been ‘completed’, collected into a book 
with a beginning, middle, and end. By addressing this contingently ‘finished’ text, I want to 
investigate more closely the uniquely uneasy experience of approaching Wallace’s unfinished 
novel as a reader. In this, I do not attempt to position Pietsch’s construction as any kind of 
‘definitive’ version of Wallace’s novel.12 Rather, by considering this version of the text (the 
version currently most widely available to readers), I want to address how the published Pale 
King places consistent focus on its own limitations, everywhere leading the reader to confront 
and negotiate the interpretative problems which arise out of its unfinished-ness. 
Returning to McHale’s initial questions: where does one begin in addressing the 
published Pale King? Even in its edited state, the novel is without a coherent ‘main’ narrative: 
we are confronted instead with a collection of 50 numbered sections, connected (albeit 
sometimes only barely) by their consistent focus on the US Internal Revenue Service. TPK’s 
‘plot’—to the extent that it can be said to have one—follows a disparate group of characters as 
they approach, and begin working at, an IRS Regional Examination Center in Peoria, Illinois, in 
or around 1985. Within this, Wallace (or, perhaps more accurately, Pietsch) allows room for 
frequent digressions, including, variously, detours into characters’ troubled childhoods; an 
                                                            
11 Frank Kermode, The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), p. 138, cited in Hering, Fiction and Form, p. 124. Kermode’s notion of the 
literary work as ‘complete action’ is in turn drawn from Aristotle’s Poetics. 
12 The impossibility of establishing any ‘definitive’ version of TPK has been addressed in greater detail 
by Groenland (‘A King of Shreds and Patches: Assembling Wallace’s Final Novel’, in Critical Insights, 
pp. 221–37).  
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extended monologue from a character named ‘Irrelevant’ Chris Fogle detailing his progress 
from youthful ‘wastoid’ to dedicated employee of ‘the Service’ (p. 156); a series of interjections 
from a voice claiming to be the novel’s ‘real author’ (p. 68); and many more fragmentary 
meditations on taxes, bureaucracy, information, civics, and boredom. Faced with this chaotic 
swirl of narrative data—in his working notes, Wallace significantly described TPK as having a 
‘tornado feeling’—perhaps the most apposite place to begin an enquiry into the text’s 
unfinished-ness is the novel’s end.13  
As might be expected with an unfinished work, the end of TPK does not offer anything 
close to narrative resolution. The novel’s final chapter (§50) is a brief, fragmentary piece 
structured as an address to a second-person ‘you’, featuring an unnamed female ‘facilitator’ (p. 
539) in a windowless room, who offers her subject enigmatic instructions to ‘relax’ and 
‘become aware of the body’ (p. 540). In its abstract, depersonalised characters and setting—an 
office which, we are told, ‘could be any office’ (p. 539)—and lack of clear connection with 
TPK’s preceding sections, the chapter offers a stark illustration of the entire novel’s final 
absence of coherence or closure. Indeed, with the exception of a few embryonic gestures 
towards an eventual showdown between ‘human examiners’ and ‘machines’ (‘Notes and 
Asides’, p. 547), TPK’s narrative threads are all left radically unfinished by the novel’s close: 
John Jeremiah Sullivan pertinently comments that the plot ‘never progresses. It never really 
seems to begin’.14 In the overt disconnection and abstraction of its final pages, TPK forces a 
readerly confrontation with the novel’s incompleteness, leading us, perhaps, to conclude with 
Sullivan that Wallace did not get ‘anywhere near’ to his intended endpoint.15 
Of course, this conclusion is problematised when we consider the novel’s 
incompleteness in the context of Wallace’s earlier writing. In many ways, TPK’s absence of 
narrative closure echoes the numerous instances of frustrated or denied completion which we 
have traced throughout Wallace’s fiction. From the unfinished final sentence of Broom, to the 
‘broken loop’ of Jest, Wallace’s writing career is characterised everywhere by narratives which, 
like TPK, fail to come to a coherent or definite close. This aspect of formal or aesthetic 
                                                            
13 Pietsch, ‘Editor’s Note’, in Wallace, The Pale King, pp. i–xii (p. ix). All further references will be 
placed in parentheses in the text. 
14 John Jeremiah Sullivan, ‘Too Much Information’, GQ, May 2011 <https://www.gq.com/story/david-
foster-wallace-the-pale-king-john-jeremiah-sullivan> [accessed 10 December 2018], para. 16. 
15 Sullivan, para. 25. 
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continuity has been addressed by Burn, who reads TPK’s incomplete arrangement as a 
continuation of the ‘centrifugal’ strategies of Jest,16 and Hayes-Brady, who likewise draws a 
direct line of connection between the ‘broken’ structure of TPK and Wallace’s earlier novels, 
observing that Jest and Broom were likewise 
characterized by a lack of strong connections between the characters, 
functioning rather as collections of loosely associated ‘short stories’, with 
different narrative styles and focuses, framed within the boundaries of a novel 
but always bursting out of them.17 
Building on this observation, Hayes-Brady goes on to suggest that we take the ‘tornadic’ quality 
of TPK as an organising principle applicable across all of Wallace’s fiction—that the novel’s 
chaotic narrative can be understood as only the last in a series of texts which, far from following 
any single coherent or ‘complete’ narrative thread, rather operate as fragments orbiting a ‘silent, 
even empty, center’.18 The fact that this notion of the ‘tornadic’ is drawn from Wallace’s own 
notes serves to complicate our response to the novel’s unfinished-ness: to what extent, for 
example, can we read TPK’s ‘incomplete’ structure as a deliberate strategy on Wallace’s part? 
Significantly, Wallace’s notes also establish a plan to ‘plot a series of set-ups for stuff 
happening, but nothing actually happens’ (p. 548), while elsewhere describing specific instances 
where ‘something big threatens to happen but doesn’t actually happen’ (p. 546). In many 
respects, these (extra)textual signposts seem to give us license to read TPK’s structural 
unfinished-ness as a further iteration of Wallace’s career-length exploration of incompletion: 
Hayes-Brady concludes that ‘the resistance to conventional narrative structure appears to be as 
present in TPK as it was in the earlier novels’,19 while Boswell goes so far as to assert that 
Wallace ‘knew what he wanted to say in this book, and largely said it’.20 Running beneath these 
confident assessments of the novel’s form, however, is a sense that we cannot know where to 
draw the line between Wallace’s deliberate engagement with incompletion and TPK’s inherent 
unfinished-ness as a posthumous work. Even in its resemblance to Wallace’s earlier frustrated 
conclusions, the ending of TPK—a conclusion which we must remember was positioned as such 
by Pietsch, not Wallace—cannot really be considered an ‘ending’ at all. 
                                                            
16 Burn, ‘The Machine in the Ghost’, p. 16. 
17 Hayes-Brady, Unspeakable Failures, p. 29. 
18 Hayes-Brady, Unspeakable Failures, p. 59. 
19 Hayes-Brady, Unspeakable Failures, p. 39. 
20 Marshall Boswell, ‘Preface: David Foster Wallace and “The Long Thing”’, in David Foster Wallace 
and The Long Thing: New Essays on the Novels, ed. by Marshall Boswell (New York: Bloomsbury 
Continuum, 2014), pp. vi–xii (p. x). 
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The question of where or whether TPK ‘ends’ (or, indeed, begins) is further troubled 
when we consider the editorial apparatus which surrounds the novel in its published form. 
Approaching TPK as a reader, §50 is immediately followed by a selection of ‘Notes and Asides’ 
drawn from Wallace’s manuscript pages. While ostensibly separate from the ‘main text’, in 
practice these notes stand in an ambiguous relation to the novel as a whole, serving variously as 
signposts for how to read and interpret TPK, fragmentary indications of how the plot might have 
continued, and stark reminders of the text’s status as an arrested ‘work in progress’. To a certain 
extent, these materials—precariously situated at the edges of the novel—again recall the 
deliberate strategies of Wallace’s earlier writing: throughout his career, Wallace unsettles the 
boundaries of the literary text, from the overt example of Jest’s endnotes, to the more buried 
instances of playfulness found on the copyright pages of many of his works.21 Across these 
instances, Wallace makes us aware of the unstable relation between text and paratexts—the 
‘accompanying productions’ which, as defined by Gérard Genette, ‘surround’ and ‘extend’ the 
literary work.22 In Genette’s terms, paratexts serve as a ‘threshold of interpretation’ for any 
literary text, occupying an ambiguous space ‘between the inside and the outside’, and in this 
profoundly informing our experience as readers.23 In Wallace’s fiction, we are confronted with 
numerous instances where the line between the textual and the paratextual has been self-
consciously blurred. We find a further deliberate iteration of this strategy within the ‘main’ text 
of TPK: at the start of §9 (the first ‘Author Here’ section), the ‘author’—attempting to assert the 
novel’s ‘really true’ status—instructs the reader to ‘flip back and look at the book’s legal 
disclaimer, which is on the copyright page, verso side, four leaves in from the rather unfortunate 
and misleading front cover’ (p. 69). Considering TPK as a whole, however, we can see how the 
additional material which surrounds the text—including Wallace’s notes, Pietsch’s ‘Editor’s 
Note’ and, in the paperback edition of the novel, ‘four previously unpublished scenes’ from 
Wallace’s papers—all serve a function which, although comparable to these earlier deliberate 
strategies, is also separate from them. By ‘framing’ TPK, these paratexts work both to establish 
                                                            
21 Hidden within the front matter for Girl, for example, is an offer of thanks to ‘The Mr. and Mrs. Wallace 
Fund for Aimless Children’ (p. vi); similarly, the copyright page of Brief Interviews acknowledges the 
‘generous and broad-minded support’ of, amongst others, ‘The Staff and Management of Denny’s 24-
Hour Family Restaurant, Bloomington, Il.’ (p. vi).  
22 Gérard Genette, Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation, trans. by Jane E. Lewin (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 1. 
23 Genette, p. 2. For more on Wallace’s paratexts, see Tore Rye Andersen, ‘Judging by the Cover’, 
Critique: Studies in Contemporary Fiction, 53.3 (2012), 251–78. 
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the ‘edges’ of Wallace’s novel and to remind us of their radical contingency, the extent to which 
the borders of the unfinished work are—more so than any of Wallace’s earlier fictions—
inescapably ‘porous’. 
Any attempt to explore the way we read TPK, then, must necessarily take account of the 
‘threshold’ presented by these editorial paratexts. Pietsch’s ‘Editor’s Note’, for example—
situated as it is at the start of the book—establishes a series of contextual frames which shape 
and direct our reading even before we reach the start of Wallace’s text. One of the central 
effects of this introduction is its foregrounding of the book’s status as a posthumously-
constructed document—and, with this, of the nature and extent of Pietsch’s own part in 
constructing the novel. The ‘note’ begins by offering something of an ‘origin story’ for TPK: an 
account firstly of Wallace’s protracted composition of this ‘long thing’, and then, following 
Wallace’s death, of Pietsch’s work of editing the ‘hundreds and hundreds of pages’ of notes and 
drafts into some kind of coherent or otherwise publishable form (p. viii). Certainly, Pietsch 
played a crucial part in the production of TPK—Andersen has suggested that Pietsch’s editorial 
choices serve a ‘significant co-authoring function’—and, in this initial note, Pietsch brings these 
editorial choices into self-conscious focus.24 Groenland reads the ‘Editor’s Note’ as an attempt 
to ‘render the process of the book’s construction “transparent”’, and we see evidence of this in 
Pietsch’s candid discussion of his editorial intentions and processes.25 While claiming at one 
point that ‘[t]he pages of the manuscript were edited only lightly’, Pietsch also offers concrete 
examples of his editorial input, including standardising character names, job titles, and other 
‘factual matters’ across the work, making ‘occasional cuts for sense or pace’, and finding 
suitable end points for chapters that ‘trailed off unfinished’ (p. xi). Underpinning these editorial 
choices, Pietsch argues, was a desire to  
eliminate unintentional distractions and confusions so as to allow readers to 
focus on the enormous issues David intended to raise, and to make the story and 
characters as comprehensible as possible. (p. xi) 
By positioning these gestures of editorial ‘transparency’ at the start of TPK, Pietsch invites us to 
engage in a specific kind of reading of Wallace’s novel—one consistently aware that the 
‘comprehensibility’ of the published text is bound up with Pietsch’s mediating editorial 
                                                            
24 Andersen, ‘Pay Attention! David Foster Wallace and His Real Enemies’, English Studies, 95.1 (2014), 
7–24 (p. 14, n. 29). 
25 Groenland, ‘A King of Shreds and Patches’, p. 223. 
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presence. 
Beyond this, Pietsch’s introduction also establishes a biographical frame for our 
reading: in setting out an ‘origin story’ for TPK, Pietsch positions the novel in the context of, 
firstly, Wallace’s protracted compositional process (he quotes a letter in which Wallace 
compares the writing of TPK to ‘wrestling sheets of balsa wood in a high wind’ (p. vii)), and 
secondly, Wallace’s suicide (the narrative of the novel’s construction begins, of course, with the 
posthumous discovery by Wallace’s agent Bonnie Nadell of a ‘neat stack of manuscript, twelve 
chapters totalling 250 pages’, arranged on a desk in the author’s office (p. viii)). This contextual 
awareness is, perhaps, an inevitable side-effect of any readerly engagement with a posthumous 
work. Critics have commented on how the fact of Wallace’s death (and the proliferation of 
biographical profiles, memorials, and memoirs which followed it) have reshaped critical and 
popular responses to his writing: Burn, for example, argues that ‘the accumulated weight of 
posthumous profiles’, along with the opening of Wallace’s archive, has ‘prompted a 
reformulation of the coordinates of David Foster Wallace’s fiction, casting a fine 
autobiographical net over much that at one time seemed pure invention’.26 For Burn, TPK stands 
at ‘the apex of this revisionary process’: he suggests that ‘the all-engulfing shadow of Wallace’s 
suicide has made The Pale King seem to be a site where reciprocal exchanges between novel 
and life are a vital phase of the reading process’.27 While, as Burn suggests, Wallace’s suicide 
casts a ‘shadow’ which informs any reading of TPK, Pietsch’s paratextual introduction is 
striking in the extent to which it explicitly guides us toward this biographical perspective: the 
‘autobiographical net’ is, in a sense, in place even within the confines of Wallace’s book. 
Throughout the ‘Editor’s Note’, Pietsch repeatedly conceives of TPK as offering us a direct, 
posthumous engagement with Wallace-the-person: he describes, for example, how, on first 
reading the drafts for the novel, he felt ‘as if I were in [Wallace’s] presence, and was able to 
forget awhile the awful fact of his death’ (p. viii). For Pietsch, the power of TPK lies at least 
partially in its capacity to reanimate Wallace’s living voice: Wallace’s notes and drafts are 
framed as offering ‘the closest thing to seeing his amazing mind at play upon the world’ (p. 
viii), and Pietsch’s organisation of these materials stands as an attempt to allow readers to ‘look 
once more inside that extraordinary mind’ (p. ix). In promising access to the ‘inside’ of 
                                                            
26 Burn, ‘The Machine in the Ghost’, p. 16. 
27 Burn, ‘The Machine in the Ghost’, p. 16. 
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Wallace’s head—an image of readerly exhumation which captures the uncanny quality which 
accompanies any reading of a posthumous text (and perhaps again gestures, like the title of 
Infinite Jest, back towards Hamlet’s graveyard scene)—Pietsch models and invites a reading of 
TPK in which biography and work are impossible to disentangle, in which the ‘living voice’ 
present in the text is always haunted by the inescapable shadow, the ‘awful fact’, of Wallace’s 
death.28 
Finally, Pietsch’s ‘Editor’s Note’ also reinforces our awareness of TPK’s incomplete 
status. Even as he insists on its ‘astonishingly full’, ‘gorgeously alive’ (p. viii) quality, Pietsch 
also reminds of TPK’s unfinished-ness: we are informed, for example, that Wallace left no 
complete outline indicating its overarching structure—that, beyond ‘a few broad notes about the 
novel’s trajectory’, the drafts and notes included ‘no list of scenes, no designated opening or 
closing point, nothing that could be called a set of directions or instructions’ (p. ix). In 
foregrounding the difficulties involved in the editorial process, Pietsch explicitly reminds us that 
TPK is ‘not by any measure a finished work’ (p. ix) and would undoubtedly be ‘vastly different’ 
had Wallace survived to finish it (p. xi). This sense of the text’s contingent structure is further 
found in the novel’s other editorial paratexts: in his brief introduction to the ‘Notes and Asides’, 
for example, Pietsch argues that these notes are included partially to ‘allow a fuller 
understanding’ of the novel’s ideas—offering hints at ‘where the plot of the novel might have 
headed’, and ‘additional information about characters’ background or their future 
development’—but also to ‘illuminate how much a work in progress the novel still was’ (p. 
541). In the note introducing the paperback edition’s four additional ‘unpublished scenes’, 
meanwhile, Pietsch further underlines the novel’s structural contingency: confronted with a 
series of ‘complete scenes’ which, although ‘hilarious and entertaining and revealing’, do not—
according to Pietsch—‘fit with the rest of the narrative’ (p. 550), we are again brought face to 
face with the ‘porous borders’ of TPK. These ‘deleted scenes’—which, like the included ‘Notes 
and Asides’, occupy a paratextual space both inside and outside the text—stand as testament to 
the provisional structure of the published novel, the ways in which TPK’s apparent points of 
                                                            
28 Andrew Bennett has commented on the ways in which TPK both apparently invites us to view the 
contents of ‘David Foster Wallace’s head’ and at the same time finally asserts ‘the impossibility of 
knowing any such thing’ (Bennett, ‘Inside David Foster Wallace’s Head: Attention, Loneliness, Suicide, 
and the Other Side of Boredom’, in Gesturing Toward Reality, pp. 69–83 (p. 72)). 
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(even partial) ‘wholeness’ exist only as what Groenland has termed an ‘editorial construct’.29 
The novel’s editorial paratexts cumulatively establish and reinforce our understanding of TPK 
as a work which is everywhere unfinished, a text which thus demands a particular kind of 
reading (Groenland, in fact, argues that the novel leads us to ‘make interpretive judgments that 
arguably go beyond those involved in encounters with the work of a living author’, blurring the 
line between reader and editor).30 Through this chapter, I will continue to address and engage 
with these paratexts, not as explanations or keys with which to ‘fill in’ the TPK’s unfinished-
ness, but rather as emblems of its incompletion, sites in which the text’s instability is brought 
into uneasy focus. 
Even when taking into account these supplementary editorial and archival materials, we 
are still left no closer to being able to answer the question of just how unfinished TPK is: 
whether, as Boswell suggests, Wallace ‘largely said’ what he intended to, or whether, as 
Sullivan contends, the novel is not ‘anywhere near’ its completed state. Pietsch addresses the 
difficulty of knowing ‘[h]ow much more there might have been’, concluding that—in the 
absence of any ‘detailed outline projecting scenes and stories yet to be written’ within the 
archive—this answer is ‘unknowable’ (p. x). We are left with the irresolvable tension between 
the notes’ vague indications of a larger plot (one which could perhaps have centred around 
‘Irrelevant’ Chris Fogle’s ability to remember a mysterious ‘formula of numbers that permits 
total concentration’ (p. 543)), and the competing suggestion that Wallace only ever intended to 
plot ‘a series of set-ups for stuff happening, but nothing actually happens’ (p. 548). This 
unanswerable question leads us to the problem at the heart of our investigation: how, in the end, 
can we make sense of the relationship between Wallace’s deliberate strategies of 
incompletion—the strategies which we have addressed and interrogated throughout this thesis—
and the inevitably more radical unfinished-ness presented by TPK? Clearly, Wallace’s final 
novel presents us with two competing forms of incompleteness; bearing this in mind, we must 
avoid the temptation to simply treat TPK as a straightforward iteration of the techniques made 
                                                            
29 Groenland, ‘A King of Shreds and Patches’, p. 221. These paratexts are themselves striking in what 
they don’t tell us: as Groenland notes, the origins of both the included notes and the ‘additional scenes’ 
are ‘not documented in any detail [. . .] no chronological or material information is presented, and we are 
told only that they come “from other parts of the manuscript”’ (p. 224). In constructing a version of the 
novel which is clearly a ‘reader’s edition rather than a scholarly one’ (pp. 222–3), Pietsch leaves scholars 
with the work of ‘fill[ing] in the missing information’ (p. 224): without supplementary reference to 
Wallace’s archives, we are offered a picture of TPK’s archival form which is itself incomplete. 
30 Groenland, ‘A King of Shreds and Patches’, p. 233. 
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familiar in Wallace’s earlier work. Nevertheless, it is difficult not to find points of connection 
between these two versions of the unfinished: Groenland, for example, draws a line between the 
‘material history’ of TPK and its related ‘thematic interest in process and incompletion’, 31 while 
Hayes-Brady suggests that novel’s incompleteness ‘encodes the persistent resistance to closure 
that mark[s] all of Wallace’s work’.32 Building on these ideas—and on Burn’s suggestion that 
Wallace’s work presents us with a ‘poetics of incompleteness’—I want to investigate how these 
aspects of connection and continuity are made manifest in the process of reading Wallace’s final 
novel.33  
 In the remainder of this chapter, I will consider the ways in which TPK invites (or 
perhaps demands) a particular mode of ‘incomplete reading’, a reading which negotiates with, 
and responds to, the unfinished-ness of Wallace’s work. In this enquiry, I will treat TPK as a 
lens through which we can reconsider and reframe our understanding of the various formal and 
thematic concerns which we have explored throughout this thesis. Burn has suggested that TPK 
can be understood as a ‘kaleidoscopic text, one in which we can see the outlines of Wallace's 
evolving career: the echoes of the earlier books, his evolving style, and a condensed rehearsal of 
his theory of the novel’.34 Following this notion, my investigation will trace a reversed path 
back through the key ideas which we identified in each of Wallace’s previous works: from the 
sustained concern with silence and absence found in Oblivion and Brief Interviews, to the self-
conscious engagement with maximalism and excess which marked Jest, to the anxious focus on 
influence and intertextuality seen throughout the stories of Girl, and finally to the explicitly 
philosophical underpinnings that characterised Broom. In this backwards movement, I will show 
how Wallace’s final novel recapitulates and builds on the concerns of his previous work, and, in 
this, how our readings of the various forms of incompletion present in these earlier texts might 
be cumulatively employed in the construction of an ‘incomplete reading’ of TPK. 
 
‘Some enormous, unexplained, and unmotivated blank’: Silence and Absence 
Approaching TPK in the wake of Oblivion and Brief Interviews, it is hard to ignore the aspects 
                                                            
31 Groenland, ‘A Recipe for a Brick’, p. 366. Groenland also pertinently identifies the ‘numerous images 
of incomplete or damaged structures’ found throughout TPK (p. 371). 
32 Hayes-Brady, ‘“Palely Loitering”: On Not Finishing (in) The Pale King, in Cambridge Companion to 
David Foster Wallace, pp. 142–55 (p. 143). 
33 Burn, ‘Theory of Vision’, p. 91. 
34 Burn, ‘A Paradigm’, p. 165. 
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of continuity and connection which run between these three late works.35 Wallace’s unfinished 
novel is marked by the same instances of absence, blankness, and silence which shaped his 
previous collections: from moments of transcribed speechlessness (in the ellipses which 
punctuate the unattributed discussion of masturbation in §3, for example), to recognisable 
‘breaks’ in the fabric of the work (as in the recurrence of the Brief Interviews’ absent-questioner 
format in the IRS’s ‘video interviews’ of §14). Even in its partially-constructed state, Wallace’s 
novel is punctuated by deliberate plot-level ‘gaps’, points of narrative indeterminacy left for the 
reader to negotiate: in his first ‘authorial’ address to the reader, ‘David Wallace’ claims that, 
due to a complex series of ‘familio-legal strictures’ (p. 80, n. 61), he is prohibited from relating 
how he came to work for the IRS, asserting that this is a ‘background item that I can explain 
only obliquely, i.e., by ostensibly explaining why I can’t discuss it’ (p. 80). While the resulting 
‘anti-explanation’ (p. 80, n. 16)—which offers oblique and tortured reference to ‘a certain 
unnamed relative with unspecified connections to the Midwest Commissioner’s Office of a 
certain unnamed government agency’ (p. 81)—is positioned as an attempt to avoid ‘some 
enormous, unexplained, and unmotivated blank’ (p. 80, n. 16) in the narrative, it succeeds only 
in making this ‘blank’ manifest, drawing attention to this unsayable point at the centre of 
‘Wallace’’s account. Looking elsewhere, meanwhile, we find this figure of textual or narrative 
‘blankness’ again associated with specific characters in the novel, recalling the ‘untenanted’, 
hollowed-out figures of Oblivion. Severs has commented on how TPK’s characters ‘see 
blankness in themselves or (often more horrifying) in others’, and we find examples of these 
unsettling embodied ‘blanks’ throughout: from Sylvanshine’s encounter with CID agent Gary 
(or perhaps Gerry) Britton, a ‘human blank-spot’ (p. 53) whose affectless gaze ‘seemed to 
Sylvanshine more like looking at his right eye than into it’ (p. 52); to §23’s disturbing dream-
vision of ‘the placid hopelessness of adulthood’ as endless rows of office workers with 
expressions ‘blank as the faces on coins’ (p. 255).36 This notion of embodied blankness, of a self 
which has become ‘untenanted’, is given more extended attention in §14, where an unnamed 
speaker describes his father’s (and increasingly, his own) unconscious tendency to lose himself 
‘in a stare’: 
                                                            
35 For further discussion of the compositional interrelatedness of Wallace’s post-Infinite Jest fiction, see 
the coda to chapter 4. 
36 Severs, ‘“Blank as the Faces on Coins”: Currency and Embodied Value(s) in David Foster Wallace’s 
The Pale King’, Critique: Studies in Contemporary Fiction, 57.1 (2016), 52–66 (p. 55). 
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Being in a stare referred to staring fixedly and without expression at something 
for extensive periods of time. [. . .] it involves gazing at something. Staring at it. 
[. . .] But in a stare, you are not really looking at this thing you are seeming to 
stare at, you are not even really noticing it—however, neither are you thinking 
of something else. You in truth are not doing anything, mentally, but you are 
doing it fixedly, with what appears to be intent concentration. [. . .] I find 
myself doing it. It’s not unpleasant, but it is strange. Something goes out of 
you—you can feel your face merely hanging loose, with no muscles or 
expression. It frightens my children, I know. As if your face, like your attention, 
belongs to someone else. (pp. 118–9) 
The speaker’s description of ‘being in a stare’ evokes an emptying-out of self, a state of ‘not 
doing anything, mentally’ in which something essential ‘goes out of you’. In this uncanny 
hollowness—a blankness made only more troubling by the suggestion that the ‘staring’ person’s 
face and attention are under the control of ‘someone else’—we are confronted with a clear 
iteration of the ‘hollowed-out’ characters of Oblivion, the absent figures who stand as human-
shaped emblems of the ‘silences’ which punctuate Wallace’s texts.37 
Even as it recalls these formal and thematic concerns, TPK also builds on these ideas. In 
particular, TPK’s points of silence and blankness are consistently bound up with the novel’s 
exploration of boredom. Since its publication, TPK has frequently been approached as a novel 
primarily about boredom: in his ‘Editor’s Note’, Pietsch frames the novel as an attempt on 
Wallace’s part to write ‘about some of the hardest subjects in the world—sadness and boredom’ 
(p. xi), and we find a persistent focus on the latter subject within the critical responses to 
Wallace’s text. Clare has catalogued the ‘numerous forms and representations’ of boredom 
presented within TPK, suggesting that Wallace employs this ‘variety of boredoms’ as part of an 
investigation of ‘the roots of “boredom” as a specific historical formation of late capitalist 
American life’.38 In taking the rote work of IRS examinations as its subject, TPK positions itself 
as a text at least partially concerned with evoking and interrogating the experience of ‘extreme 
boredom’ (p. 316): reflecting on his time working for the IRS, the fictional ‘David Wallace’ 
notes that ‘I learned, in my time with the Service, something about dullness [. . .] About 
negotiating boredom as one would a terrain, its levels and forests and endless wastes’ (p. 87).39 
Considering again TPK’s depictions of absence and silence, we can see how these textual 
                                                            
37 Hering has further discussed TPK’s depiction of ‘being in a stare’, situating his analysis in the context 
of a larger exploration of formal models of reflective/refractive visuality found across Wallace’s fiction 
(Hering, Fiction and Form, p. 156). 
38 Clare, ‘The Politics of Boredom and the Boredom of Politics in The Pale King’, in Long Thing, pp. 
187–208 (pp. 188, 190, 187). 
39 Max credibly speculates that Wallace chose to write about the IRS specifically because it ‘was the 
dullest possible venue he could think of’ (Every Love Story, p. 256). 
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‘blanks’ are now framed by this larger engagement with dullness and boredom: the novel’s most 
significant moments of silence are those situated within the noiseless, agonisingly dull space of 
the IRS examinations room, while the hollow status of its ‘untenanted’ figures is associated with 
an extended exposure to the extreme tedium of IRS work—work which, in its dullness, seems to 
provoke the kind of absent, ‘staring’ evacuation of self described by §14’s anonymous speaker.  
Beyond addressing its status as a ‘novel about boredom’, critics have also approached 
TPK as a text concerned with the possibility of overcoming this tedium. Andersen argues that, 
alongside its interrogation of the nature of boredom, the novel ‘devotes at least as much energy 
to the question of how to transcend boredom by paying attention’.40 If, as Clare suggests, 
Wallace uses the IRS as a lens through which he can more broadly interrogate the ‘modern 
problem’ of boredom,41 then Andersen reads the novel as striving to offer a solution to this 
problem, a means of confronting the difficulties of—and perhaps even embracing the 
possibilities inherent in—the inescapable boredoms of contemporary experience. Within TPK, 
this necessary confrontation with boredom is perhaps articulated most clearly by the (again 
unnamed) speaker of §44, who, having asserted that the ‘world of men as it exists today is a 
bureaucracy’ (p. 439),42 goes on to offer what he sees as the ‘key’ to surviving and succeeding 
in this contemporary bureaucratic environment: 
The underlying bureaucratic key is the ability to deal with boredom. To 
function effectively in an environment that precludes everything vital and 
human. To breathe, so to speak, without air. 
     The key is the ability, whether innate or conditioned, to find the other side of 
the rote, the picayune, the meaningless, the repetitive, the pointlessly complex. 
To be, in a word, unborable. [. . .] 
     It is the key to modern life. If you are immune to boredom, there is literally 
nothing you cannot accomplish. (p. 440) 
Here, the ability to ‘deal with boredom’ is positioned as an invaluable skill within the airless, 
inhuman environments of ‘modern life’: the monumental—even, to employ one of TPK’s 
favoured terms, ‘heroic’ (p. 230)—effort of confronting ‘the rote, the picayune, the 
meaningless, the repetitive, the pointlessly complex’ is figured as one of transcendence, of 
                                                            
40 Andersen, ‘David Foster Wallace and His Real Enemies’, p. 12. 
41 Clare, ‘The Politics of Boredom’, p. 189. 
42 This starkly gendered conception of a ‘world of men’ reflects the predominantly male environment of 
the novel’s IRS REC—and, by extension, of TPK as a whole. For more on the (often problematic) 
maleness—and, relatedly, the overwhelming whiteness—of Wallace’s final novel, see Hayes-Brady, 
Unspeakable Failures; Araya, ‘Why the Whiteness?’; Thompson, ‘Wallace and Race’. 
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reaching a mystical ‘other side’ of boredom.43 Among the novel’s characters, this ‘unborable’ 
status is most fully realised in the figure of Shane Drinion. Drinion—described by his 
colleagues as ‘possibly the dullest human being currently alive’ (p. 450)—seems ‘immune’ to 
boredom, with the capacity to pay complete attention to whatever is in front of him. This 
capacity is demonstrated in §46’s extended conversation between Drinion and Meredith Rand—
a conversation which culminates in Drinion ‘hovering very slightly—perhaps one or two 
millimeters at most—above the seat of his wooden chair’ (p. 471). This levitation, we are told, 
is  
what happens when he is completely immersed [. . .]. One night someone 
comes into the office and sees Drinion floating upside down over his desk with 
his eyes glued to a complex return, Drinion himself unaware of the levitating 
thing by definition, since it is only when his attention is completely on 
something else that the levitation happens. (p. 487) 
Drinion, in his capacity to direct his attention ‘completely on something else’, seems to 
exemplify the heroic engagement with boredom described by §48’s speaker, reaching a 
transcendence manifested in this mystical ‘hovering’.44 Significantly, however, Drinion’s 
superhuman attentiveness is matched by (and seems inexorably connected with) his innate and 
unavoidable dullness. Drinion, who demonstrates ‘nothing that could be called charm or social 
grace or even compassion’ (p. 451), is almost devoid of personality, possessed of an affectless 
vacancy—a facial expression which ‘is bland and neutral in a way that might as well be blank 
for all it tells you (pp. 457–8)—which seems to serve as a foundation for his unborable power of 
‘complete attention’ (p. 450). In this personal ‘blankness’, Drinion seem like yet another 
‘untenanted’ figure, another absent, unknowable, or otherwise ‘hollowed out’ presence: 
Drinion’s nickname of ‘Mr. X’, while ostensibly an ironic abbreviation of ‘Mr. Excitement’ (p. 
450), seems equally to gesture towards his status as a ‘blank space’, a further point of embodied 
                                                            
43 This connection between boredom and transcendence has been variously contextualised by critics. Max 
notes that the composition of TPK was informed by Wallace’s ‘growing interest’ in Buddhism and 
‘Eastern religious practices’: for Max, the ‘lack of stimulation’ involved in the tedious work of IRS 
examinations can be read as invoking a kind of meditative state in the novel’s characters, giving them ‘a 
chance to open themselves up to experience in the largest sense of the word’ (Max, Every Love Story, p. 
257). Dulk, meanwhile, draws connections between this ‘transcendent’ engagement with boredom and 
Wallace’s reading of Kierkegaard’s philosophy: in these terms, an engagement with boredom is figured as 
a ‘leap’ across a ‘dizzying abyss’, a heroic effort which ‘leads us back to meaningful, real existence’ 
(Dulk, ‘Boredom, Irony, and Anxiety: Wallace and the Kierkegaardian View of the Self’, in Long Thing, 
pp. 43–60 (pp. 53, 58)). 
44 In his mysterious ability to levitate, Drinion echoes Jest’s ‘Spandexed sweat-guru’ Lyle, who at one 
point reaches a comparable meditative transcendence as he ‘hovers cross-legged just a couple mm. above 
the top of the towel dispenser in the unlit weight room, eyes rolled up white, lips barely moving and 
making no sound’ (Infinite Jest, pp. 316, 700). 
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speechlessness within TPK’s text. However, Drinion’s blankness is distinct from the 
‘untenanted’ characters of Oblivion (or the other untenanted figures in TPK) in its positive 
associations. Drinion’s absence does not represent the troubling ‘hollow space’ of boredom, but 
rather a state of attention, an other-directed concentration which allows him to overcome or 
transcend the tedium of contemporary experience. Severs suggests that Drinion stands as a 
corrective to TPK’s numerous instances of ‘horrifying’ absence: his blankness, while an 
apparently ‘undesirable trait’, enables an ‘erasure of ego’, an openness to being ‘stamped’ by 
the stories of others.45 In Drinion, we seem to find evidence of Wallace reframing and 
recuperating the ‘blank spaces’ of his previous writing, finding a potentially redemptive value in 
the ‘silent’ spaces of his work.46 
Even as it presents a model of an apparently constructive, valuable blankness, however, 
TPK simultaneously complicates and disturbs this redemptive ideal. While the novel establishes 
the heroic necessity of confronting the boredom of modernity, it is equally concerned with 
evoking the actual, often unbearable, experience of extreme tedium. In §9, ‘David Wallace’, 
having asserted the vital power of the boring (and particularly the IRS’s deliberate employment 
of ‘the dull, the arcane, the mind-numbingly complex’ as a form of insulation against ‘public 
protest and political opposition’ (p. 85)), goes on to address the ‘really interesting question; of 
‘why dullness proves to be such a powerful impediment to attention’ (p. 87):  
Maybe it’s because dullness is intrinsically painful; maybe that’s where phrases 
like ‘deadly dull’ or ‘excruciatingly dull’ come from. But there might be more 
to it. Maybe dullness is associated with psychic pain because something that’s 
dull or opaque fails to provide enough stimulation to distract people from some 
other, deeper type of pain that is always there, if only in an ambient low-level 
way, and which most of us spend nearly all our time and energy trying to 
distract ourselves from feeling, or at least from feeling directly or with our full 
attention. (p. 87) 
‘Wallace’ suggests that there is something behind dullness, an ‘other, deeper type of pain’ 
within the silences of boredom. It is this unsettling ‘ambient low-level’ pain which makes the 
experience of boredom so ‘excruciating’. In this context, the manifold distractions of 
contemporary ‘information society’—a society which, ‘Wallace’ argues, ‘[e]veryone knows’ is 
                                                            
45 Severs, ‘Blank as the Faces on Coins’, pp. 55, 63. 
46 A further example of this redemptive absence is found in ‘David Wallace’’s description of the absolute 
silence of the Peoria REC’s ‘Immersives Room’ (p. 292): here, as with Drinion, this blank state of ‘total 
quiet’ is here associated not with unsettling ‘emptiness’ (as it was, for example, in the ‘gaps’ of Brief 
Interviews), but rather with total, superhuman concentration, an attentiveness which has transcended 
boredom. 
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‘about something else, way down’—are figured as desperate attempts to avoid this ‘deeper’ 
pain, this ‘terror of silence with nothing diverting to do’ (p. 87). The nature of this ‘terror’ is 
notably difficult to articulate: ‘Wallace’ himself asserts that the subject is ‘pretty confusing, and 
hard to talk about abstractly’ (p. 87). This suggestion of a horrifying point behind (or beneath) 
boredom brings us again closer to the troubling ‘blank spaces’ of Oblivion and Brief Interviews: 
‘Wallace’’s conception of an inarticulable ‘deeper type of pain’ suggests a boredom which 
cannot be transcended or recuperated through paying attention, a boredom which resists, and 
thus undermines, the redemptive model embodied by Drinion. 
This suggestion of an un-redemptive or -redeemable boredom—a blankness which 
overwhelms any attempt at confrontation or transcendence—is demonstrated more starkly in 
§33, as Lane Dean desperately attempts to negotiate the extreme tedium of IRS examinations 
work: 
Lane Dean Jr. with his green rubber pinkie finger sat at his Tingle table in his 
Chalk’s row in the Rotes Group’s wiggle room and did two more returns, then 
another one, then flexed his buttocks and held to a count of ten and imagined a 
warm pretty beach with mellow surf as instructed in orientation the previous 
month. Then he did two more returns, checked the clock real quick, then two 
more [. . .]. After just an hour the beach was a winter beach, cold and gray and 
the dead kelp like the hair of the drowned, and it stayed that way despite all 
attempts. (p. 378) 
In experiencing total, unbearable boredom—a ‘boredom beyond any boredom he’d ever felt’ (p. 
379)—Dean is confronted with the kind of terrifying silence described by ‘Wallace’, a 
blankness which obliterates all his attempts to confront, embrace, or overcome it. Like Drinion, 
Dean’s work of extended attention again seems to result in a ‘hollowing out’ of the self: he is 
struck by the ‘unbidden’ though that ‘boring also meant something that drilled in and made a 
hole’ (p. 380). Far from Drinion’s heroically attentive blankness, however, Dean’s extended 
engagement with boredom results only in ‘the sensation of a great type of hole or emptiness 
falling through him and continuing to fall and never hitting the floor’, a self-evacuation which 
leads him to picture ‘different high places to jump off of’ (pp. 380–1). Here, the ‘other side’ of 
boredom is imagined not as transcendence but as suicide: the ‘terror’ behind the quotidian is, for 
Dean, that of a self which has been ‘bored through’, not merely ‘untenanted’ but annihilated 
altogether. This conception of a boredom which edges upon suicide is addressed by Bennett, 
who finds a theoretical model for TPK’s more troubling existential boredoms in the philosophy 
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of Arthur Schopenhauer.47 In Bennett’s reading, Wallace’s novel is profoundly informed by 
Schopenhauer’s identification of boredom as ‘the condition that underlies, indeed underpins, all 
of human existence’: this existential boredom is both inescapable and horrifying, at once 
serving as ‘the ultimate possibility or promise’ of human life and ‘lead[ing] directly, ineluctably 
to suicide’.48 Beyond this, I would argue that the ‘deeper’, horrifying boredom experienced by 
Dean also invites us to consider the unsettling absent spaces which punctuate Wallace’s own 
texts: in many respects, Dean’s encounter with this horrifying point of total boredom reads like 
a further encounter with the ‘essential solitude’ which Blanchot finds at the heart of the literary 
work.49 Blanchot explicitly imagines the negative language of literature as engaged in a kind of 
self-destructive movement: 
[. . .] words, having the power to make things ‘arise’ at the heart of their 
absence—words which are masters of this absence—also have the power to 
disappear in it themselves, to absent themselves marvelously in the midst of the 
totality which they realize, which they proclaim as they annihilate themselves 
therein, which they accomplish eternally by destroying themselves there 
endlessly. This act of self-destruction is in every respect similar to the ever so 
strange event of suicide [. . .]50 
In comparing literature and suicide—a comparison which, he acknowledges, is ‘shocking in a 
way’—Blanchot articulates how the language of fiction always leads us back to the ‘negative 
space’ on which it is precariously constructed: this hollowed-out language ‘comes from silence’ 
and finally ‘returns to silence’ as well.51 In its evocation of the unbearable, existential blankness 
of boredom, TPK can be read as enacting a version of this self-destructive movement, 
reflexively gesturing towards the unsettling, unspeakable absence at the text’s heart. 
In this suggestion of a more horrifying absence beneath the surface of quotidian 
dullness—a blankness resistant to recuperation or redemption—TPK draws attention to the 
limitations of its own attempts to find a means to ‘transcending’ or ‘overcoming’ contemporary 
boredom. We find evidence of these limitations even within the novel’s depiction of Drinion: 
although serving as TPK’s central and most significant example of ‘transcendent’ attentiveness, 
Drinion arguably offers a distinctly imperfect model for a ‘heroic’ engagement with boredom. 
                                                            
47 Bennett, p. 72. 
48 Bennett, p. 73–4. 
49 Blanchot, p. 22. 
50 Blanchot, pp. 26, 43. 
51 Blanchot, pp. 106, 39. This comparison inevitably invites us to consider the problematic question of 
how our reading of TPK is informed or affected by the extratextual fact of Wallace’s own suicide. This 
question, and the inescapable difficulties which surround it, is addressed in greater detail later in this 
chapter. 
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In his seemingly total lack of personality, his apparently ‘untenanted’ status, Drinion—while 
not explicitly horrifying in the same way as, for example, ‘The Soul Is Not a Smithy’’s 
‘demonically possessed’ Mr Johnson—nonetheless embodies a ‘blank space’ within TPK’s 
narrative, a point of absence which leaves his character unknowable to the reader. Rather than 
providing a programmatic example of a sustained, ‘heroic’ engagement with extreme tedium, 
Drinion’s mystically ‘unborable’ blankness leaves him seeming, as Jon Baskin has suggested, 
‘not properly human’: he has ‘not mastered the problem [. . .] so much as he has been spared 
from it’.52 Like his associated power of levitation, Drinion’s embodied ideal of total attention is 
figured as something unreal, beyond the realms of human possibility. This sense of the 
qualified, problematic nature of Drinion’s redemptive potential is only further compounded 
when we consider that TPK’s most concrete and sustained discussion of Drinion’s 
‘transcendence’ is situated not in the novel’s main text, but rather in the ‘Notes and Asides’: 
Drinion is happy. Ability to pay attention. It turns out that bliss—a second-by-
second joy + gratitude at the gift of being alive, conscious—lies on the other 
side of crushing, crushing boredom. Pay close attention to the most tedious 
thing you can find (tax returns, televised golf), and, in waves, a boredom like 
you’ve never known will wash over you and just about kill you. Ride these out, 
and it’s like stepping from black and white into color. Like water after days in 
the desert. Constant bliss in every atom. (p. 548) 
This note offers perhaps the novel’s most arresting image of a redemptive confrontation with 
dullness—of the potential ‘bliss’ which resides on the ‘other side’ of ‘crushing boredom’.53 
Here, certainly, Drinion seems positioned as a prescriptive model, someone whose example can 
and should be followed—a suggestion supported by the note’s shift from an initially specific, 
third-person description of Drinion’s own ‘ability to pay attention’ to a more generalised 
second-person instruction to pay ‘close attention to the most tedious thing you can find’. The 
note has been much-discussed within criticism of TPK, with commentators frequently 
employing the passage to illustrate Wallace’s investment in the redemptive possibility of 
                                                            
52 Jon Baskin, ‘Untrendy Problems: The Pale King’s Philosophical Inspirations’, in Gesturing Toward 
Reality, pp. 141–56 (pp. 147). 
53 Wallace’s juxtaposition of ‘bliss’ and ‘boredom’ echoes Barthes’s characterisation of boredom as ‘not 
far from bliss: it is bliss seen from the shores of pleasure’ (The Pleasure of the Text, trans. by Richard 
Miller (New York: Hill & Wang, 1980), p. 26). For Barthes, the text of bliss ‘imposes a state of loss’ in 
the reader, unsettling their ‘historical, cultural, psychological assumptions’, discomforting them ‘perhaps 
to the point of a certain boredom’ (p. 14). This vision of interpretative engagement resonates strikingly 
with the particular interpretative work demanded by TPK, the state of readerly discomfort, boredom, and 
‘loss’ imposed by the novel’s incomplete form. 
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‘transcending’ boredom.54 I would argue, however, that the note’s primary significance lies in 
its positioning outside the novel’s main text: this vision of ‘constant bliss in every atom’ is left 
unincorporated into TPK’s narrative, located in the unstable paratextual space at the margins of 
Wallace’s novel. Taking this into account, we are led to consider whether the note’s ‘blissful’ 
version of Drinion matches up with the blank, ‘hollowed out’ character depicted in the 
conversation with Meredith Rand: without the supplementary information offered by this 
(para)text, could we confidently argue that the affectless, disconnected Drinion of §46 
demonstrates—even in his state of levitating total attention—the kind of happiness described in 
the note? We as readers are left faced with the question of precisely how far TPK’s flawed 
model of transcendent engagement with boredom reflects Wallace’s writerly intentions, and 
how far it serves as an inevitable mark of the text’s own, very real, unfinished-ness. In his 
biography of Wallace, Max suggests that TPK’s central project was left significantly 
uncompleted and unsolved at the time of the author’s death,55 and we find in reviews of TPK a 
consistent attentiveness to this aspect of incompletion: Adam Kirsch argues that Wallace had 
‘not resolved the tension at the heart of the project: the problem of how to write an interesting 
book about boredom’.56 In the novel’s incomplete depiction of Drinion’s ‘blissful’ 
transcendence, we are thus drawn into a confrontation with ‘unresolved’ aspects of Wallace’s 
novel, the very real points of potential broken-ness which arise as a result of TPK’s unfinished 
form. 
It could be argued that any reading of TPK’s points of absence and silence involves a 
continual negotiation between these conflicting forms of incompletion: the deliberate ‘blank 
spaces’ which we have identified across the novel intersect, and sometimes conflict, with the 
starker textual ‘spaces’ which mark the work’s unfinished-ness. The previous chapter of this 
thesis has already explored how the compositional interrelatedness of Brief Interviews, 
Oblivion, and TPK informed the ‘porous borders’ of all three of these post-Infinite Jest works. 
Just as the stories in the Brief Interviews and (especially) Oblivion were punctuated by archival 
‘fissures’, points which marked their status as abandoned and broken pieces of Wallace’s larger 
                                                            
54 See, for example, Andersen, ‘David Foster Wallace and His Real Enemies’, p. 15; Clare, ‘The Politics 
of Boredom’, p. 200; Hayes-Brady, Unspeakable Failures, p. 201. 
55 Max, Every Love Story, pp. 280, 292. 
56 Adam Kirsch, ‘The Importance of Being Earnest’, New Republic, 28 July 2011 
<http://www.newrepublic.com/article/books/magazine/92794/david-lipsky-foster-wallace-pale-king> 
[accessed 15 January 2019]. 
175 
 
work-in-progress, so TPK is marked by visible traces of its connections to these preceding texts: 
the anonymous recollection of ‘soaring, ceilingless tedium’ (p. 255) in §23, for example—with 
its closing image of a grammar school characterised by ‘rows of empty faces and shadowless 
lights and wire mesh in the windows’ (p.256)—reads almost like an alternate draft of the civics 
classroom setting of ‘The Soul Is Not a Smithy’. Beyond these examples of the novel’s unstable 
edges, meanwhile, TPK is also characterised by further flaws and breakages throughout the 
work, moments which draw attention to its unfinished status. In his ‘Editor’s Note’, Pietsch—
having noted that TPK would be ‘vastly different had [Wallace] survived to finish it’—draws 
explicit attention to the various ‘draft sloppinesses’ still present in the published text: from the 
awkward overuse of certain words and images (‘the terms “titty-pinching” and “squeezing his 
shoes”, for example, would probably not be repeated as often as they are’) to the fact that ‘at 
least two characters have Doberman hand puppets’ (p. xi). In approaching the ‘less-than-final’ 
(p. xi) published text of TPK, however, it is impossible to distinguish these (presumably 
unintentional) ‘sloppinesses’ from the novel’s parallel employment of deliberate gaps and flaws: 
we cannot know with any certainty, for example, whether the recurrence of ‘Doberman hand 
puppets’ (which indeed appear to be mysteriously owned by two separate characters in the 
novel) were part of Wallace’s design, or merely marks of authorial carelessness. These apparent 
points of compositional or editorial awkwardness open up a more fundamental ‘gap’ in our 
reading, creating textual ‘spaces’ which we as readers cannot confidently fill.  
We find a key example of this interpretative uncertainty, these unreadable ‘blanks’, in 
the ambiguous figure of ‘X’. X appears most notably in §19: a chapter consisting of an extended 
conversation on ‘civics and selfishness’ (p. 132)—related in almost entirely unattributed 
dialogue—between DeWitt Glendenning (the Director of the Peoria REC) and a group of junior 
IRS examiners. In his conspicuous anonymity, X has been a subject of critical debate: Boswell, 
for example, confidently identifies X as Shane Drinion (‘whose nickname’, he reminds us, ‘is 
X, or Mr. X’),57 while Kelly disputes this conclusion, arguing that, while it may be ‘tempting’ to 
associate X with Drinion, ‘the characters of these two men seem entirely at odds with one 
another, which may indicate that the X in §19 was simply a placeholder for the name of a 
                                                            
57 Boswell, ‘Trickle-Down Citizenship: Taxes and Civic Responsibility in The Pale King’, in Long Thing, 
pp. 209–225 (p. 225, n. 3). 
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character as yet undecided by Wallace’.58 Commenting on this (apparently minor) dispute, 
Groenland notes how TPK’s ‘unfinished elements’ give rise to inevitable critical ‘differences in 
opinion’: indeed, X crystallises the interpretative problems which confront any reader of TPK, 
the impossibility of disentangling the text’s deliberate ‘absences’ from its parallel points of 
compositional incompletion.59 In this way, the anonymous X seems to stand as a further 
example of an empty, ‘untenanted’ character, another—arguably more fundamentally absent—
human-shaped breach in the novel’s fabric. 
These points of irresolvable ambiguity are evident throughout TPK: even the novel’s 
title resists coherent interpretation, with critics continuing to debate over its intertextual source, 
as well as the specific nature of its significance within the text.60 While, in the incomplete 
narrative offered by the published novel, the ‘pale king’ seems to refer most concretely, as Jeff 
Staiger has noted, to ‘a formidable higher-up at the IRS, never seen and perhaps never meant to 
be seen even in the final version’, commentators have read the title as associated with a number 
of other key characters and ideas: Staiger, for example, goes on to note that the ‘Jesuit who 
inspires Fogle to change his life is significantly referred to as “pale”’,61 while Stephen Shapiro 
argues that DeWitt Glendenning should be regarded as the primary candidate for the novel’s 
‘eponymous pale king’.62 Max, meanwhile, suggests that the title’s ambiguity reflects a 
corresponding authorial uncertainty on Wallace’s part: drawing on Wallace’s notebooks, Max 
argues that, where the ‘pale king’ was initially intended to refer to ‘the I.R.S., or possibly to the 
state of contentment and focus the book advocated’, it eventually came, over the course of the 
novel’s protracted composition, to serve as a ‘synonym for the depression that tormented’ 
Wallace.63 Surveying this range of conflicting critical interpretations, we can again see how the 
unfinished status of TPK serves as both echo and amplification of the points of indeterminacy 
                                                            
58 Kelly, ‘Novel of Ideas’, p. 22, n. 16. Kelly’s conclusion is potentially supported by Wallace’s notes, 
which seem to refer to Drinion and X (a ‘talent-arrangement genius’ (p. 546)) as distinct and separate 
characters. 
59 Groenland, ‘A King of Shreds and Patches’, p. 231. 
60 Hayes-Brady, for example, traces the novel’s title back to a mention of ‘pale kings, and princes too’ in 
John Keats’s 1819 poem ‘La Belle Dame Sans Merci’ (Unspeakable Failures, p. 60), while Sullivan 
alternately posits that the title may refer to ‘the pale king of terrors’, a ‘nineteenth-century folk expression 
[. . .] meaning the melancholy fear of death’ (‘Too Much Information’, para. 16).  
61 Jeff Staiger, ‘David Foster Wallace’s Contest with Himself’, New England Review, 36.2 (2015), 90–
111 (p. 109). 
62 Stephen Shapiro, ‘From Capitalist to Communist Abstraction: The Pale King’s Cultural Fix’, Textual 
Practice, 28.7 (2014), 1249–71 (p. 1276). 
63 Max, ‘The Unfinished’, para. 83. 
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and undecidability which we traced across Wallace’s preceding fictional work. While the 
novel’s ambiguous title resembles, at least in part, the empty, silent spaces—the ‘gaps’ left for 
readers to attempt to fill—which punctuate all of Wallace’s writing, it also opens out onto a 
further silence, a starker undecidability borne of the work’s actual incompletion. Like all the 
novel’s breaks and fissures, TPK’s title stands both as an invitation to readerly participation and 
a reminder of the limits of our interpretative engagement. In reading the self-consciously 
unfinished document presented by the published Pale King, we are forced to recognise that our 
efforts to imaginatively ‘finish’ the novel will always come up against this point of unreadable 
blankness: an absence which seems to intersect with unsettling ‘deeper’ silences—the 
unspeakable negativity which resided beneath the surface of boredom—evoked throughout 
TPK’s narrative. 
 
‘Ephemeral, useless, undramatic, distracting’: Maximalism and Excess 
While TPK’s concern with absence and silence links it directly with Brief Interviews and 
Oblivion, it also diverges from these works in certain significant ways: even in its unfinished 
state, the novel displays a commitment to the construction of something larger, distinct from the 
shorter, disconnected pieces of the previous books—a principle which instead looks back 
towards the maximalism of Jest. While composing the novel, Wallace famously conceived of 
TPK as a ‘long thing’ (‘Editor’s Note’, p. vii), and this long-ness is built into the text at every 
level: from the micro (in Wallace’s characteristic long, looping sentences) to the macro (in the 
novel’s wealth of characters, perspectives, styles, forms, and voices). While TPK does not have 
the reach or scope of Jest—Staiger, for example, suggests that the novel transposes Jest’s style 
and concerns into a ‘minor register’, subjecting his previous novel to a ‘systematic 
diminishment’—it nonetheless offers a demonstrable break from both the fragmentary pieces of 
Brief Interviews and the introverted, claustrophobic spirals of Oblivion.64 Instead, the novel 
recalls Jest in the extent to which it once more explores and embodies excess, employing an 
unmanageable surplus of text to convey both the information ‘overload’ of contemporary 
American culture and the spiralling logorrhoea of its characters’ self-conscious thought. In §2—
which follows Claude Sylvanshine as he approaches the Peoria REC by plane—we are faced 
with a familiar depiction of hyper-self-consciousness: shifting variously between Sylvanshine’s 
                                                            
64 Staiger, p. 92. 
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troubled interior monologue, his jumbled recollections of his past failures, his anxieties over his 
current position at the IRS, and the external stresses of the crowded aeroplane. Throughout, 
Sylvanshine is perturbed by his attempts to study for the Certified Public Accountant exam—
attempts hampered by his tendency towards excessive thinking: ‘Knowing that internal stress 
could cause failure on the exam merely set up internal stress about the prospect of internal 
stress’ (p. 16). This crippling self-consciousness echoes the state of ‘analysis paralysis’ felt by 
Jest’s cast of addicts,65 and particularly that of Ken Erdedy in its second chapter: significantly, 
both Erdedy and Sylvanshine end their respective chapters physically rooted to the spot by their 
own excesses of anxious, self-conscious thought.66 De Bourcier has explored how Wallace’s 
syntax in TPK explicitly echoes the depiction of ‘analysis-paralysis’ in Jest, noting how, in both 
novels, ‘excessively complex syntax is associated with an unhealthy mode of thought’: in §2, 
this echo is felt most acutely in the chapter’s final, 3-page sentence, where Wallace employs a 
literal excess of language, an unending cascade of clauses and subclauses, to offer a textual 
reflection of the ‘storm in [Sylvanshine’s] head’ (p. 12).67 
While TPK demonstrates clear connections with and echoes of Jest, it also, again, 
demonstrates a shift or development in focus. A key aspect of this shift is seen in the novel’s 
interrogation of the nature and texture of contemporary excess: throughout TPK, the ‘overload’ 
of language and information which characterises contemporary experience is figured in terms of 
a totalising, inescapable noise, a cacophony of overlapping and competing voices and sounds 
cumulatively felt as an indiscriminate roar. This notion of ‘noise’ originates—and is explained 
most clearly—not in TPK, but in Wallace’s non-fiction writing: specifically, in ‘Deciderization 
2007 – a Special Report’, an essay originally published as an introduction to The Best American 
Essays 2007. In ‘Deciderization’, Wallace relates his experience—as the collection’s guest 
editor—of reading through 
essays on everything from memory and surfing and Esperanto to childhood and 
mortality and Wikipedia, on depression and translation and emptiness and 
James Brown, Mozart, prison, poker, trees, anorgasmia, color, homelessness, 
                                                            
65 See Wallace, Infinite Jest: ‘most Substance-addicted people are also addicted to thinking, meaning they 
have a compulsive and unhealthy relationship with their own thinking. [.  . . ] the cute Boston AA term 
for addictive-type thinking is: Analysis-Paralysis’ (p. 203). 
66 Sylvanshine is finally immobilised by ‘a kind of paralysis’ (p. 23), while Erdedy—caught between the 
simultaneous ringing of telephone and doorbell—is left ‘splay-legged, arms wildly out as if something's 
been flung, splayed, entombed between the two sounds, without a thought in his head’ (Infinite Jest, p. 
23). 
67 De Bourcier, ‘Syntax and Narrative', p. 22. 
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stalking, fellatio, ferns, fathers, grandmothers, falconry, grief, film comedy [. . 
.]68 
For Wallace, the work of confronting this excess is ‘both numbing and euphoric’: at his ‘rate of 
consumption’, this mass of undifferentiated data is experienced as a generalised ‘Total Noise’, a 
static roar which, he argues, is ‘also the sound of our U.S. culture right now, a culture and 
volume of info and spin and rhetoric and context that I know I’m not alone in finding too much 
to even absorb, much less to try to make sense of’.69 In TPK, we find Wallace taking up this key 
image, framing the novel’s excess in terms of this ‘noise’. Sylvanshine’s swirling mass of 
internal anxieties and external impressions, for example, are metaphorically reflected in his 
failed attempt to listen to the sound of the plane’s propellers: ‘Sylvanshine tried to think of what 
the props sounded like but could not except as a gnawingly hypnotic rotary hum so total that it 
might have been silence itself’ (p. 16). Here and throughout the novel, this flattened-out noise is 
figured as the mirror-image and inextricable partner of silence: this static roar directs us back 
towards the same ‘deeper sadness’ which resides behind the noiseless absence of total boredom. 
We find a further example of this in Lane Dean, whose experience of the extreme boredom of 
IRS examinations (a job which involves confrontation with endless excesses of data) is reflected 
in his observations on the noise of locusts outside: Dean, who notes that ‘the normal protocol is 
not to hear them’, is struck by the disturbing suggestion that ‘[i]f you think of the locusts as 
actually screaming, the whole thing becomes much more unsettling’ (p. 125). Again, this 
consistent ‘noise’—a noise which we would ordinarily tune out of everyday experience—seems 
to exist as the other side of silence, another manifestation of an unspeakable absence. This 
suggestion again seems partly to gesture back to the concerns of Jest: in many respects, 
Wallace’s earlier novel offers a series of depictions of characters attempting—whether through 
drug addiction, competitive tennis playing, or surrendering to the lethal pleasures of the novel’s 
titular ‘Entertainment’—to avoid confrontation with this horrifying ‘something else’ which 
exists on the other side of both the silence of boredom and the ‘noise’ of contemporary US life. 
Viewed from this perspective, however, TPK distinguishes itself from Jest in its primary 
concern with those engaged in attempts to confront this overwhelming noise: the novel’s focus 
on the IRS holds significance for Wallace not merely—as Max suggests—as ‘the dullest 
                                                            
68 David Foster Wallace, ‘Deciderization 2007 – a Special Report’, in Both Flesh and Not: Essays 
(London: Penguin, 2013), pp. 299–317 (p. 301). 
69 Wallace, ‘Deciderization’, p. 301. 
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possible venue he could think of’, but also as an institution founded upon the (undeniably 
boring) project of sorting, organising, and making sense of the excess data of contemporary US 
society.  
This essential discrepancy between Jest and TPK is well-illustrated if we return to the 
thematic and formal excess of Sylvanshine’s plane journey in §2: where Sylvanshine’s 
spiralling, self-conscious loops of thought echo the narcissistic spirals of Jest’s addicts (or 
Oblivion’s collection of narcissistic, self-absorbed voices), Sylvanshine distinguishes himself in 
the extent to which his anxiety is specifically and explicitly linked to this ‘noise’, to his attempts 
to make sense of the ‘cyclone of logistical problems and complexities’ (p. 26) which confront 
him. In his frustrated attempts to study for the CPA exam, Sylvanshine is concerned with the 
problem of ‘perspective, filtering, the choice of perception’s objects’ (p. 17): even as he 
recognises that he himself is ‘weak or defective in the area of will’, he retains an awareness that 
the ‘entire ball game, in terms of both the exam and life, was what you gave attention to vs. 
what you willed yourself to not’ (p. 14). In this question of attention, we find the ‘noise’ of 
contemporary information overload again converging with the novel’s depiction of the ‘blank 
spaces’ of boredom: contemporary information excess, like contemporary boredom, can only be 
overcome through the difficult work of sustained attentiveness, the ‘heroic’ effort of organising 
this swirling mass of contextless data—an effort which forms the basis of IRS examinations. 
The precise nature of this attention is illustrated most clearly in the speech delivered by an 
anonymous ‘substitute accounting professor’ (p. 219) at the climax of Chris Fogle’s long 
narrative in §22. The substitute’s speech positions the ‘accounting profession’ as defined by a 
courage which is only more valuable in its apparent banality: ‘True heroism is a priori 
incompatible with audience or applause’ (p. 232). This ‘heroism’ is founded on an engagement 
with boredom—the substitute argues that ‘[e]nduring tedium over real time in a confined space 
is what real courage is’ (p. 231)—but also, crucially, on an engagement with excess data: 
Yesterday’s hero pushed back at bounds and frontiers—he penetrated, tamed, 
hewed, shaped, made, brought things into being. Yesterday’s society’s heroes 
generated facts. For this is what society is—an agglomeration of facts. [. . .] But 
it is now today’s era, the modern era [. . .] In today’s world, boundaries are 
fixed, and most significant facts have been generated. Gentlemen, the heroic 
frontier now lies in the ordering and deployment of those facts. Classification, 
organization, presentation. (p. 234) 
In the sustained attention they pay to the excessive, unmanageable ‘agglomeration of facts’ 
which constitute contemporary society, accountants are positioned as embodying a particularly 
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modern (and particularly American) ‘heroism’: the substitute goes on to explicitly characterise 
accountants as ‘today’s cowboys. [. . .] Riding the American range. Riding herd on the unending 
torrent of financial data’ (p. 235).70 While this hyperbolic, romanticised imagery is comically 
absurd, the substitute’s speech is significant in further establishing the parameters of TPK’s 
‘heroic’ conception of attention, the extent to which the novel finds redemptive potential in kind 
of sustained engagement with contemporary ‘noise’ demonstrated by the novel’s IRS workers. 
This notion of the redemptive potential of attention can again be traced back from TPK 
to Wallace’s non-fiction writing: in ‘Deciderization’, for example, Wallace, having introduced 
the concept of ‘Total Noise’, goes on to argue for the moral and social necessity of paying 
attention to this information excess: in the face of the ‘seething static’ of contemporary 
culture—and of ‘total freedom of infinite choice about what to choose to attend to and represent 
and connect, and how, and why, &c.’—Wallace asserts the vital importance of ‘deciding’, of the 
essential work of ‘absorption, organization, and triage’ which is required of us if we are to 
consider ourselves ‘informed citizen[s]’.71 Relatedly, Wallace’s well-known 2005 Kenyon 
College commencement speech (later published as This is Water) offers the central thesis that:  
the liberal arts cliché about ‘teaching you how to think’ [is] actually shorthand 
for a very deep and important truth. ‘Learning how to think’ really means 
learning how to exercise some control over how and what you think. It means 
being conscious and aware enough to choose what you pay attention to and 
to choose how you construct meaning from experience. Because if you cannot 
or will not exercise this kind of choice in adult life, you will be totally hosed.72 
Here, again, Wallace insists on the importance of paying attention, of actively choosing, from 
the mass of information which underpins the ‘boredom, routine, and petty frustration’ of day-to-
day experience, which of this data is relevant, significant, or meaningful to our lives.73 Both of 
these essays are useful in their introduction to and explication of ideas later taken up by Wallace 
in TPK. As we have seen across Wallace’s career, however, the relationship between fiction and 
                                                            
70 The precise nature of, and critical context for, TPK’s particular depiction of ‘heroism’ has been 
explored in greater detail by Hayes-Brady, who suggests that the novel ‘combines the figure of the 
romantic hero with that of the ironic hero, ultimately figuring the kind of reflective romanticism Wallace 
advocated across the board in his writing’ (Hayes-Brady, ‘Palely Loitering’, p. 143). 
71 Wallace, ‘Deciderization’, pp. 301–3. ‘Deciderization’ is notable in situating this work of attention in a 
specific social and political context: towards the end of the essay, Wallace explicitly suggests that ‘[t]here 
is just no way that 2004’s reelection could have taken place—not to mention extraordinary renditions, 
legalized torture, FISA-flouting, or the passage of the Military Commissions Act— if we had been paying 
attention and handling information in a competent grown-up way. “We” meaning as a polity and culture’ 
(p. 301). 
72 Wallace, This Is Water: Some Thoughts, Delivered on a Significant Occasion, about Living a 
Compassionate Life (Little, Brown and Company, 2009), pp. 52–5. 
73 Wallace, This is Water, p. 65. 
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non-fiction is less straightforward than it might initially appear: while there are clear overlaps, 
we should be cautious of any attempt to use these supplementary texts to ‘explain’ or ‘flesh out’ 
the ideas of Wallace’s fictional work (even, and perhaps especially, a work as broken and 
unfinished as TPK). Even as it echoes the ideas of these essays, TPK can be seen to 
problematise—to explore the inevitable limits of—the more straightforwardly programmatic, 
redemptive rhetoric of these earlier texts. If both ‘Deciderization’ and ‘This is Water’ offer 
arguments for the value and necessity of attention, then TPK is more often concerned with the 
points where this sustained attentiveness fails, with an excess which has become so 
overwhelming as to make the work of ‘choosing’ or ‘deciding’ impossible—a ‘noise’ which, 
like the ‘deeper’ absence of boredom, is often overwhelming and un-redemptive. We have 
already addressed how Drinion’s apparently redemptive model of total, mystical attentiveness is 
complicated through TPK; beyond this, we find throughout the novel further examples of 
characters who are unable to confront or make sense of the excess of contemporary experience.  
A key example of this is seen in Sylvanshine, whose inability to manage the excess of 
his thoughts and experiences in the aeroplane approach of §2 is taken up and amplified in later 
chapters. In §15, for example we learn that Sylvanshine is a ‘fact psychic’, afflicted by a 
supernatural/medical condition—also known as ‘Random Fact Intuition’ (p. 120)—which 
manifests in the intrusion of ‘sudden flashes of awareness’, psychic insights which are 
‘structurally similar to [. . .] the dramatically relevant foreknowledge we normally conceive as 
ESP or precognition’, but, crucially, almost exclusively consist of contextless, irrelevant data, 
information which is ‘ephemeral, useless, undramatic, distracting’ (p. 120). Sylvanshine is 
unable to control or stop the flow of this information, to the extent that his consciousness is 
constantly invaded by these unwanted trivia: 
Perhaps one in every four thousand such facts is relevant or helpful. Most are 
like having someone sing ‘The Star-Spangled Banner’ in your ear while you’re 
trying to recite a poem for a prize. (p. 122) 
In many respects, Sylvanshine’s condition seems to offer a funhouse-mirror distortion, an 
absurd amplification, of the ‘total noise’ of contemporary experience: Sylvanshine’s ‘world of 
fractious, boiling minutiae’ is, in a sense, only an exaggerated reflection of US culture more 
generally. Significantly, the sheer volume of information so overwhelms Sylvanshine that the 
‘heroic’ attention advocated in ‘Deciderization’ and ‘This is Water’ is entirely out of reach: 
Sylvanshine’s confrontation with excess results not with Drinion-style transcendence, but with 
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‘[c]onstant headeaches’, an inevitable failure in the face of ‘[o]verwhelming’ data (p. 123). 
Notably, Sylvanshine’s attempts to gather information on the Peoria REC are fundamentally 
limited: in §30, we find him reporting to his colleague Reynolds, whose job is to ‘analyze 
Sylvanshine’s initial field reports and reduce them to relevant fact patterns’ (p. 360). Here, 
Wallace suggests that Sylvanshine—in his constant, heightened state of direct confrontation 
with information excess—has become unable to carry out the vital work of choosing or deciding 
between this data, unable to offer the necessary attention required of him, both as an IRS 
employee and more generally as a citizen of contemporary US society. 
 Beyond this, Sylvanshine’s experience of the torrent of excess information which 
accompanies ‘Random Fact Intuition’ can be seen not only as a general reflection of the ‘noise’ 
of contemporary American culture, but also as a self-conscious reflection of the textual excess, 
the mass of fragmentary data, presented by TPK’s text. Burn has pertinently argued that 
Sylvanshine offers a reflective ‘model’ of the ‘centrifugal’ structures and strategies employed in 
the novel, noting that ‘the logic that underlies many of the short fragments that interrupt 
[TPK’s] longer narrative seems to be the same logic that drives a Random Fact Intuition’.74 
Looking beyond Sylvanshine, we can see how TPK works—like so much of Wallace’s earlier 
fiction—to embody the information excess it describes: Boswell argues that the novel ‘seeks to 
embody what it hopes to overcome’, suggesting that, by ‘forcing the reader to comb through the 
welter of data and information that constitutes the bulk of the novel, the reader is forced into the 
position of a IRS tax examiner who must “process and reduce the information . . . to just the 
information that has value”’.75 Throughout TPK, we are faced with a text which reflexively 
takes the shape of this overwhelming excess of data, this ‘total noise’: from the 
characteristically Wallaceian torrential sentences, to the self-consciously ‘involving and 
confused data dump[s]’ which are ‘inflict[ed]’ (p. 70, n. 3) on the reader in the voluminous, 
page-dwarfing footnotes of the ‘David Wallace’ chapters. While these formal strategies are to 
some extent familiar from Wallace’s earlier writing, they also reflect Wallace’s changing 
conception of the ‘noise’ of information excess: where Jest, for example, expanded into a self-
conscious bigness—a maximalism which both invoked and subverted traditions of fictional 
encyclopaedism—TPK’s formal excess are more often figured in terms of the disorganised, 
                                                            
74 Burn, ‘A Paradigm’, p. 161. 
75 Boswell, ‘Author Here: The Legal Fiction of David Foster Wallace’s The Pale King’, English Studies, 
95.1 (2014), 25–39 (p. 35). 
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swirling mass of irrelevant, contextless data which characterises ‘Total Noise’.  
It is significant that the novel’s longest chapter is one defined primarily by irrelevance. 
The first-person account of Chris Fogle in §22 presents us with—at 98 pages—perhaps TPK’s 
most ‘complete’, sustained narrative, and has been regarded by various critics as the thematic 
centrepiece and foundation of Wallace’s novel: Baskin, for example, argues that Fogle stands as 
the ‘moral and philosophical center of The Pale King’.76 Fogle’s narrative—tracing his 
progression from youthful, nihilistic ‘wastoid’ to committed member of the IRS, and 
culminating in the substitute accounting lecturer’s speech on the ‘heroism’ of accounting—
seems to offer the novel’s clearest example of the ‘heroic’, redemptive value of attention, the 
necessity of decision and choice in the face of contemporary excess.77 This suggestion is 
problematised, however, by the formal qualities of Fogle’s narrative, the extent to which it 
echoes and embodies this very excess: it may only be later in TPK that we are informed of 
‘Irrelevant’ Chris Fogle’s nickname, but this central principle of irrelevance can be seen to 
define Fogle’s ‘vocational soliloquy’ (p. 259, n. 3) at every turn, as, throughout the chapter, 
Fogle shows himself to be chronically unable to sort between relevant and irrelevant data. As 
readers, we are forced to negotiate endless digressions and extensions, abrupt shifts between 
vital plot points and absurdly extended lists of pop-cultural ephemera—as in his recollection of 
his youth in the ‘Chicagoland area in the 1970s’ (p. 158): 
I can remember things I wore—a lot of burnt orange and brown, red-intensive 
paisley, bell-bottom cords, acetate and nylon, flared collars, dungaree vests. I 
had a metal peace-sign pendant that weighed half a pound. Docksiders and 
yellow Timberlands and a pair of shiny low brown leather dress boots which 
zipped up the sides and only the sharp toes showed under bell-bottoms. [. . .] I 
remember everyone despising Gerald Ford, not so much for pardoning Nixon 
but for constantly falling down. Everyone had contempt for him. Very blue 
designer jeans. (p. 159) 
From Fogle’s perspective, the 70s are reduced to a contextless list of items of clothing, a 
seemingly endless array of irrelevant information which both describes and embodies the 
flattened-out ‘noise’ of contemporary culture (a noise in which, significantly, momentous social 
events such as Watergate are reduced to further fragments of meaningless data). While Fogle 
himself associates this ‘trouble just paying attention’ (p. 156) with his nihilisticic, ‘wastoid’ 
                                                            
76 Baskin, ‘Untrendy Problems’, p. 150. 
77 Andersen goes so far as to assert that the arguments made within Fogle’s chapter are ‘almost identical 
to the ones made by Wallace’ in This is Water, arguing that ‘it almost sounds as if Chris Fogle were in the 
audience during Wallace’s Commencement Speech’ (‘David Foster Wallace and His Real Enemies’, p. 
13). 
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youth—the period before he ‘put away childish things’ and began ‘the process of developing 
some initiative and direction in my life, which obviously led to my joining the Service’ (p. 
174)—the chapter’s tendency towards structural irrelevance undermines the aspect of 
teleological, redemptive ‘progression’ which Fogle wants to impress upon us. The chapter’s 
excesses of text, information, and data evoke Fogle’s continued inability to decide, his 
powerlessness in the face of the ‘noise’ of his own subjective experience. This sense of Fogle’s 
failure is solidified in later chapters: in §24, for example, ‘David Wallace’ explicitly frames 
Fogle’s account as a ‘cautionary example’ (p. 259, n. 3) of narrative irrelevance, a story which 
inflicts upon the reader ‘a regurgitation of every last sensation and passing thought’ (p. 261). 
‘Wallace’ later notes that Fogle is ‘unpopular out of all proportion’ to his otherwise ‘decent and 
well-meaning character’: it is this tendency to founder ‘in extraneous detail’ (p. 273, n. 17) 
which makes him so unbearable.78 Fogle, then, stands as an unavoidably compromised model of 
redemptive attention, the digressive excesses of text embodied by his narrative figuring another 
failure in the face of information overload.  
The chapter’s bigness, like the bigness of TPK as a whole, is felt not in terms of an 
unbounded expansiveness (as in Jest), but rather in an absurd overextension; in fact, the story 
perhaps more directly recalls ‘Westward’ in its self-conscious status as a story which simply 
‘goes on too long’. ‘David Wallace’’s notes inform us that Fogle’s account originated—within 
TPK’s fictional reality—as part of an ‘1984 Personnel Division motivational/recruitment faux 
documentary debacle’: the same documentary project which serves as the framework for the 
fragmentary ‘video interviews’ of §14. ‘Wallace’ goes on to note that this project ‘ended up as a 
debacle in part because Fogle and two or three other maundering grandstanders took up so much 
film and time’ (p. 259). While Fogle’s narrative offers the novel’s starkest example of embodied 
‘noise’, we find this suggestion of an inability to manage textual excess reflected throughout 
TPK: even as he critiques Fogle’s ‘irrelevance’ (explicitly assuring us, as one point that ‘I am 
not Chris Fogle’ (p. 261)), ‘David Wallace’’s chapters demonstrate a comparable tendency 
towards digression and irrelevance: from their copious, often extraneous footnotes, to their 
digressive employment of useless data (such as, for example, his ‘interpolation[s]’ on, amongst 
other topics, ‘the most notable businesses and industries based in metropolitan Peoria as of 
                                                            
78 Fogle’s failure to manage the excesses of IRS work is further implied in ‘Wallace’’s oblique reference 
to the ‘great injustice’ of ‘what eventually happened’ to Fogle, a downfall seemingly connected with the 
use of drugs which Fogle took ‘entirely for professional reasons’ (p. 273, n. 17).  
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1985’ (p. 268)). In seeking to distance himself from Fogle, ‘Wallace’ draws ironic attention to 
his own failures of concision and choice, suggesting that Fogle’s irrelevance is only one 
manifestation of a wider, collective failure of attention in the face of the overwhelming excess 
of contemporary experience.79 We are faced with the implication that, even in their attempts to 
confront this irrelevant information, almost all of TPK’s characters are eventually overwhelmed 
by this ‘noise’—a noise which we are in turn confronted with in the form and shape of the 
novel’s text. 
This distinction between the overwhelming expansiveness of Jest and the more 
disorganised, fragmentary ‘noise’ of TPK’s excesses reflects a shift not only in Wallace’s 
conception of information overload, but also, arguably, in the kind of excess which Wallace saw 
as increasingly prevalent in early-21st century culture. Addressing Jest’s growing popularity in 
the decade after its publication, Max notes that, while ‘the novel was connecting with more and 
more readers’,  
the world had changed drastically in the decade since Wallace had written it. 
The current danger was not from total immersion but from relentless 
fragmentation, not from watching one video to death but from skipping among 
hundreds. Americans were now not passively but frenetically entertained [. . .]80 
In many ways, it is this notion of a fragmented, ‘frenetic’ entertainment which we find evoked 
in TPK’s ‘noisy’ excess: a reflection not of the 1990s televisual culture addressed in Jest, but 
rather of the unprecedented excesses of information which characterise 21st century life, as most 
clearly embodied and exemplified by the internet. While the internet was in existence at the time 
of Jest’s publication (and was regarded by certain reviewers as informing the novel’s depiction 
of information ‘overload’),81 its influence on Wallace’s earlier fiction was apparently limited: in 
a February 1996 interview, for example, Wallace asserted that ‘you don’t have to be on the 
Internet for life to feel this way’, and explicitly claimed to have ‘never been on the Internet’.82 
                                                            
79 We find a further example of this failure of choice in the figure of Meredith Rand, whose own tendency 
towards narrative digression leads, we are informed in Wallace’s notes, to her reputation as ‘a yammerer 
of the most dire kind, on and on, excruciating to be around’ (p. 546). 
80 Max, Every Love Story, p. 286. 
81 See, for example, Sven Birkerts, who argued that Jest’s ‘webbed, branched’ plot, while not explicitly 
‘about electronic culture’, nonetheless showed signs of having ‘internalized some of the decentering 
energies that computer technologies have released into our midst’ (Birkerts, ‘Infinite Jest: A Postmodern 
Saga of Damnation and Salvation’, The Atlantic, 1996, para. 10, 
<https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1996/02/the-alchemists-retort/376533/> [accessed 25 
January 2019]). 
82 Wallace, ‘Interview with Mark Caro’ (1996), in Conversations, pp. 53–7 (p. 57). This position had 
evidently shifted somewhat by May 1996, when Wallace took part in a ‘Web Chat’ interview with readers 
of Word online magazine (Wallace, ‘Live Online’). 
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Wallace apparently remained ambivalent towards the internet throughout his life: Max asserts 
that he was instinctively ‘wary of the emerging technology’, quoting a 2001 letter to a graduate 
student in which Wallace claimed to allow himself ‘to Webulize only once a week now’, and 
noting that Wallace ‘didn’t become a consistent emailer for several years afterward’.83 
Nevertheless, I would suggest that the ever-more prevalent influence of the internet’s vast mass 
of fragmentary data, its offering of an overwhelming and infinite number of decisions and 
choices, can be felt far more acutely and persistently through TPK’s evocation of contemporary 
‘Total Noise’. 
Admittedly, this suggestion of the novel’s concern with 21st-century excess seems 
counterintuitive when taking into account TPK’s mid-80s setting. In fact, TPK is significant, as 
Boswell has recognised, in being Wallace’s only novel not set in an imagined near-future: 
Although The Broom of the System’s cartoonish 1990s America is almost 
indistinguishable from the mid-Eighties world of the novel’s creation, and 
Infinite Jest’s post-millennial America was clearly imagined from the vantage 
point of the actual early Nineties, both novels take place in a fully replete 
alternative reality that seems to have branched off from the reader’s world and 
pursued its own quirky, though plausible, path.84 
In contrast with the exaggerated, hyperreal settings of Broom and Jest, TPK situates itself in ‘a 
carefully reconstructed historical past’, evoking the specific cultural and historical texture of 
1985 Peoria.85 Even in turning towards the past, however, Wallace’s novel retains a continued 
concern with reflecting on his own contemporary moment. By abandoning the cartoonish, 
vaguely science-fictional scenarios of Jest and Broom—scenarios which, Boswell argues, lend 
both earlier novels ‘an almost a-historical and, at times, even spectral quality’ which obscures 
‘the historical contingency of their signature themes’—TPK’s historical setting signals a more 
urgent concern with interrogating a particular ‘turning point’ for contemporary US culture, a 
shift which, Wallace suggests, laid the foundations for his own early-21st century present.86 TPK 
has been read by critics as demonstrating a more concretely social and political focus which 
distinguishes it from Wallace’s previous fiction: Kelly, for example, argues that the novel joins 
Wallace’s later non-fiction writing (including ‘Deciderization’) in addressing ‘ideas which are 
                                                            
83 Max, Every Love Story, pp. 286–7. 
84 Boswell, ‘Trickle-Down Citizenship’, p. 209. 
85 Boswell, ‘Trickle-Down Citizenship’, p. 209. 
86 Boswell, ‘Trickle-Down Citizenship’, p. 209. TPK’s mid-80s setting also holds a specific resonance in 
gesturing back towards the beginning of Wallace’s own writing career, which began with the publication 
of ‘The Planet Trillaphon’ in a 1984 issue of The Amherst Review. 
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not only overtly political but also importantly historical’,87 while Boswell asserts that, ‘[m]ore 
so than any of his other major works, The Pale King wrestles directly with matters of real world 
politics and [. . .] civics’.88 In this unprecedentedly ‘real-world’ focus, TPK seems to employ its 
1980s setting to interrogate the sociopolitical foundations of Wallace’s late-capitalist US present 
(a suggestion supported by the fact that the fictional ‘author’s foreword’ offers a self-
consciously retrospective view of the novel’s action from ‘this fifth day of Spring, 2005’ (p. 
69)). In particular, the novel’s background subplot concerning the showdown between the ‘Old 
IRS’—the traditional, ‘conservative’ proponents of the ‘Service’ as ‘an arena of social justice 
and civic virtue’ (pp. 84–5)—and the ‘New IRS’—a competing group of ‘more progressive, 
“pragmatic” policymakers who prized the market model, efficiency, and a maximum return on [. 
. .] investment’ (pp. 84–5)—has been convincingly read as tracing the historical roots of the 
contemporary US’s individualistic culture of neoliberalism.89 David Harvey has succinctly 
defined neoliberalism as a ‘theory of political economic practices’ which ‘holds that the social 
good will be maximized by maximizing the reach and frequency of market transactions’; for 
Harvey, neoliberalism has been undeniably ‘incorporated into the common-sense way many of 
us interpret, live in, and understand the world’, to the extent that it has become ‘hegemonic as a 
mode of discourse’.90 We can see, then, how TPK’s depiction of an ‘involved intra-Service 
battle’—a battle centred around the question of ‘whether and to what extent the IRS should be 
operated like a for-profit business’ (p. 85)— serves, at least in part, as a microcosmic depiction 
of the neoliberalisation of late 20th Century America. By setting his novel in 1985, Wallace—far 
from turning away from his contemporary moment—rather approaches the 1980s, as Kelly has 
suggested, as a ‘key transitional moment to contemporary American society’, an origin point for 
the hegemonic late capitalism of 21st century US culture.91 
Running parallel to this political focus, however, I would argue that TPK’s 1980s 
setting is also significant in its pinpointing of a shift in the nature of contemporary information 
excess. In his review of the novel, Tom McCarthy asserts that 
by backtracking to the ‘Flintstonianly remote’ era of mainframe computers, 
                                                            
87 Kelly, ‘Novel of Ideas’, p. 14. 
88 Boswell, ‘Trickle-Down Citizenship’, p. 209. 
89 See, for example, Boswell, ‘Trickle-Down Citizenship’; Clare, ‘The Politics of Boredom’; Kelly, 
‘Novel of Ideas’; Shapiro. 
90 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 2–3. 
91 Kelly, ‘Novel of Ideas’, p. 17. 
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tape-and-card-based data storage and so on, Wallace identifies a watershed 
moment, a kind of base layer in the archaeology of the present [. . .]92 
While McCarthy once again characterises TPK’s historical setting in terms of its retrospective 
identification of a foundational point in the ‘archaeology’ of contemporary culture, this 
argument is here framed in technological, rather than political, terms, with the suggestion of 
something centrally significant in the novel’s ‘backtracking’ depiction of 1980s-era ‘mainframe 
computers, tape-and-card-based data storage and so on’. Part of this significance, I would 
suggest, is in the physicality of the novel’s excesses of information. This is felt, for example, in 
Sylvanshine’s post-traumatic recollections of the ‘debacle’ at his previous posting at the IRS’s 
‘Rome NY Northeast Regional Examination Center’: a departmental bureaucratic failure which, 
we learn, escalated to the status of disaster after the department in question attempted to ‘hide 
the growing pile of returns and cross-audit receipts and W-2/1099 copies rather than duly 
reporting the backlog’ (p. 9). Here, the ‘backlog’ of unsorted excess data is physically 
manifested in the overwhelming mass of accumulating forms, receipts, and returns which the 
IRS examiners cannot bring themselves to ‘burn, shred, or pack in Hefties and discard’ (p. 10). 
It is this concretised ‘overload’ which continues to haunt Sylvanshine: he ‘still dream[s]’ of 
desk drawers and air ducts stuffed with forms and forms’ edges protruding from 
grilles over the ducts and the utility closet stacked to the top with Hollerith 
cards and the Inspections Division lady forcing the door and the cards all falling 
out on her like McGee’s closet as the whole debacle caught up to them [. . .]  
             (p. 12) 
This nightmarish vision of analogue excess is troubling in part in the extent to which it 
transfigures contemporary information overload into something manifest and real, an acutely 
felt mass of data which threatens to literally crush the examiners under its weight. From the 
novel’s 21st century perspective, however, the images also carry a further, more unsettling 
implication: running beneath Sylvanshine’s anxiety is a concurrent suggestion that this 
physicalised excess is, like the punch-cards and receipts themselves, outdated, a relic of a 
‘Flintstonianly remote’ past. In many respects, these visions of paper-based overload stand in 
contrast with the disturbingly unreal, digital excesses of the contemporary world (as exemplified 
by the internet)—a swirling mass of information which is conversely even more troubling in its 
                                                            
92 Tom McCarthy, ‘David Foster Wallace: The Last Audit’, The New York Times, 14 April 2011, section 
Books <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/17/books/review/book-review-the-pale-king-by-david-foster-
wallace.html> [accessed 6 August 2019]. 
190 
 
essential unreality, its ungraspable abstraction.93 In its retrospective, ‘backtracking’ focus, TPK 
allows Sylvanshine’s recollections of these analogue, physical ‘disasters’ to be overshadowed, 
rendered quaintly obsolete, by our inevitable awareness of the more unmanageable (and, with 
this, more troubling) ‘overloads’ of 21st century experience. 
In its depiction of this analogue overflow, we can see how TPK’s 1980s setting 
describes a tipping point for contemporary excess, a historical moment when this mass of data 
ceased to be manageable or comprehensible in physical, real-world terms. This suggestion is 
further shown when we turn to the ‘four previously unpublished scenes’ included in the novel’s 
paperback edition. The last and longest of these scenes—featuring, as Pietsch notes in his 
editorial introduction, ‘several characters not seen elsewhere in the novel’ (p. 560)—is primarily 
concerned with an IRS examiner named T. Hovatter’s stated intention to: 
take a year entirely off work and school and devote himself to a personal 
project of evidently watching every last second of television broadcast in the 
month of May 1986. (pp. 561–2) 
Hovatter’s project is founded on the ‘advent of cable television in all but the most rural outlying 
parts of Peoria’, an innovation which has resulted in an increase from ‘the four classic 
traditional TV stations’ to a total of ‘twelve channels overall’ (p. 562). In his attempt to ‘watch 
everything broadcast locally for one month’, Hovatter thus technically requires twelve months 
in total, ‘hence the full-time year off of all other pursuits’ (p. 562). The majority of the 
following scene is taken up with the other IRS examiners’ involved discussions of the complex 
logistics of Hovatter’s project: from the difficult work of taping ‘whatever was on the other 
channels besides the one he was watching at a given time’ (a task which, due to the maximum 
length of VHS tapes, requires changing over ‘every four hours’ (p. 564); to the necessary 
additional time required for Hovatter to ‘eat, sleep, bathe’ (p. 569); to the complicated question 
of precisely ‘what he means by watching’ (with one colleague considering the parameters of 
‘how closely must he attend, can he alternate what he watches, must he pause the tape every 
time he goes to the bathroom, etc.’ (p. 571)). Even in its transparently comic, grandiose 
pointlessness, Hovatter’s ‘heroic’ effort stands as a further example of an engagement with 
                                                            
93 This implied sense of TPK as identifying an origin point for the incorporeal nature of contemporary 
excess chimes with its concurrent focus on the unreal, abstract qualities of neoliberal capitalism: Richard 
Godden and Michael Szalay have explored how TPK addresses ‘the unstable relation between 
corporeality and the forms of abstraction inherent in finance capital’ (Godden and Szalay, ‘The Bodies in 
the Bubble: David Foster Wallace’s The Pale King’, Textual Practice, 28.7 (2014), 1273–1322 (p. 1276)). 
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‘Total Noise’: although Hovatter himself remains a mostly peripheral, unspeaking figure 
through the scene, his colleagues speculatively characterise his scheme as a confrontation with 
the ‘signal and noise’ of televisual culture, an attempt to pay attention, to identify that which is 
‘important’ or ‘crucial’, within the endless ‘extraneous choices’ of late-20th century American 
experience (p. 572–3).  
Once again, however, our impression of this excess is informed by awareness of its 
historical specificity, its outdatedness. From our retrospective position, we as readers are left 
aware of the fact that Hovatter’s project of watching everything—while still technically possible 
with his circa-1985 total of twelve television channels—would be wholly impossible in the face 
of the overwhelming masses of data which have come to characterise 21st century life. Even 
within the chapter, Hovatter’s colleagues already imagine a near-future where ‘they offer fifty 
channels’, acknowledging that ‘[t]his may be the last time a lone man can absorb it all’ (p. 
573).94 Here, again, we find Wallace positioning the novel’s 1980s setting as a critical moment 
in the development of contemporary information excess, a point of no return which serves both 
as an embryonic ‘origin’ for the ‘Total Noise’ of ‘Deciderization’, and also as a comparative 
reminder of the unimaginable enormity of our 21st-century digital ‘overload’. Hovatter’s project 
crystallises the shift in the depiction of information excess which has occurred in Wallace’s 
writing between Jest and TPK: in his effort of constant, uninterrupted watching—a ‘sense-
overload’ which, his colleagues predict, will finally leave him ‘all slumped’ (p. 568)—Hovatter 
serves as both echo and obverse of the viewers of Jest’s Entertainment, a character immobilised 
not by a single source of lethally-pacifying distraction, but rather by the sheer effort of 
attempting to attend to, and choose between, the manifold fragmentary, ‘frenetic’ 
entertainment(s) of contemporary experience. 
In many respects, TPK’s evocation of an incomprehensible, fragmentary excess 
inevitably informs our understanding of the novel’s own fragmentary, disorganised, and 
frequently excessive unfinished text. It is again worth acknowledging the significance of the 
Hovatter scene’s positioning outside the limits of TPK’s ‘main text’. We have already addressed 
                                                            
94 Again, this sense of the exponential proliferation of contemporary ‘noise’ is bound up with the novel’s 
concurrent depiction of the developing hegemony of neoliberal marketisation: when one of Hovatter’s 
colleagues asks whether this growing mass of extraneous data might be the result of a shadowy 
‘conspiracy’, another responds by more prosaically linking it to the demands of ‘the market’: ‘[p]eople 
want choice, you give them choice’ (p. 572). 
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how these paratextual materials draw reflexive attention to the structural ‘blank spaces’, the 
points of compositional silence and incompletion, found throughout the published Pale King; 
we could equally, however, argue that these supplementary passages and notes demonstrate and 
embody a kind of manifest excess, creating the impression of a literary work which, in its 
unfinished-ness, ruptures and exceeds its own boundaries, stretching into a disorganised, ‘noisy’ 
incoherence. To a certain extent, this suggestion of a self-consciously unbounded mass of text 
follows the example of Jest’s 388 endnotes—notes which comparably established the novel as a 
work of unbounded maximalist hugeness, exceeding even its own generous limits. Here, again, 
however, we as readers are forced to negotiate the intersection between Wallace’s deliberate 
strategies of incompletion and the starker, more fundamental incompleteness presented by TPK: 
even as they echo the ‘surplus text’ of Wallace’s earlier novel, the paratexts which append to the 
published Pale King also present us with a more tangible incompletion. Beyond Jest’s self-
conscious maximalism, TPK offers a more concrete example of a work which cannot be 
adequately contained, a novel which seems to embody—in terms starker than those of Wallace’s 
previous writing—the kind of overflowing textual and informational excess described, for 
example, in Sylvanshine’s recollection of the overflowing ducts and cabinets of the Rome REC. 
TPK’s inevitable structural fragmentation is evident not only at the work’s transparently 
‘broken’ edges, but throughout the published novel as a whole. We find evidence of this 
structural disorganisation in the unstable depiction of various characters through the novel: 
Stephen Burn, for example, has argued that Sylvanshine, while ‘a prominent presence 
throughout the book’, is ultimately ‘insufficiently integrated into the novel’s proposed arc’.95 
Even in the published Pale King, Sylvanshine is notable as a character who seems to exist, as 
Burn has suggested, in a state of ‘flux’: Sylvanshine’s initial journey to the Peoria REC in §2, 
for example, is conspicuously lacking reference to the ostensibly overwhelming, inescapable 
condition of ‘Random Fact Intuition’ introduced in §15—an absence which is perhaps explained 
in one of Wallace’s included ‘Notes and Asides’, which, in positioning Sylvanshine as ‘the fact 
psychic’, goes on to acknowledge that this development ‘would require rewriting the 
Sylvanshine arrival sequence’ (p. 542).96 Meanwhile, in §49—a chapter viewed through the 
eyes of Chris Fogle—Sylvanshine and his partner Reynolds appear as a pair of self-important 
                                                            
95 Burn, ‘A Paradigm’, p. 159. 
96 Burn, ‘A Paradigm’, p. 159. 
193 
 
‘legendary dickheads’ (p. 530), a characterisation which seems, as Burn asserts, ‘entirely 
divorced from his earlier appearances’.97 Of course, as with the text’s blanks and silences, it is 
more often than not impossible to draw any kind of clear line between the intentional and the 
unintentional aspects of TPK’s structural disorganisation. I have already noted Burn’s 
suggestion that Sylvanshine offers a self-conscious reflection of Wallace’s own difficulties in 
composing TPK: from this perspective, the character’s unstable ‘combination of bodily presence 
and mental dispersion’ are framed as an (at least partially) deliberate ‘figure for writer’s 
block’.98 Beyond this, I would suggest that Sylvanshine’s instability finally resists and—in his 
‘brokenness’—exceeds our attempts to offer any kind of coherent reading of his character. Even 
as he offers a deliberate commentary on the experience of ‘total noise’, Sylvanshine also 
embodies and exemplifies the unavoidably chaotic, excessive, and unreadable nature of 
Wallace’s unfinished text.99 
This notion of TPK as a work which exceeds and overwhelms our efforts at 
interpretation is also evident in the extent to which it consistently gestures towards a larger mass 
of text, one which exists beyond the limits of the printed book. In reading the published, edited 
version of TPK, we are made persistently aware of the more expansive collection of notes and 
drafts now housed in Wallace’s archive: from Pietsch’s introductory reference to the ‘hundreds 
and hundreds of pages’ of writing divided between ‘[h]ard drives, file folders, three-ring 
binders, spiral-bound notebooks, and floppy disks’ (p. viii); to the conspicuous gaps and 
limitations of the included ‘Notes and Asides’ (the origins of which are, as Groenland 
comments, ‘not documented in detail’, with no ‘chronological or material information’ to help 
place them in any kind of definite context);100 to the aforementioned ‘unstable’ depictions of 
various characters through the novel. In these instances, the published Pale King is haunted by 
the peripheral, ghostly presence of this larger excess, of a manifestation of the work which—
                                                            
97 Burn, ‘A Paradigm’, p. 159. This alternate characterisation seems to reflect an earlier version of 
Sylvanshine described in the included notes, which make reference to Reynolds and Sylvanshine ‘liv[ing] 
together—sort of like Rosencrantz and Guildenstern in Hamlet’ (p. 546)—a description at odds with the 
generally solitary, anxious, hyper-self-conscious Sylvanshine encountered through much of the published 
Pale King. 
98 Burn, ‘A Paradigm’, p. 160. 
99 Sylvanshine is far from the only character in TPK to show evidence of this underlying compositional 
‘brokenness’: Groenland, for example, has employed Wallace’s drafts and notes in exploring comparable 
aspects instability in the depiction of characters including Shane Drinion, Toni Ware, and Chris Fogle (‘A 
King of Shreds and Patches’). 
100 Groenland, ‘A King of Shreds and Patches’, p. 224. 
194 
 
while nowhere near ‘finished’—nevertheless stands as something like a ‘total’ (or at least 
unabridged) version of TPK’s chaotic text. In this suggestion of an implied ‘whole’ beyond the 
reach of the printed book, TPK recalls the mythologised missing ‘five hundred pages’ of Jest.101 
Like Jest’s ‘broken circle’ structure (as well as the extratextual framing offered by Wallace’s 
interviews), the published Pale King points us at every turn towards a larger, inaccessible 
version of its own text. Where Jest’s unfinished plotlines seem to ‘converge’ towards an 
imagined ‘completion’ beyond the limits of the printed book, however, TPK only gestures 
towards a further excess, to the more concrete mass of textual ‘noise’ now collected in the 
archive. In its invocation of this physical textual excess, of the ‘hundreds and hundreds of 
pages’ which could not all be contained within this printed work, TPK recalls the unfinished 
novel of the reclusive novelist Bill Gray, the protagonist of Don DeLillo’s Mao II. In DeLillo’s 
novel, Gray deliberately leaves his work perpetually unfinished and unpublished, existing only 
as a vast mass of draft and notes hoarded by his assistant Scott: an ‘entire house filled with 
pages, pages spilling into the shed that abutted the back of the house, a whole basement 
containing pages’.102 While the posthumous nature of TPK obviously distinguishes it from the 
deliberate unfinished-ness of Gray’s novel, the published version of Wallace’s final work is 
nonetheless haunted by a comparable suggestion of an excess of unmanageable text. In its 
chaotic ‘noise’, TPK both invites us to, and reminds us of the inevitable problems of, attempting 
to interpretatively piece together this essentially broken ‘whole’. 
 
‘The living human holding the pencil’: Intertextuality and Influence 
Since TPK’s publication, critics have placed focus on teasing out the various sources and points 
of influence invoked over the course of Wallace’s unfinished text: from McHale and De 
Bourcier’s discussions of the novel’s continued debt to the postmodern ‘patriarchs’ who so 
informed Wallace’s early writing;103 to Shapiro’s assertion of the vital intertextual significance 
of ‘Melville’s anti-capitalist fiction’;104 to Hayes-Brady’s consideration of the influence of 
                                                            
101 See Steven Moore, ‘The First Draft of Infinite Jest’. 
102 Don DeLillo, Mao II (London: Vintage, 1992), pp. 223–4. 
103 See McHale, and De Bourcier, ‘Forms, Punch Cards and LETTERS: Self-Reference, Recursion and 
(Un)Self-Consciousness in The Pale King’s Representation of Bureaucracy’, English Studies, 95.1 
(2014), 40–58. 
104 Shapiro, p. 1267.  
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British Romantic poetry on TPK’s depiction of contemporary ‘heroism’;105 to Burn’s further 
exploration of the disparate range of echoes and allusions scattered throughout the novel.106 
Surveying these critical responses, we can see how TPK’s diverse intertextual engagements 
follow, at least in part, the model established by Wallace’s earlier work, building on the already 
dense network of intertexts established by, for example, Jest’s self-conscious allusions to 
Hamlet, The Brothers Karamazov, and avant-garde cinema, or Brief Interviews’ pointed formal 
echoes of the ‘constrained writing’ of the OuLiPo. TPK, however, distinguishes itself from 
these immediately preceding examples in the extent to which its invocation of these intertexts is 
bound up with an underlying anxiety, a self-consciousness frequently manifested in uneasy, 
unstable terms. We have already discussed how the edited text of the published Pale King draws 
attention to the precarious edges of Wallace’s unfinished novel. When considered in terms of its 
intertextual engagements, however, TPK’s unstable boundaries serve to remind us not only of 
its general unfinished-ness, but also specifically of the points where it intersects and collides—
sometimes awkwardly—with its literary sources, influences, and ‘ancestor texts’. In his analysis 
of Wallace’s personal library (as collected in his archive), Mark Sheridan has noted how these 
books—many of which are covered with annotations ranging from ‘words that he gleaned and 
wished to learn’ to ‘rough ideas and character sketches for future work’—illustrate the blurred 
‘boundary between text and intertext’, demonstrating the often literal ways in which Wallace’s 
writing is written ‘in the margins’ of other texts.107 Sheridan argues that this ‘blurring’ is felt 
only more starkly in the case of TPK—a novel in which ‘unedited drafts and sketches’ have 
become ‘part of the final product’, where the boundaries of the published ‘novel’ exist in an 
unprecedentedly provisional, unstable state.108 Thompson elsewhere offers a specific example of 
this kind of ‘intersection’, noting how Wallace’s copy of Walker Percy’s 1961 novel The 
Moviegoer is filled with ‘jottings of plot ideas, character names, and narrative fragments’ for 
TPK. For Thompson, these notes show Wallace ‘literally writing his own fiction between the 
                                                            
105 Hayes-Brady, ‘Palely Loitering’. 
106 Burn, ‘A Paradigm’.  Burn identifies a range of ‘ancestor texts’ (p. 152) for TPK which stretches 
significantly beyond the familiar remit of American metafiction, including T. S. Eliot’s The Waste Land, 
B. S. Johnson’s 1973 work Christie Malry’s Own Double-Entry, C. S. Lewis’s 1961 text An Experiment 
in Criticism, Sloan Wilson’s 1955 novel The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit, and Walker Percy’s 1975 
essay collection The Message in the Bottle.  
107 Mark Sheridan, ‘Interpret you, INTERPRET-ME? Or, Fictional Pasts and Fictional Futures: The 
Predecessors and Contemporaries of David Foster Wallace’, in Critical Insights, pp. 78–93 (p. 80). 
108 Sheridan, p. 80. 
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lines of Percy’s’, offering us a ‘profoundly revealing glimpse into the way that [Wallace’s] 
work so often enacts a sophisticated response to an earlier text’.109 While these points of 
intertextual ‘collision’ are inevitably only ever partially visible in TPK’s published form, 
Sheridan and Thompson’s archival observations nonetheless offer a useful contextual frame for 
understanding the fraught quality of the allusions found within the novel. 
 We find an example of this more self-conscious, uneasy kind of allusion in the sections 
of TPK dedicated to Toni Ware, chapters which take on a voice distinctly unlike Wallace’s 
characteristic style:  
There were fires in the gypsum hills to the north, the smoke of which hung and 
stank of salt; then the pewter earrings vanished without complaint or even 
mention. Then a whole night’s absence, two. The child as mother to the woman. 
These were auguries and signs: Toni Ware and her mother abroad again in 
endless night. Routes on maps that yield no sensible shape or figure when 
traced. (p. 56) 
In his review of TPK, Sullivan comments on the ambiguous quality of these uncharacteristic 
passages: he initially suggests, for example, that the Toni Ware sections are the ‘most 
remarkable pages in The Pale King’, sounding, in their lyrical, ‘unselfaware’ 
straightforwardness, unlike ‘anything else Wallace wrote’, and demonstrating more clearly than 
anywhere else the fulfilment of Wallace’s desire to ‘find some other level, to go beyond Infinite 
Jest’.110 Crucially, however, Sullivan also identifies—alongside the ‘beauty and terror’ of these 
passages—a ‘whiff of pastiche’, going on to argue that  
Wallace seems to be making fun of bad Cormac McCarthy, the incorrigible 
McCarthy who, when he wants to write ‘toadstools’, writes ‘mushrooms with 
serrate and membraneous soffits where-under toads are reckoned to siesta’.111 
We can see how these passages invoke the presence of McCarthy, both generally in their self-
consciously ornate, archaic language (‘auguries and signs’) and specifically in their direct 
echoes of McCarthy’s fiction (the mention of ‘gypsum hills’ seems, for example, to directly 
reference a line from McCarthy’s All the Pretty Horses).112 Sullivan’s review is astute in 
capturing the uneasiness of this allusion, the extent to which these passages function both as 
comic, ironic critiques of McCarthy’s stylistic tics and also, conversely, as apparently earnest 
                                                            
109 Thompson, Global Wallace, p. 172. 
110 Sullivan, para. 27. 
111 Sullivan, para. 27. 
112 See Cormac McCarthy, All the Pretty Horses (London: Picador, 1993): ‘he rode up through white 
gypsum hills grown with stunted datil and through a pale bajada crowded with flowers of gypsum like a 
cavefloor uncovered to the light’ (p. 248). 
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attempts on Wallace’s part to follow McCarthy’s example in striving towards ‘something more 
satisfyingly conventional, more adult in his work’.113 Here, TPK engages in a mode of 
intertextual engagement which, in its underlying ambivalence, seems to distinguish the novel 
from the allusive strategies established across Oblivion, Brief Interviews, and Jest. 
In this more self-consciously ambivalent relationship with its literary intertexts, TPK 
looks back to the starker generational anxiety displayed in Wallace’s earlier fiction: most 
notably in the pastiches, borrowings, and ‘ventriloquised’ voices of Girl. In many respects, 
Wallace’s parodic/reverent allusions to McCarthy can be read as another instance of the uneasy 
‘usurpation’ which Wallace (‘borrowing’ from Ozick) positioned in ‘Westward’ as standing at 
the foundation both of intertextual engagement and of fiction-writing more generally.114 This 
notion of literary usurpation or plagiarism, of a work which steals from, or otherwise 
ventriloquises, the voices of other writers, is reintroduced in §9 of TPK, as ‘David Wallace’ 
describes how, as a means of paying his way through college, he provided ‘a certain service’ (p. 
77) for his wealthy classmates: 
In a nutshell, the truth is that the first pieces of fiction I was ever actually paid 
for involved certain other students at the initial college I went to [. . .]. Without 
going into a whole lot of detail, let’s just say that there were certain pieces of 
prose I produced for certain students on certain academic subjects, and that 
these pieces were fictional in the sense of having styles, theses, scholarly 
personas, and authorial names that were not my own. (p. 76) 
While ‘Wallace’ acknowledges that his primary motivation for this plagiarism—a practice 
which leads to his expulsion from college, and precipitates his eventual employment at the 
IRS—was ‘financial’ (p. 76), he also invites us to consider how ‘these sorts of exercises would 
be good apprentice training for someone interested in so-called “creative writing”’ (p. 77). 
Within the chapter’s fragmentary ‘vocational memoir’ (p. 72), the fictional ‘Wallace’’s literary 
career is traced back to this formative act of ventriloquism: a kind of writing which, while not 
recognisable as ‘fiction’, is nonetheless founded on his ability to ‘usurp’ a series of alternate 
‘styles, theses, scholarly personas, and authorial names’. Although the biography offered in §9 
self-consciously diverges from the facts of the actual Wallace’s life (significantly, Wallace was 
never expelled from college, nor was he employed by the IRS), this ‘origin myth’ nonetheless 
                                                            
113 Sullivan, para. 27. TPK’s complex, ambivalent invocation of McCarthy has been further explored by 
Thompson (‘“Books Are Made out of Books”: David Foster Wallace and Cormac McCarthy’, The 
Cormac McCarthy Journal, 13.1 (2015), 3–26). 
114 See Chapter 2. 
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draws a tangible line of connection from TPK back to the instances of literary ‘usurpation’ 
which characterise Wallace’s early work.115 Boswell has suggested that TPK’s ‘David Wallace’ 
sections offer a ‘coded memoir of [Wallace’s] development as a writer’, and we can see how 
this (at least semi-) fabricated narrative of juvenile plagiarism functions as a kind of 
fictionalised account of the ‘usurpations’ of Girl—instances of anxious intertextual 
ventriloquism which, as we have seen, are brought once more to the surface within TPK.116 
 This recapitulation of Wallace’s uneasy early intertextual engagements is complicated, 
however, by the fact that TPK’s most significant ‘usurpation’ is arguably found in the figure of 
‘David Wallace’ himself. Despite the speaker’s claims to be the ‘real author, the living human 
holding the pencil’, TPK’s ‘David Wallace’ sections remind us of the essential unreality, the 
performative artificiality, of this ‘abstract narrative persona’ (p. 68). In this, the ‘Author Here’ 
chapters can thus be read as engaging in a kind of uncanny ‘ventriloquism’ of Wallace’s own 
writerly voice, a heightened pastiche of the author’s recognisable stylistic tics: from the 
juxtaposition of obscure technical jargon with informal, folksy colloquialisms, to the self-
conscious tendency towards digressive verbosity, to the copious employment of excessive, 
page-dwarfing footnotes (a technique largely absent from the remainder of TPK). Max has 
suggested that, following the publication of Jest, Wallace ‘began to doubt the aspect[s] of his 
work that many readers admired most’, and it is easy to read these chapters as offering a parodic 
critique of the techniques—the ‘endlessly fracturing narratives’ and ‘stem winding sentences’—
                                                            
115 The truth of Wallace’s plagiarism-for-hire story been the subject of critical debate. In his interview 
with Lipsky, Wallace admits to having ‘written a couple of papers for other people’ while studying at 
Amherst, describing how the experience made him feel ‘like a weird kind of forger. I mean, I can sound 
like anybody’ (Wallace, qtd. in Lipsky, p. 258). Max, however, has cast doubt on this claim, relating how 
he ‘never found anyone on the receiving end of such a transaction or had direct knowledge of one’, and 
noting that even Wallace’s Amherst roommate Mark Costello believed that these stories were simply 
examples of the author’s ‘self-mythologizing’ tendencies (‘A Conversation With D.T. Max About His 
New David Foster Wallace Biography’, interview with Michelle Dean, The Awl, 2012, para. 31 
<https://www.theawl.com/2012/08/a-conversation-with-d-t-max-about-his-new-david-foster-wallace-
biography/> [accessed 12 February 2019]). 
116 Boswell, ‘Legal Fiction’, p. 37. Boswell’s term is drawn from Wallace’s 1993 interview with 
McCaffery, where Wallace characterised Broom as a ‘coded autobio’ (Wallace, ‘Interview with 
McCaffery’, p. 41). 
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which had come to stand as Wallace’s unwelcome authorial trademarks.117 This aspect of 
reflexive critique has been addressed by various critics: Konstantinou, for example, argues that 
the novel’s ‘mercenary “David Wallace” is an object of fun, an emblem of what Wallace came 
to dislike most about his own literary style’,118 while Miley argues that these chapters find 
Wallace ‘plagiarizing’ his own style, stealing from the voice of the ‘persona that readers have 
come to expect from him’—that of the ‘bandanna-wearing, footnote-obsessed maximalist David 
Foster Wallace’.119 In this aspect of self-plagiarism, TPK both echoes and reframes the 
intertextual ventriloquisms of Wallace’s early work. The novel arranges itself around a central 
instance of usurpation, an anxious intertextual engagement, not with a literary precursor (as with 
Barth in ‘Westward’), but rather with ‘Wallace’ himself. 
The uneasy quality of this central ‘self-usurpation’ is compounded by the unstable 
position of ‘David Wallace’ in TPK’s text. To some extent, the ‘Author here’ chapters can be 
seen to offer a ‘frame’ for TPK’s otherwise disparate collection of narrative fragments: by 
positioning TPK as his own ‘vocational memoir’, ‘Wallace’ casts himself as the author, not only 
of these ‘autobiographical’ sections, but rather of the novel as a whole. In §9’s ‘Foreword’, 
‘Wallace’ explains that his ‘nonfiction account’ has been subjected to ‘some slight changes and 
strategic rearrangements’ in response to the ‘legal and corporate concerns’ (p. 72) of his editor: 
in this way, TPK’s variety of voices, perspectives, characters, and styles—its notably un-
memoir like employment of ‘features like shifting p.o.v.s, structural fragmentation, willed 
incongruities, & c.’ (p. 74)—are explained as deliberate, editorially-enforced strategies for 
protecting ‘Wallace’ and his publishers from the litigation of the novel’s ‘real’ subjects.120 If we 
take ‘Wallace’ at his word, the entirety of TPK is organised by his own overarching ‘authorial’ 
                                                            
117 Max, ‘The Unfinished’, para. 7. Wallace’s tics and ‘trademarks’—and his wider public persona—have 
been likewise parodied and ventriloquised in the work of his contemporary fiction-writers: Jennifer 
Egan’s A Visit from the Goon Squad, for example, features a single heavily-footnoted chapter which 
serves as an unambiguous pastiche of Wallace’s characteristic voice (Egan, A Visit From the Goon Squad 
(London: Corsair, 2011), pp. 175–90); while Jeffrey Eugenides’s The Marriage Plot features a hyper-self-
conscious, bandanna-wearing central character who reads very much like a version of Wallace himself 
(Eugenides, The Marriage Plot (London: Fourth Estate, 2012). For more on Wallace’s complicated 
influence on his contemporaries, see Konstantinou, ‘Wallace’s “Bad” Influence’, in Cambridge 
Companion, pp. 49–66; and Boswell, The Wallace Effect. 
118 Konstantinou, ‘Unfinished Form’, Los Angeles Review of Books, 6 July 2011, para. 3 
<https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/unfinished-form/> [accessed 14 November 2018]. 
119 Miley, p. 200. 
120 ‘Wallace’ further explains that the ‘distorted depersonalized, polyphonized, or otherwise jazzed up’ 
quality of TPK is equally a product of the status of his own notebooks, which—as befitting his  youthful 
desire to become ‘an immortally great fiction writer la Gaddis or Anderson, Balzac or Perec’—were 
‘themselves literarily jazzed up and fractured; it’s just the way I saw myself at the time’ (pp. 75–6). 
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presence: Staes has suggested that ‘Wallace’ can be read as ‘the narrator of the entire novel’, a 
‘fictional “ghost”’ whose spectral presence both haunts and ‘governs’ the whole of Wallace’s 
unfinished text.121 In his exploration of the novel’s compositional history, Hering notes that the 
‘Author Here’ chapters were only added to TPK in the final stages of its composition (the period 
between 2005 and Wallace’s death in 2007): these chapters thus reflect the actual Wallace’s 
attempts to ‘create a frame story for his increasingly disparate narrative’—by positioning this 
‘author’ at the text’s centre, Wallace establishes ‘a pervasive structural spine’ for his baggy, 
unfinished work, while at the same time dramatising his own ‘curatorial role over the mass of 
data that he had accumulated’.122 In Hering’s reading, this ‘frame’ places a problematic limit on 
our interpretative engagement: in contrast with the open-ended ‘dialogism’, the polyphony of 
conflicting voices and perspectives, which characterised Wallace’s previous fiction, TPK’s 
apparently disparate narratives all point back to the authorial presence of ‘Wallace’, the ‘self-
confessed sole voice of the text’—a monologic, ‘“correct” reader and writer of everything’, 
whose in-text presence inevitably constrains our own readerly responses to Wallace’s work.123 
While Hering’s reading is convincing in detailing the compositional importance of—
and interpretative limitations imposed by—these ‘authorial’ interventions, I would contest his 
suggestion that these ‘David Wallace’ chapters succeed in offering any coherent ‘frame’ for our 
reading of TPK. I would argue that, even as it establishes an apparent narrative ‘spine’ for the 
novel, TPK is equally concerned with demonstrating the essential inadequacy of ‘Wallace’’s 
claims for monologic mastery over the text. This aspect of limitation is arguably already present 
within the ‘Author’s Foreword’, as ‘Wallace’ attempts to establish the parameters of the 
‘contract’ between author and reader: 
Our mutual contract here is based on the presumptions of (a) my veracity, and 
(b) your understanding that any features or semions that might appear to 
undercut that veracity are in fact protective legal devices, not unlike the 
boilerplate that accompanies sweepstakes and civil contracts, and thus are not 
meant to be decoded or ‘read’ so much as merely acquiesced to as part of the 
cost of our doing business together, so to speak, in today’s commercial climate. 
(pp. 74–5) 
While, in his proposed ‘contract’, ‘Wallace’ offers an explicit attempt to direct the nature and 
scope of our reading, this effort is from the outset transparently, comically limited. In asking us 
                                                            
121 Staes, ‘Work in Process’, pp. 80, 82. 
122 Hering, Fiction and Form, p. 136. 
123 Hering, Fiction and Form, pp. 146, 161. 
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to treat the novel’s contents as ‘really true’, ‘Wallace’ insists that the ‘literary’ aspects of TPK—
the aforementioned ‘shifting p.o.v.s, structural fragmentation, willed incongruities’—be 
regarded as nothing more than ‘protective legal devices’, features ‘not meant to be decoded or 
“read” so much as merely acquiesced to’: within this transactional model of textual engagement, 
we are finally, absurdly, instructed not to ‘read’ TPK at all. Far from restricting our 
interpretative engagement, however, ‘Wallace’’s instructions serve only to demonstrate the 
limits of this ostensibly didactic ‘framing’: just as its claims to ‘veracity’ only remind us of 
TPK’s fictionality, so these attempts to direct and constrain our reading only remind us of the 
degree to which the novel exceeds ‘David Wallace’’s gestures of authorial control, the fact that 
his status as monologic ‘author’ is inevitably less secure than his assertions would have us 
believe. 
The underlying instability of ‘Wallace’’s position as ‘author’ is further complicated 
when we again take into account the actual unfinished-ness of Wallace’s text. Throughout this 
chapter, we have repeatedly addressed how our reading of the published Pale King is informed 
by an awareness of the novel’s incompletion: in its unfinished state, we as readers are 
confronted with a mass of disorganised narrative fragments, partially-developed plots and 
characters, and structural ‘breaches’, which cumulatively exceed even the ‘distorted 
depersonalized, polyphonized, or otherwise jazzed up’ (p. 75) qualities—the familiar strategies 
of deliberate fragmentation and incompletion—which the fictional ‘Wallace’ assigns to his own 
work. Ultimately, our awareness of TPK’s tangible broken-ness serves to further destabilise the 
notion of any kind of ‘frame’ or ‘spine’ for Wallace’s novel: the posthumously-published text of 
TPK exceeds any aspect of, control, constraint, or structural unity which either the fictional 
‘Wallace’ or the real Wallace attempt to impose upon it. The novel’s ‘David Wallace’ stands not 
as a figure of monologic authorial ‘mastery’, but rather as an essentially unstable and contingent 
character, one who—like Sylvanshine, Drinion, and Fogle—mirrors the structural incompletion 
of the text as a whole.  
This contingency is further reflected when tracing ‘Wallace’’s progression across the 
published text. Within the included ‘Notes and Asides’, we find reference to a plan for ‘David 
Wallace’ to disappear ‘100pp in’, with another note elaborating that ‘Wallace disappears—
becomes creature of the system’ (p. 548). While a number of critics have read this 
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‘disappearance’ as a key component of Wallace’s project for TPK,124 Hering—drawing on the 
further contextual information provided by Wallace’s archive—has asserted the danger of 
attaching outsized significance to these compositional fragments: 
One must be careful when referring to the two notes [concerning the 
‘disappearance’ of ‘David Wallace’] as these are written some years before the 
‘Author Here’ sections and should not be considered as coterminous with 
Wallace’s post-2005 adaptation of the frame narrative. To consider them as 
such risks an inexact analysis, collapsing together two distinct temporal periods 
of composition.125 
Hering is right to warn against reading these earlier notes—which date back to an ‘embryonic 
outline’ for the novel written in November 1999, long before the 2005 incorporation of 
‘Wallace’ as the work’s fictionalised ‘author’—as straightforwardly applicable to the ‘final’ 
iteration of TPK. However, when considered from our own, inevitably limited and subjective, 
position as readers of the novel in its posthumously-constructed form, we can nevertheless find 
a version of this ‘disappearance’ taking place over the course of Wallace’s unfinished work. The 
beginnings of this apparent vanishing into ‘the system’ are arguably found in ‘David Wallace’’s 
account of his introduction to the Peoria REC: ‘Wallace’ relates how his employment for the 
IRS was initially disrupted by an institutional ‘snafu’, a bureaucratic error which led to his 
being mistaken for ‘a completely different David Wallace, viz. an elite and experienced 
Immersives examiner’ (p. 297, n. 48). In a later chapter, we learn that this error was the result of 
a flaw in the IRS’s archaic computer systems, a defect which resulted in a ‘ghost conflation’ of 
the two David F. Wallaces: ‘[i]n effect, David F. Wallace, GS-9, age twenty, of Philo IL, did 
not exist; his file had been deleted, or absorbed into, that of David F. Wallace, GS-13, age 
thirty-nine, of Rome NY’s Northeast REC’ (p. 413). Already, we can see how ‘Wallace’’s entry 
into the IRS is deliberately built on a kind of vanishing, a self-negating absorption into an 
impersonal bureaucratic ‘system’ (the ‘author’ markedly goes on to refer to himself as ‘the 
“unreal” David Wallace’ (p. 416), with his higher-ranking double taking the position of ‘real’ 
                                                            
124 See, for example, McHale, who reads ‘Wallace’’s disappearance as a direct echo of the vanishing of 
Tyrone Slothrop in the final section of Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow (McHale, p. 208). 
125 Hering, Fiction and Form, pp. 181–2, n. 23. 
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David F. Wallace (p. 414)).126  
Beyond this plot-level example, ‘Wallace’’s ‘disappearance’ is further evident in a 
gradual stylistic shift felt across the novel’s various ‘authorial’ chapters. In contrast with the 
exaggeratedly ‘Wallaceian’ verbal excesses of, for example, §9’s ‘Author’s Foreword’, later 
chapters are notable in the extent to which this ‘authorial’ voice begins to sound increasingly 
abstract, increasingly anonymous: §38, for example, is missing ‘Wallace’’s assertions of his 
unquestionably ‘real’ status, while §43 (apparently the final chapter narrated by the ‘author’), is 
conspicuous in abandoning the footnotes and associated stylistic tics which have hitherto served 
as touchstones for the fictional ‘Wallace’’s self-parodic voice. In tracing ‘Wallace’’s apparent 
progression towards stylistic ‘invisibility’, it is important to recognise our own inability to 
determine how far this movement follows Wallace’s designs for TPK: the sequence itself was, 
of course, constructed and organised as such by Pietsch, not Wallace, while furthermore we—
approaching the published text—cannot answer the question of whether the later, more 
anonymous ‘authorial’ chapters are a relic of earlier drafts of the work. While this 
unknowability places a limit on our ability to interpret TPK’s broader narrative structure or 
‘progression’, however, it is difficult not to find a readerly significance in this apparent 
movement, this ‘disappearance’ which may only be a reflection of the novel’s unfinished state. 
While Hering is right to be cautious of attempts to read the published Pale King as 
straightforwardly following the outline offered by these brief, early notes, we—as readers of the 
published text—are confronted with a ‘David Wallace’ whose position in the novel is, whether 
by design or accident, fundamentally unstable, a ‘Wallace’ who does indeed seem to ‘vanish’ 
into the incomplete, blank spaces of this unfinished work. 
In addressing TPK’s radically precarious depiction of this fictionalised ‘author’, we are 
led to confront the question of whether, and in what form, we can discern the presence of the 
actual Wallace within this unfinished work. In their ostensibly direct address to the reader, the 
‘Author Here’ chapters seem—at least on the surface—to promise an unmediated access to 
                                                            
126 Within the novel’s fabricated ‘autobiography’, this bureaucratic mix-up is positioned as a fictionalised 
origin story for ‘Wallace’’s use of his middle name in his published writing: ‘For years afterward, I had 
morbid anxieties about there being God only knew how many other David Wallaces running around out 
there, doing God knows what; and I never again wanted to be professionally mistaken for or conflated 
with some other David Wallace. And then once you’ve fixed on a certain nom de plume, you’re more or 
less stuck with it, no matter how alien or pretentious it sounds to you in your everyday life’ (p. 297, n. 
48). 
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Wallace-the-author, to the ‘living human holding the pencil’. In this, TPK serves as the 
culmination of a sequence which began with the address to/from the ‘fiction writer’ in ‘Octet’’s 
final ‘Pop Quiz’, and continued with the more explicit invocation of ‘David Wallace’ at the 
conclusion of ‘Good Old Neon’: here again, Wallace, positioning a version of himself within 
the narrative, stages a literalised, metafictional instance of direct ‘communication’ between 
author and reader. As in the preceding examples, this rhetorical gesture again works to remind 
us of the impossibility of this access, the incomplete nature of this ‘communication’. With his 
self-consciously fictionalised biography, and his parodically exaggerated ‘usurpations’ of 
Wallace’s stylistic tics, this ‘David Wallace’ is—even more starkly than the author-figures of 
either ‘Octet’ or ‘Good Old Neon’—self-evidently distinct from the novel’s actual author. 
Stephen Taylor Marsh argues that TPK finds Wallace using ‘the structure of autobiography to 
disarticulate his flesh-and blood self from the implied author [. . .] and from any potential 
narrators he uses’.127 For Marsh, the ‘physical’ Wallace ‘cannot be found in the text’: his 
authorial presence is ‘barricaded off’, made deliberately inaccessible by the obfuscating, self-
consciously unreal presence of this fictionalised ‘author’.128 While Marsh is rightly suspicious 
of critical attempts to collapse TPK’s ‘Wallace’ into the real, extratextual Wallace, I would 
argue that his conception of this inviolable ‘barricade’ between text and writer ignores the ways 
in which this fictionalised ‘author’—and the various ‘David Wallaces’ found across ‘Octet’, 
‘Good Old Neon’, and TPK—persistently invite this interpretative collapse, asking, demanding, 
or daring us to read aspects or traces of the real Wallace into these fictional works. Miley—
while following Marsh in recognising the distinction between the real David Wallace (Wallace’s 
‘private identity’) and ‘David Foster Wallace’ (the ‘public literary persona’ as embodied and 
parodied in TPK)—has suggested that the ‘authorial intrusions’ within Wallace’s writing 
‘enable, if not encourage, the reader’s tendency to conflate’ these two distinct figures.129 Even 
as we are made aware of the unreality of TPK’s ‘Wallace’, we cannot help but attempt to read 
him as a (partial, precarious, and flawed) reflection of the actual writer. In this way, the 
ostensible attempts at metafictional authorial ‘communication’ found across ‘Octet’, ‘Good Old 
Neon’, and TPK are read not as establishing ‘barricades’ between reader and author, but rather 
                                                            
127 Stephen Taylor Marsh, ‘Self-Sacrifice in the Autobiographical Narration of David Foster Wallace’s 
The Pale King’, Biography, 39.2 (2016), 111–28 (p. 112). 
128 Marsh, p. 115. 
129 Miley, p. 196. 
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as staging a ‘showdown’, a dynamic conflict between Wallace’s private and public selves, 
wherein neither one is ever wholly separable or distinguishable from the other.130 
The stakes of this question of how far these texts offers us access to the ‘real’ Wallace 
are greater—and, with this, more fraught and problematic—in the particular case of TPK. We 
have already noted how Pietsch’s ‘Editor’s Note’ invites us to conceive of TPK as a chance to 
‘look once more inside [Wallace’s] extraordinary mind’ (p. ix), promising an almost 
supernatural reanimation of the departed author’s presence. In many respects, this biographical 
framing is an unavoidable aspect of any reading of a posthumous work: when confronted with 
novel as manifestly and self-consciously incomplete as TPK, it becomes impossible to separate 
the text from the troubled circumstances of its composition, from the facts of its author’s life 
and death. We cannot, perhaps, help but read the ‘ghostly’ presence of the actual Wallace into 
the unfinished ‘spaces’ of TPK: an impulse which has reflected in the various critical readings 
which have interpreted the novel as deliberately and reflexively addressing its own difficult 
genesis, from Groenland’s suggestion that Wallace ‘deliberately inscribe[d] his working 
difficulties within the work’,131 to Hering’s assertion that the work ‘betrays a dramatization of 
its own composition’.132 From this perspective, we can see how the novel’s fictionalised ‘David 
Wallace’ at once underlines this biographical framing—inviting (or demanding) that we read the 
work as an ‘act of communication’ from the ‘real’ Wallace—and also, in his persistently 
unstable, precarious characterisation, reminds us of the degree to which the actual Wallace 
remains inaccessible to us, impossible to locate within this fragmented, posthumously-organised 
text. 
The innate problems involved in this biographical framing are revealed more starkly 
when considered specifically in relation to Wallace’s suicide. The circumstances of Wallace’s 
death have had a profound impact on the way readers approach and interpret his work, 
reframing our understanding of his fiction, and, in particular, recontextualising the concrete 
references to suicide found throughout his writing career: from Kate Gompert’s account of her 
own suicidal depression in Jest, to the mother’s undescribed act at the conclusion of Brief 
Interviews’ ‘Suicide as a Sort of Present’. This chapter has already addressed—in our discussion 
of Lane Dean’s horrifying experience of unbearable existential boredom, and Blanchot’s notion 
                                                            
130 Miley, p. 191. 
131 Groenland, ‘A Recipe for a Brick’, p. 361. 
132 Hering, Fiction and Form, p. 162. 
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of the literary text’s tendency towards suicidal, self-negating silence—how suicide is taken up 
as a key thematic and structural motif within TPK. Bennett has articulated how these narrative 
depictions of suicide and depression work both to reveal and to occlude the ‘truth’ of Wallace’s 
‘own psychological condition’: 
In representing people as suffering from loneliness and from clinical 
depression, and as escaping depression by resorting to [. . .] suicide, Wallace 
continually draws on the special power of literature both to figure the authorial 
subject and to disguise it, to hide, to depersonalize the self, to eradicate it, in or 
by articulating it.133 
In the wake of Wallace’s own suicide, it is easy to see how these representations have taken on 
an additional autobiographical weight, a significance only partially present within the texts 
themselves. While this contextual ‘reframing’ is to some extent unavoidable, it is also 
dangerous, particularly in the degree to which it raises the temptation to ‘read’ Wallace’s 
suicide alongside (or even as an aspect of) his writing. We find numerous examples of this kind 
of problematic interpretation within criticism of TPK: Godden and Szalay’s analysis of the 
novel’s treatment of bodies, for example, concludes with an admittedly intriguing—but 
fundamentally flawed—attempt to read a deliberate ‘mirroring’ between Wallace’s own hanging 
‘body in the air’ and the ‘body in the text’ of TPK’s incomplete manuscript.134 Jonathan 
Franzen, meanwhile, has argued that Wallace ‘died of boredom and in despair about his future 
novels’—an interpretation of Wallace’s death which is, somewhat uncomfortably, worked into a 
wider critique of what Franzen regards as the ‘despairing’, narcissistic, inward-looking qualities 
of Wallace’s fiction.135 Most controversially, Hubert Dreyfus and Sean Dorrance Kelly have 
approached Wallace’s suicide from a symbolic perspective, reading his death as a reflection of 
the underlying contemporary ‘nihilism’ embodied within his writing: the fact of Wallace’s 
suicide is thus bluntly abstracted into a generalised ‘warning’ for contemporary US culture, a 
                                                            
133 Bennett, p. 71. 
134 Godden and Szalay, p. 1315. Godden and Szalay’s thesis—an argument which they themselves 
acknowledge borders on the ‘tasteless’—is hampered by their limited understanding of the fragmentary 
nature of TPK’s incomplete ‘manuscript’.  Throughout their essay, Godden and Szalay make confident 
reference to ‘the manuscript’ and ‘the typescript’ for TPK as if this were a single, coherent document, 
even though, as Groenland has noted, ‘no such unitary document exists’ (‘A Recipe for a Brick’, p. 374, 
n. 8). Groenland rightly argues that this mistake suggests ‘an inadequate apprehension of the multiplicity 
and complexity of material included in the work’, an interpretative failure which undermines their 
confident ‘claims about the author’s intentions’, including their contentious reading of the ‘mirroring’ 
between suicide and text (‘A Recipe for a Brick’, p. 374, n. 8). 
135 Jonathan Franzen, ‘Farther Away’, The New Yorker, 4 November 2011 
<http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/04/18/farther-away-2> [accessed 3 June 2019].  
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‘canary in the coal mine of modern existence’.136 In their questionable attempts to approach 
Wallace’s death as a ‘text’ in its own right—a direct reflection or extension of his writing—
these readings are easy to dismiss as variously misguided, tasteless, or offensive.137 
Nevertheless, these problematic, flawed interpretations illustrate the innate difficulty of 
approaching or interpreting TPK on its own terms—the impossibility of separating TPK’s text 
from the circumstances surrounding its incompletion. While Wallace’s suicide may remain 
unreadable in itself, we, as readers of Wallace’s unfinished novel, cannot help but let it shape 
our understanding of the text in front of us, or our understanding of Wallace’s wider body of 
work. 
In this, TPK presents us with an interpretative difficulty comparable to that which Paul 
de Man finds in his strange and striking reading of Percy Shelley’s unfinished poem The 
Triumph of Life: a work, which, as de Man acknowledges, likewise exists as a ‘fragment that 
has been unearthed, edited, reconstructed and much discussed’.138 De Man’s reading, which 
focuses closely on points of linguistic ‘disfiguration’ in Shelley’s text, is eventually confronted 
with a ‘decisive textual articulation’: an unavoidable awareness of the poem’s ‘reduction to the 
status of a fragment brought about by the actual death and subsequent disfigurement of 
Shelley’s body, burned after his boat capsized and he drowned off the coast of Lerici’.139 For de 
Man, Shelley’s ‘defaced body’ is both ‘present in the margin of the last manuscript page’ and 
‘an inseparable part of the poem’: our reading of The Triumph of Life is thus unavoidably 
informed by the fact of Shelley’s death—an ‘event which shapes the text but is not present in its 
represented or articulated meaning’.140 TPK, like Shelley’s poem, presents us with a text 
‘interrupted by an event that is no longer simply imaginary or symbolic’, demanding from us a 
reading which—even as it acknowledges the extratextual, and fundamentally un-‘readable’ 
quality of Wallace’s suicide—nonetheless confronts us with the ‘final test’, to paraphrase de 
Man, of ‘how one disposes of [Wallace’s] body’.141 
                                                            
136 Hubert L. Dreyfus and Sean Dorrance Kelly, All Things Shining: Reading the Western Classics to 
Find Meaning in a Secular Age (New York: The Free Press, 2011), p. 26. 
137 Indeed, they have duly been critiqued as such by a number of commentators: see, for example, 
Andersen, ‘David Foster Wallace and His Real Enemies’; Groenland, ‘A Recipe for a Brick’; Marsh. 
138 Paul de Man, ‘Shelley Disfigured’, in Harold Bloom and others, Deconstruction and Criticism 
(London: Routledge, 1979), pp. 39–73 (p. 39). 
139 De Man, p. 66. 
140 De Man, p. 67. 
141 De Man, p. 67. 
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  How, then, can we make sense of this problem? How can we engage in a reading of 
TPK which takes into account Wallace’s authorial presence within the text—a presence which, 
while ‘ghostly’ in its precariousness and uncertainty, is seemingly inescapable—without 
flattening out the contradictions and complexities of this unfinished work, reducing the novel to 
a simplistic ‘reflection’ of its author’s life (or, indeed, his death)? A useful interpretative model 
can be found, I would argue, if we turn to Kafka. Amid the range of intertexts invoked 
throughout Wallace’s writing career, Kafka’s work stands as a consistent influence: Max notes 
how the teenage Wallace pasted ‘a newspaper picture of Kafka to the wall of tennis stars on the 
corkboard in his room’,142 while Wallace himself—in a short 1999 essay on Kafka’s humour—
expressed his admiration for the ‘grotesque, gorgeous, and thoroughly modern complexity’ of 
Kafka’s stories.143 Kafka’s intertextual impact on Wallace’s fiction has been addressed by a 
number of critics,144 with the most sustained and detailed exploration offered by Thompson, 
who argues that Wallace was profoundly influenced both by Kafka’s particular, ambiguous 
employment of humour (as addressed in Wallace’s essay), and more generally by the 
‘nightmarish vision of humanity’ which pervades Kafka’s writing.145 While generally less overt 
than his intertextual engagements with, for example, Barth, Pynchon, or DeLillo—Thompson 
acknowledges that ‘Wallace’s appropriations of Kafka are often more tonal, permeating his 
work in subtle ways’—Kafka is nevertheless seen to stand as a literary ‘touchstone’ for 
Wallace, an ‘ever-present point of reference, a comparative figure against whom he could assess 
the value and success of his own work’.146 We find clear examples of the intertextual 
appropriation and transposition described by Thompson—the borrowings of Kafka’s ‘specific 
literary strategies and ideas’—within TPK.147 In its concern with the vast, unmanageable 
bureaucratic systems (and failures) of late-20th century experience, TPK inevitably both recalls 
and expands on The Castle’s earlier evocation of a world in which ‘officialdom and life’ have 
become so ‘interwoven’ as to apparently have ‘changed places’—a reference made explicit in 
‘David Wallace’’s description of the IRS’s Peoria REC as ‘some kind of ur-bureaucratic version 
                                                            
142 Max, Every Love Story, p. 12. 
143 Wallace, 'Some Remarks on Kafka's Funniness from Which Probably Not Enough Has Been 
Removed', in Consider The Lobster, pp. 60–65 (p. 64). 
144 See, for example, De Bourcier, ‘Syntax and Narrative’, p. 23; Hayes-Brady, Unspeakable Failures, p. 
158; Staes, ‘Only Artists Can Transfigure', ‘Work in Process’. 
145 Thompson, Global Wallace, p. 130. 
146 Thompson, Global Wallace, p. 160.   
147 Thompson, Global Wallace, p. 156. 
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of Kafka’s castle’ (p. 263).148 Elsewhere (in fact on the same page), meanwhile, we find 
Wallace directly plagiarising from Kafka’s Amerika, with the extract from the letter of 
‘supporting documentation’ (p. 262) brought along by ‘Wallace’ to the IRS (‘He will be given a 
small job to begin with, and it will be his business to work his way up by diligence and 
attentiveness’ (p. 263, n. 6)) lifted, as Staes has pointed out, ‘almost verbatim from Kafka’s 
novel’.149 
 Beyond these points of explicit influence, however, I would argue that Kafka’s work 
holds further relevance for us in our attempts to find a way to read or make sense of TPK’s 
incompletion. Kafka’s fiction can be seen to inform Wallace’s primarily in the extent to which it 
itself defined by an essential incompleteness. Like Wallace, Kafka’s engagement with the 
unfinished is partially manifested in terms of a deliberate, self-conscious thematic and structural 
concern: we have only to think, for example, of the description which opens ‘The Great Wall of 
China’—of the ‘piecemeal construction’ of the titular wall, the vast edifice marked by rumoured 
‘gaps which have never been filled in at all’ but which ‘cannot be verified [. . .] on account of 
the extent of the structure’—to find a consideration of unfinished-ness which anticipates that 
found across Wallace’s writing.150 Allen Thiher has suggested that Kafka’s fiction can be 
characterised by its adherence to an underlying ‘incompletion principle’: 
[. . .] nearly all of Kafka’s texts are, implicitly at least, self-referential in that 
they are about their own development and movement, toward an encounter with 
revelation, the law, the Castle, or at least an understanding of why one is 
seeking to go wherever it is that one is going [. . .]. Since the text’s encounter 
with whatever might be its goal does not take place, the trip is not completed, 
and the text often resembles an unfinished allegory, which is to say, a struggle 
to reach some realm where a meaning might be lodged.151 
This sense of a self-consciously unfinished narrative movement unavoidably recalls the 
frustrated narratives, the resistance to closure, which we have traced across Wallace’s work. 
Relatedly, Wallace’s own essay on Kafka’s humour significantly hinges on the notion of 
‘exformation’—a term which Wallace defines as ‘a certain quantity of vital information 
removed from but evoked by a communication in such a way as to cause a kind of explosion of 
                                                            
148 Franz Kafka, The Castle, ed. by Idris Parry, trans. by J. Underwood (London: Penguin Classics, 2000), 
p. 54. 
149 Staes, ‘Work in Process’, p. 72. See Kafka, Amerika, ed. by Klaus Mann and E. L. Doctorow, trans. by 
Willa Muir and Edwin Muir, Reprint edition (New York: Schocken, 1996), p. 133. 
150 Kafka, 'The Great Wall of China', trans. by Willa and Edwin Muir, in The Complete Short Stories, ed. 
by Nahum N. Glatzer (London: Vintage, 1999), pp. 235–48 (p. 235). 
151 Allen Thiher, Understanding Franz Kafka (Columbia: The University of South Carolina Press, 2018), 
p. 39. 
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associative connections within the recipient’.152 For Wallace, it is this sense of something left 
unsaid within, but nonetheless evoked by, a communication or narrative which defines both 
Kafka’s uneasy ‘funniness’ and the ambiguous power of his stories more generally. We can see 
how this deliberate narrative ‘space’ left for the reader to negotiate or fill chimes with the self-
conscious ‘breaches’ of, for example, Broom, Jest, or Brief Interviews.  
As with Wallace’s fiction, however, our reading of Kafka’s deliberate strategies of 
incompletion ultimately conflicts with a concurrent awareness of the concrete unfinished-ness 
which marks his texts. Many of Kafka’s works—including all three of his novels—were left 
unfinished and unpublished at the time of his death: dying of tuberculosis in 1924, Kafka 
famously requested that his friend Max Brod burn all of his papers and drafts, a request which 
Brod (equally famously) ignored, editing and posthumously publishing the stories and novels in 
their often fragmentary state (The Castle, for example, breaks off mid-sentence). As readers of 
Kafka’s work, we are forced—just as we are in TPK—to negotiate the troubled intersection 
between a deliberate, thematic ‘incompletion principle’, and a much starker compositional, 
structural incompletion, one which, as in Wallace’s novel, cannot be wholly explained away as 
a deliberate authorial strategy. In his biography of Kafka, Reiner Stach warns against the critical 
temptation to read the unfinished-ness of Kafka’s works as an intentional aspect of the author’s 
literary aesthetic: 
It is [. . .] a legend-catering to the pseudo-Romantic concept of literature-that 
Kafka regarded failure in general and the fragmentary character of his novels in 
particular as the appropriate expression of his aesthetic desire or even of 
himself. The opposite is true. He greatly admired perfect formal unity and was 
determined to achieve it, a resolution evident in every one of his endeavors.153 
For Stach, the incomplete state of so much of Kafka’s work is bound up with a very real 
aesthetic disappointment, a persistent failure to reach the idealised point of ‘perfect formal 
unity’ which Kafka desired for his fiction. From a readerly perspective, however, it is clear that 
this recurring aspect of unfinished-ness and failure nevertheless informs our reading, coinciding 
with, and thus compounding, the resonance of the thematic incompletion identified by Thiher. 
Regardless of Kafka’s authorial intentions, the actual structural incompletion of his stories 
                                                            
152 Wallace, 'Some Remarks on Kafka's Funniness’, 64. Staes has traced the concept of ‘exformation’ 
back to Danish science writer Tor Nørretranders’s 1998 book The User Illusion, a heavily annotated copy 
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mirrors the ‘incompletion principle’ explored and enacted within his narratives, fundamentally 
shaping our readerly response to his work. Furthermore, these conflicting forms of 
incompleteness establish a seemingly unavoidable biographical frame for our interpretation: 
approaching Kafka’s stories, it becomes almost impossible to escape a contextual awareness of 
the circumstances surrounding their unfinished-ness (such as, for example, Kafka’s ignored 
instructions to Brod). Stach’s biography offers a clear illustration of the difficulty of 
disentangling Kafka’s fiction from his life: in its opening pages, Stach’s evocation of the ‘heap’ 
of textual ‘rubble’ left by Kafka is, for example, immediately juxtaposed—and thus inextricably 
connected—with a parallel awareness of Kafka’s short life as one ‘half lived, incomplete and 
senseless’.154 Like the ghostly ‘presence’ of Wallace in TPK, Kafka’s fiction everywhere invites 
us to read Kafka himself into the work, to read these unfinished stories as (ambiguous, 
distorted) reflections of Kafka’s own ‘unfinished’ or ‘failed’ authorial experience. 
While Kafka’s fragmentary stories and novels—texts which were most often 
consciously abandoned as abortive attempts to achieve the ‘perfect formal unity’ he desired—
are not always straightforwardly analogous to the posthumous unfinished-ness of TPK (a text 
only ‘abandoned’ on Wallace’s death), we can see how Kafka nonetheless provides us with a 
prior example of a writer whose oeuvre is shaped by parallel thematic and compositional 
failures, by an incompletion which troubles the boundary between text and context, writer and 
work. Beyond this, Kafka’s writing—and the critical commentary surrounding his work—can 
be seen to offer us an idea of what an ‘incomplete reading’—the kind of reading seemingly 
demanded by TPK—might look like. An example approaching this kind of reading can, 
perhaps, be found if we return again to Blanchot’s The Space of Literature, and specifically to 
his discussion of Kafka. Within Blanchot’s reading, an awareness of Kafka’s life is an 
unavoidable aspect of any analysis of his work. Discussing Kafka’s diaries, Blanchot addresses 
how Kafka’s ‘numerous abandoned narratives’, his apparent inability or refusal ‘to write “in 
little bits”—in the incompleteness of discontinuous moments’, are tangled up with, and thus 
inseparable from, the broader ‘failed attempts’ which characterise Kafka’s biography: 
Of all the undertakings to which he applies himself in order to orient his life 
differently, he himself will say that they are nothing but broken attempts, so 
many radii making the center of that incomplete circle, his life, bristle with 
dots. In 1922, he counts up all his projects and sees only failures: the piano, the 
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violin, languages, German studies, anti-Zionism, Zionism, Hebraic studies, 
gardening, wood carving, literature, attempts at marriage, living independently 
[. . .]155 
While this awareness of the details of Kafka’s life informs his reading, however, Blanchot 
resists the impulse to interpret Kafka’s works as a straightforward ‘reflection’ of their author, a 
means of getting ‘inside Kafka’s head’. Rather, Blanchot’s analysis is always underlined by his 
definition of the ‘solitude’ of the literary work, the sense that, in our encounter with any text, 
‘[h]e who writes the work is set aside; he who has written it is dismissed’.156 For Blanchot, it is 
only in the act of reading that the physical literary ‘book’ (‘a mute collection of sterile words, 
the most insignificant thing in the world’) is transformed into a literary work.157 In this way, our 
readerly encounter with Kafka’s unfinished fiction—even as it is inevitably informed by the 
facts of Kafka’s life—inevitably separates these texts from their author: ‘the work, finally, 
knows him not. It closes in around his absence as the impersonal, anonymous affirmation that it 
is—and nothing more’.158 Perhaps this reading resembles, or at least points us towards, the kind 
of interpretative activity demanded by Wallace’s own incomplete, broken ‘books’: an 
interpretation which, while acknowledging the unavoidable contextual authorial ‘presence’ of 
the actual Wallace—the facts of his life, his struggles in composing TPK, and finally his 
suicide—also remains attuned to inevitable ways in which the act of reading itself serves to 
erase this ‘real’ Wallace, to affirm his absence from this incomplete work. 
 
‘Read These’: Philosophy 
When addressing a text as self-evidently unfinished as TPK, the question of defining the novel’s 
‘core philosophy’ is an inevitably vexed one. As with the range of literary reference points 
catalogued in the previous section, TPK finds Wallace invoking a broad spectrum of 
philosophical sources, one which has been extensively traced by critics: from Dulk’s reading of 
the novel’s debt to Kierkegaard;159 to Bennett’s exploration of the simultaneous, competing 
influences of Schopenhauer and ‘optimist psychologist Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi’;160 to 
Boswell’s discussion of the key significance of the American pragmatic philosopher William 
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James.161 In its references to these various—often conflicting—schools of thought, TPK seems 
to resist definition in terms of a unifying philosophical project: critical attempts to articulate 
TPK’s defining ‘philosophy’—such as Baskin’s assertion that Chris Fogle’s extended narrative 
of ‘conversion or transformation’ should be regarded as the novel’s ‘moral and philosophical 
center’—flatten out the inherent complexities and contradictions of Wallace’s unfinished text.162 
In part, this philosophical complexity is familiar from Wallace’s previous work. Hayes-Brady 
has suggested that, far from adhering to the work of any single philosopher, Wallace rather 
engages in a series of ‘probing, contradictory, and plural’ encounters with numerous 
philosophies, ‘taking what is useful and discarding what is not’—a strategy traceable back to  
Broom’s conflicting array of philosophical ‘systems’.163 Approaching TPK, however, we find 
this ambiguity amplified: faced with this incomplete text, we are left unable to determine where 
the philosophical (or structural) ‘centre’ of the work is or might have been. That critics such as 
Baskin have nevertheless attempted to do so is partly a result of the fact that TPK does—in its 
focus on the potentially transcendent value of ‘paying attention’ in the face of contemporary 
narcissism, nihilism, and boredom—seem to offer us the embryonic outline of a coherent 
philosophical project. Max argues that TPK was, more so than any of Wallace’s earlier work, 
‘supposed to be prescriptive’, to ‘convince the reader that there was a way out’ of the 
contemporary ‘bind’ articulated and explored across his preceding novels and stories.164 While 
we may find traces of this ‘prescriptive’ impulse within TPK, however, this ‘way out’ is—
whether deliberately or otherwise—absent from the published text. Even as it gestures towards 
this central project, our efforts to piece together TPK’s animating philosophy are persistently 
frustrated. 
While the details of Wallace’s intended philosophical project may remain beyond our 
reach, however, I would argue that, even in its unfinished state, TPK nonetheless invites us to 
consider and engage with a philosophy of reading, a reflexive consideration of how we read, 
interpret, and respond to literary texts. Undoubtedly, TPK is a novel consistently concerned with 
the question of how it is read. Turning again to the ‘Author Here’ chapters, we can see how 
these sections, beyond their explicit focus on the ‘authorial’ figure of ‘David Wallace’, place 
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equal emphasis on our own position as readers: by ostensibly framing the work as ‘basically a 
nonfiction memoir’, ‘Wallace’ draws our attention to the complex, precarious nature of the 
‘unspoken contract between a book’s author and its reader’ (pp. 74–5). Aside from its comically 
mercenary, legalistic framing, the fictionalised ‘Wallace’’s discussion of this ‘mutual contract’ 
leads us to reflect on how our own engagement with TPK—or with any literary work—is 
always founded on a dynamic exchange or interaction between reader and author (or, perhaps, 
between reader and text). While ‘Wallace’ fails—in his futile attempts to insist on the novel’s 
‘really true’ nature—to assert total authorial control over our reading, we are nevertheless made 
aware of the fact that our interpretative efforts are at least partially shaped and directed by the 
text in front of us, and thus by the actual Wallace’s (ambiguous) authorial presence. Looking 
beyond these instances of explicit self-consciousness, meanwhile, we find TPK marked by 
points which provoke further interrogation of our own reading practice: as, for example, in 
§25—a chapter consisting almost entirely of descriptions of various IRS examiners turning 
pages (‘“Irrelevant” Chris Fogle turns a page. Howard Cardwell turns a page. Ken Wax turns a 
page. Matt Redgate turns a page [. . .]’ (p. 312)). §25 has been read as offering a concretisation 
of TPK’s ‘aesthetic of boredom’: Clare notes how, in its ‘double-columned reproduction of the 
tedium of IRS workers’ daily tasks’, the section stands as ‘a candidate for one of the “most 
boring” parts of the novel’.165 This enacted monotony is punctuated, however, by a series of 
buried, oblique phrases scattered across the chapter (‘Devils are actually angels. [. . .] Every 
love story is a ghost story’ (p. 314)), sentences which, as Clare suggests, ‘reward the attentive 
reader’, seemingly offering—in their gnomic, vaguely mystical quality—a version of 
‘transcendent’ insight which Wallace imagines on the ‘other side’ of tedium.166 In its textual 
embodiment of this absolute boredom (and its vague gestures towards the ‘rewards’ which lie 
on its ‘other side’), the chapter forces us to take stock of the nature, and limits, of our reading of 
TPK as a whole, provoking a consideration of both the difficulty and the necessity of this kind 
of active engagement with the text. 
TPK’s most suggestive example of this reflexive focus is, however, found in its brief 
opening chapter. Wallace’s novel (or, rather, Pietsch’s arrangement) begins with a pastoral 
evocation of the Illinois countryside: ‘Past the flannel plains and blacktop graphs and skylines 
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of canted rust, and past the tobacco-brown river overhung with weeping trees and coins of 
sunlight through them on the water downriver, to the place beyond the windbreak [. . .]’ (p. 5). 
While this uncharacteristically lyrical description reads in part like another of the novel’s 
intertextual ‘usurpations’,167 the chapter’s ending transcends this aspect of pastiche, concluding 
with a striking, ambiguous image of textual interpretation: 
The pasture’s crows standing at angles, turning up patties to get at the worms 
underneath, the shapes of the worms incised in the overturned dung and baked 
by the sun all day until hardened, there to stay, tiny vacant lines in rows and 
inset curls that do not close because head never quite touches tail. Read these. 
(p. 6) 
In its closing words of instruction, the chapter’s evocation of this ‘very old land’ is transfigured 
into a kind of text, a literary work left for us to ‘read’. Burn has interpreted the chapter as a self-
conscious ‘allegory for the reading process, especially the process of reading a posthumous 
novel’, and we can see how, in its final image of the ‘shapes of the worms incised in the 
overturned dung’, Wallace offers a vision of reading as an encounter with the unfinished: as 
Burn notes, the ‘language’ of these markings comes to mirror the posthumous text of TPK 
itself—these oblique ‘symbols’ are ‘not themselves the sign of a present maker, but are a 
message that only becomes visible once the creature that created them has passed by’.168 
Beyond this, the markings themselves are defined by an inherent incompletion, their ‘inset 
curls’ describing loops which ‘do not close because head never quite touches tail’: these 
unfinished loops offer a striking echo of the partially occluded typographical circle which 
extended over the edge of Jest’s final page, and, with this, of the ‘broken circle’ structure which 
defined the novel as a whole. Approaching TPK’s opening chapter, we are immediately 
presented with an apparent model for a kind of ‘incomplete reading’: a reading which can 
respond both to the specific, posthumous unfinished-ness of this text, and more widely to the 
incompletion found across Wallace’s fiction—indeed, the incompletion inevitably present in 
any literary work. In this opening image of an oblique, ambiguous ‘text’, one which both resists 
and demands readerly interpretation, TPK invites us to consider how literary reading always 
involves an engagement with unfinished-ness—an active, subjective ‘realisation’ which is itself 
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never ‘complete’, never definitive in closing or finishing the ‘broken circles’ of the work. 
This conception of literary interpretation as an active engagement with incompletion 
brings us again back to Iser’s writing on the phenomenology of reading. For Iser, the act of 
reading is figured as a fundamentally ‘dynamic process’—one independent from, and yet 
inescapably shaped by, the printed text: while the ‘written part’ of the literary work ‘imposes 
certain limits’ on our interpretation, it is the ‘unwritten part’—the inevitable ‘gaps’ and 
‘elements of indeterminacy’—which leaves space for the work’s subjective ‘realization’.169 I 
would suggest that TPK—in its stark unfinished-ness—demands from us a particularly self-
conscious manifestation of this ‘active’ reading: a reading which remains aware, both of the 
interpretative constraints presented by the novel’s fragmentary text, and also of the extent of our 
own activity in ‘realising’ this incomplete work, subjectively ‘filling in’ the novel’s manifold 
gaps in the construction of an inevitably precarious, provisional ‘whole’. With this, however, I 
would also argue that, in provoking this markedly active, self-reflexive readerly work, the novel 
simultaneously leads us to consider more broadly the incompletion which characterises any 
encounter with a literary text. Beyond underlining its own unfinished-ness, TPK draws attention 
to an unfinished-ness at the heart of the reading process—to the fact that, in every act of literary 
‘realisation’, both text and interpretation are revealed to be essentially, inescapably incomplete. 
In this suggestion, TPK tests the limits of the somewhat mechanical, formalised 
framework of reader/text interaction theorised by Iser. A more pertinent critical reference point 
might be found if we turn to Felski’s more recent work on the nature of literary reading. In her 
attempts to present an alternative to the inflexibly suspicious position or ‘mood’ of critique—to 
gesture towards the possibility of ‘a wider range of affective styles and modes of argument’—
Felski, like Iser, concerns herself with the phenomenology of reading, the nature of the 
interaction between reader and text.170 In contrast with the rigidly structured ‘gaps’ and 
‘ambiguities’ outlined by Iser, however, Felski’s approach takes into account the innate 
complexity, and the inevitably affective dimension, of this reader/text entanglement, concerning 
itself with what the text ‘sets alight in the reader—what kind of emotions it elicits, what changes 
of perception it prompts, what bonds and attachments it calls into being’.171 I would suggest that 
Felski’s more diffuse, affective conception of literary interpretation captures, more acutely than 
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Iser’s, the kind of ‘incomplete reading’ demanded by, and reflexively explored within, TPK. 
Returning to the opening chapter’s evocative ‘posthumous text’, the ‘rows and inset curls’ left 
in the dung, we can see how reading is posited not merely as the ‘filling in’ of a schematic 
structure of textual ‘spaces’, but rather a more ambiguous encounter with a mysterious, 
suggestive, and finally unknowable ‘document’, with an unfinished-ness which cannot be 
straightforwardly ‘completed’ by the reader. This uneasy interaction seems to reflect our own 
readerly engagement with TPK itself: the unfinished novel’s various gaps, blanks, and silences, 
while inviting a level of interpretative work on the part of the reader, remain ‘unfillable’ and 
unreadable, the text’s ‘breaches’ opening outwards onto our own contextual awareness of the 
work’s troubled compositional history, and of the tragic, inescapable fact of Wallace’s suicide. 
We can see then, how TPK’s opening chapter reflexively invites us into a consideration of the 
felt experience of reading an unfinished work, the strange, unsettling readerly ‘work’ involved 
in approaching and interpreting an incomplete text. With this, perhaps, Wallace’s text also 
directs us towards a particular mode of reading: one capable of recognising, attending to, and 
engaging with this troubling unfinished-ness—a kind of interpretation equipped to confront the 
underlying incompletion, both of Wallace’s final novel, and, to some extent, of any fictional 
text. 
In attempting to more confidently outline a philosophical foundation for this 
‘incomplete reading’, it is worth us turning back, once more, to Wittgenstein. A potential model 
for this ‘unfinished interpretation’ can be found in the Philosophical Investigations—and, 
specifically, in the metaphilosophical ‘frame’ offered by Wittgenstein’s preface to his own 
work. In its ‘grammatical’ investigations, the Wittgenstein of the Investigations seems—as we 
explored in the first chapter—to deny the possibility of any ‘complete’ philosophical account of 
language: we are positioned inside language, with no way to ‘command a clear view’ of the 
totality of its uses, no way to describe or analyse it as a ‘whole’.172 Despite its apparent 
resistance to categorisation in terms of either the ‘complete’ or the ‘incomplete’, however, 
Wittgenstein’s preface nonetheless frames the text’s project as bound up with an aspect of 
incompleteness. Outlining his intentions for the book, Wittgenstein notes how he had originally 
hoped to draw his various philosophical enquiries into a coherent whole: ‘the essential thing 
was that the thoughts should process from one subject to another in a natural order and without 
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breaks’.173 These intentions were, however, ultimately frustrated: 
After several unsuccessful attempts to weld my results together into such a 
whole, I realized that I should never succeed. The best that I could write would 
never be more than philosophical remarks; my thoughts were soon crippled if I 
tried to force them on in any single direction against their natural inclination.174 
Here, the partial, granular structure of the Investigations is positioned as the result of a kind of 
failure, an inability to attain the completion and coherence which Wittgenstein intended for his 
project. Nevertheless, this incompletion is figured in essentially positive terms: Wittgenstein 
goes on to note that the work’s incompleteness ‘was, of course, connected with the very nature 
of the investigation. For this compels us to travel over a wide field of thought criss-cross in 
every direction’.175 Even if the Investigations are incomplete, theirs is an innately constructive 
form of ‘failure’: far from fragmentary, ‘broken’ attempts, these various investigations are 
imagined as ‘a number of sketches of landscapes’ made over the course of Wittgenstein’s ‘long 
and involved journeyings’.176 While not wholly separable from questions of incompleteness and 
failure, then (the preface concludes with Wittgenstein acknowledging that, while he ‘should 
have liked to produce a good book’, this has ‘not come about’), the Investigations offers us an 
example of an incompletion figured in pragmatic terms, an unfinished-ness which seems to hold 
a value of its own.177 
We can see, then, how the ‘incomplete’ structure of the Investigations offers a potential 
example of the kind of ‘unfinished’ interpretation demanded by TPK. From this perspective, the 
stark, self-conscious unfinished-ness of Wallace’s novel is seen to lead the reader to engage in 
the kind of granular, partial work of ‘investigation’ modelled by Wittgenstein’s late philosophy: 
we are invited to view the text not as the broken fragments of an inaccessible whole, but rather 
as an accumulation of ‘sketches’ made ‘over a wide field of thought’, sketches which, while 
never attaining totality or coherence, nonetheless attain a cumulative utility or significance of 
their own. This late-Wittgensteinian approach can be seen to underpin a number of critical 
responses to Wallace’s work: Dulk, for example has argued for the usefulness of reading 
Wallace’s fiction—and literary fiction in general—as ‘a form of grammatical investigation [. . .] 
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as showing and exploring the structures of our language use’.178 Meanwhile, Hayes-Brady’s 
argument for the ‘generative failure’ of Wallace’s writing is founded on a notion of the 
constructive unfinished-ness of philosophical enquiry which has its roots in the 
Investigations.179 In these readings, TPK’s unfinished-ness (and the thematic incompleteness 
found across Wallace’s work) is recuperated as an example of the kind of ongoing philosophical 
project modelled within Wittgenstein’s late philosophy. As one point in the Investigations, 
Wittgenstein famously suggests that there ‘is not a philosophical method, although there are 
indeed methods, like different therapies’: in these late-Wittgensteinian readings, the (notably 
incomplete) diagnostic intent of TPK—the ‘prescriptive’ impulse identified by Max—is 
reframed as an ongoing, necessarily unfinished, engagement in the ‘therapeutic’ work of the 
Investigations’ philosophical enquiries. 
While the pragmatic approach of the Investigations is useful, I would argue that TPK 
also directs us towards another, less straightforwardly constructive form of ‘incomplete 
reading’. Even as it invokes the ‘positive incompletion’ of the Investigations, our reading of 
TPK is concurrently haunted by an awareness of the more unsettling unfinished-ness of the 
Tractatus: the sense of an enquiry which does strive towards an imagined point of completion, 
but which falls short of reaching this ‘ending’, concluding with a self-contradictory gesture 
towards an unknowable silence, an ‘unspeakable’ negative space beyond the edges of text or 
language. This parallel philosophical model is in part established within TPK itself: the novel’s 
persistent evocation of the ‘tangle of contradictory and hopelessly complex facts’ (p. 294, n. 46, 
emphasis added) which define contemporary experience inevitably brings to mind the 
Tractatus’s austere conception of a world which ‘divides into facts’, which consists of ‘the 
totality of facts, not of things’.180 A further, more specific echo of Wittgenstein’s early 
philosophy, meanwhile, is found in §14, as an unnamed IRS examiner relates his intention to 
write a ‘totally real, true-to-life play’—one which, in its direct representation of the tedium or 
IRS work, is ‘unperformable’: 
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The idea’s that a wiggler, a rote examiner, is sitting poring over 1040s and 
attachments and cross-filed W-2s and 1099s and like that. [. . .] He sits there 
longer and longer until the audience gets more and more bored and restless, and 
finally they start leaving, first just a few and then the whole audience, 
whispering to each other how boring and terrible the play is. Then, once the 
audience have all left, the real action of the play can start. (p. 108) 
In its total absence of dramatic action or movement, this ‘play’ seems ostensibly to serve as a 
further reflection of TPK’s depiction (and embodiment) of contemporary boredom. In the 
speaker’s mysterious suggestion that the play’s ‘real action’ only begins when the audience 
have left the theatre, however, the passage establishes a striking intertextual echo of 
Wittgenstein’s early philosophy: specifically, Wittgenstein’s letter to Ludwig von Ficker 
describing the Tractatus as consisting of ‘two parts: the one presented here plus all that I have 
not written’.181 Like the Tractatus, the speaker’s play is split into ‘two parts’: a 
written/performed first part, and an unwritten, ‘unperformable’, and seemingly unspeakable (the 
speaker notably admits that he ‘could never decide on the action, if there was any’ (p. 108)) 
second part. For Wittgenstein, it is ‘precisely this second part that is the important one’, and we 
can see how, in its invocation of the Tractatus’s ‘two-part’ structure, TPK leads us to consider 
the vital significance of the ‘unsaid’ or ‘unwritten’ portions of its own text, the silent, 
unspeakable spaces which both surround and punctuate this unfinished work.182 Reading TPK, 
we can see how our late-Wittgensteinian model of a constructive ‘incomplete’ reading is 
troubled and complicated by these gestures towards the more fundamental, ‘unspeakable’ 
incompletion of the Tractatus. Like the Wallace of Broom, we as readers find ourselves 
positioned precariously between Wittgenstein’s early and late philosophies: however much we 
try to read TPK’s fragments as a series of discrete, productive investigations, we cannot escape 
this simultaneous awareness of the text as the fragmentary remnants of something larger, 
something uncompleted (and, perhaps, uncompletable). Perhaps our own ‘incomplete reading’ 
must situate itself uneasily between these two versions of unfinished-ness: conscious both of the 
readerly possibilities offered by TPK’s open-ended, unfinished text, but also of the novel’s 
status as something broken, impossible, and unreadable—a text which opens out onto the 
horrifying ‘silence’ of Wallace’s suicide. Even as we find the text apparently engaging in a 
series of ‘therapies’, we cannot escape the knowledge that the novel’s attempts at a ‘diagnosis’ 
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for contemporary culture are inevitably unfinished, undeniably broken. Reading TPK, then—
like reading all of Wallace’s fiction—finally requires an active engagement with this 
unfinished-ness, a readerly effort which allows us both to recognise the very real incompletion 
of these works, and also to acknowledge the power of these flaws, breaches, and failures. 
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Conclusion 
I have completed the construction of my burrow and it seems to be successful.1 
Kafka’s remarkable short story ‘The Burrow’ opens with an assertion of an ostensible 
completeness, a seemingly ‘successful’ construction. The story’s unnamed speaker—apparently 
some kind of mole-like creature—begins his narration from the self-proclaimed position of 
having finished the ‘arduous labor’ of excavating the titular burrow: an elaborate subterranean 
structure consisting of ‘manifold passages and rooms’ surrounding a central ‘beautifully vaulted 
chamber’, referred to as the ‘Castle Keep’.2 Even as he details his achievements, however, 
Kafka’s narrator proceeds to qualify and problematise his assessment of the burrow’s ‘success’: 
his boast that its entrance is ‘secured as safely as anything in this world can be secured’, for 
example, is followed by an uneasy acknowledgment that ‘someone could step on the moss or 
break through it, and then my burrow would lie open, and anybody who liked [. . .] could make 
his way in and destroy everything for good’.3 Indeed, as the story progresses, ‘The Burrow’’s 
speaker continues to circle, with increasing obsessiveness, around the inevitable failures of his 
efforts: the flaws, weaknesses, and ‘unavoidable defects’ which compromise the safety and 
quiet of his home, leaving it open to the ‘attack’ of unknown enemies.4 These tortured spirals of 
self-critique come to a head at ‘The Burrow’’s (significantly unfinished) ending, as the speaker 
awaits the impending arrival of a (possibly imagined) ‘great beast [. . .] dangerous beyond all 
one’s powers of conception’—a beast which, significantly, never arrives, the story cutting off 
with the anticlimactic assertion that ‘all remained unchanged’.5 While the speaker may dream 
the ‘dream of a completely perfect burrow’, his ‘castle’ is finally defined, at the story’s close, by 
an irrevocable imperfection. Despite his initial claims to the contrary, the burrow—like Kafka’s 
story itself—reveals itself as a construction which can never be ‘successful’, which is 
necessarily unfinished and unfinishable. 
In many respects, ‘The Burrow’ seems to offer us a striking, self-reflexive vision of the 
incompletion which, throughout this thesis, we have consistently found positioned at the heart 
of the reading process. Kafka’s nameless creature is motivated by a desire for ‘stillness’, for a 
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total silence: his creative endeavour is one of burrowing down and hollowing out, establishing a 
construction out of negative, empty space, ‘wrested from the refractory soil with tooth and 
claw’.6 In this way, the burrow’s arrangement of absent spaces can be seen to figure the 
untenanted blankness at the heart of the literary text: the ‘negativity’ which Iser positions as the 
necessary ‘unformulated background’ of any work of fiction, 7 or perhaps the ‘essential solitude’ 
which Blanchot suggests defines the ‘space’ of literature.8 The creature’s burrow is, like 
Kafka’s unfinished story, built on a fundamental ‘hollowness’, a space which can only ever be 
‘filled in’ through the active work of readerly interpretation. With this, however, Kafka’s story 
also undoubtedly presents us with a uniquely self-conscious manifestation of this 
incompleteness: an unfinished-ness which exceeds, and thus complicates our responses to, the 
typical and innate ‘silences’ of the literary work. In the speaker’s obsessive examination of his 
own frustrated project—and, indeed, in the actual structural unfinished-ness of the text itself—
we find ‘The Burrow’ establishing and interrogating a unique, particular form of aesthetic 
incompletion. Indeed, from its opening line onwards ‘The Burrow’ positions incompletion as an 
engine of literary possibility: like the speaker’s ‘castle’, Kafka’s story confronts us with a 
narrative built out of a continual self-conscious encounter with its own limitations, flaws, and 
failures. 
Reading ‘The Burrow’, we find a crystallisation of a tension which has been felt 
throughout our exploration of Wallace’s fiction. In tracing the various forms of incompletion 
which mark and define Wallace’s oeuvre, we have found his writing repeatedly evoking an 
incompleteness inherent to the reading process. Wallace’s work, I have suggested, is 
consistently concerned with investigating how we read, and the ways in which our reading 
always involves a necessary, active encounter with an aspect of textual unfinished-ness. While 
we acknowledge this general focus, however, it is impossible to ignore the extent to which 
Wallace, like Kafka, simultaneously evokes and explores a particular kind of incompleteness. In 
its innumerable instances of breakage, rupture, silence, and blankness, Wallace’s writing is at 
every turn marked by a singularly stark and self-conscious incompletion, one which, like the 
creature in ‘The Burrow’, is committed to a relentless interrogation of its own flaws, errors and 
failures. In  this aesthetic incompletion—an aesthetic which, at least to a certain extent, situates 
                                                            
6 Kafka, ‘The Burrow’, pp. 327, 340. 
7 Iser, The Act of Reading, p. 226. 
8 Blanchot, p. 22. 
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Wallace’s writing as part of a tradition stretching back to Kafka and Beckett—Wallace’s writing 
undoubtedly demands from us a distinct mode of active reading, an interpretative ‘work’ which 
negotiates and responds to the specific textual broken-ness—both deliberate and inevitable—
found everywhere across his own novels and stories. 
Even in its self-conscious aesthetic incompletion, however, Wallace’s writing is never 
merely concerned with exploring its own textual failures, or indeed with affirming the value of a 
circumscribed class of comparably ‘difficult’, ‘writerly’ incomplete fictions. Rather, by 
consistently shifting our focus back on to our own reading practice, Wallace’s manifestly 
‘broken’ works invite (or perhaps demand) us to reflect upon and rethink our wider 
interpretative responses to literary texts. The published Pale King begins with this epigraph 
from Frank Bidart’s poem ‘Borges and I’: 
     We fill pre-existing forms and when we 
fill them we change them and are changed.9 
Beyond its IRS-appropriate pun on the filling of ‘forms’, TPK’s quotation of Bidart offers a 
suggestive image of the kind of literary engagement provoked and interrogated by Wallace’s 
work: a mode of interpretation which takes into account our capacity as readers to ‘change’ the 
texts we encounter, and, with this, the ways we are in turn inevitably ‘changed’ by them as well. 
Here, once again, we find Wallace’s work chiming with broader contemporary discussions 
around the place and nature of literary reading, such as Felski’s discussion of the extent to 
which the reader is always ‘intertwined and entangled with texts’,10 or Macé’s consideration of 
the reading process as ‘a moment of individuation’: 
In reading, and the way we deal with a book, we shape ourselves in the simplest 
possible sense: we move aside, in order to occupy a new sphere and be 
enveloped by it, to test out our own contours and our particular forms of 
separation. We invite ourselves into an exterior image; by engaging in an 
exchange with this new environment, we try out postures, feign gestures, and 
are as likely to lose ourselves in the intense environment of the book as to make 
an effort to remain detached from it.11  
For Macé, the process of reading is characterised by an essentially affective, dynamic, and often 
disorienting interaction between text and reader. In Wallace’s variously incomplete or failed 
fictions, we are repeatedly led to negotiate and think through this process of ‘entanglement’, to 
consider and reconsider both the hollow, unfinished ‘form’ of the work in front of us and the 
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10 Felski, The Limits of Critique, p. 84. 
11 Macé’, pp. 224–5. 
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correspondingly incomplete nature of our own reading. 
While they stand as indisputable examples of ‘INTERPRET-ME’ fiction, then, I would 
suggest that the power of Wallace’s novels and stories is felt most keenly in the extent to which 
they direct our interpretations outwards, inviting us to address, and to think beyond, the 
limitations of his own body of work—limitations including the very real shortcomings which 
we addressed in the introduction to this thesis. If Wallace’s fiction invites a kind of ‘incomplete 
reading’, it is necessarily a reading with the capacity to confront these inarguable failures and 
limitations, to recognise the manifest problems of Wallace’s work, and, in this, to identify that 
which is still singular and vital about his writing. In this way, we are able to avoid treating 
Wallace as a monolithic, unimpeachable ‘voice of a generation’, and instead approach him as a 
writer always in dialogue with a range of other contemporary authors and fictions—a group 
exceeding (somewhat limited) field of ‘post-postmodern’ authors routinely cited as his literary 
successors.  
We can trace clear lines of connection, for example, between the broken maximalism of 
Wallace’s fictions and the incomplete encyclopaedism of Roberto Bolaño’s monumental novel 
2666—a text which, like TPK, was published in an unfinished state after the author’s death. In a 
much-quoted passage from 2666, Bolaño describes the reading habits of a ‘young pharmacist’ 
who ‘inarguably preferred minor works to major ones’, notably choosing to read ‘The 
Metamorphosis over The Trial’, ‘Bartleby  over Moby-Dick’,  ‘A Simple Heart over Bouvard 
and Pécuchet’, and ‘A Christmas Carol over A Tale of Two Cities or The Pickwick Papers’.12 
On learning this, the section’s protagonist—the Chilean philosophy professor Óscar 
Amalfitano—laments the ‘sad paradox’ that 
Now even bookish pharmacists are afraid to take on the great, imperfect, 
torrential works, books that blaze paths into the unknown. They choose the 
perfect exercises of the great masters. Or what amounts to the same thing: they 
want to watch the great masters spar, but they have no interest in real combat, 
when the great masters struggle against that something, that something that 
terrifies us all, that something that cows us and spurs us on, amid blood and 
mortal wounds and stench.13 
Bolaño identifies, and implicitly signals his own participation in, an extended tradition of 
‘torrential', encyclopaedic texts—texts which are powerful precisely in the extent to which they 
are ‘imperfect’ and incomplete, blazing (or even burrowing) ‘paths into the unknown’, 
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13 Bolaño, p. 227. 
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approaching an unsayable ‘something that terrifies us all’. In this, 2666 establishes a model of 
aesthetic incompletion which seems at least partially comparable to the defining unfinished-ness 
of Wallace’s work. Ward argues that Bolaño’s massive novel offers ‘an encyclopaedism that 
makes itself aware of its own weaknesses’, and, crucially, outlines a correspondingly 
incomplete mode of ‘active reading’, one with the ‘ability to reveal those blindnesses on which 
ideas of the world depend’.14 With this, however, Bolaño also presents an expansion on the 
undeniably US-centric, predominantly white world of Wallace’s fictional encyclopaedias: in its 
self-consciously global focus (Ward notes that the novel demonstrates an ‘implicit disregard for 
or disinterest in the rigidity of national boundaries’), Bolaño puts forward a vision of an 
encyclopaedic ‘circle’ which, even in its necessary broken-ness, nonetheless offers a totality 
which troubles and exceeds the limited margins of Wallace’s work, insisting, as Ward has 
asserted, on ‘the radical potential of fiction to reconceive our sense of the world’.15 Indeed, in 
2666 we find this encyclopaedic incompletion specifically positioned as a necessary response to 
the particular violence of the contemporary world—the ‘blood and wounds and mortal stench’ 
strikingly crystallised in 2666’s fourth section ‘The Part about the Crimes’, which offers a 
fictionalised account of the real-life ongoing epidemic of unsolved murders of women in Ciudad 
Juárez. Reading Bolaño’s novel, we are faced with an argument—laid out in terms more 
forceful than anywhere in Wallace’s fiction—for the radical potential of ‘incomplete reading’ as 
a means of reconfiguring not only the way we read literature, but more broadly the way we 
interpret the particular, horrifying ‘blindnesses’ which characterise 21st century experience. 
 Looking elsewhere, meanwhile, we find a very different iteration of ‘incomplete 
reading’ invoked by Ali Smith in her extraordinary 2014 novel How to be Both.16 Although not 
framed in the self-evidently encyclopaedic, ‘torrential’ terms of 2666 or Infinite Jest, How to be 
Both nonetheless offers an arresting echo of Wallace’s fiction in its self-conscious concern with 
an unfinished-ness at the heart of the reading process—an unfinished-ness made explicitly 
manifest in the novel’s unconventional form. Smith’s novel is divided into two parts: one set in 
15th century Ferrara, following the painter Francesco del Cossa, and another in contemporary 
Cambridge, following a sixteen-year-old girl named George. Crucially, these two sections—
which overlap and interact with each other in curious and suggestive ways—are structured so 
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that they can be read in either order: the novel was published in two editions, with Francesco’s 
and George’s stories respectively positioned first within the alternate texts. In its reversible 
structure, How to be Both provokes a reading built on inevitable interpretative and aesthetic 
limits: in an interview following the novel’s publication, Smith noted that she was interested in 
‘exploring fiction’s problem of representing synchronicity; the fact that whereas in life all sorts 
of things can happen at the same moment, on the page one event must precede the other’.17 
While Smith’s novel does not present us with the manifest ‘broken-ness’—the visible breaks 
and incompletions—which mark Wallace’s novels and stories, it is nevertheless comparably 
concerned with the ‘problems’, the innate constraints, of the fictional text—and, with this, the 
corresponding constraints of our own reading. Later in the same interview, she commented that 
‘whatever way you read this book, you're stuck with it. There are two ways to read this novel, 
but you'll end up reading one of them’.18 Reading How to be Both, we are made inescapably 
aware of the extent to which we are ‘stuck’ with an interpretation which is always, in a sense, 
incomplete. In a review of the novel, Laura Miller offers a representative readerly response in 
her conclusion that, while 
the two halves of How to Be Both may be read in either order with satisfying 
results, once read, it's impossible to know what it would be like to first 
encounter it in the alternate order. Is George's portion of the novel, as it seems 
to me, the more profound one, or do I feel this only because as I reached the 
resolution of her story, the cumulative power of the whole book had taken 
effect? What is read cannot be unread, because [. . .] How to Be Both is 
unforgettable. I can never know what it would be like to meet George before 
knowing Del Cossa, so that version of the novel is forever lost to me. It's a bit 
sad. But it was worth it.19 
Like Wallace, Smith uses her fiction to provoke a reflexive consideration of the innate 
unfinished-ness of our own engagement with the text: the fact that our reading of How to be 
Both is unavoidably partial, unavoidably incomplete. With this, she also leads us to reflexively 
consider the fundamentally affective dimensions of this incomplete readerly entanglement, the 
aspect of inevitable ‘sadness’ involved in feeling that the text ‘cannot be unread’, cannot be 
‘completed’. Where Wallace’s unfinished works seem to burrow, like Kafka’s creature, towards 
                                                            
17 Smith, ‘Interview with Alex Clark’, Guardian, 6 September 2014, section Books, para. 4 
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September 2019]. 
18 Smith, ‘Interview with Clark’, para. 17. 
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a self-negating ‘hollowness’, however, Smith’s novel can instead be seen to gesture towards a 
more wholly productive set of aesthetic possibilities within this interpretative incompletion: its 
incompleteness is, in Miller’s terms, ‘worth it’. In her interview with Clark, Smith asserts that 
How to be Both’s structure is supposed to be ‘about fresco form’: 
You have the very first version of the fresco underneath the skin, as it were, of 
the real fresco. There's a fresco on the wall: there it is, you and I look at it, we 
see it right in front of us; underneath that there's another version of the story 
and it may or may not be connected to the surface. And they're both in front of 
our eyes, but you can only see one, or you see one first. So it's about the 
understory.20 
Smith’s novel finally moves away from Wallace’s fiction in offering an affirmation of a 
(crucially unreachable) ‘bothness’—tracing, in its incompletion, the outline of an ‘understory’, 
an aesthetic potential which is only ever partially accessible, teasingly present ‘beneath the 
surface’ of the fictional text.21 
In these brief examples, we gain a sense of the ways in which Wallace’s unfinished 
oeuvre offers us a productive interpretative frame, not only for approaching his own fictions, 
but also for engaging with a range of other contemporary authors who likewise use their work to 
evoke and confront a contemporary world shaped by unavoidable uncertainty, by proliferating 
instances of the unknowable, unreadable, or unspeakable. In his extended analysis of the 
Tractatus, Morris suggests that Wittgenstein’s early philosophical work is, at its self-negating 
conclusion, finally concerned with establishing ‘a certain kind of outlook’ in its readers: a 
means of surmounting its self-consciously ‘failed’ or ‘nonsensical’ propositions and seeing the 
world ‘as the mystic views it’—as a ‘limited whole’.22  It is perhaps something akin to this 
‘certain outlook’, then, which we can take from Wallace’s own undeniably flawed, incomplete 
texts: a means of looking beyond his own work, of negotiating an incompletion present in a 
range of contemporary (and, indeed, historical) literary texts, and, with this, of making sense of 
the ways in which our own reading is fundamentally, necessarily, and perhaps even 
productively 
                                                            
20 Smith, ‘Interview with Clark’, para. 5. 
21 In this, Smith’s novel inevitably recalls, and arguably offers a reconfiguration of, the more troubling 
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